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Ich kenne mich zwar nicht selbst genug, um zu wissen, ob ich 
eine wahre Tragödie schreiben könnte; ich erschrecke aber bloß 
vor dem Unternehmen und bin beinahe überzeugt, daß ich mich 
durch den bloßen Versuch zerstören könnte.
I do not know myself well enough to know if I could write a true 
tragedy; however, I am terrified of the very undertaking and am 
nearly convinced that I could destroy myself in the mere attempt.
(Goethe to Schiller, 9 December 1797).1
g oetHe knew. Perhaps it is not surprising to discover that he knew, but in the shadows cast over the generations that followed him, his 
words possess an especially marked poignancy. While Goethe does arrive 
at his own version of classical tragedy in Iphigenie auf Tauris, he ultimately 
criticizes that attempt as too “damned humane” (verteufelt human); mean-
while, there is little doubt that the peril he describes in confronting the 
tragic continued to haunt those who bore his legacy: Hölderlin, Kleist, 
Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud.2 To produce “true tragedy” in a modern age implies 
nothing less than the pursuit of a phantom. Anyone who attempts it must 
reconstruct a world out of elements that are not only of another language 
but also of another time, another place, an entirely other system of thought. 
It demands, in other words, a constant engagement with a past that in 
 1. Der Briefwechsel zwischen Schiller und Goethe, Erster Band: Briefe der Jahre 1794–1797, ed. S. 
Seigel (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1984), 451f. Translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.
 2. Speaking of the development of German drama after Goethe and Schiller, George Steiner 
describes Kleist and Hölderlin, as well as Georg Büchner and J. M. R. Lenz, as a “family of hectic ge-







many ways has come to define us, but nevertheless remains just beyond 
our reach; and whoever does not heed this imperative risks losing contact 
altogether with his distant source. The project of modern tragedy departs 
from a nucleus that is at once magnetic and inaccessible.
 Nonetheless, this inaccessibility has hardly proven a barrier to tragedy’s 
longevity as a model and point of departure in the post-Enlightenment age. 
Greek tragedy treats themes that remain universally familiar and provocative 
for modern readers, and nowhere is this more true than in the intellectual 
history of modern Germany. Since the birth of what Peter Szondi has called 
the “philosophy of the tragic”3 in the late eighteenth century, tragedy has 
served as a paradigm in aesthetic and intellectual efforts to define, illuminate, 
and stabilize modern subjective experience. Essential to the development of 
both Weimar classicism and German idealism, tragedy’s presentation of a 
society and a central figure in crisis has inspired confrontations with funda-
mental questions of social justice, ethical action, and individual responsibil-
ity. Why have so many poets and thinkers chosen to return again and again 
to a small set of dramatic texts written for a specific occasion, the Athenian 
Dionysia festivals, over two thousand years ago?4 And perhaps even more 
importantly, what does it mean to appropriate the themes and structures of 
ancient tragedy in the service of defining modernity? What is lost in such a 
transmission from ancient text to modern context? What is gained?
 This study will place such questions into sharper relief by focusing on a 
progression of thought inspired by the often controversial practice of trans-
lating the Greeks. In 1804 Friedrich Hölderlin published translations of 
Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus and Antigone that were widely ridiculed by his 
contemporaries as incomprehensible products of a disturbed mind.5 “Is the 
man insane, or is he only pretending to be,” wrote Heinrich Voss, the son 
of the great translator of the Odyssey, “and is his Sophocles secretly a satire 
 3. “Since Aristotle there has been a poetics of tragedy, but only since Schelling a philosophy 
of the tragic” (Seit Aristoteles gibt es eine Poetik der Tragödie, seit Schelling erst eine Philosophie des Tra-
gischen). Peter Szondi, Versuch über das Tragische (Frankfurt: Insel, 1961), 7.
 4. Classical scholars admit that our knowledge of what went on at those festivals is limited by 
our considerable historical distance from the events and the small proportion of remaining artifacts 
at our disposal; as Christian Meier asserts, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides each likely composed 
about one hundred plays, of which only about a dozen now remain, and they were not the only tra-
gedians to participate in the festival’s competitions (The Political Art of Greek Tragedy, trans. Andrew 
Webber [Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993], 54). For a concise explanation of the festival setting, see also 
John J. Winkler and Froma Zeitlin’s introduction to Nothing to do with Dionysos? Athenian Drama in 
its Social Context (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 4–5.
 5. In the Frankfurt edition of Hölderlin’s works, D. E. Sattler includes extensive notes on the 
reception of these translations in the nineteenth century. Friedrich Schelling, for example, claimed in 
a letter to Hegel that the translations “express fully his ruined mental condition” (Seinen verkommenen 
geistigen Zustand drückt die Übersetzung des Sophocles ganz aus). In FA 16: 20.
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of bad translators? . . . You should have seen how Schiller laughed” (FA 16: 
20). In an age of celebrated and masterful translations, from Voss’s Homer to 
Humboldt’s Aeschylus and Schlegel’s Shakespeare—an age in which transla-
tion, in fact, was regarded as a tactical necessity in the development of Ger-
man cultural identity6—Hölderlin’s Sophocles project could perhaps only 
have appeared hermetic, tortured, mad. Although philosophers of language 
such as Herder and Schleiermacher soon argued for a translation practice in 
which the receiving language gains from being “bent toward an alien like-
ness,” the most celebrated translations of the time were still clearly character-
ized by their accessibility and stylistic beauty.7 The best sort of translation, 
as Wilhelm von Humboldt stipulated in his introduction to his transla-
tion of Agamemnon, benefits from the encounter with the source language 
while avoiding the loss of identifiable cultural markers: the translator must 
approach “the foreign” (das Fremde) without crossing over into “foreignness” 
(Fremdheit) (Schulte 58). No wonder, then, that Hölderlin’s Sophocles, with 
its jarring hybrid syntax and often disorienting word choice, seemed to have 
fallen to earth from a distant star.
 While Hölderlin’s engagement with Greek tragedy may have begun as a 
somewhat bizarre digression within the culture of translation around 1800, 
however, it has maintained a relevance far beyond the reach of its more 
conventionally readable cohort. In a general sense, as poet Hölderlin has 
gained nearly all of his renown since the start of the twentieth century, but 
it is his Sophocles that has captured a particularly large share of scholarly 
and creative interest.8 Both between and since the two world wars, no other 
 6. See, for example, the now-classic discussions by George Steiner (After Babel: Aspects of Lan-
guage and Translation [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998], 257f.) and Antoine Berman (The 
Experience of the Foreign: Culture and Translation in Romantic Germany, trans. S. Heyvaert (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1992). For a thorough treatment of the mania for translation, see Weltliteratur: Die 
Lust am Übersetzen im Jahrhundert Goethes. Eine Ausstellung des Deutschen Literaturarchivs im Schiller-
Nationalmuseum Marbach am Neckar, ed. Reinhard Tgahrt (Marbach: Deutsche Schiller-Gesellschaft, 
1982).
 7. Friedrich Schleiermacher, “On the Different Methods of Translating,” trans. Waltraud 
Bartscht, reprinted in Theories of Translation: An Anthology of Essays from Dryden to Derrida, ed. Rainer 
Schulte and John Biguenet (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 47. This tension between 
translation theory and practice around 1800 might perhaps inhere precisely in the cultural agenda 
that sought to define German national identity in relation to an abstract and mutable concept of the 
“foreign.” As Lawrence Venuti has argued, Schleiermacher’s advocacy of the “foreignizing” transla-
tion was perhaps based on an agenda of bourgeois nationalism: “Since the category ‘foreign’ here is 
determined by the educated, Schleiermacher is using translation to mark out a dominant space for a 
bourgeois minority.” The Translator’s Invisibilty: A History of Translation (Routledge, 1995), 103.
 8. M. B. Benn already noted this retroactive interest in 1967; see “Hölderlin and the Greek 
Tradition,” Arion 6:4 (Winter 1967): 495. In the subsequent 40 years the degree of creative and intel-
lectual fascination has more likely intensified than subsided.
introduCtion4
rendition of Sophocles’ Antigone has had a more profound impact on the 
German stage, and perhaps only Hegel’s reading of the same tragedy has 
proven a more influential intellectual confrontation with the modern experi-
ence of the tragic. Cited and adapted by prominent artists and intellectuals 
such as Walter Benjamin, Martin Heidegger, Bertolt Brecht, Heiner Müller, 
Martin Walser, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Hölderlin’s translations and 
accompanying remarks have become something of a specimen piece in the 
attempt to actualize ancient tragedy.
 Discussions of how tragedy continues to raise ethical questions of rel-
evance to modernity have become almost commonplace in literary and cul-
tural criticism, as notable thinkers from Jacques Lacan and Luce Irigaray to 
Judith Butler and Carol Jacobs have offered valuable insight into the genre’s 
continuing relevance. Most of these discussions focus on thematic issues, 
taking up in particular the conflict between state decree and individual will 
in Sophocles’ Antigone. At least since Hegel placed tragic art at the center of 
the ethical universe in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1808), the figure of Anti-
gone has maintained an exemplary status within a modern ethical debate 
encompassing the tensions between civic and religious laws, public and pri-
vate spheres, the state and the individual, man and woman. Meanwhile, the 
more contemporary recasting of the ethical sphere sheds new light on the 
fundamental questions that arise when we are confronted with the tangle of 
relationships and motivations at the heart of this tragedy—questions that 
address the claims of justice and the legitimacy of crime; the nature of love 
and the effects of hatred; the status of siblings, of lovers, of family duties; 
the articulations of community, of responsibility, of resistance, of violence.
 By placing emphasis on the problems inherent in translation, however, 
my study approaches the question of ethics from another angle. Contem-
porary discussions of translation address ethics extensively, in the wake of 
postcolonial and postmodern critiques of the power structures inherent in 
the relation between a source text (and culture) and its rendering in another 
form and context. In examining the ever-changing status of Greek tragedy 
in German translation, however, my focus turns not toward the interchange 
between radically different yet contemporary cultural discourses, but rather 
toward the historical implications of translation as palimpsest, over what 
Samuel Weber has called “instances” of translation.9 Insofar as translation 
 9. “ . . . translation always involves not merely the movement from one language to another, 
but from one instance—a text already existing in another language—to another instance, that does 
not previously exist, but that is brought into being in the other language.” Translation thus designates 
“both a general process, involving a change of place, and a singular result of that process.” Samuel We-
ber, “A Touch of Translation: On Walter Benjamin’s ‘Task of the Translator,’” in S. Bermann and M. 
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is always an act of close reading, requiring its practitioner to maintain an 
interpretive position with respect to her source text, it also forces a con-
frontation with the unfamiliar, the inconceivable, the untranslatable—those 
elements that, in the case of Greek tragedy, lie amid the ruins of the distant 
past. At the same time, this practice of reading—defined by distance from 
its interlocutor and hence a certain hermeneutic urgency—is fluid and pro-
foundly mutable, marked irrevocably by the particular cultural, linguistic 
and historical context (the “instance”) in which it occurs. In appropriating 
the themes of tragedy in the service of constructing the modern subject, 
some readers have failed to account for this stubborn distance and allowed 
their work to glide seamlessly over the problems it poses, rendering them 
invisible to the reader; tragedy essentially becomes the property of modern 
Western intellectual discourse, often functioning—as in Hölderlin’s time—
in the service of “nation-building.”10 The works of translation and adapta-
tion I discuss in the following pages, however, attempt to confront those 
problems of undecidability head-on: the persistent unfulfillment that the 
transfer between linguistic and semiotic systems underscores; the experience 
of the radical limits of one’s own language and the vulnerability that those 
limits reveal for a subject constituted by his relation to language; the dif-
ficult tension between the task of making the past understandable and the 
responsibility to preserve its radical singularity.
 Hölderlin’s attempt to translate the Greeks in a new way offers a fascinat-
ing case study for any reader interested in the history of efforts to make sense 
of modernity through the confrontation with an ancient past that is both 
foundational and inscrutable. Rather than adapting the themes and lan-
guage of tragedy unproblematically to modern modes of thought, Hölder-
lin’s project affirms their difference in the very obscurity of his translation. 
His Sophocles reflects a profound commitment to exposing the relation 
between the structure of Greek tragedy—with its stark separation of chorus 
from characters, the isolation of the tragic hero, and the unsettling effects 
of poetic language—and the problem of translation as a mode of transfer 
from ancient to modern registers. Foreignizing word choices, through which 
Hölderlin aims to reconstruct the distinctiveness of the ancient source text, 
continually let translation speak its name, intensifying the precarious expe-
Wood, Nation, Language, and the Ethics of Translation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 
66.
 10. See the brief but pointed discussion of the tradition of German Romanticism for transla-
tion theory and practice in Buden and Nowotny, “Translation Studies Forum: Cultural Translation,” 
Translation Studies 2.2 (2009): 199–200.
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rience of tragedy’s effects by lingering at the fraying margins of language.11 
This affirmation of disjunction as a mode of representation, both on the 
tragic stage and in the process of transmission, redefines the ethical impulse 
of tragedy not in the founding of the self in a modern sense but in the 
responsibility to a differentiating movement to which the self is continu-
ally subject. By tracing the striking influence of these translations within a 
discourse on tragedy, ethics, and subjectivity extending to Benjamin, Hei-
degger, Brecht, Müller, Walser, and Lacoue-Labarthe, I aim to unravel the 
complex dynamics through which the perception of ethical responsibility, 
having long taken its cues from the themes of classical tragedy, might find 
resonance with a particular relationship implicit in the theory and practice 
of translation.
i. Tragedy
While the transmission of ancient text into modern forms models an inter-
subjective exchange that is fundamentally ethical, discussions of ethics and 
violence in the context of Greek tragedy have generally taken place on a 
thematic level. Although in the following chapters I will be more concerned 
with the translation and adaptation of tragic form and language into the 
context of modernity, a brief summary of these thematic discussions will 
nevertheless help to illuminate the fundamental questions at stake in that 
process of transmission.
 By staging a historical moment of transition from the age of myth to that 
of the Athenian polis, as Jean-Pierre Vernant has discussed, tragic drama has 
always presented a forum through which to confront political and ethical 
conflict against the backdrop of violence.12 With the phenomenon of tragedy 
coinciding with the formative years of the polis, Vernant and others claim 
that the plays typically portray a clash of the new burdens of citizenship 
with the traditional mythic world that precedes them. While the Chorus 
corresponds more closely to the contemporary point of view of the civic 
community, the hero represents a figure “more or less alien to the ordinary 
condition of a citizen” (Vernant 1988, 24). Within this framework the hero’s 
 11. In After Babel, Steiner eloquently expresses the disorienting effects of Hölderlin’s translation 
style: Hölderlin “compels us to experience, as in fact only a great poet can, the limits of linguistic 
expression and the barriers between languages which impede human understanding” (323).
 12. See Jean-Pierre Vernant, “The Historical Moment of Tragedy in Ancient Greece: Some of the 
Social and Psychological Conditions” and “Tensions and Ambiguities in Greek Tragedy,” in Myth and 
Tragedy in Ancient Greece, ed. Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: Zone 
Books, 1988).
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virtues and exploits are no longer glorified by an admiring public, as was the 
case with epic; rather, “the hero has ceased to be a model. He is, both for 
himself and for others, a problem” (25). Insofar as it presents the conflicts 
and discrepancies contained within a moment of historical transition, then, 
tragedy does not merely reflect the social reality of its time but calls it into 
question: “ . . . tragedy is born when myth starts to be considered from the 
point of view of a citizen” (33).13 That point of view is rent by a fundamental 
distance, a gap which has developed at the heart of social experience between 
a mythic past and a political present—a gap “wide enough for the opposi-
tions . . . to stand out quite clearly . . . [yet] narrow enough for the conflict 
in values to be a painful one and for the clash to continue to take place” 
(27).14
 Nor is this gap, reconstituted on the tragic stage, destined to find resolu-
tion there. As Charles Segal notes, the “systems of linked polarity” that deter-
mine the tragic universe—conflicts between “mortal and divine, male and 
female, man and beast, city and wild” (Segal 1986, 57)—operate as a critical 
instrument that reveals “not the orderly process of transition from one stage 
of life to another, but the inbetweenness, the marginality, the ambiguity in 
the juxtaposition of the two sides . . . ” (60). By thinking through this lack 
of a solution, through the detached discovery on manifold levels “that words, 
values, men themselves are ambiguous, that the universe is one of conflict,” 
the spectator “acquires a tragic consciousness” (Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 
43). From its very start, then, the viewing of tragedy is linked to a critical 
perspective that extends beyond the identificatory dynamics that have since 
become associated with Aristotle’s notion of catharsis.
 Such polarities extend deeply into the heart of tragedy, such that the dra-
matic scene does not merely reflect its social context in all of its ambiguity 
but also presents marginalized outliers, “others” that do not fit neatly into 
that context but are able to use their difference as a source of power. For 
example, by elevating female figures to the atypical status of autonomous 
 13. On this point see also Charles Segal’s comments in “Greek Tragedy and Society: A Structural-
ist Perspective”: “As part of a public festival, a ritual in honor of the god Dionysus, tragedy validates 
the social order. . . . At the same time the violence of its action, its radical questioning of justice, both 
human and divine, its searching explorations of the failure or the betrayal of public and private moral-
ity take us outside of that order.” In Greek Tragedy and Political Theory, ed. J. P. Euben (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), 47.
 14. In an important article, Froma Zeitlin asserts that Thebes, setting of many tragic plays, takes 
shape as the essential scene of such conflict; it functions in the context of tragedy as the “Anti-Athens” 
(116), allowing problems to be displaced onto a city imagined as the “negative model to Athens’s 
manifest image of itself ” (102). Insofar as Thebes comes to contain the tragic space, it becomes pos-
sible to conceive of Athens by contrast as a space where reconciliation and transformation are possible. 
“Thebes: Theater of Self and Society in Athenian Drama,” in Euben 101–41.
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decision-makers, as Helene Foley argues, tragedians were able to present the 
possibility of other modes of ethical reasoning that involved “the unknow-
able and the uncontrollable both within and outside the self.”15 Indeed, 
Dionysus himself was frequently identified with a femininity that, as Froma 
Zeitlin has shown, lends power to both him and the theatrical spectacle 
created in his name.16
 With its focus on historical moments of painful flux, then, tragedy was 
designed to leave its spectators both attuned to contradiction and yearning 
for its resolution. And in its appetite for the paradoxical pleasures of tragic 
pathos, modern Western culture has readily identified with both the oppo-
sitional structure and the will to dialectical resolution that this transitional 
dynamic inspires. Indeed, interpreters of tragedy in the post-Enlightenment 
era commonly relate their return to the Greeks to the perception of a crisis 
not unlike that which brought tragic art to light in the first place; the pres-
ent day is perceived as a time in need of radical transformation, as Dennis 
Schmidt states in his book on tragedy and German philosophy, a time in 
which “those who argue most powerfully for a revitalization of the question 
of tragedy are united by the assumption that the present era is a time of cri-
sis, of exhaustion, of historical limits reached.”17 Much of that crisis thinking 
is reflective of the sense that contradiction, the essence of tragedy, lies at the 
heart of experience and must be confronted. In her study of ethics and luck 
in ancient tragedy, Martha Nussbaum asserts that modern interpreters of 
tragedy often view its conflict as a kind of adversity that one should be able 
to avoid through the application of practical reason, by structuring life and 
commitments to avoid serious conflict (Nussbaum 51). This is an intellec-
tual movement somewhat separate from the debates surrounding Aristotle’s 
conception of tragic effect, the awakening of fear and pity in the spectator, 
that Lessing initiated in the eighteenth century and Schiller transformed 
into a means of moral education. The German Idealists were also concerned 
with the problem of how tragic experience can bring resolution despite its 
 15. Helene Foley, Female Acts in Greek Tragedy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 15. 
On this point, see in particular her comprehensive reading of Antigone, 172–200. See also Martha 
Nussbaum’s comments on moral luck and ethical ambiguity in The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and 
Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, rev. ed. (Cambridge, 1986), also in particular with respect to 
Antigone, which she introduces as “a play about teaching and learning, about changing one’s vision of 
the world, about losing one’s grip on what looked like secure truth and learning a more elusive kind 
of wisdom” (52).
 16. “Playing the Other: Theater, Theatricality, and the Feminine in Greek Drama,” in Winkler 
and Zeitlin 66.
 17. Dennis Schmidt, On Germans and Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2001), 5. Schmidt’s excellent and comprehensive book also contains new 
translations of many key texts on tragedy, to which I will refer in the following chapters.
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unbearable contradiction, but their field of inquiry was that of dialectics: 
for Schelling (and in a different sense for Hegel), the affirmative moment of 
tragedy comes with the reinscription of the possibility of human freedom, 
despite the downfall of the individual subject. Although Hegel submits that 
both Antigone and Creon suffer the consequences of their actions in the 
name of divine or human laws—for within Hegel’s tragic universe both 
are unquestionably guilty—the restoration of equilibrium brought about 
by “justice” (Gerechtigkeit) ensures that universal Spirit shall continue its 
forward trajectory. For Nussbaum, then, Hegel regards tragedy as represen-
tative of a “primitive or benighted stage of ethical life and thought,” which 
suggests that his incorporation of the tragic into his dialectical system is at 
its heart no less a model for Bildung than the poetic efforts of Lessing and 
Schiller (Nussbaum 51).
 For many others who follow in Hegel’s wake, however, Greek tragedy 
offers an ethical legitimacy outside the conventions of modern concepts of 
law and crime, innocence and guilt. While Nussbaum maintains that the 
Greek tragic universe is uniquely complex insofar as it presents the incom-
mensurability of conflicting value systems (such as those of Antigone and 
Creon) as a permanent condition, untouchable by reconciliation,18 others 
such as George Steiner and Susan Sontag echo this idea to argue that “true” 
tragedy in Goethe’s sense is unsustainable within the modern Judeo-Chris-
tian framework of “moral adequacy”:19
Tragedy says there are disasters which are not fully merited, that there is 
ultimate injustice in the world. So one might say that the final optimism 
of the prevailing religious traditions of the West, their will to see meaning 
in the world, prevented a rebirth of tragedy under Christian auspices—
as, in Nietzsche’s argument, reason, the fundamentally optimistic spirit of 
Socrates, killed tragedy in ancient Greece. (Sontag 137)
 Central to these readings is a sense of historical distinction; Greek 
tragedy participates in a historical movement that presents it as capable of 
 18. This frames Nussbaum’s central criticism of Hegel; what she sees as his tendency to eliminate 
conflict represents a “dangerous reform” of the tragic universe which neglects the possibility of separ-
ateness or difference in the world of value: “ . . . to do justice to the nature or identity of two distinct 
values requires doing justice to their difference; and doing justice to their difference . . . requires seeing 
that there are, at least potentially, circumstances in which the two will collide”[68].
 19. Thus it is certainly fitting that Steiner and Sontag wrote pieces with the same title. See 
Steiner, The Death of Tragedy, 4–8 and Sontag, “The Death of Tragedy,” in Against Interpretation and 
Other Essays (New York: Picador, 1966), 132–39. With respect to the demise of Goethe’s “true” trag-
edy, Steiner offers some intriguing if schematic comments about Goethe’s “avoidance of the tragic,” 
166–68.
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speaking to modernity and at the same time maintaining its secrets. (To be 
sure, Hegel himself also addressed this issue of historical development as it 
pertains to tragedy, but not in the interest of preserving any trace of secrecy 
within that movement of history.) However, Hegel’s reading of Antigone 
has become such a mainstay of modern ethical discourse that its version of 
tragic events, even more so than Sophocles’ play itself, often assumes center 
stage. Many such critics take issue with Hegel’s account of sexual difference 
in his reading of tragedy, arguing that the tragedy of Antigone in particular, 
far from codifying gender roles in relation to the “laws” of family and state, 
calls established categories of sexuality and kinship radically into question.20 
Judith Butler’s essay on Antigone is a case in point: the tragic heroine “upsets 
the vocabulary of kinship that is a precondition of the human, implicitly 
raising the question for us of what those preconditions really must be.”21 
However, not unlike the models it criticizes, Butler’s reading of “kinship 
trouble” in the Antigone finally runs aground in its claim to an essential 
universality—the universality of multiplicity, as it were—in its presentation 
of the Greek tragedy as a work that conveys truths into a modern context 
with minimal disruption.
 While the philosophy of the tragic, born in the long eighteenth century, 
has thus given rise to much important debate, in some ways the text of 
tragedy tends to remain isolated from this. (It is perhaps no coincidence 
that Schelling and Hegel refer only obliquely to tragic situations; Schelling 
never even names Oedipus, though he is evidently the subject of his dis-
cussion, and Hegel’s only citation of Sophocles’ Antigone, as we will see 
later, is taken badly out of context.) Thus a new question arises where the 
Idealists leave off: where must the ethical stance of tragedy be situated, if it 
is not to become a mere reflection of modern systems of philosophy? And 
how does its performativity—the particularity of its language and rhetorical 
sway—come into play in the recognition of that stance? While Hegel and 
Schelling engage with the enduring legacy of tragedy, the perception that it 
expresses certain universal truths, it is their friend Hölderlin who considers 
 20. See, for example, the essays by Luce Irigaray (“The Eternal Irony of the Community”) and 
Patricia J. Mills (“Hegel’s Antigone”), in Mills, ed., Feminist Interpretations of G. W. F. Hegel (Univer-
sity Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1996).
 21. Judith Butler, Antigone’s Claim (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 82. As Butler 
emphasizes, the family headed by Oedipus and Jocasta hardly remains within a recognizable kinship 
structure, as Oedipus is both father and brother to Antigone and her siblings; and Antigone herself, as 
Butler and other readers have pointed out, is described in Sophocles’ language not only as a sister and 
daughter but also as a man (the Greek aner), a son (see Butler 62), and a mother (Jacobs, “Dusting 
Antigone,” MLN 111 [1996]: 910).
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above all the differences that tragedy also expresses, both in structure and 
in language. And who allows his writings on tragedy—the translations, but 
also his weirdly hermetic essays—to reflect those differences in a manner 
that makes their existence, if not always their explicit content, intelligible.
ii. Translation
Even when the material of a “true” tragedy such as Goethe describes above 
aims to be wholly original, any modern attempt to approximate tragedy 
approaches the transformative dynamics of a translation. The modern tragic 
poet must strive to illuminate the obscurities of the original form, to con-
nect, however imperfectly, to the inscrutable quality that within the context 
of modernity would still lend tragedy its “truth.” As Goethe’s dread at the 
very thought implies, taking on the ancient forms of the tragic involves the 
acknowledgment of a distance both within the work and from it, a recogni-
tion and suspension of the work’s foreignness that may be destructive.
 Matters become even more complicated when that confrontation also 
involves the mechanics of translation itself, as it so frequently has in the 
two centuries since Goethe’s remarks. Inspired to a “most comprehensive 
predilection for all things Greek” by the classical aesthetics of Johann Jakob 
Winckelmann, Goethe’s own age featured a rash of classical material in 
translation, from Voss’s celebrated Homer (1781) to Humboldt’s translation 
of Agamemnon (1816) and Hölderlin’s and Solger’s translations of Sophocles 
(1804 and 1824).22 Under these circumstances, the undertaking redoubles 
the risk to which Goethe referred. If any act of translation is inherently 
violent insofar as its need for comprehensibility is also a call to assimilate 
the distinctive elements of the other (text) to the familiar cadence of native 
language and thought, that violence may exact a toll not only upon the 
translated object but the translating subject as well. Particularly in the exten-
sive discourse concerning translation in and around Goethe’s age, these two 
forms of violence frequently stand in direct tension with one another; the 
translator who aims to mitigate the violence of transmission also exposes 
himself to the limits of his own language and process of thought, that which 
had been most radically his “own.”
 22. Of these, Voss’s Homer was the most influential and held in the highest regard; Goethe, for 
example, described Voss’s translations as the most perfect of their kind, achieving a “perfect identity” 
with the original in which “one does not exist instead of the other but in the other’s place” (Schulte 
and Biguenet 61). For a concise but nevertheless engaging summary, see Charlie Louth, Hölderlin and 
the Dynamics of Translation (Legenda: European Humanities Research Center, 1998), 5–53.
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 This consideration only renders more curious—and perhaps, at the same 
time, more understandable—the most intriguing aspect of the long tradi-
tion of translating the Greeks, particularly in Germany: the prevalence of 
translators who are also, or even primarily, poets. To be sure, one of the most 
prolific and enduring of all modern translators, A. W. Schlegel, was also 
involved in the Romantic aesthetic project presented in the Athenäum and 
other literary documents, but he was not a poet in the same vein as Hölder-
lin, Goethe, Hofmannsthal, Brecht, Pound, Müller, or Heaney.23 Nor did 
he attempt, as they did, to translate Greek tragedy. Does the encounter with 
the outermost limits of expression inherent in the task of translation—which 
Enlightenment theorists of translation such as Bodmer and Herder already 
regarded as essential to the development of thought itself 24—demand, in the 
extreme case of tragedy, a poet’s sensitivity to the openness of one language 
to another, to the elasticity of representation and the conveyance of image? 
And what happens—to the poet, to the text, to the reader—if that encounter 
fails?
 Indeed, one might ask what “failure” means at all in this context. In one 
sense, Hölderlin’s translations have continued to be an object of interest 
precisely because they violate an essential pact at the heart of translational 
practice: in their foreignizing tone they allow language, and therefore that 
which produces language—the voice of the translator—to be heard between 
the lines of text. Yet as we know from the writings of Lawrence Venuti, the 
translator has long been expected to strive for the opposite pole: to remain 
invisible. The translator is meant to be a mere intermediary, not to have a 
voice of her own but to reproduce, seamlessly, the voice of another (Venuti 
1995, 2). But this is a false transparency, as Venuti has shown: while main-
taining the appearance of unmediated access to a source text and author, the 
smooth transition from one language to another by an “invisible” translator 
 23. Josephine Balmer discusses the “close, symbiotic relationship” between creative writing and 
classical translation, claiming that the “translator of a classic text can be seen more as an innovator, 
making their own mark on an already well-known work, reimagining it for a new generation, a new 
audience. . . . [I]n certain circumstances, a translation can supersede the original and become iconic in 
its own right.” “What comes next? Reconstructing the classics,” in Susan Bassnett and Peter R. Bush, 
The Translator as Writer (London: Continuum, 2006), 184.
 24. Bodmer and Herder were early proponents of the idea, further developed by the Romantics, 
that translation offers a means of confronting one’s own language that is essential to the edification of 
the self. Bodmer advocated the expansion of language, and by extension the expansion of the possibili-
ties of thought, via the translation of “substantial instances of special beauty,” figurative expressions 
that exhaust a particular thought through descriptive images. Such “instances” differ from language to 
language, yet each is intuitively comprehensible in any language because the images are recognizable. 
See Bodmer, Der Mahler der Sitten, reprinted in Translating Literature: The German Tradition from 
Luther to Rosenzweig, ed. and trans. André Lefevere (Assen/Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1977), 18–20.
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in fact requires a particularly violent degree of intervention (16f.). A com-
mon thread among newer theories of translation, then, involves advocating 
a more activist and ethical mode of translation, regarded not as a seamless 
transfer but as a creative practice that remains receptive to the distances—
cultural, linguistic, temporal—traveled between languages and modes of 
expression.25 This represents a different sort of transparency than the illu-
sion of the “invisible” translator: translation acts as a layer of “translucence” 
over the source text, not concealing it with the appearance of transparency 
but rather engaging with it in a manner that allows new connections to 
emerge in the context of the receiving culture.26 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
describes this level of engagement as “the most intimate act of reading,” a 
“surrender” to the source text that attends to its specificity.27 The translator’s 
invisibility is displaced by her readiness to disturb her own language, to let 
it reflect the otherness of the foreign text rather than offer it to the reader 
in familiar forms.
 Yet this truer form of translation may exact no less a price than the “true” 
tragedy in Goethe’s estimation. As we must realize from Hölderlin’s exam-
ple, this approach to the source text carries with it a potentially dangerous 
imperative for the “true translator,” who, as Friedrich Schleiermacher had 
already suggested in 1813, subjects himself to “the most extraordinary form 
of humiliation that a writer  .  .  . could inflict upon himself.”28 More than 
merely receding into invisibility, the translator in Schleiermacher’s model 
must deliberately expose himself to danger, must be willing to bear the stain 
of failure and sacrifice the quality of his own expression, all for the sake of a 
voice that would otherwise be effaced in the transmission from one language 
to another.
Who would not like to have his native tongue appear everywhere in its most 
enticing beauty, of which every literary genre is capable? Who would not 
rather beget children who are in their parents’ image rather than bastards? 
Who would like to show himself in less attractive and less graceful move-
 25. The recent work of Susan Bassnett, a translator, poet, and scholar, is particularly interesting 
in this respect. See her discussion in “Writing and Translating” (Bassnett and Bush, The Translator as 
Writer [London: Continuum, 2006], 173–83), as well as her creative dialogue with the Argentinian 
poet Alejandra Pizarnik in Exchanging Lives: Poems and Translations (Leeds: Peepal Tree, 2002).
 26. For a discussion of this idea of “translucence” in translation, see Sherry Simon’s response in 
Buden and Novotny 211.
 27. Spivak, “The Politics of Translation,” in Spivak, Outside in the Teaching Machine (New York: 
Routledge, 1993), 180.
 28. Friedrich Schleiermacher, “On the Different Methods of Translating,” trans. Waltraud 
Bartscht, reprinted in Schulte and Biguenet 47.
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ments than he is capable of, and at least sometimes appear harsh and stiff, 
and shock the reader as much as is necessary to keep him aware of what he is 
doing? . . . These are the sacrifices that every translator must make; these are 
the dangers to which he exposes himself. . . . (Schulte and Biguenet 46f.)29
Along with Johann Jakob Bodmer, who sixty years previously had likewise 
prevailed upon translators to have the courage to make use of the “natural 
freedom” of language (“so that the freedom of words matches the freedom 
of things” [Lefevere 31]), Schleiermacher equates a translator’s fidelity to 
the foreign text with the possibility of ridicule on the home front. How-
ever, this does not by any means lessen the significance of the exercise. If, 
as Schleiermacher advocates, the proper method of translation is indeed to 
move the reader to the author rather than the author to the reader (“leaving 
the author alone as much as possible” [Schulte and Biguenet 42]), then the 
translator’s fidelity to his text may have an even more disconcerting result 
than invisibility; it may imply vulnerability of a most fundamental sort. To 
translate in these terms is to assume responsibility for communicating the 
foreign text while renouncing regard for one’s own voice, to enact a relation 
that refuses to reduce the difference of another voice to the discourse of the 
same. It represents, in other words, testing ground for a relation between 
self and other that evokes the ethical as such.30
 This call to ethical responsibility remains a vital aspect of the current field 
of translation studies, which approaches the history of such appropriations 
of the “foreign” (such as Schleiermacher’s here) far more critically.31 Schleier-
macher composed his theoretical remarks in a period in which the practice of 
translation was regarded as essential to the construction of a national culture, 
and his advocacy of the foreign as a vehicle for establishing identity, while 
 29. “Wer möchte nicht seine Muttersprache überall in der volksgemäßesten Schönheit auftreten 
lassen, deren jede Gattung nur fähig ist? Wer möchte nicht lieber Kinder erzeugen, die das väterliche 
Geschlecht rein darstellen, als Blendlinge? Wer wird sich gern auflegen, in minder leichten und an-
muthigen Bewegungen sich zu zeigen als er wol könnte, und bisweilen wenigstens schroff und steif zu 
erscheinen, um dem Leser so anstößig wie möglich zu werden als nöthig ist damit er das Bewußtsein 
der Sache nicht verliere? [ . . . ] Dies sind die Entsagungen die jener Übersetzer nothwendig überneh-
men muß, dies die Gefahren denen er sich aussetzt . . .” (Störig 55).
 30.  This tone of responsibility to an other that the subject does not negate or appropriate but 
rather recognizes as primary and ineffaceable recalls the ethical thought of Emmanuel Levinas, for 
whom the relation to the Other constitutes “first philosophy,” the primary dimension of experience. 
For a perspective on the relevance of Levinas’s ethics for translation theory, see Robert Eaglestone, 
“Levinas, Translation, and Ethics,” in Bermann and Wood 127–37.
 31. See Lawrence Venuti, The Scandals of Translation: Towards an Ethics of Difference (London: 
Routledge, 1998). In his discussion of “the power of translation to form identities and to qualify 
agents” [6], Venuti attempts to outline an ethical stance through which both the practice and the 
reading of translation take place with a more nuanced view towards linguistic and cultural difference.
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common among theories of translation in his time, also betrays a reliance on 
essentialist categories such as “nation,” “culture,” “equivalence” and even “the 
foreign” that contemporary critics call radically into question.32 Rather than 
an interaction between two static poles of identity (what Michael Cronin 
calls a “zero-sum of binary opposition” between “source and target language, 
source and target culture, author and translator, translator and reader”33), 
translation today exemplifies flux; and the translator must once again muster 
her courage for the path that lies ahead, for she is charged with maintaining 
the productive tensions and discontinuities between a text and its transla-
tion. Susan Bassnett describes the practice of translation as “a process of 
negotiation between texts and between cultures, a process during which all 
kinds of transactions take place mediated by the figure of the translator.”34 
Both source and product of translation cannot remain unaffected by this 
process: while the text in translation introduces discontinuity and conflict 
into the perception of uniformity, the “original” obtains meaning in a new 
and different context. This transaction lies at the heart of Walter Benjamin’s 
notion that translation represents the “living on” (Fortleben) of a given text.
 The responsibility of the translator in such models is no trifling mat-
ter. The basis for the translator’s more ethical stance—the imperative of 
“keep[ing] the reader aware of what he is doing,” in Schleiermacher’s terms—
is risk: risk of exposure, of ridicule, and ultimately of failure. Indeed, the 
specter of failure looms large in any attempt at translation, and reflections 
on the ultimate impossibility of translation are as common in the theoreti-
cal discourse as discussions of its significance.35 Benjamin—who famously 
praised Hölderlin’s translations as “prototypes (Urbilder, originary images) 
of their form” that confirm “every important aspect” of his own thoughts on 
translation—alludes to this limit in his concept of the translator’s “Aufgabe,” 
a term which contains within it not only the idea of a task but also, as Paul 
De Man first pointed out, of giving up (aufgeben): “It is in that sense also 
the defeat, the giving up, of the translator. The translator has to give up in 
relation to the task of refinding what was there in the original.36
 To be sure, in light of the contemporary discourse on translation, De 
Man’s remarks about “refinding what was there in the original” sound posi-
 32. For a good summary, see Doris Bachmann-Medick, “Introduction: The Translational Turn,” 
trans. Kate Sturge, in Translation Studies 2:1 (2009): 2–16.
 33. See Cronin’s contribution to the forum in Buden and Nowotny 218.
 34. Susan Bassnett, Translation Studies (Routledge 2002), 6.
 35. Paul De Man, The Resistance to Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 
80. For another perspective on translation’s impossibility, see Robert Eaglestone, “Levinas, Transla-
tion, and Ethics,” in Bermann and Wood 127–37.
 36. De Man, The Resistance to Theory, 80.
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tively antiquated. In an interview on his concept of the “third space” in 
translation, Homi Bhabha argues that the “original,” precisely insofar as it 
is open to translation, does not constitute an a priori totality.
.  .  .  translation is a way of imitating, but in a mischievous, displacing 
sense—imitating an original in such a way that the priority of the original 
is not reinforced but by the very fact that it can be simulated, copied, 
transferred, transformed, made into a simulacrum and so on: the ‘original’ 
is never finished or complete in itself.37
 Likewise, the familiar allusion to the translator’s inevitable “failure” 
reflects an attitude that newer translation theory aims to transcend, not 
least since translators succeed in completing translations all the time. Where 
Benjamin’s interest in Hölderlin becomes most instructive for contempo-
rary translation theory, then, is with respect to more fundamental questions 
about the nature of translation as “Aufgabe”: what if the task of translation, 
for Hölderlin in particular but also in a more general sense, were not to 
“refind what was there” at all? Not to reconstitute an “original” but rather 
simply to produce a relation between texts and contexts that reflects the 
differential and variable use of language as such?38 The relevance of that rela-
tion would then persist and evolve over time, offering a key means by which 
to address the ethical implications of translation practice within literary 
and cultural histories. Jorge Luis Borges claimed that Homer in translation 
represented not merely the Greek classic itself but also “different perspec-
tives of a mutable fact,  .  .  .  a long experimental lottery of omissions and 
emphases,” and examining a translation’s evolution within a given language 
sheds much light on the stakes inherent in that process.39 The critical study 
of a text’s “living on” in other forms and contexts shifts the central question 
of translation away from a binary of success or failure: from a yes or no to 
a why and how.40
 37. Jonathan Rutherford, “The Third Space: Interview with Homi Bhabha,” in Rutherford, ed. 
Identity: Commnunity, Culture, Difference (London: Lawrence and Wishart), 210.
 38. See Weber on Benjamin’s notion of “origin” in “A Touch of Translation,” Bermann and Wood 
65–78.
 39. Jorge Luis Borges, “Some Versions of Homer” (1932), trans. Suzanne Jill Levine, PMLA 
107.5 (Oct. 1992): 1136.
 40. An outstanding example of this type of study is Antoine Berman’s Experience of the Foreign, 
in which he outlines the process by which degrees of receptivity to difference as well as pockets of re-
sistance become legible in the ambivalent manner in which a translating culture approaches its object: 
“We may formulate the issue as follows: Every culture resists translation, even if it has an essential 
need for it. The very aim of translation—to open up in writing a certain relation with the Other, to 
fertilize what is one’s Own through the mediation of what is Foreign—is diametrically opposed to the 
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 As that progression aims to cross ever broader temporal and spatial 
chasms, moreover, as the orientation of the original grows more distant from 
what is familiar, the potential violence of translation cuts deeper still, neces-
sitating not only the negotiation between languages but also the conceptual 
transmission of an alterity that cannot be entirely recovered. Winckelmann’s 
double imperative of imitating the Greeks and surpassing them (“the imi-
tation of the ancients is the only way for us to become great—yes, if it 
is possible, inimitable”41) left poets and would-be translators around 1800 
acutely aware of this dilemma. Friedrich Schiller may have best described 
its implications in his essay On the Use of the Chorus in Tragedy (Über den 
Gebrauch des Chors in der Tragödie)—an essay that accompanied his only 
attempt to reproduce classical Greek forms in a modern drama, The Bride of 
Messina:
The palace of the kings is locked up now, the courts have withdrawn from 
the gates of the cities into the interiors of houses, writing has suppressed the 
living word, the people have therefore become an abstract concept, the gods 
have retreated into the hearts of men. The poet must open up the palaces 
again, must lead the courts back out into the open air, he must prop up the 
gods again, he must reproduce everything immediate that has been annulled 
through the artificial institution of real life and cast off, as the sculptor does 
with modern garments, all of the artificial constructions on and around 
the human that hinder the appearance of his inner nature and his original 
character; he must take up, from all of his external surroundings, nothing 
except that which makes visible the highest of forms, the human.42
ethnocentric structure of every culture, that species of narcissism by which every society wants to be a 
pure and unadulterated Whole” (4).
 41. “Die Nachahmung der Alten ist der einzige Weg für uns, groß, ja wenn es möglich ist, un-
nachahmlich zu werden” (The imitation of the ancients is the only way for us to become great, yes, if it is 
possible, to become inimitable). J. J. Winckelmann, Sämtliche Werke, ed. J. Eiselein (Osnabrück: Otto 
Zeller, 1965), 8.
 42. “Der Palast der Könige ist jetzt geschlossen, die Gerichte haben sich von den Toren der 
Städte in das Innere der Häuser zurückgezogen, die Schrift hat das lebendige Wort verdrängt, das 
Volk . . . ist . . . folglich zu einem abgezogenen Begriff geworden, die Götter sind in die Brust der 
Menschen zurückgekehrt. Der Dichter muß die Paläste wieder auftun, er muß die Gerichte unter 
freien Himmel herausführen, er muß die Götter wieder aufstellen, er muß alles Unmittelbare, das 
durch die künstliche Einrichtung des wirklichen Lebens aufgehoben ist, wieder herstellen, und alles 
künstliche Machwerk an dem Menschen und um denselben, das die Erscheinung seiner innern Natur 
und seines ursprünglichen Charakters hindert, wie der Bildhauer die modernen Gewänder, abwerfen, 
und von allen äußern Umgebungen desselben nichts aufnehmen, als was die Höchste der Formen, die 
menschliche, sichtbar macht” (Friedrich Schiller, Werke und Briefe, Band V, ed. M. Luserke [Frank-
furt: Klassiker, 1996], 286f.).
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Schiller’s lines here evoke an arduous and solitary process of reconstruction 
that captures both the exertion and the artistry of confronting the ancients, 
highlighting the special task of anyone who aims to become their transla-
tor. The long tradition of translating Greek tragedy, insofar as it demands 
a degree of transformation perhaps unmatched by the exchange between 
modern works, may subject both text and author to a particularly ruthless 
form of violence. Perhaps this is what Goethe knew.
iii. Other Ethics
In her introduction to the recent anthology Nation, Language and the Eth-
ics of Translation, Sandra Bermann proposes that translation as an object 
of study “might be effectively re-thought in historical and temporal terms 
rather than only in ontological and spatial ones.” In this sense, translation 
gains relevance not only as a means of intercultural exchange but “in terms 
of a history of ‘instances’ or of linguistic negotiations occurring over time, 
each a poeisis, each establishing a new inscription and, with it, the possibility 
of new interpretation” (6). Bermann’s model provides a compelling frame-
work for examining the impulse to translate the Greeks since the Enlight-
enment, with each new version a different manifestation of the exchange 
between modernity and its nearly imperceptible shadows.
 In seeking to frame this exchange as it develops diachronically, I examine 
a constellation of texts that reflect upon the ethics of translation as a way 
of thinking—an epistemological category that proposes to call a dialectical-
mimetic progression of thought (what Heidegger will call “metaphysics”) 
into question. Hölderlin’s translation project, emerging out of a discourse 
in which both translation and tragedy operate in the service of establishing 
identity (in conversation with and in opposition to the “foreign”), allows 
language to slip its moorings in a manner that effectively undermines a fixed 
concept of identity. The intersection of tragedy and translation thus opens 
up the possibility of thinking otherwise, of experiencing the foreign not only 
as it relates to the perception of identity or the process of Bildung but rather 
also as that which cannot be reconciled, that cannot offer any greater lesson 
than its own fundamental, permanent dissonance. In the sense that it aims to 
reveal tragic experience as both radically foreign and curiously foundational, 
Hölderlin’s translation project prefigures, as Heidegger recognized, a concept 
of “das Unheimliche.”
 Nowhere does this intersection of tragedy and translation have more last-
ing effects than in the German intellectual tradition. Chapter 1 thus makes 
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the case for considering the significance of translation for the modern under-
standing of tragedy by situating Hölderlin’s project within the intellectual 
climate of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a time in which 
translation was regarded as a crucial means toward national and individual 
Bildung and most German intellectuals had something to say about the 
relationship between ancient Greece and modern subjectivity. While many 
of the models that emerged were essentially ahistorical in approach, treat-
ing the themes of tragedy as universal truths to be mined for their modern 
relevance, the texts of Greek tragedy themselves were regarded by translators 
and educated readers as immutable ideals to be rivaled, perhaps, but never 
changed. Hölderlin, who grappled with the issue of the tragic for most of 
his productive life, finally manages in his translations to hollow out a space 
between these two poles, neither appropriating ancient tragic concepts in the 
service of a modern intellectual agenda nor pledging unquestioned fidelity 
to the original text. Neither a relic nor a modern transformation, Hölderlin’s 
translations represent a space in which transition itself can come to light.
 It is this concern for marking the space between texts that defines Hölder-
lin’s project as a valuable counterpoint to a conception of ethics more com-
monly shaped by the thematics of Greek tragedy. Most voices in this debate 
address the identity of tragic figures more than the structure of tragedy itself. 
However, Hölderlin’s illumination of the process of transmission represents 
something else in its rapt attention to the otherness of tragic language and 
structure; as a result, the writers that follow in his footsteps inevitably reflect 
on problems that his translations both confront and produce. What ques-
tions, if any, can we answer by reading Greek tragedy today? How do we 
represent a past that eludes our comprehension? What can we understand of 
tragedy at all, and what can we glean from that which we do not understand?
 The following two chapters focus on Hölderlin’s translation project, the 
uniqueness of which lies in his attempt to make the experience of transla-
tion an integral part of the tragedy’s effect on a modern audience. That 
modern experience rests upon the sheer foreignness of the material and is 
intensified by a strange and hauntingly beautiful syntax that is neither Ger-
man nor Greek. Thus not only the plight of Oedipus and Antigone but the 
language of the plays themselves is unsettling, unfamiliar—and nevertheless 
captivating. In this synthesis of form and content, translation and tragedy, 
Hölderlin’s texts suggest that the modern subject is brought to a place that 
the tragic figures already inhabit: a place in which, as Antigone’s Chorus tes-
tifies, “Much is monstrous, yet / Nothing more monstrous than the human.” 
While other readers of Antigone’s tragedy, most notably Hegel, understand 
her decision to bury her brother as representative of divine law in conflict 
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with the law of the state, in Hölderlin’s translation she not only resists that 
gesture of assimilation into the structure of legitimacy but also brings those 
around her “outside of the law.” The modern subject’s apprehension of Anti-
gone’s solitary entry into the tomb, and of a language that constantly slips 
its moorings, forms the basis for the recognition of an essential difference—a 
“monstrosity”—that exceeds that subject’s presupposition of his own imma-
nence. What others in his time see as the ethical context of tragedy—the 
conflict of divine and human realms, the dialectical advancement of subject, 
community and finally history—is thus complicated by a model of tragic 
experience inseparable from the dynamics of translation. For Hölderlin the 
ethics of tragedy is grounded in nothing more than the imperative to pre-
serve the dignity of an unfathomable and ultimately untranslatable differ-
ence; by calling into question the reflected immanence of the subject, it 
brings into focus that subject’s responsibility for engaging with a form of 
alterity that both disrupts and defines it.
 In the following chapters, I extend my discussion to Hölderlin’s most 
influential twentieth-century readers, all of whom problematize the ethical 
stance that these translations illuminate. Common to these engagements 
with the same set of texts is an emphasis on the particular timeliness of trag-
edy, and particularly of Hölderlin’s translations, in the political and cultural 
milieu of the present day. Consequently, the relationship between the ethical 
and the political becomes central, particularly with respect to the question of 
identity (both national and individual). Insofar as all these writers attempt 
to engage their thinking about tragedy with the horrors of recent events and 
with efforts to come to terms with the violence of the past, the question of 
responsibility gains even greater urgency.
 Walter Benjamin’s engagement with Hölderlin’s Sophocles, which opens 
this second section, is a thread, an accumulation of reflections over two 
decades rather than a single essay or text. At no point does Benjamin offer 
a sustained reading of the translations and remarks in the manner of his 
writings on Goethe’s Elective Affinities or even Hölderlin’s twinned poems 
“Dichtermut” (“The Poet’s Courage”) and “Blödigkeit” (“Timidity”). There 
is no question, however, that Hölderlin’s Sophocles represents a crucial foun-
dation not only for Benjamin’s concept of translation but for his theory 
of criticism in a more general sense. From his early essay “Two Poems by 
Friedrich Hölderlin” through the celebrated “Task of the Translator” and his 
monumental habilitation, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, it is apparent 
that Benjamin regards Hölderlin not only as a poet but also always as a trans-
lator—as a translator, in fact, of the very highest order. If Benjamin was not 
the first reader to acknowledge this, he was certainly the most impassioned. 
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For Benjamin, Hölderlin’s renditions of Sophoclean tragedy underscore the 
ethical implications of translation as a mode of reading and engaging with 
the continued “life” of a text; and in this sense, they inch closer to a rela-
tion to an abstract notion of “truth” to which all poetry, and essentially 
all cultural artifacts, refer. By examining the individual moments in which 
Benjamin turns to this text, either directly or obliquely, as an example of 
his own thinking, I consider the extent to which a concept of translation 
informs not only his notion of Aufgabe or “task” in that celebrated essay but 
also, in a much larger sense, the idea of criticism itself as integrally related to 
the expression of a higher truth. Although his earliest reading of Hölderlin 
emphasizes the idea of the poet’s courage (“Dichtermut”), I attempt to trace 
the less-trodden path by which the translator comes to express a particularly 
Benjaminian (and thus profoundly ethical) fortitude.
 In his remarks on translation and tragedy in his lecture “Hölderlins Hymn 
‘The Ister,’” Martin Heidegger also develops his own concept of courage, 
particularly with respect to the poet or thinker, but that courage is ultimately 
expressed in a political rather than an ethical realm, and its ramifications 
are considerably more controversial. Delivered in 1942–43, the lecture has 
drawn much criticism for its violent and transformative readings of Hölder-
lin’s poetry and Sophoclean tragedy, which many critics view as indicative of 
the totalitarian streak still legible within Heidegger’s philosophy. To be sure, 
Heidegger’s usual reading practice is in evidence in the lecture; the texts he 
examines are ultimately brought in line with a disturbing conception of “the 
Germans” that renders the past a mere reflection of the destiny about to be 
fulfilled. However, I argue that the lecture also presents a fascinating tension 
between this totalizing violence that silences reading in any genuine sense 
and a more fluid reading practice, thematized in the concept of dialogue or 
“Zwiesprache,” that both describes Hölderlin’s relationship to the Greeks 
and frames Heidegger’s own reading on a rhetorical level.
 This is not an attempt to “rescue” Heidegger, whose methods of inter-
pretation remain problematic on many levels, but rather to engage with 
his text in a way that goes beyond the often knee-jerk tendency to expose 
Nazi sympathies in his writings of the 1930s and 40s. Heidegger’s concept 
of “Zwiesprache” represents a movement away from the totalizing violence 
that characterizes his earlier texts on Hölderlin, offering a mode of reading 
posited on a semiotics of incomprehension, on the possibility that the failure 
of reading can also convey a certain kind of knowledge. That failure is high-
lighted in the clash of differences that ancient tragedy represents in a mod-
ern context. In the negotiation between foreign and familiar that informs 
both Sophoclean tragedy and Hölderlin’s writings, Heidegger argues, the 
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unsettling experience of being “not-at-home” (Unheimischsein) constantly 
underlies the process of “coming to be at home” (Heimischwerden)—is, in 
fact, integral to that very process. By allowing this instability to permeate 
the practice of interpretation itself, Heidegger performs the same exchange 
with Hölderlin that Hölderlin, as he argues, undertakes with Sophocles: a 
“dialogue” that allows for the possibility of being moved by the past and its 
echoes—even those still to be heard—in the present.
 In Chapter 6, the 1948 adaptation of Hölderlin’s Antigone by the noto-
rious anti-Aristotelian Bertolt Brecht highlights this issue of violence as 
expressed within the various media that form history. With his Antigonemod-
ell, a collection of script, notes, photographs, and sketches that creates a 
record of the play’s performative genesis and development, Brecht attempts 
to lay bare the process by which recorded history marks and shapes dramatic 
forms and possibilities. His presentation of the modern ruins of Greek trag-
edy offers a model and an ethical argument for what he calls the “ruination” 
of German theater in the immediate post-war period. By basing his adapta-
tion on Hölderlin’s alienating translation, he underscores the sheer foreign-
ness of the Greek original and thereby rejects the violence of transformation 
that would leave the past as a mere version of the present. Meanwhile, his 
construction of the Modell serves both as an example and as open-ended 
stimulus for continued adaptation. The “Modell” introduces another dimen-
sion of historical transformation by assuring at its very foundation its own 
infinite variability, thus the impossibility of ever being “finished” with the 
past.
 The concluding chapter deals briefly with more recent appropriations of 
the translations by Heiner Müller (Ödipus, Tyrann, 1967), Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe (L’Antigone des Sophocle, 1977), and Martin Walser (Antigone, 
1989). All three authors emphasize the special timeliness of tragedy for the 
historical moment in which they write their adaptations; all consequently 
grapple more or less openly with the ethics of mining the past for the sake 
of its affinities with the present, in particular with respect to the particularly 
German task of coming to terms with the past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung). 
Composed in three different milieus—the GDR, France, and the Federal 
Republic—the texts express vastly different comfort levels in setting param-
eters for this process of appropriation. As each adaptation is intriguingly 
mirrored upon Hölderlin’s own structure—a text accompanied by detailed 
remarks—I show how each author takes a particular conception of “re-
writing” as a point of departure in the attempt to situate tragedy within 
modernity. Rewriting the past as text thus gains a metaphorical significance 
that underscores the responsibility inherent in any process of remembrance: 
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a responsibility to preserve the traces of singularity, even eccentricity, that 
resist the sway of ideology, of tradition, of historical transformation.
 As a side note, I am painfully aware of the considerable ironies of pre-
senting a text of and about translation, in translation. As a compromise I 
have provided the German texts of most primary sources, particularly where 
the use of language is consequential or intentional, either in the body of text 
or in footnotes. Where an author’s particular mode of expression in German 
must be foregrounded – in poetic passages, as well as in much of Hölderlin’s, 
Benjamin’s and Heidegger’s theoretical language—I have placed the German 
source text ahead of the English translation; for passages in which content is 
more important than expression, I have placed the German text in footnotes. 
Moreover, while many translated passages are based on published material, I 
have often modified those existing translations to correspond more precisely 
to the arguments I wish to make. This is not in any way meant to suggest 
that the published translations of Hölderlin, Heidegger, or Benjamin are 
deficient—on the contrary, in general they are admirably precise—but rather 
to underscore the extent to which translations are always individual inscrip-
tions within a multitude of possible readings.
iv. The Task of the reader
Each of the texts I will examine in this study undertakes the challenge of 
engaging with difference through a particular mode of performance that I 
would describe as rhetorical—taking shape through the effects of discursive 
form rather than through the transmission of content alone43—and that 
ultimately concentrates its effects on the practice of reading rather than 
spectatorship. Hölderlin’s performative expression rests in his concept of 
translation, Heidegger’s in Zwiesprache; Brecht’s in the Modell, which is pre-
sented as a kind of “image-text” that is meant to represent the text’s infinite 
malleability and yet also carry the same weight as Sophocles’ and Hölderlin’s 
written “originals.” That practice of reading takes place in the unmistakable 
presence of difference, of distances both temporal and conceptual that lead 
the reader in each case to limits that remain uncrossable: to the untranslat-
able in Hölderlin; the unreadability of “poetic knowledge” in Heidegger; 
the gaps between word and image, between text and performance in Brecht. 
 43. See Spivak on the distinction between the focus on rhetoric and the reliance on logic in 
translation: “Logic allows us to jump from word to word by means of clearly indicated connections. 
Rhetoric must work in the silence between and around in order to see what works and how much” 
(“Politics of Translation” 181).
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All these texts, in other words, demand from the reader a receptivity to the 
singularity of the past and a preservation of the distance that separates past, 
present and future.
 In this regard, the translation of tragedy takes on precisely the charac-
teristics that its German synonyms suggest: it is at once a crossing from one 
“instance” to another (Über-setzung), a carrying-over (Über-tragung) and a 
passing-on, the reception of a history (Über-lieferung). For the reader, this 
trifold context involves an engagement with the material of that translation 
that goes beyond the traditional sense of “tragic effect.” Reading in this 
manner implies not an active, identificatory suffering for the sake of a tragic 
hero but a suffering more closely related to receptivity, to the effort involved 
in finding one’s way through a text that is transparent, in the sense that 
Martin Buber claimed all translation should be transparent: not clarifying 
the “true” meaning of the “original” but on the contrary, as in Buber’s Bible 
translation, allowing the obscurities of the source text to shine through its 
language so that “its otherness in comparison with much that is familiar will 
become clear, but so will the importance of our receiving this otherness into 
the structure of our own life.”44 It is an experience of reading that implies a 
suffering of distance itself, a relentless attentiveness to singularity, an ethical 
challenge to modernity.
 44. Martin Buber, “On Word Choice in Translating the Bible,” in Martin Buber and Franz 
Rosenzweig, Scripture and Translation, trans. Lawrence Rosenwald and Everett Fox (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1994), 76f., Buber, in making the case for his and Rosenzweig’s new Bible 
translation in 1930, argues forcefully that the reader should have to work his or her way into a foreign 
text, rather than receiving it in familiarized form—that in fact such a mode of reading bears all the 
more fruit: “Readers openmindedly looking for the way to the Bible will find words of the new version 
at odds with what they are used to; but then they will seek to pass from those words to the realities that 
are expressed in them, will consider whether the usual rendering does justice to the special character 
of these realities, will measure the distance between the two, and will consider how the new rendering 
holds up in comparison. For such readers the biblical world will in their reading be revealed, sector 
by sector; its otherness in comparison with much that is familiar will become clear, but so will the 
importance of our receiving this otherness into the structure of our own life.”
t wo related intellectual projects frame the context in which Hölder-lin would translate Greek tragedy in the long eighteenth century: on 
one hand the ongoing discussion of how classical Greek models—includ-
ing, but not limited to tragedy—might provide the aesthetic ideal to which 
German culture should aspire, on the other the discourse surrounding 
the importance of translation for the development of German language 
and identity. These developments were multifaceted, to say the least, and 
expressed the underlying principles of the Enlightenment on several fronts. 
Winckelmann inspired a pan-European frenzy for ancient Greece in 1755 
with his treatise on the imitation of classical art, which he considered the 
only possible path to cultural greatness;1 meanwhile, Lessing spearheaded 
efforts to reinvent German drama in the spirit of classical and Shakespearean 
tragedy (and Schiller aimed for its culmination in Weimar). At the same 
time, the language philosophers Bodmer, Breitinger, and Herder promoted 
the expansion of German language and thought through the confrontation 
with foreign texts and authors, and pioneering translators such as Wieland 
and Voss paved the way for the Romantic-era achievements of A. W. Schlegel 
and Goethe. Literary language, confronted with difference and consolidated 
 1. See Winckelmann, “Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei 
und Bildhauerkunst,” Sämtliche Werke I [1825] (Osnabrück: Otto Zeller, 1965), 1–58. Winckelmann 
formulates here what will become the motto for Weimar classicism, the notion of “noble simplicity 
and quiet grandeur” (edle Einfalt und stille Grösse). See the discussion of the trend towards classical 
models in Reinhardt, “Goethe and Antiquity,” Tradition und Geist: Gesammelte Essays zur Dichtung, 
ed. Carl Becker (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960), 276ff.
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by its contact with foreign models, offered a unifying means by which, as 
George Steiner writes, “the hitherto divided provinces and principalities of 
the German-speaking lands could test a new common identity.”2
 It is no coincidence that the German national character stands as the 
uncertain, unformed center of these developments, given the ambivalent 
cycling between the aspiration to models and their overturning that charac-
terized the age of Enlightenment. A generation later, that ambivalence would 
be inscribed in most artistic and intellectual production. Hölderlin’s was, 
after all, the generation that had absorbed Winckelmann’s remarks on imi-
tating the ideal abundance inherent in Greek beauty and yet also struggled 
mightily with new questions of subjectivity posed by Kant’s critical philoso-
phy, had responded to the revolutionary fervor of the French revolution only 
to revert to a safer stance in support of enlightened absolutism,3 and had 
arrived at the notion of Bildung as a compromise between the compulsion 
to emulate ancient ideals and the creation of new knowledge.4
 This general awareness of a sea change in and following the age of Enlight-
enment suggests an intriguing affinity with the “historical moment of trag-
edy” in ancient Greece as Vernant describes it. Whereas Vernant introduces 
this concept to describe the clash of the Athenian polis with the traditional 
values it continually challenged on the tragic stage, the term could be used 
with nearly equal relevance to describe the political, social, and aesthetic 
upheavals that characterized the “Kunstepoche.”5 If the painful contradic-
tions at the heart of tragedy, the “linked polarities” (Segal 1986, 57) that 
perpetuate its conflicts reflect the messy ambiguity of historical flux, then 
 2. Steiner, After Babel, 80.
 3. See Harold Mah, Enlightenment Phantasies: Cultural Identity in France and Germant, 1765–
1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 157–63. Mah claims that German intellectuals initially 
regarded the revolution as a culmination of the Enlightenment conception of linear progress through 
the exercise of reason (159f.), later struggling with the conflict between that ideal and the reality of 
extreme violence.
 4. For a discussion of the status of “revolutions” in German culture, see Susanne Marchand’s 
excellent study of the institutional effects of philhellenism in Germany: “That this was a cultural, 
rather than a political revolution . . . owes both to the more limited aims of reform-minded German 
intellectuals, and to the more repressive states in which they lived. Over the years, historians have 
often lamented the unwillingness of this generation of Germans to confront political issues head-on, 
without recognizing that by avoiding political confrontations, the poets and thinkers of the Golden 
Age were able to accomplish something more feasible given their small numbers, and something they 
wanted more passionately than political change: the remaking of German culture and cultural institu-
tions” (Down from Olympus, 4).
 5. Moving away from the traditional designation “Goethezeit,” which cannot help but evoke 
(in some ways appropriately, to be sure) a crushing anxiety of influence, the Metzler German literary 
history introduces this more general term to describe the period between 1789 and 1830—the age of 
revolution, classicism, and Romanticism. Deutsche Literaturgeschichte von den Anfängen bis zur Gegen-
wart, 5th ed. (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1994), 154.
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a similar set of contradictions may also serve to concretize the dissonances 
inherent in an age of revolutions. Greek tragedy’s modern reception, its 
continued translation into the language of modern thought, bears at least as 
rich and conflicted a history as its initial production. The study of tragedy in 
translation thus requires a certain duplicity of approach, a consideration not 
only of its ancient historicity but also of its resonance in the development 
of a modern cultural consciousness.
 Hölderlin was no stranger to the vacillating mood of his age, and his 
approach to the Greeks will reflect both poles of influence, the reactionary 
and the revolutionary. In his early novel Hyperion, for example, Hölderlin 
echoes Winckelmann’s principles by letting Greek landscapes and scenarios 
evoke the permanence of the classical ideal within modernity, while his 
tragedy The Death of Empedocles represents the attempt to heal the division 
placed by Kant’s critical philosophy within the subject’s potential for self-
recognition.6 Yet his Sophocles could not have taken its particular shape 
without the simultaneous development of a discourse on translation that 
valorized the encounter with the foreign in a more general sense extending 
beyond ancient Greece. While for Winckelmann the Greeks represented 
the only model worth imitating, Hölderlin’s contemporaries a generation 
later were more polymorphous in their choices of foreign objects of interest. 
Within this context, translation did not merely imply reverent imitation but 
suggested the creation of new life within existing things, the step forward 
rather than the backward gaze. The experience of the foreign was the means, 
at once identificatory and contrastive, by which the modern subject might 
come to recognize himself.7 This determination led to a virtual explosion in 
the appearance of foreign works in Germany in the early nineteenth century. 
When Hölderlin began his project of translating, the German intelligentsia 
had had its first tastes of Shakespeare and Homer, in new translations by 
Wieland and Voss; by the time he was finished, Goethe and A. W. Schlegel 
alone had translated Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, Diderot, Voltaire, Cor-
neille, Calderòn, and, of course, Shakespeare once again (in Schlegel’s bril-
liant rendition, which is often still used today).8
 Interestingly enough, however, this German fascination with the foreign 
did not typically include extensive travel to far-flung locations. As David 
 6. See David Constantine, Early Greek Travellers and the Hellenic Ideal (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 41.
 7. For an extensive treatment of translation as both concept and practice in the Romantic pe-
riod, see Berman.
 8. Both Goethe and Schlegel continued to translate well into the nineteenth century; Schlegel 
eventually turned his attention to the Bhagavad Gita and lesser-known poets of Spain, Portugal, and 
Italy, while Goethe tackled Lord Byron’s Manfred. See Berman 54 and 129.
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Constantine has observed, no noted German artists or thinkers of the age 
traveled to Greece—not even Winckelmann, who had settled in Rome but 
ventured no further east—and German Hellenists relied instead for their 
conceptions of Greece on various mediating devices, such as descriptive 
accounts written by English and French travelers, sketches, and plaster 
reproductions of statuary.9 This marks what Suzanne Marchand calls Ger-
many’s “peculiar asceticism and aestheticism,” in which a distance from the 
desired ideal is stubbornly upheld; like Faust’s love for the inaccessible Greek 
beauty Helen, the German fascination with Greece was “a marriage in spirit 
alone, an unsatisfied and unsatisfiable longing.”10 Far from seeking to allevi-
ate this longing, however, intellectuals and artists preferred to let it define 
their relationship to Greece, proudly transforming a concrete limitation into 
a noble abstinence.11 Wilhelm von Humboldt, the educational reformer and 
learned translator of Aeschylus, summed up this philosophical stance as an 
obligation: “Only from a distance . . . only as separate from all that is com-
mon, only as a thing of the past should antiquity appear to us” (cited in 
Constantine 1984, 2: Nur aus der Ferne . . . nur von allem Gemeinen getrennt, 
nur als vergangen muss das Altertum uns erscheinen). For the thinker or scholar 
focused on the ideal, this view offered a degree of safety: divided from both 
the quotidian and the mutable, Greece could remain a static entity contained 
within the past and effectively defined within the limits of existing tradition.
 In this light—with ancient Greece a statue cast in stone and immortal-
ized as the embodiment of “noble simplicity and quiet grandeur”—Hölder-
lin perceived the twin burdens of Winckelmann’s Greek models and the 
new classical Bildungsideal taking shape in Weimar. With not only the entire 
array of classical Greek works but also a generation’s worth of imitations 
and adaptations to consult, it is no wonder that Hölderlin first regarded the 
Greeks as at once a model for perfection and a burden that had stifled his 
own nation’s potential for artistic originality. “We dream of originality and 
independence, we believe we are saying nothing but new things, and yet all 
of this is just reaction and at the same time a mild revenge against the ser-
vitude with which we have behaved with respect to antiquity,” he writes in 
the 1799 essay “The Perspective from which we must regard Antiquity” (Der 
Gesichtspunct aus dem wir das Altertum anzusehen haben).12 His antidote to 
 9. See Constantine 1984, 2f.
 10. Marchand, Down from Olympus, 16.
 11. Herder describes the Germans in similar terms: “Since we are not very used to this kind of 
travelling, since we are vaguely repelled by it. . . . ” the translator should expose us to the “awesome 
secrets of state which abound in Greek literature.” Cited in Lefevere 33.
 12. “Wir träumen von Originalität und Selbstständigkeit, wir glauben, lauter Neues zu sagen, 
und alles dies ist doch Reaktion, gleichsam eine milde Rache gegen die Knechtschaft, womit [wir] uns 
verhalten haben gegen das Altertum” (FA 14: 95).
Contexts: wHy translate? wHy study tHe greeks? 29
this condition of servitude is awareness—of the roads already traveled, of the 
paths that lie as yet unexplored—and forward motion, propelled not by the 
constant reflection on past ideals but rather by the measure of distance from 
those ideals: “For there is a difference in whether this Bildungstrieb affects 
us blindly or with our awareness, whether or not it knows from whence it 
came and in what direction it strives.”13
 This marking of distance will ultimately become the hallmark of his 
approach to translating the Greeks. Although a certain attitude of distancing 
was already common in the reluctance of German artists and scholars to visit 
Greece, for Hölderlin that distance from the source is accompanied less by 
that sense of unsatisfiable (yet paradoxically satisfying) longing for the ideal 
than by the questioning of ideals as such. Only by considering the fluidity 
of the relationship to models, by reflecting on the part those models play in 
the development of one’s own language and literature, can one gain a sense 
of cultural history that is “alive” rather than (as Herder put it) “vague or 
dead.” In suggesting that the modern distance from classical models marks 
the work’s contextual life in the present, Hölderlin prefigures an idea of tex-
tual “history” that Benjamin will later posit, as always in conversation with 
both Romantic philosophy and Hölderlin’s translation practice. In effect, 
Hölderlin’s translations will express a subtler version of Novalis’s provoca-
tive claim that “the German Shakespeare [i.e., Schlegel’s translation] today 
is better than the English.”
i. The New day: Translation is good for the Germans
Where there is a translator who is at the same time a philosopher, a poet, and a 
philologist: he is to be the morning star of a new era in our literature. (Johann 
Gottfried Herder, Fragmente 1766–67 [Lefevere 32])
As dawn breaks, a literature, a language, and a culture emerge; and the 
translator—tasked, it appears, with the probably impossible feat of being all 
things to all people—guides the nation into the new day. Herder’s challenge 
places the translator at the center of a movement that would help to shape 
the social and intellectual contours of the second half of the eighteenth 
century. In the course of several decades the general view of translation in 
Germany would shift dramatically, from a concrete exercise to a universal 
category of thought, from a practical means of developing the artist to a 
 13. “Es ist nämlich ein Unterschied, ob jener Bildungstrieb blind wirkt, oder mit Bewußtsein, ob 
er weiß, woraus er hervorging und wohin er strebt” (FA 14: 96).
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crucial mode of conceiving both national culture and subjective identity.14 
Likewise, the discourse on Greek tragedy and the concept of the tragic would 
migrate from the stage to the writing-desk and from the optimistic quest to 
establish identities, both national and individual, to the questioning of the 
contours of identity as such. For Hölderlin, the convergence of these two 
ideas would prove essential, as translation became the vehicle for engender-
ing and intensifying tragedy’s effect in a modern context.
 Herder was certainly not alone in his sentiment that the German nation 
stood before a new dawn;15 that same rhetoric of potentiality found ample 
public expression in other intellectual arenas at the same time, from Less-
ing’s refutation of French classical models on the German stage to Kant’s 
self-proclaimed “Copernican” revolution in thought. Their mutual call for 
an intellectual and cultural shift in the age of reason (which is also, of 
course, the age of revolution) lends credence to that rhetoric; taken together 
they represent two prongs of what Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy have called 
the “triple crisis” of the eighteenth century: the social and moral crisis of 
the bourgeois subject, the political crisis of the French Revolution, and the 
Kantian critique.16 And indeed, Herder’s depiction of a newly creative and 
intellectual approach to translation highlights its crucial role in the drive 
toward cultural autonomy. In this sense it carries clear echoes of Lessing’s 
famously scathing critique of the neoclassical traditionalist Johann Chris-
toph Gottsched; both Lessing and Herder reject the traditional acceptance of 
French artistic superiority in favor of the development of more intrinsically 
German modes of expression. However, there are also important differences 
between Lessing’s and Herder’s models of German nationhood, chiefly with 
respect to their views on the ways in which the Germans might learn or 
profit from the exposure to foreign models.17
 14. Louth describes Germany’s particular openness to a historical moment of translation, where-
as British intellectuals were less receptive to the “potential lying in translation” (31).
 15. Schmidt submits, in fact, that every thinker concerned with Greek tragedy in the post-En-
lightenment era, from Schelling to Nietzsche to Heidegger, departs likewise from the assumption that 
“the present age is a time in need of radical transformation.” On Germans and Other Greeks, 5.
 16. See The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German Romanticism, trans. Philip Bar-
nard and Cheryl Lester (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), 5. Their designation alludes to Friedrich Schle-
gel’s Athenäum fragment from 1798: “The French Revolution, Fichte’s Science of Knowledge, and 
Goethe’s Meister are the greatest movements of our age. Whoever takes exception to this combination, 
to whom a revolution cannot seem important if it is not noisy and physical, this man has not yet 
raised himself to the high, wide standpoint of the history of humankind.” (Die Französische Revolu-
tion, Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre und Goethes Meister sind die grössten Tendenzen des Zeitalters. Wer an 
dieser Zusammenstellung Anstoß nimmt, wem keine Revolution wichtig scheinen kann, die nicht laut und 
materiell ist, der hat sich noch nicht auf den hohen weiten Standpunkt der Geschichte der Menschheit 
erhoben). F. Schlegel, Kritische Schriften, ed. Wolfdietrich Rasch (Munich: Hanser, 1964).
 17. For an illuminating discussion of their respective views on translation, see Katherine Arens, 
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 In the seventeenth installment of his immensely popular journal Let-
ters Concerning the Latest Literature (Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend ), 
published with Mendelssohn and Nicolai in 1759, Lessing had argued pas-
sionately for a turn from French ornamentation to a more Shakespearean 
approach to tragic theater, while his Hamburgische Dramaturgie (1767) offers 
a reading of Aristotle’s Poetics that reframes the conventions established by 
the likes of Corneille and Racine.18 His campaign is clearly intended to 
incite rebellion in German theatrical circles, as is immediately evident in 
the seventeenth letter:
“No one,” say the authors of the library, “will deny that the German stage 
has Professor Gottsched to thank for much of its initial improvement.” I 
am this no one; I deny it point-blank.19
The final lines of the text are equally audacious in their call for a more 
specifically German mode of expression. After presenting a scene from a 
Faust drama purportedly written by one of his “friends” (who turns out to 
be Lessing himself ), he challenges the reader directly: “You wish to see a 
German play full of such scenes? So do I!” (Lessing 60).20
 Herder composed his Fragments as a direct response to Lessing’s Briefe, 
and he takes aim at the same target as his compatriot, submitting that the 
“French” mode of translation (which Gottsched had also come to repre-
sent) is just as imperfect a model for the Germans as their theater was for 
Lessing:21
“Translators who are not Traitors: Herder’s and Lessing’s Enlightenments,” Herder Yearbook 5 (2000): 
91–109.
 18. This pairing of Shakespeare and Aristotle is itself a risky gesture, since in fact Shakespeare was 
likely unfamiliar with Aristotle’s Poetics. Still, as Steiner points out, Lessing’s assertion continues to 
color our view of modern tragedy (The Death of Tragedy, 188).
 19. “‘Niemand, sagen die Verfasser der Bibliothek, wird leugnen, dass die deutsche Schaubühne 
einen großen Teil ihrer ersten Verbesserung dem Herrn Professor Gottsched zu danken habe.’ Ich 
bin dieser Niemand; ich leugne es geradezu” (Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Werke und Briefe IV, ed. 
Wilfried Barner [Frankfurt: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1985]: 56).
 20. “Sie wünschen ein deutsches Stück, das lauter solche Szenen hätte? Ich auch!” Arens indicates 
that the Letters generally represented a new, satirical style of criticism not previously seen in German 
(Arens 91).
 21. Gottsched regarded translation primarily as a useful exercise for aspiring authors, just as 
copying the works of great painters would train beginning art students. Although he does not directly 
reference the “French” manner of translation in the way that many of his contemporaries do, he advo-
cates a form of translation that leans toward the transformative description others give: “ . . . express 
everything by means of locutions that do not sound strange in your own language, but have a familiar 
ring to them” (Lefevere 16).
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The French, who are overproud of their national taste, adapt all things to it, 
rather than to try to adapt themselves to the taste of another time. Homer 
must enter France a captive, and dress according to fashion, so as not [to] 
offend their eye. But we poor Germans, who still are almost an audience 
without a fatherland, who are still without tyrants in the field of national 
taste, we want to see him the way he is. (Lefevere 33)
The tone of the passage, just as that of Lessing’s letter, implies a rivalry of cul-
tural values: although the Germans may be “poor” in their lack of “national 
taste,” they already surpass the French in recognizing that foreign models 
must be allowed to exert particular influence on cultural life.22 Translation in 
Gottsched’s view functioned as a useful exercise for the aspiring author, just 
as copying the works of great painters would train beginning art students 
(Lefevere 15). For Herder, however, translation has a higher potential as an 
instrument of cultural enrichment and identity formation. As an audience 
“almost . . . without a fatherland,” the Germans are more capable than the 
French of accepting the patronage of Shakespeare, or Homer, or Sophocles; 
and as a result, German language and culture profit by exposure to the previ-
ously unknown, unheard, and unseen.23 For Herder, who regarded thought 
as directly conditioned by its relation to language, a translation of the prop-
erly expansive sort sheds light on other ways of thinking and perceiving the 
world, unique to particular linguistic, cultural, and historical contexts. A 
proper translation does not attempt to transform these unique structures but 
rather makes it “incumbent on each writer, critic, scholar, and translator to 
perceive and preserve the perspectival alterity of the products of each foreign 
nation.”24 What Berman identifies as the two key concepts for translation 
in the Enlightenment period, Erweiterung (expansion) and Treue (fidelity), 
collaborate in Herder’s view, not as a slavish literalness but as the “ability 
to capture the uniqueness of the original in its form, expression, characters, 
‘genius,’ and ‘nature’” (Berman 40). Referring to the Bildung of language 
itself, Herder elaborates in another context: “Thus we edify [bilden] our lan-
guage through translation and reflection” (Man bilde also unsre Sprache durch 
Übersetzung und Reflexion).25 Translation plays a significant role, therefore, 
 22. Berman identifies the German cultural problematic as “the reverse of the French” (36).
 23. This idea of “profiting” through the study of foreign models is common in the theoretical 
discourse of translation during the Enlightenment: Bodmer, for example, describes the “enrichment 
of [one’s] stock of words and images,” and Herder encourages German readers to “make use of the 
treasures of one of the most excellent nations” (Lefevere 20 and 32; my emphasis).
 24. Übersetzung, Translation, Traduction: An International Encyclopedia of Translation Studies, ed. 
Harald Kittel, Juliane House, and Brigitte Schultze (Berlin, New York: W. de Gruyter, 2007), 1587.
 25. Herder, Werke: Band I (Munich: Hanser, 1984): 195.
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in the development of a free subject who is, as Kant will posit in 1784, 
“mündig” (a word which denotes a subject’s maturity but which the Grimms’ 
dictionary also relates to the mouth [der Mund]). As Johann Jakob Bodmer, 
one of Gottsched’s contemporaries, writes already in 1746, “we are living 
in a country in which we would like the freedom of words to match the 
freedom of things” (Lefevere 21).
 While Herder insists here that the Germans must meet Homer “the way 
he is” rather than forcing him to conform to familiar patterns—a dislocating 
experience in which Homer remains essentially inimitable (“unnachahm-
lich”)—Lessing regards the encounter with foreign models as a meeting on 
more common ground. An important distinction between Lessing’s dra-
maturgy and the view of translation advanced by Herder emerges, there-
fore, with respect to the question of identification. Lessing’s theoretical 
framework for a new German theater in the Hamburgische Dramaturgie—
anchored by his influential rereading of Aristotle’s Poetics—depends on a 
more self-centered idea of recognition. Only through identification with 
tragic heroes (and heroines, as was the case for much German bourgeois trag-
edy of the eighteenth century) “of like kind” (vom gleichen Schrot und Korn) 
can the audience experience dramatic effect as both sympathy (Mitleid ) 
and fear (Furcht), which Lessing identifies as a self-reflexive form of sym-
pathy (das auf uns bezogene Mitleid ).26 The recognition of my likeness on 
the stage, along with the accompanying fear that the same fate could befall 
me, has a didactic aim in the awakening of a moral capacity for sympathy 
(Mitleidsbereitschaft).27 Whereas Aristotle regarded recognition (anagnorisis) 
as an essential plot element of tragedy, Lessing displaces that gesture upon 
the spectator, who recognizes his similarity to the tragic figure on the stage—
specifically, with a figure who faces misfortune as a result of his or her all 
too human imperfections.28
 26. Max Kommerell captures the main thrust of Lessing’s conception of the tragic stage in de-
scribing it as a “school of compassion” (Schule des Mitgefühls). Lessing und Aristoteles: Untersuchung 
über die Theorie der Tragödie (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1941 [1957]), 72 and 91.
 27. Kommerell 1957, 82. As he notes, the formality of classical tragedy is thereby replaced by 
a psychological intimacy that is, in fact, a far cry from Aristotle’s Poetics (121). This also renders 
problematic the issue of guilt and innocence, insofar as pity, through its proximity to identification, 
becomes situated “jenseits von schuldig und unschuldig” (120).
 28. See The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1984): 2324f.  Terence Cave offers an interesting analysis of the term anagnorisis, suggesting 
that the prefix ana- represents a double negative, thus that anagnorisis would be “the shift from ‘not-
knowing’ to ‘not not-knowing.” The truth has been present from the start in veiled form, and the hero 
was only unaware of it until the crucial moment. Lessing’s version of recognition on the part of the 
spectator corresponds well with this analysis; even if it is not exactly Aristotelian in style; the spectator, 
too, is implicated in a relationship that he suddenly recognizes as true. Cave, “Recognition and the 
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 Although Lessing claims, therefore, that his dramaturgy represents a 
radical departure from established models—a true statement, to be sure, 
with respect to its break with the French tradition—that upheaval does not 
lead the Germans beyond themselves but rather ensures that they remain 
within a recognizable comfort zone. As von Wiese explains, the discovery 
of a character’s imperfection allows the spectator to feel sympathy rather 
than awe (Bewunderung), and thus to retain an experience pertinent to the 
human as such: “In tragedy man discovers who he is, a being between per-
fection and error.”29 If the viewer is disturbed by the fear that emerges from 
this universal sense of likeness, he is more than compensated by the greater 
understanding of “who he is.” The encounter with another on the stage only 
counts if it is, in the end, an encounter with a version of the self.30 Herder’s 
journey towards Homer also assumes identification, and even empathy (Ein-
fühlung), as the reader must attempt to imagine the sensations that underlie 
another’s words in order to understand the meaning of those words.31 That 
identification occurs, however, on the rather more unsettling terms of the 
other rather than those of the self: a translation must present Homer “the 
way he is,” and it is the task of the receiving culture not only to “see” him, 
but to attempt to see like him.
 As uncomplicated as it sounds, however, the translator’s task of bring-
ing Homer to the Germans “the way he is” is deceptively arduous. Herder 
himself writes in the Fragmente that a translator must be a “creative genius” 
(schöpferisches Genie) in order to carry out his craft successfully, must not 
just imitate a text but recreate its language in every nuance of its relation to 
culture and history. For Herder, then, a good or “authentic” translation has 
no chance of being a perfect one; even as translation remains a necessary 
task, every foreign text remains “fundamentally untranslatable” (Arens 103). 
Reader,” in Comparative Criticism: A Yearbook, Vol. 2, ed. E. S. Shaffer (Cambridge University Press, 
1980): 51.
 29. Benno von Wiese, Die Deutsche Tragödie von Lessing bis Hebbel (Hamburg: Hoffmann und 
Kampe, 1948), 30.
 30. For a comprehensive discussion of the birth and development of bourgeois tragedy in re-
lation to the emergence of the autonomous subject of the Enlightenment, see Szondi, Theorie des 
bürgerlichen Trauerspiels im 18. Jahrhundert: der Kaufmann, der Hausvater, und der Hofmeister (Frank-
furt: Suhrkamp, 1973). Rainer Nägele offers a helpful gloss of Szondi’s theory in Theater, Theory, 
Speculation: Walter Benjamin and the Scenes of Modernity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1991), 10–13.
 31. See Michael N. Forster’s detailed treatment of Herder’s concept here: “in order to understand 
another person’s concepts an interpreter must not only master the person’s word-usage in an external 
way but must also in some manner recapture the person’s relevant sensations. . .  . [I]n order really 
to understand the Greeks, we must learn to see like them. . . . ” “Herder’s Philosophy of Language, 
Interpretation, and Translation: Three Fundamental Principles,” The Review of Metaphysics 56:2 (Dec. 
2002): 353–54.
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Still, there are degrees of success among translations, chiefly with respect to a 
translator’s ability to render the specific tone of a foreign work in the target 
language. In this vein Herder describes a particularly good translation of 
Sophocles:
For the geniuses that read “ethereally,” it [the translation] leads them 
securely by the hand to a clear source. They see the tragic spirit of the 
Greeks, learn of that which is most particular to their manner of thinking 
and their feeling: can follow their simplicity and their composition, their 
talents and development through to the construction of a purpose.32
If a translation can never perfectly capture the particularity of an age and 
its language, that does not imply that the translator is exempt from respon-
sibility for its success. An “authentic” (Arens 98) translation must, at best, 
replicate a text’s “primary tone” (Hauptton), must reveal the “spirit” of the 
source text rather than copying its form.33
 Yet even if Herder’s notion only functions as an ideal—and he indicates 
himself that his model of translation is more aspirational than achievable34—
the concept he advances of bringing the reader to the foreign text persists 
throughout the period as a central aspect of translation theory and prac-
tice, echoed in the writings of A. W. Schlegel, Goethe, Schleiermacher, and 
Humboldt. Little wonder, then, that the translator who transports readers 
across great distances is frequently characterized as needing “courage” for the 
journey. Translation in Herder’s form calls to mind at once the ubiquity of 
translation as a concept and its persistent practical inadequacy.35
 32. Cited in Arens 104: “Den Genies, die bloß ätherisch lesen, ist sie eine sichere Handleiterin 
zu einer klaren Quelle. Sie sehen den tragischen Geist der Griechen, lernen das Eigentümlichste 
ihrer Denkart und ihrer Rührung: können ihre Einfalt und ihre Zusammensetzung, ihre Anlage und 
Fortleitung bis zur Errichtung des Zwecks verfolgen.”
 33. Sauder discusses what Ulrich Gaier has called Herder’s concept of “restorative translation” 
(restaurative Übersetzung), in which the translator “attempts to reach ‘behind’ the original texts—for 
example, when he tries to discover behind Macpherson’s Ossian the ‘palimpsest’ of ancient and undoc-
umented folk poetry” (“Herder’s Poetic Works, His Translations, and His Views on Poetry,” in Koepke 
2009, 320). This idea suggests an intriguing link to Hölderlin’s later formulations about bringing out 
the “Oriental” behind the Greek source text.
 34. Herder jokingly suggests that the “best translator” who is also the “best explicator” would 
be able to produce a book with the title, “A Poetic Translation of Hebrew Poems, Explained in the 
Context of the Country, the History, the Opinions, the Religion, the Situation, the Customs, and the 
Language of their Nation and Transplanted into the Genius of Our Time, Our Thinking, and Our 
Language” (Lefevere 31).
 35. Arens claims that Herder’s argument ultimately renders any foreign text “fundamentally un-
translatable,” since the best translator must be able to explain and form ideas (bilden) rather than 
merely recreate them (103).
CHaPter one36
 As a young philosopher-poet deeply engaged with both the intellectual 
icons and the volatile politics of his time, Hölderlin was well aware that 
the path to Bildung demanded the study of foreign models, and he also 
recognized the potential of translation as a mode of communication and 
linguistic expansion. (An avid reader of Herder, moreover, he would likely 
have had some knowledge of his views on translation as outlined in the 
Fragmente.) At an early stage, however, he also identified the translator’s 
particular vulnerability in that process. In February 1794 Hölderlin writes a 
letter to Ludwig Neuffer, who was working on translations of Virgil as well 
as the Roman historian Sallust. Hölderlin first praises his friend’s efforts 
to remain “loyal” (treu) to Virgil, since that struggle will pay off in the 
strengthening of both language and spirit: “The spirit of the great Roman 
will surely strengthen yours wonderfully. Your language will gain more and 
more agility and strength in the struggle with his” (StA 6, 1: 109f.).36 A few 
months later he writes to Neuffer again, extolling the “healing gymnastics” 
(heilsame Gymnastik) of translation practice, in which one’s own language 
becomes more “supple” (geschmeidig) through striving for “foreign beauty 
and magnitude” (nach fremder Schönheit und Größe).37 Despite its beneficial 
effects, however, the practice also carries risks for the translator: in what 
Charlie Louth describes as “an uncanny proleptic evocation of the whole of 
his development as a translator” (58), Hölderlin proposes that spending too 
much time in “foreign service” might cause a dangerous loss of contact with 
one’s own language.
Language is the organ of our heads, our hearts, the sign of our fantasies, our 
ideas; it must obey us. If it has lived too long in foreign service, I think it 
is nearly to be feared that it will never again become entirely the free, pure 
expression of our spirit, formed out of nothing but our interiority, thus 
and not otherwise.38
 “Translation is good for you,” then, to cite the title of a recent lecture 
 36. “Der Geist des hohen Römers muß den Deinen wunderbar stärken. Deine Sprache muß im 
Kampfe mit der seinigen immer mer an Gewandheit und Stärke gewinnen.”
 37. In this letter he also describes the pitfall of remaining so long in “foreign service” that one 
cannot safely return to one’s own language, an uncannily prescient observation that both Louth and 
Constantine have discussed in some detail, see Louth 58f. and Constantine, “Translation Is Good for 
You,” lecture at Swansea University, 30 June 2010.
 38. “Die Sprache ist Organ unseres Kopfs, unseres Herzens, Zeichen unserer Phantasien, unserer 
Ideen; uns muss sie gehorchen. Hat sie nun zu lange in fremdem Dienste gelebt, so denk’ ich, ist fast 
zu fürchten, daß sie nie mehr ganz der freie reine, durch gar nichts, als durch das Innre, so und nicht 
anders gestaltete Ausdruk unseres Geistes werde” (StA 6, 1: 125).
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by David Constantine, but not always.39 To be more precise, it is surely 
good for the Germans but not necessarily good for the translator. Friedrich 
Schleiermacher would later recognize the extent of the translator’s exposure, 
describing the “extraordinary form of humiliation” to which he must sub-
ject himself for the sake of his source text; Hölderlin—at least in the eyes 
of many readers, from his contemporaries to the present day—has come to 
embody its consequences. Within the specific context of the nascent German 
nation, however, the sacrifice makes sense; translation, which is at once a look 
backward and a step forward, a negotiation with difference and a gesture 
that constitutes new identity, grants the source text a renewed hermeneutic 
urgency. This was especially true for Greek tragedy, given the distances the 
form had traveled and the passionate responses it nevertheless continued to 
inspire. An ancient text has the potential to mean something different in a 
modern context, Hölderlin and his cohort imply, and by that other relevance 
to lend shape to the intellectual and aesthetic activity of the day.
ii. The Step Forward: romantic Translation
When I read Homer I have no choice but to become a Greek. . .  . The reader’s 
soul secretly translates him for itself, wherever it can do so . . . (Herder, cited in 
Lefevere 34)
The secret of reading, at least for Herder and the early Romantics who 
studied his work, is that it is always a process of translation. (Novalis will 
eventually agree with and radicalize this notion, suggesting that “not just 
books, everything can be translated” in the differentiated ways in which he 
imagines the process [Störig 33]). In the moment that Homer speaks to 
the reader, that reader becomes a Greek, identifies with that position and 
occupies it in absentia. The idea that we have “no choice” in the matter, 
that reading transports and transforms us secretly and regardless of our will, 
does not invalidate this process as a crucial step on the path of Bildung. 
Translation thus exceeds the boundaries of literary practice and becomes a 
metaphor, a “category of thought” (Lefevere 30) that describes and validates 
a particular mode of aesthetic experience.40 Such an experience goes beyond 
 39. David Constantine, “Translation is Good for You,” keynote address, The Author-Translator 
in the European Literary, Context, Swansea University 30 June 2010.
 40. Indeed, as Louth points out, translation as a theoretical construct in the long eighteenth 
century closely resembles the process of Bildung in microcosm, sending the self on a journey into 
the unknown that ends with the return to a more complete self (24). At least for Herder, then, the 
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the mere study of models, engaging the soul, rather than the intellect alone, 
in following the “flight” of Homer’s Greek.
To understand Homer is one thing, says Winckelmann, to be able to explain 
him to yourself another; and this happens in my soul only by means of a 
secret translation, a rapid change in thought and language. (Lefevere 34)
 Herder invokes a contrast here that will continue to resonate in the 
coming decades as the study of the Greeks gains momentum alongside the 
will to translate. On one side is Winckelmann, with his idealizing, even 
paganistic passion for the beauty of ancient Greece, and those readers who 
would seek to follow, by “secret translation,” the paths laid along those dis-
tant shores; on the other, “a commentator, an annotator, a schoolmaster, or a 
learner of languages”—the reader who studies the Greeks, who understands 
their language and traditions in a concrete sense, but does not surrender to 
the transporting experience of “secret translation” (see Constantine 1984, 
101f.) Herder describes this reader’s approach to classical Greece—or any 
such encounter with foreign shores, for that matter—as “vague or dead.” 
Hölderlin will likewise equate this latter approach with “dead” reading, with 
the collector of artifacts and his excessive concern for “everything positive” 
(alles Positive); as Constantine explains, “‘positives Beleben des Todten’ [the 
positive reanimation of the dead] was the way of the antiquarians rummag-
ing in the ruins of Athens, and by extension it is the illusion, under many 
forms, that a living work can be made by assembling enough material” 
(Constantine 1984, 102f.). Meanwhile, as we will see, one of Hölderlin’s 
primary concerns in translating the Greeks was to render their texts “more 
alive” to a modern audience. Far from a static artifact, the “living” text is 
one that engenders an effect, not just passive admiration but surrender to 
its “flight.”41
 Herder’s comments on the practice of translation uphold this distinction 
between antiquarian and aesthete, as he pegs the ideal translator as “creative 
genius”: “A German Homer, Aeschylus, Sophocles . . . builds a monument 
unnoticed by pedants and schoolmasters, but it holds the eye of the wise 
by virtue of its silent grandeur and simple splendour” (Lefevere 31). At the 
practice of translation turns this secret self-transformation into a conscious exercise in individual and 
universal betterment. The one who translates, however, bears a heavy burden: as the transmitter of the 
foreign, he is responsible to both text and reader. Little wonder, then, that such a translator must be, 
in Herder’s estimation, a “creative genius” (Lefevere 31).
 41. Spivak 1993, 180: “Translation is the most intimate act of reading. I surrender to the text 
when I translate.”
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same time, however, he complicates Winckelmann’s notion of Nachahmung, 
since the emphasis on the translator as “creative” force suggests an engage-
ment with the text that shifts away from reverent imitation. In this light he 
imagines the preface to the ideal translation as a challenge both to aspiring 
translators and to the reader as such:
And should you want to make use of the treasures of one of the most excel-
lent nations: look, they are here. I want to teach you their art of transform-
ing history and religion into poetry; do not steal what they have invented; 
steal their art of inventing, of creation, of expression. (Lefevere 32)
 Steal the art of inventing, not its substance: the primary task of trans-
lating is not to copy foreign material (what Herder calls “wretched imita-
tion” [Lefevere 31]) but to learn from foreign methods in the creation of 
new material, “an imitation which manages to remain original.” As Gerhard 
Sauder discusses, Herder’s formulation clearly echoes the aesthetic ideology 
of the Sturm und Drang, with its emphasis on the essential role of genius for 
achieving great art, and we also see most clearly his influence on the Jena 
Romantics’ thinking on translation as expansion and improvement over the 
original (Sauder 319). His comments find an echo in Novalis’s provocative 
claim, in a 1797 letter to A. W. Schlegel, that “the German Shakespeare 
(i.e., Schlegel’s translation) today is better than the English.” This process 
of improvement does not suggest, as it would have for Gottsched or even 
for Lessing, that the translation must compensate for a source text’s poetic 
weaknesses.42 Rather, as Berman discusses, Novalis refers here to the Roman-
tic idea that “the original has an a priori scope that never quite is” (106); 
translation, in the sense that it implies continued aesthetic and intellec-
tual reflection, represents a potentiating process that moves the work of art 
toward its culmination. The look backward is always a step forward—and 
for Novalis, a step upward.43
 42. Lessing: “the hand of a master [ . . . ] has compensated, with countless little improvements 
and corrections, for that which in the original text is often a bit cross-eyed, a bit affected” (eine 
Meisterhand [  .  .  .  ] mit unzählig kleinen Verbesserungen und Berichtigungen desjenigen, was in 
der Urschrift oft ein wenig schielend, ein wenig affektiert ist, kompensiert hat” [cited in Arens 96]). 
Gottsched: “ . . . you should leave each writer his own nature, which identifies him, in the translation. 
Yet I would not therefore advise to leave together in one piece all the long-winded sentences. . . . No, 
in this case a translator is rightfully entitled to the liberty of splitting up a convoluted sentence into 
two, three, or more parts” (Lefevere 16).
 43. Louth calls Novalis’s formulation an example of “Bildung . . . von außen hinein” (from the 
outside in, quoting Friedrich Schlegel), in which the translation of Shakespeare has “taken him up and 
transmuted him into a continuum, extended his reach, introduced that self-reflexivity which unsettles 
the finished work . . . and exposes it” (Louth 35).
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 For the celebrated translator and language philosopher Wilhelm von 
Humboldt, translation was certainly a “potentiation,” as Berman describes 
it (77), though not as much for the text itself as for the subject who reads 
it; insofar as it has the capacity to illuminate—or, even better, to provide 
readers with the tools to illuminate for themselves—the dark contours of 
ancient text, classical translation provides the basis for the subject’s dialecti-
cal progress toward enlightened citizenship. A comparison between Hum-
boldt’s approach to translating Aeschylus’s Agamemnon with Hölderlin’s 
work on Sophocles is instructive, not only because the two projects are 
nearly contemporary but also because of their starkly divergent perspectives 
on what a translation can and ought to achieve. If Humboldt retains in his 
approach a touch of the “antiquarian,” in stark contrast to Hölderlin, he also 
provides precisely the kind of critical reflection on the text that Herder and 
the Romantics regarded as essential to its “improvement.”44
iii. divergent methods: Humboldt and Hölderlin
Humboldt embarked on his translation of Agamemnon at approximately the 
same time as Hölderlin began translating Sophocles (although Humboldt 
devoted another decade and a half to the project before publishing it in 
1816). Yet although the two projects emerge from similar contexts, their 
respective approaches—as well as the finished products—are quite different. 
While Hölderlin used a source widely regarded as corrupt, the Frankfurt 
Juntina edition of 1555, Humboldt consulted closely with Greek philolo-
gists to achieve the “historical rigor and conscientiousness” that the source 
text merited (historische Strenge und Gewissenhaftigkeit, Störig 85). While 
Hölderlin’s remarks are cryptic and offer little explanation of the texts they 
introduce, Humboldt’s introduction evinces a careful engagement not only 
with the material of Aeschylus’s text but with the “monstrous background” 
(Störig 77) of the Trojan war. Situating the plot of the Agamemnon within 
the broader context of the Greek world, he repeatedly invokes metaphors 
of darkness and light to argue that the text represents a bridge to greater 
understanding of myth and history, for Greek and modern audiences alike: 
“  .  .  . a line of torches binds Asia and Europe in one shining night” (eine 
Fackelreihe verbindet in einer glanzvollen Nacht Asien und Europa, Störig 78). 
 44. Steiner has particularly high praise for Humboldt in After Babel, describing him somewhat 
quaintly as “among the last Europeans of whom it may be said with fair confidence that they had 
direct professional or imaginative notions of very nearly the whole of extant knowledge” (After Babel 
80).
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Where darkness once obscured the potential for connection, a row of flicker-
ing flames lights the crossing; a description of the mythic-historical impact 
of the play thus also stands as a metaphor for its translation in Humboldt’s 
able hands.
 In general, Humboldt advances the argument that a critical and learned 
approach to ancient text enhances its aesthetic impact. This applies not only 
to the translator’s work but also to that of the reader. Aeschylus’s text does 
contain obscurities (Dunkelheiten), Humboldt suggests, particularly in the 
Choral passages, but it is not the translator’s duty alone to illuminate them; 
the reader is primarily responsible for negotiating his own understanding of 
the text’s dark contours.
As one thinks oneself into the mood of the poet, into his time, into the 
characters he puts on the stage, the obscurity gradually fades and is replaced 
by a high clarity. A part of this careful attention must also be given to the 
translation: never expect that what is sublime, immense, and extraordinary 
in the original language will be easily and immediately comprehensible in 
the translation. (Schulte and Biguenet 59, trans. modified).45
The basis of reading here is attention, “thinking oneself into” another age and 
mode of expression; darkness fades and is replaced by “high clarity” (hohe 
Klarheit), implying the elevation of the viewing subject to an elevated level of 
understanding (indeed, his word choice recalls the German Enlightenment 
[Aufklärung] itself ). This is somewhat reminiscent of Herder’s “secret trans-
lation,” in the sense that the reader is swept away, by the power of his own 
reading, to another time, place, and “mood,” but Humboldt’s model insists 
on activity, the work of thinking, rather than surrender to the effects of for-
eign expression. Indeed, the reader must be challenged to think through a 
text’s obscurities, left conspicuously in place by the translator, while avoiding 
the interference of “feeling” at all costs: “Least of all should one allow the 
influence of so-called aesthetic feeling, to which translators may feel them-
selves called, if one wants to avoid encroaching on the text in a manner that 
sooner or later will make space for other encroachments (the worst thing 
that can happen to an interpreter of the ancients).”46
 45. “Sowie man sich in die Stimmung des Dichters, seines Zeitalters, der von ihm aufgeführten 
Personen hineindenkt, verschwindet sie [die Dunkelheit] nach und nach, und eine hohe Klarheit tritt 
an die Stelle. Einen Theil dieser Aufmerksamkeit muss man auch der Uebersetzung schenken; nicht 
verlangen, dass das, was in der Ursprache erhaben, riesenhaft und ungewöhnlich ist, in der Uebertra-
gung leicht und augenblicklich fasslich seyn solle” (Störig 84).
 46. Störig 85: “Am wenigsten darf man dem sogenannten ästhetischen Gefühl, wozu gerade die 
Uebersetzer sich berufen glauben könnten, darauf Einfluss gestatten, wenn man (das Schlimmste was 
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work, not only for the translator but for the reader as well, strongly reflects 
Humboldt’s vision for the reform of educational institutions in the early 
decades of the nineteenth century. As a model of Bildung, the philologi-
cal study of the ancients would instill in the individual the drive toward 
“self-willed citizenship” (Marchand 28). (Again—as with the translation 
that leaves some obscurity in place for the reader’s “attention”—the subject’s 
momentum toward clarity emerges as an act of volition rather than in the 
form of Herder’s surrender to “secret translation.”) As Marchand discusses, 
Humboldt’s model of Bildung identified “appreciation of the Greeks with 
the ideal of individual self-cultivation, thereby drawing him away from, 
rather than into, the public sphere” (26); the individual subject, turning 
inward in the interest of developing intellectual skill, places himself (and 
for Humboldt it can only be himself 47) on the path to active citizenship.
 Only one “feeling” proves productive for both translator and reader in 
Humboldt’s estimation, namely, a form of aesthetic judgment concerning 
the extent of a translation’s effect of “foreignness.” Some foreign feeling is 
essential if a translation is to remain “loyal” to its source: a “certain shade of 
foreignness” (Störig 83: eine gewisse Farbe der Fremdheit) must coexist with a 
“love for the original.” However, that touch of the foreign (das Fremde) may 
not cross over into outright foreignness (die Fremdheit), or the translation 
will merely reveal its translator’s lack of skill:
The line . . . can easily be drawn. As long as one does not feel the foreignness 
(Fremdheit) yet does feel the foreign (Fremde), a translation has reached its 
highest goal; but where foreignness appears as such, and more than likely 
even obscures the foreign, the translator betrays his inadequacy to the origi-
nal. (Schulte and Biguenet 58; trans. modified)48
Humboldt goes on to say that “the feeling of the unbiased reader (das Gefühl 
des unvoreingenommen Lesers) is not likely to miss this true line of separa-
tion:” the reader will simply know when a line has been crossed.
 It is at this juncture, where impressions of the foreign are governed by 
einem Bearbeiter der Alten begegnen kann) nicht dem Text Einfälle aufdringen will, die über kurz, 
oder lang andren Einfällen Platz machen.”
 47. See Marchand 28: with his educational reforms Humboldt sought to promote “civic harmo-
ny and loyalty to the state” by curing “one-sidedness” in learned men. However, he did not consider 
this “one-sidedness” to be a bad trait at all for women.
 48. “Die Gränze  .  .  .  ist hier sehr leicht zu ziehen. Solange nicht die Fremdheit, sondern das 
Fremde gefühlt wird, hat die Uebersetzung ihre höchsten Zwecke erreicht; wo aber die Fremdheit an 
sich erscheint, und vielleicht gar das Fremde verdunkelt, da verräth der Uebersetzer, dass er seinem 
Original nicht gewachsen ist” (Störig 83).
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the reader’s “feeling,” that Humboldt’s and Hölderlin’s projects contrast most 
productively. In granting the reader authority to place a limit on a transla-
tion’s degree of foreignness, Humboldt implies that the translator must not 
only be sufficiently learned to command both source and target languages 
but eloquent enough to make that command accessible to a reading pub-
lic. And it is undeniable that Hölderlin as translator would stumble under 
both of these conditions. Not only were his contemporaries bewildered by 
the tone and language of his Sophocles, but, as Beissner has thoroughly 
shown, the combination of his limited knowledge of Greek and his imper-
fect source text led to numerous errors and nonsequiturs that undermined 
his scholarly credibility.49 Yet Humboldt’s “true line of separation,” easily 
recognized by the unbiased reader, has its limits: it cannot account for the 
gradual expansion of cultural tastes and preferences (in an age, moreover, 
in which those values were most definitely in flux). Goethe would later 
(1819, in Noten und Abhandlungen zu bessern Verständnis des west-östlichen 
Divans) suggest a more dynamic model, arguing that an audience becomes 
accustomed to and prepared for new forms through the development of 
translation as medium, that with time and experience an audience comes to 
tolerate more and more “foreignness.” His distinction among three different 
“epochs” of translation posits a final phase, the “highest and last,” in which 
“the goal of the translation is to achieve perfect identity with the original, 
so that the one does not exist instead of the other but in the other’s place” 
(Schulte and Biguenet 61).50 Of the three phases of translation, this last 
one elicits the most resistance from its audience and yet offers the greatest 
potential reward, as Goethe argues with the example of Voss’s Homer:
At first the public was not at all satisfied with Voss . . . until gradually [nach 
und nach] the public’s ear accustomed itself to this new kind of translation, 
became comfortable with it. Now anyone who assesses the extent of what 
has happened, what versatility has come to the Germans, what rhetorical, 
rhythmical, metrical advantages are available to the spirited, talented begin-
ner . . . may hope that literary history will openly acknowledge who was the 
first to choose this path in spite of so many and varied obstacles. (Schulte 
and Biguenet 61)51
 49. Friedrich Beissner, Hölderlins Übersetzungen aus dem Griechischen (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1961), 
65f.
 50. Steiner justifiably points out that Goethe’s model is in general “unsatisfactory,” leaving too 
much open to conjecture, but that it does fit in well with Goethe’s central philosophic beliefs: “Trans-
lation is an exemplary case of metamorphosis” (After Babel, 259).
 51. “. . . Voß konnte das Publikum zuerst nicht befriedigen, bis man sich nach und nach in die 
neue Art hinein hörte, hinein bequemte. Wer nun aber jetzt übersieht, was geschehen ist, welche 
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 The gradual (nach und nach) education of a modern audience is accom-
plished for Goethe through the process of “sich hineinhören” (literally, 
hearing oneself into the foreign work); by exposing the senses to new and 
unfamiliar forms, the public makes itself comfortable with those forms 
(Goethe’s formulation is “sich hineinbequemen,” an echo of “hineinhören;” 
interestingly enough, Humboldt had insisted on the importance of “sich 
hineindenken,” emphasizing once again the work of the intellect rather than 
the senses). Voss’s translations may never be duly appreciated in his own age, 
Goethe suggests here, but their time will come. Humboldt’s easily recogniz-
able distinction between the desirable “foreign” and undesirable “foreign-
ness” is perhaps only temporary, then, and the question of its limit must 
continually be posed anew as the senses expand to meet more challenging 
material. Goethe’s notion of an audience in flux points to a dynamic and 
historical dimension of Fremdheit, thus of translation itself: if translators 
such as Voss or Hölderlin push the boundaries of their readers’ tolerance 
for the foreign, it does not mean that their works are failed or “ruined” 
translations. Indeed, to follow Goethe’s point, perhaps a translation must be 
situated at this limit, must risk foreignness in order to sustain that experi-
ence of the foreign that even Humboldt regards as essential. The continued 
life of the text in translation (its “living on,” in Benjamin’s terms) depends 
on the translator’s maintaining that precarious balance.
 This is where Hölderlin enters the picture as translator: he holds the text 
in a suspended position between foreignness and familiarity, refusing ever to 
cross completely over into the safe zone of the “familiarly” foreign. Indeed, 
perhaps it is because his translations are situated on this precipice that they 
have remained an object of interest to literary history. By challenging Hum-
boldt’s limit of Fremdheit, he effectively ensured that his project would not 
become a relic of a particular historical period but rather would continue 
to resonate as a set of questions that would engage audiences over time. 
The very difficulty of the text, its suspension between sense and nonsense, 
guarantees its “living on.”
iv. Suspension
Der scheinet aber fast
Rückwärts zu gehen und
Versatilität unter die Deutschen gekommen, welche rhetorischen, rhythmischen, metrischen Vorteile 
dem geistreich-talentvollen Jüngling zur Hand sind . . . der darf hoffen, dass die Literaturgeschichte 
unbewunden aussprechen werde, wer diesen Weg unter mancherlei Hindernissen zuerst einschlug” 
(Störig 37).
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Ich mein, er müsse kommen
Von Osten. Vieles wäre
Zu sagen davon. Und warum hängt er
An den Bergen gerad?  (“Der Ister”)
That one seems, however, almost
To go backwards and
I think it must come
From the East. Much could
Be said of this. And why does it cling
To the mountains, just there? (“The Ister” )
As is so typical for Hölderlin, the poetic depiction of the Danube’s flow 
evokes the depth of his relation to the ancient past (here “the East”): the 
look back, the reflective contact with the source, the fleeting effect of suspen-
sion as the river, seemingly moving forward and backward at once, clings 
momentarily to the mountainside.52 In a similar way, his translation practice 
will enact a suspension between two languages where the reader must hold 
each one in brief abeyance, dislocating herself from the steady flow of her 
own language in order to measure the distance traveled by the text. In a 
recent article, Stanley Corngold eloquently describes a similar “delay” in the 
process of translation that implies a fundamental ethics:
How should we begin to know such a person—and we must—otherwise 
than by becoming acquainted with dislocation, our own dislocation, out-
side language, outside competence? What room is there for this difficult 
strangeness, if we have not learned to stand firm in the midst of it, abiding 
a moment of inexpressibility, an incommunicable sense of otherness, of 
intimacy with a common human grain.53
Although Corngold’s comments here do not refer directly to Hölderlin, 
they nevertheless evoke this scholar-translator’s long engagement with the 
poet-translator. His image of “holding together in the mind” two disparate 
ways of meaning—of affirming, at once, not only likeness but unlikeness—
sketches out Hölderlin’s mode of translation quite precisely and highlights 
its key distinction from the theory and practice of translation as the path to 
 52. See Constantine’s discussion of the poem and its depiction of a river that “puzzles him” with 
its west-east current, The Significance of Locality in the Poetry of Friedrich Hölderlin (Modern Humani-
ties Research Association, 1979), 61f.
 53. Stanley Corngold, “Comparative Literature: The Delay in Translation.” In Bermann and 
Wood 144.
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Bildung. For Hölderlin, translation is not “good for you” because it expands 
subjective horizons outward but because its effects unsettle identity at its 
very core. This leaves his translation practice at some distance not only from 
the “antiquarian” mode of imitating the ancients but also from the idea of 
“surrender” to the text that Herder proposes (and that contemporary transla-
tion theorists like Spivak have continued to refine). Hölderlin’s investment 
lies rather in the possibility of rendering tragedy “more alive” by allowing 
the translation to speak, always imperfectly, of the complexity of relation 
between contexts and languages. The resonance of such “tragic effects” is 
evident, as we will see, in the extent to which Hölderlin’s Sophocles has sent 
(and continues to send) ripples through modern concepts of translation, 
reading, and interpretation.
(it should be said from the start that Hölderlin will repeatedly 
prove to be an exception and so needs to be singled out as offering 
something unique) (Schmidt 2001: 19)
But you, you must not put yourself at risk; your noble nature, the 
mirror of all that is beautiful must not shatter in you; you also 
owe to the world what appears to you transfigured in a higher 
form. . . . Few are like you!1
Few are like HiM,  as his muse Susette Gontard insists; and already, with the mirror placed both before him and in him, we begin to reflect 
on what has set him so very far apart. To be sure, the dominant image of 
Hölderlin in the German cultural imagination remains that of the Einzel-
gänger: the sensitive loner, the conflicted revolutionary, the tragically silent 
madman. His translations, moreover, were widely regarded as the unfor-
tunate product of precisely that habit of risk-taking against which Susette 
warns here. “The translation of Sophocles fully expresses his ruined mental 
condition,” a concerned Schelling wrote to Hegel in July 1804 (FA 16: 20), 
introducing a bias in reading these translations that would extend well into 
the twentieth century.2 Yet starting from this point of departure, however 
 1. “Dich selbst darfst Du auf ’s Spiel nicht setzen, Deine edle Natur, der Spiegel alles Schönen 
darf nicht zerbrechen in Dir, Du bist der Welt auch schuldig zu geben, was Dir verklärt in höherer 
Gestalt erscheint . . . Wenige sind wie Du!” Letter from Susette Gontard to Friedrich Hölderlin (June 
1799), StA VII: 80. There are several highly usable editions of Hölderlin’s collected works, the Stutt-
garter edition (StA) and the other, more recent and arguably more definitive edition, the “Frankfurter 
Ausgabe” (FA). Although I refer primarily to the FA in my discussion of the Sophocles translations, at 
certain points the StA is more clearly organized, in which case I have elected to refer to the StA..







tempting it may be, shifts our attention from the possibility that strange-
ness can itself mark out a path, even if the one less traveled by. If Hegel’s 
and Schelling’s attempts to define the tragic have come to represent the 
beginnings of a philosophical debate concerned with ethics and modern 
subjectivity—a debate that spans centuries and continents and still has not 
ended—then Hölderlin’s engagement with Greek tragedy may have begun 
as a somewhat bizarre digression within that debate. Yet it proves to be a 
digression of almost uncanny fortitude, one that does not exhaust itself in 
its own incongruity but maintains a voice of its own. That likewise spans 
centuries and continents, and likewise has not ended.
 While Hölderlin’s confrontation with the tragic may appear as an anom-
aly in the tradition of reading and translating the Greeks, it also initiates 
a progression that has had a significant impact on concepts of tragedy and 
translation in the twentieth century. For readers at several different stages in 
the twentieth century, this translation project is not an isolated instance but 
the reflection of another way of thinking about the tragic within modernity. 
This other way raises questions that confront above all the problem of the 
work’s place in history and thus make possible a more nuanced relationship 
to the past. How do we represent a past that eludes our comprehension? 
What is the responsibility of the translator or reader of ancient text vis-à-vis 
her “original”? Can the fundamental distinctiveness of an ancient source text 
be preserved in any meaningful way in the transition to a modern frame of 
reference?
 Hölderlin began to reflect on such questions at a time when “the tragic” 
represented something else, namely, a retrieval of ancient themes in the ser-
vice of modern aesthetics and epistemology. If this debate considered at all 
the gap between ancient and modern tragic experience, it was in the form of 
a question—how are we to understand the relevance of ancient tragedy for 
us today?—that had always already been answered, in the very intentional-
ity of posing the question. However, such logic forecloses the possibility 
of preserving that which is not understood, that which cannot be made 
relevant—of allowing comprehension to slip its moorings in a manner that 
unsettles the solid ground on which the modern subject aims to stand. If 
Hölderlin’s theoretical reflections on the tragic stand alone in any sense, it is 
here: while his contemporaries in Romantic and Idealist circles were largely 
if only to demonstrate how it unsettles that context from within; see, for example, the seminal essays 
by Szondi (“Überwindung des Klassizismus,” in Hölderlin-Studien [Frankfurt: Insel, 1967], 85–104) 
and Lacoue-Labarthe (“The Caesura of the Speculative”) . See also Nägele, “Ancient Sports and Mod-
ern Transports,” in The Solid Letter: Readings of Friedrich Hölderlin, ed. Aris Fioretos (Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press, 1999): 250–51.
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concerned with grounding experience in a self-recognition that would eradi-
cate the epistemological gap embodied by the Kantian subject, Hölderlin’s 
most salient contribution to the thinking of the tragic lies in his exposure 
of the instability at the heart of speculative thought, the ruptures underly-
ing the conciliatory aims of both Romantic and Idealist philosophies in the 
wake of Kantian critique.3 Ultimately, it is this naked instability that allows 
Hölderlin’s Sophocles to appear so profoundly anomalous in its time—to 
appear, in fact, touched by madness—and yet also compel such passionate 
response in its wake.4
 In the larger context of Hölderlin’s work on tragedy and the idea of the 
tragic, which spans most of his productive life, these translations represent 
both culmination and resignation.5 After failing three times between 1797 
and 1800 to complete an original tragedy, The Death of Empedocles, Hölder-
lin turned to the translation project in earnest around 1801 with the prob-
able intention of eventually translating all of Sophocles’s works (Beissner 
107f.). Idealist in initial conception if not in execution, the translations of 
Oedipus and Antigone with their accompanying remarks achieve a marriage 
of philosophy and poetic performance that eluded him in the Empedocles 
drafts. As his last published works, they represent his final accounting of the 
Idealist program and reveal, in place of that program’s presumption of total-
ity in the concept of intellectual intuition, the impossibility of conceiving 
totality. Nevertheless, they do not represent mere failure. While his three 
incomplete versions of Empedocles may anticipate the collapse of speculative 
thought into irreducible difference (both thematically and in practice), his 
Sophocles project introduces another trajectory of mediation, an “askew 
perspective” (linkischer Gesichtspunkt) through which the process of transla-
tion itself becomes the vehicle for a different conception of what tragedy can 
effect within modernity.
 3. See Lacoue-Labarthe, “The Caesura of the Speculative,” 61f.: “If  .  .  .  the culmination of 
philosophy is the stop-gap measure attempting to close the wound (re)opened, in extremis, by Kant 
in the thinking of the Same . . . —if, in short, it is this patching-over of the Kantian crisis . . . then 
Hölderlin .  .  . will have represented .  .  .  the impossibility of overlaying this crisis, this wound still 
open in the tissue of philosophy, where the hand which attempts to close the wound only succeeds in 
reopening it.”
 4. Silke-Maria Weineck offers a rich discussion of Hölderlin’s theory of tragedy in relation to 
(his) madness: she argues that the madness of the tragic hero, in contrast to the fantasy of poetic inspi-
ration or “mania” that surrounded Hölderlin in his lifetime, is primarily an anti-poetic, philosophical 
construct “that must be contained by the counterforce of poetry.” The Abyss Above: Philosophy and 
Poetic Madness in Plato, Hölderlin and Nietzsche (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002), 50f.
 5. His publisher Friedrich Wilmans claimed that the translations were the result of ten years’ 
work, an accurate representation if one goes back to Hölderlin’s earliest attempts to translate Antigone 
in 1794. See D. E. Sattler’s timeline in FA 16: 13–18.
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 As we have already seen, readings of the ethical dilemma played out in 
Greek tragedy have long shaped the construction of the modern subject in 
a profound sense; but Hölderlin’s writings suggest another ethics, in which 
not only thematic details but also the dynamics of translation itself engender 
a specific effect. As the translations and notoriously difficult remarks will 
show, it is precisely as figures in translation that Oedipus and Antigone both 
mark and efface their own mythic status. Unlike the tragic heroes of classi-
cism and Idealism, they present to modern culture neither an unattainable 
ideal, nor a mimetic challenge, nor a mere ethical prototype.6 Instead, their 
particularity produces an effect that is more alienating and yet resonates 
more powerfully than these more conventional frameworks. While, as Karl 
Reinhardt has argued, a pattern of isolation is already set into motion in 
Sophoclean tragedy by a hero who stands alone,7 for whom “the race is 
run,”8 Hölderlin’s logic expands this definition to encompass modern tragic 
experience as such, striving to make palpable an alienation that affects the 
hero but also implicates the subject who encounters him in another age and 
another mode of representation (what Hölderlin calls Vorstellungsart). Not 
only do Oedipus and Antigone stand defiantly apart from the mise en scène, 
but poetic language itself undergoes a process of insistent distancing from 
and disruption of the subject who aims to comprehend its message.9
 This hinge between ancient text and modern experience is made most evi-
dent through Hölderlin’s often disorienting practice of translation. Wedded 
to a syntax neither German nor Greek, his rendering of Sophocles evokes, 
as the translator and critic Susan Bernofsky has noted, “a space between 
 6. With respect to this question of Hölderlin’s image of Greece and his view of mimesis, see 
Lacoue-Labarthe, “Hölderlin and the Greeks,” trans. Judi Olson, rpt. in Typography: Mimesis, Philoso-
phy, Politics, ed. Christopher Fynsk (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 236–47.
 7. For Reinhardt, the “Sophoclean situation” involves above all the hero’s recognition of his own 
radical solitude: “so erfaßt er sich als Mensch doch erst in seinem Preisgegeben- und Verlassen-Sein.” 
Reinhardt, Sophokles (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1947), 10.
 8. Jacques Lacan invokes this phrase with reference to Sophoclean heroes in general, appropri-
ating an observation by the Reinhardt. According to Lacan, Reinhardt is alone in pointing out the 
“special solitude” of Sophoclean heroes “  .  .  .  for in the end tragic heroes are always isolated, they 
are always beyond established limits, always in an exposed position and, as a result, separated in one 
way or another from the structure.” This point has bearing on the solitude of Hölderlin’s Oedipus as 
well. Jacques Lacan, Seminar Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, trans. Dennis Porter (New York: 
Norton, 1992): 271.
 9. Schmidt discusses this modern dilemma of the alienated subject in relation to Plato’s claims 
about the dangers of tragic art for political life: “tragic art fosters a sense of the apartness of people 
thereby weakening, if not destroying, the sense of the common that is needed for a community to 
thrive” (Schmidt 2001, 43). This concern for the “anarchic potential” of language to isolate the indi-
vidual at the expense of the community will certainly haunt Hegel’s reading of the ethical conundrum 
of the Antigone. For Hölderlin, however, the isolation of the tragic hero—which is also always a con-
finement within language—is essential for tragedy to engender its most powerful effect.
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languages” that can leave the reader at some distance from comprehension in 
any conventional sense.10 Rather than attempting to adapt the tragic model 
to a modern setting or modify classical characters to make them recognizable 
to their new audience, his project disavows the prevailing perception in his 
time of tragic experience as a process of identification that evokes fear and 
pity for the hero onstage, offering the pleasurable relief of catharsis. If we 
can speak of catharsis at all in Hölderlin’s reading of Oedipus, we will see 
it defined not as a mode of identificatory reconciliation between spectator 
and hero but as a gesture of severance, of a paradoxically purifying disrup-
tion of identification. Moreover, that disruption finally comes to inhabit a 
figure—that of Antigone—in a manner that magnifies a strangeness inherent 
to the modern subject itself.
 Along with his general theory of tragedy, Hölderlin’s model of transla-
tion in the Sophocles project diverges in significant ways from his con-
temporaries’ views on the subject. Novalis, A. W. Schlegel, and Friedrich 
Schleiermacher all delineate the Romantic conception of translation as a 
fundamental element of apprehension itself, maintaining that translation 
should enact the expansion or Bildung of the self via the experience of the 
foreign, a “positing oneself beyond oneself ” that is literally an Über-setzung, 
a crossing-over.11 Hölderlin’s model appears similar, at least at first glance; 
even if much of what constitutes the foreign text is necessarily “lost in 
translation,” both theories aim to reveal what is gained at the same time. 
However, while both Hölderlin and the Romantics wish to potentiate the 
original by enabling it to say something other than what it had said in 
the source language, Hölderlin’s project and the figure at its center do not 
replicate the Romantic dynamics of expansion into the unknown and reap-
propriation into a more perfect self. Indeed, as evidenced in a letter to his 
publisher Wilmans in April 1804, his efforts aim in quite another direction:
Ich hoffe, die griechische Kunst, die uns fremd ist, durch Nationalkonve-
nienz und Fehler, mit denen sie sich immer herum beholfen hat, dadurch 
lebendiger, als gewöhnlich dem Publikum darzustellen, dass ich das Ori-
 10. Susan Bernofsky, “Hölderlin as Translator: The Perils of Interpretation,” Germanic Review 
76:3 (Summer 2001): 231.
 11. See Berman’s discussion of the Romantics’ view of translation as critical movement: “Its 
scope is not merely the original in its crude being. . . . The original itself, in what the Romantics call 
its ‘tendency,’ possesses an a priori scope: the Idea of the Work which the work tends towards . . . but 
empirically never is. In this respect, the original is only the copy—the translation, if you want—of 
this a priori figure which presides over its being and gives it its necessity.” Translation, by contrast, 
distances the work from this initial empirical layer that separated it from the Idea, hence bringing it 
closer to its truth” (Berman 107).
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entalische, das sie verläugnet hat, mehr heraushebe, und ihren Kunstfehler, 
wo er vorkommt, verbessere.
I hope to represent Greek art, which is foreign to us through the conformity 
to the national and the flaws to which it has always resorted, as more alive 
than usual to the public by bringing out the Oriental element that it has 
disavowed and by correcting its artistic flaw where it occurs. (FA 16: 19)
Hölderlin’s desire to render the Greek text “more alive than usual” does not 
reflect the Romantic subject’s attempt to come to individual terms with 
the foreign, since for Hölderlin it is the conformity to “national” forms of 
expression that has siphoned the life out of Greek art. Rather, he aims to 
bring to light a secondary alterity, the “Oriental,” that not only mobilizes 
the experience of the foreign in modern translation but undermines the 
stability of the original as well, by highlighting an element of Greek identity 
(the “Oriental”) that remains inaccessible to itself. What previous modern 
renderings of Greek tragedy lack is thus a subversive facet of the text that 
is silent in the language of the original but makes itself heard in another 
register, namely, in the manner in which the tragedy, through its disclosure 
of that previously imperceptible alterity, becomes “alive” to its audience: in 
simpler words, in its dramatic effect. If tragedy has always implicitly borne 
the impression of that source of “life,” Hölderlin aims to grant it a voice 
through his translation. Neither reinforcing the Romantics’ expansionist 
logic nor attempting to recover a unified, idealized identity of Greek art, 
for Hölderlin the dynamics of translation retrace and even intensify the dis-
appropriating process by which tragedy produces its most unsettling effects. 
And it is precisely within this logic of (tragedy in) translation that the defi-
ant solitude of his principal characters will eventually come to represent an 
ethical stance like no other.
 The translation project is the central pillar of Hölderlin’s confrontation 
with Greek tragedy, but the roots of this project extend deeply and broadly 
within his poetic and philosophical writings. As Charlie Louth has shown, 
structures of translation infiltrate his poetry to a considerable extent,12 and 
even a cursory examination of Hölderlin’s writings both previous to and 
contemporary with his translation work indicates that classical tragic figures 
are central to his theoretical reflections.13 An understanding of the context 
 12. See in particular Louth’s Chapters 5 and 6, which examine Hölderlin’s later writings, includ-
ing the Sophocles translations.
 13. For a detailed discussion of Hölderlin’s use of mythic figures in the service of messianic 
thought, see Robert Charlier, Heros und Messias: Hölderlins messianische Mythogenese und das jüdische 
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in which Hölderlin undertook these translations can not only help to illu-
minate their more obscure elements but also underscore their crucial status 
within his overall body of work.
in tHe exCerPt  from Susette Gontard’s letter at the start of this chapter, 
the mirror maintains a corrective role, not just reflecting the world as it 
appears to the poet but also altering what it means to reflect by presenting 
it in a higher form. By contrast, Hölderlin’s own representation of the mirror 
image, composed some years later, assumes a less familiar, even monstrous 
cast. In the disputed text “In lieblicher Bläue  .  .  .  ” (In lovely blueness), a 
late but undated piece whose origins remain murky, we find a mirror image 
that both resonates with the stabilizing gesture of Gontard’s description and 
alludes to its potential disruption:14
Wenn einer in den Spiegel siehet, ein Mann, und siehet darin sein Bild, 
wie abgemalt; es gleicht dem Manne, Augen hat des Menschen Bild, hin-
gegen Licht der Mond. Der König Ödipus hat ein Auge zu viel vielleicht. 
Diese Leiden dieses Mannes, sie scheinen unbeschreiblich, unaussprechlich, 
unausdrücklich. (StA II: 1, 372)
When someone looks into a mirror, a man, and sees in it his image, as if 
painted; it resembles the man, the human image has eyes, whereas the moon 
has light. King Oedipus has one eye too many, perhaps. The sufferings of 
this man, they seem indescribable, unspeakable, inexpressible. (Schmidt 
2001, 170; trans. modified)
Denken (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1999). However, Charlier focuses not on Oedipus 
and Antigone but on the recurrence in Hölderlin’s thought of other Greek heroes who are, strictly 
speaking, not “tragic”—Icarus, Heracles, and Proteus—as well as the tragic figure of Dionysus.
 14. The poem was first published in prose form by Hölderlin’s biographer F. W. Waiblinger in his 
1823 novel Phaèton; however, Waiblinger contended that the original text was written by Hölderlin 
in a Pindaric style of verse (“nach Pindarischer Weise”). Norbert von Hellingrath, editor of an early 
version of Hölderlin’s collected works, was the first to attempt reconstruction of that poetic structure 
(Hölderlins Sämtliche Werke, Sechster Band, eds. Hellingrath, Friedrich Seebass and Ludwig Pigenot 
[Berlin: Propyläen, 1923]: 26 [Lesarten 490ff.]). Heidegger also employs the version in verse in his 
body of work on this text (“Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung,” “ . . . dichterisch wohnet der 
Mensch . . . ”), while Beissner reproduces the text as prose (StA II:1, 372). Though Beissner main-
tained that the text may have been written by Waiblinger himself in a somewhat “Hölderlinian” style, 
the image of Oedipus in particular resonates so strikingly with Hölderlin’s other writings that Waib-
linger’s claims about the text’s authenticity seem convincing. More recently scholars have attempted to 
make a case for the poem’s authenticity. See A. den Besten, “Ein Auge zuviel vielleicht: Bemerkungen 
zu einem als apokryph geltenden Hölderlin-Gedicht,” in Poesie und Philosophie in einer tragischen 
Kultur, ed. Heinz Kimmerle (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1995), 87–122.
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 Compared with the “mirror of all that is beautiful” in Gontard’s letter, 
this passage represents both an echo and a distancing, a reinforcement and a 
disruption. The image of the mirror does approximate a man closely enough 
that he may recognize it as “his image,” but without apprehending the par-
ticular beauty that this image reflected for Gontard; eyes see the image that 
both resembles and equals (gleicht). But what on earth does it equal? If for 
Susette the gleam of the mirror reflects all of the beauty that the poet’s soul 
has to offer, here that light projects something far less remarkable—some-
thing even marked by a reduction, “as if painted” (wie abgemalt)—with 
eyes lacking luminescence when compared with the moon. If the reflected 
image does equal something here, that something remains remote from the 
intuition of plenitude that the “mirror of all that is beautiful” initially calls 
to mind.
 Moreover, any semblance of complementarity between subject and image 
is overturned in the very next moment with the emergence of a figure that, 
as the text suggests, cannot possibly become “equal.” In an abrupt turn of 
phrase that fractures the elongated prosaic flow of the sentence before it, a 
tragic figure interrupts. “King Oedipus has one eye too many, perhaps”: the 
familiar image in the mirror shatters and comes tumbling down. Far from 
being an exemplary figure, Oedipus is is the jarring exception to the univer-
sality of the mirror scene. But what does it mean to say that he has “one eye 
too many”? What does having “too many” eyes have to do with the ability 
to see, and what does that have to do with the suffering of the tragic hero, 
not to mention its troubled representation in poetic language? For after all, 
if the mythic Oedipus has a figurative excess in eyes, that factor does little 
more for him in the end than to force him to see too much—and then quite 
literally not to see at all, only to suffer. It is this “one eye too many” that 
marks Oedipus with an excess of suffering; it introduces a difference that 
is marred by deformity, that shatters the glass and the Gleichnis of the mir-
ror with its resistance to the dialectical equation that generated the human 
image.
 This resistance is timely, emerging just as German intellectuals seek to 
come to terms with a rift in the possibility of grounding knowledge in 
self-consciousness. Indeed, it begins to expose Fichte’s statement “Ich bin 
ich,” his fundamental conception of a subject’s potential for absolute self-
intuition, as riven by a difference that exceeds that equation.15 In the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason, Kant had introduced a division not only characteristic 
 15. Thomas Pfau locates the backdrop for the Idealist project in precisely this dilemma, intro-
duced by the thought of Kant and Fichte. Pfau, Idealism and the Endgame of Theory (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1994), 26.
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but constitutive of the subject. Proclaiming in the preface the equivalent of 
a Copernican revolution in philosophy, he reversed the conventional view 
that knowledge must conform to objects, proposing instead the principle 
of objects’ necessary submission to the subject.16 Yet this “revolution” bears 
other consequences, for insofar as it distinguishes the subject’s apprehension 
and understanding of phenomena from the Ding an sich, which cannot 
be known, it also sets limits for the subject an sich; the Kantian subject is 
unable to present itself to itself, absolutely. By asserting, in the section on 
the Transcendental Aesthetic, that the “I” cannot assume its own unity or 
autonomy beyond internal intuition, Kant revealed that the subject can only 
ever presuppose its own identity.
If the faculty of coming to consciousness of oneself is to seek out (to appre-
hend) that which lies in the mind, it must affect the mind, and only in this 
way can it give rise to an intuition of itself. But the form of this intuition, 
which exists antecedently in the mind, determines, in the representation 
of time, the mode in which the manifold is together in the mind, since 
it then intuits itself not as it would represent itself if immediately self-active, 
but as it is affected by itself, and therefore as it appears to itself, not as it is. 
(my emphasis)17
 With this axiom Kant constructs the subject’s potential for self-recogni-
tion in the inescapable terms of reflexivity rather than immediacy; the “I,” 
just like the objects it apprehends and which affect it, can only ever appear 
as representation.18 The imposition of this limit on knowledge was devastat-
ing to the notion of an enlightened autonomous and self-present subject—
 16. See Deleuze’s discussion of Kant’s reversal here, its consequences, and its difference from the 
subjective idealism that follows it in Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties, trans Hugh 
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: Athlone Press, 1984), 13f.
 17. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd ed., trans. Norman Kemp Smith (Houndmills: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 88. “Wenn das Vermögen, sich bewusst zu werden, das, was in Gemüte 
liegt, aufsuchen (apprehendieren) soll, so muss es dasselbe affizieren, und kann allein auf solche Art 
eine Anschauung seiner selbst hervorbringen . . . da es denn sich selbst anschauet, nicht wie es sich un-
mittelbar selbstätig vorstellen würde, sondern nach der Art, wie es von innen affiziert wird, folglich wie 
es sich erscheint, nicht wie es ist” (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in Werke: Band III, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel 
([Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974] 93 [B69]). My emphasis.
 18. Deleuze illustrates Kant’s position with a citation from Rimbaud, “I is another.” The form 
of the inner sense as time is one that is only thought in spatial (thus distant, mediated) terms, while 
the receptive experience of changes in time (Ego, moi) remains separated from an active synthesis of 
time (I, je): “The I and the Ego are thus separated by the line of time which relates them to each other, 
but under the condition of a fundamental difference. [ . . . ] ‘Form of interiority’ means not only that 
time is internal to us, but that our interiority constantly divides us from ourselves, splits us in two: a 
splitting in two which never runs its course, since time has no end.” Kant’s Critical Philosophy, ix.
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such as the subject Lessing hoped to condition through a new approach to 
theater—and the turmoil that ensued would continue to ripple through 
discourses of philosophy and literarure for decades to come. While Idealists 
endeavored, through the labor of the concept, to reclaim the subject’s self-
presence in the face of division, Romanticism aimed for the subject’s auto-
production in the work of art, within the experience of beauty.19 What both 
these attempts present above all is the desire that triggered their movement, 
what Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy have called the will to System (la volonté 
du Système). The aims of both speculative Idealism and Romanticism form 
an exigency announced in the future, an overcoming of dissonance, not 
yet there but “to do;”20 as Schelling writes in a letter to Hegel, “We must 
continue with philosophy!—Kant has swept everything away” (Wir müssen 
noch weiter it der Philosophie!—Kant hat alles weggeräumt).21
 Given the convergence of this crisis in philosophy with the attempt, after 
Lessing and Winckelmann, to reinvent tragedy in the spirit of enlightened 
humanism, it is perhaps no surprise that the Greeks are very soon placed 
into the service of this “to do” as the exemplary text of post-Kantian phi-
losophy. A philosophical inquiry into the essence of the tragic is initiated in 
the same moment that German Idealism gives birth to itself in the throes of 
a crisis; thus while Lessing remained within the sphere of poetics, Friedrich 
Schelling represents for Szondi the first philosopher of the tragic.22 The dif-
 19. See also Walter Benjamin’s Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism (Begriff der Kunstkri-
tik in der deutschen Romantik), in which he discusses the Romantic conception of reflection as capable 
of bearing the absolute; despite its infinite character, thought (including the concept of the “Ich”) is 
“substantial and fulfilled in itself,”(in sich selbst substanziell und erfüllt). Gesammelte Schriften, Band 
1:1, ed. Tiedemann and Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974): 31.
 20. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 33. To be sure, their heavy privileging of philosophy as the 
precursor to Romanticism has not gone unchallenged; Jean-Pierre Mileur argues that their “philoso-
centrism” neglects the equivocity of Romantic literary practice, reducing it to a mere effect of theory 
(“The Return of the Romantic,” in Rajan and Clark, Intersections: 19th-Century Philosophy and Theory 
[Albany: SUNY Press, 1995], 325–48). While Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, according to Mileur, 
suggest that literature “lacks propriety” and thus requires a “properly philosophical” orientation, he 
invokes the “possibility that literature’s impropriety, even if or even because it encourages a prolif-
eration of approaches to criticism, might be a positive advantage, its main advantage in contrast to 
philosophy . . . ” (337)
 21. Letter from Friedrich Schelling to G. W. F. Hegel, 6 January 1795. In Briefe von und an 
Hegel, Band I: 1785–1812, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1952), 14. As the 
youthful triumvirate of Schelling, Hölderlin, and Hegel posited in their collaborative fragment Das 
älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus (1796), that aspiration also marks the culmination of 
humankind: “A higher spirit, sent from heaven, will found this new religion among us; it will be the 
last great work of humankind” (Ein höherer Geist, vom Himmel gesandt, muss diese neue Religion unter 
uns stiften, sie wird das letzte große Werk der Menschheit sein). In FA 14: 17 (trans. Schmidt 85). The 
Systemprogramm is included in the collected works of all three of its purported authors.
 22. Peter Szondi, Versuch über das Tragische, 7 (An Essay on the Tragic, trans. Paul Fleming [Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 2002], 1). Szondi begins by distinguishing poetics from philosophy 
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ference emerges in their disparate accounts of what tragedy can and must 
represent in their day and age; while Lessing, following tradition as well 
as attempting to establish his own, regards tragic art as a means to edify 
the self, for Schelling tragedy, as the highest form of art, has the potential 
to take over where philosophy reaches its conceptual limits (Schmidt 74). 
Where speculative reason can no longer account for contradiction, the tragic 
aesthetic both highlights that contradiction and makes it bearable to the 
viewing subject.
 The contrast between Hölderlin’s monstrous image of Oedipus and that 
of his close collaborator Schelling is intriguing enough to warrant a brief 
elaboration. Schelling’s discussion of the tragic in the tenth of the Philoso-
phische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kritizismus (1795–96) is framed by 
his efforts to differentiate between two poles of philosophical inquiry with 
respect to (as Peter Fenves writes) “the nature of the unconditioned, the 
absolute, or to use a misleading term, God.”23 Dogmatism, represented by 
Spinoza and Leibniz, and criticism, represented by Fichte and Kant, were 
for Schelling the only valid ways to conceive of the absolute and thereby 
found a philosophical system.24 The former is based on a conception of the 
absolute object or Not-I, the latter on the absolute subject or I, and the 
task that remains of philosophy is to determine by which path the uncon-
ditioned might be reached.25 For Schelling, this task can only be addressed 
insofar as poetics, ancient and modern, offer a strictly empirical approach to the tragedy, not its “idea”; 
its concern is specific dramatic effect, whereas Idealist philosophy placed emphasis on determining 
what, it fact, is tragic. Historically speaking, Szondi, citing Hegel, finds it logical that tragic theory can 
only ever follow its praxis with considerable delay: “To understand the historical relation prevailing 
between nineteenth-century theory and seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century practice, one 
must assume that the flight of Minerva’s owl over this landscape also begins only with the onset of 
dusk” (Szondi 2002, 2) (Vielmehr wäre zum Verständnis des historischen Bezugs, der zwischen der Theo-
ries des neunzehnten und der Praxis des siebzehnten und achtzehnten Jahrhunderts waltet, anzunehmen, 
dass die Eule der Minerva ihren Flug auch über dieser Landschaft erst mit der einbrechenden Dämmerung 
beginnt [Szondi 1961, 8]).
 23. Peter Fenves, “The Scale of Enthusiasm,” in Enthusiasm and Enlightenment in Europe 1650–
1850, ed. Lawrence E. Klein and Anthony J. LaVopa (San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 1998), 
136.
 24. To a certain extent, however, Kant does not ideally represent the standpoint of criticism for 
Schelling, because his Critique of Pure Reason is not just a philosophical system among others but the 
point of departure for all philosophical systems, whether informed by criticism or dogmatism. See 
the “Editorischer Bericht” written by Annemarie Pieper in Schelling, Werke 3, ed. Hartmut Buchner, 
Wilhelm G. Jacobs, and Annemarie Pieper (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1982): 23.
 25. See his letter to Hegel from 4 February 1795: “Der eigentliche Unterschied der kritischen 
und dogmatischen Philosophie scheint mir darin zu liegen, daß jene vom absoluten (noch durch kein 
Objekt bedingten) Ich, diese vom absoluten Objekt oder Nicht-Ich ausgeht. . . . Vom Unbedingten 
muß die Philosophie ausgehen. Nun fragt sich’s nur, worin dies Unbedingte liegt, im Ich oder im 
Nicht-Ich. Ist diese Frage entschieden, so ist alles entschieden.” Briefe von und an Hegel, 22.
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in a practical sense, through the idea of freedom: “For me the highest prin-
ciple of all philosophy is the pure, absolute I, that is, the I insofar as it is 
simply I, not yet conditioned by objects at all, but rather posited through 
freedom” (Schelling to Hegel, 4 February 1795 [my emphasis]).26 Endowed 
with a freedom that is both point of departure and ultimate goal, the human 
subject obtains the possibility of moving beyond the limitations of a world 
conditioned by objects and attaining the infinite, the “supersensual” (über-
sinnliche) world.
 It is with respect to this question of freedom that Schelling turns to 
tragedy in the tenth letter of the series; underscoring his claim that great 
art can represent what reason can no longer conceive theoretically, Schelling 
maintains that tragedy illustrates the extent to which freedom contends with 
necessity. Opposing human freedom with an “objective power” bent on 
disrupting that freedom, he manages to argue that even man’s submission 
to the machinations of fate can affirm the force of freedom.
You are right, one thing remains—to know that there is an objective power 
which threatens to annihilate our freedom, and with this firm and certain 
conviction in our hearts, to fight against it, to summon up the whole of 
one’s freedom, and thus to go down (Schmidt 2001, 86).27
This scenario, Schelling asserts, is thematized in the tragic situation: by allow-
ing the hero both to struggle against the superior power of the objective world 
and to expiate his crime willingly, Greek tragedy affirms human freedom. It 
is this affirmation, in fact, that makes tragedy tolerable to its audience.
The reason for this contradiction, that which made it bearable, lay deeper 
than the level at which it has been sought: it lay in the conflict of human 
freedom with the power of the objective world, a conflict in which the mor-
tal necessarily had to succumb when that power was a superior power—a 
fatum; and yet, since he did not succumb without a struggle, he had to be 
punished for this very defeat. The fact that the criminal succumbed only 
to the superior force of fate and yet was punished all the same—this was 
the recognition of human freedom, an honor owed to freedom. (Schmidt 
2001, 86)28
 26. Briefe, 22: “Mir ist das höchste Prinzip aller Philosophie das reine, absolute Ich, d.h. das Ich, 
inwiefern es bloßes Ich, noch gar nicht durch Objekte bedingt, sondern durch Freiheit gesetzt ist.”
 27. “Sie haben Recht, noch Eines bleibt übrig—zu wissen, dass es eine objective Macht giebt, die 
unsrer Freiheit Vernichtung droht, und mit dieser festen und gewissen Ueberzeugung im Herzen—
gegen sie zu kämpfen, seiner ganzen Freiheit aufzubieten, und so unterzugehen” (Werke 106).
 28. “Der Grund dieses Widerspruchs, das, was ihn erträglich machte, lag tiefer, als man ihn such-
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With this logic, the tragic universe becomes recognizable from within the 
framework of Idealism. It is not merely the fact that the tragic hero is subject 
to fate that ensures his downfall; he is punished because he exerts his freedom 
by fighting against necessity. His punishment is thus a (negative) recognition 
of freedom: only a subject who possesses freedom—and exercises it—can be 
deprived of it by fate. This represents tragedy’s great insight for Schelling: 
where philosophy exhausts itself, the “highest in art”—tragedy—allows us 
to “think” beyond the limits placed on freedom by a higher power.
It was a great thought to willingly bear punishment even for an inevitable 
crime; in this way he was able to demonstrate his freedom precisely through 
the loss of this freedom, and still to go under with a declaration of free will. 
(Schmidt 2001, 86; trans. modified)29
Schelling’s invocation of the hero’s freedom here is clearly marked by the dia-
lectical force of its time, as Lacoue-Labarthe has argued: insofar as the tragic 
subject invokes his freedom in the very moment of losing it, a negative is 
transformed into a positive, and the struggle, however futile it has appeared, 
proves productive.30 The tragic conflict, by itself intolerable for Schelling, 
thus offers through this force of negativity the possibility of a resolution, and 
the “‘idealist’ interpretation . . . of tragedy” is born (Lacoue-Labarthe 217).
 By virtue of this opening towards resolution, however, Schelling’s inter-
pretation runs counter to the notion that tragic art has the potential to 
exceed the limits of philosophy; in fact, this model embeds tragedy deeply 
within philosophy. As Szondi has discussed, the tragic comes into play here 
as a “third way” between dogmatism and criticism, representing the space in 
which those two poles come into conflict with one another.31 But precisely 
by making tragedy recognizable within this intellectual context, Schelling 
te, lag im Streit menschlicher Freiheit mit der Macht der objectiven Welt, in welchem der Sterbliche, 
wenn jene Macht eine Uebermacht—(ein Fatum)—ist, nothwendig unterliegen, und doch, weil er 
nicht ohne Kampf unterlag, für sein Unterliegen selbst bestraft werden mußte. Daß der Verbrecher, 
der doch nur der Uebermacht des Schicksals unterlag, doch noch bestraft wurde, war Anerkennung 
menschlicher Freiheit, Ehre die der Freiheit gebührte” (Werke 106f.).
 29. “Es war ein großer Gedanke, willig auch die Strafe für ein unvermeidliches Verbrechen zu 
tragen, um so durch den Verlust seiner Freiheit selbst eben diese Freiheit zu beweisen, und noch mit 
einer Erklärung des freien Willens unterzugehen” (Werke, 107).
 30. See Lacoue-Labarthe, “Caesura,” 217. Schellings emphasis on the hero’s freedom runs coun-
ter to the view of classicists with respect to the possibility of deliberate action in tragedy. As Vernant 
argues, the Greeks had no word to denote the category of “will,” hence the question of individual 
action or choice becomes more delicate than Schelling allows here. See Vernant, “Intimations of the 
Will in Greek Tragedy,” in Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 49–84.
 31. See Szondi’s analysis in Versuch über das Tragische, 13–16. See also Pfau 1994, 35.
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clips its wings. While in Schelling’s view the tragic spectacle allows con-
tradiction to become tolerable (if not entirely reconcilable), the performa-
tive dissonances endemic to tragedy—the divisions and tensions on which 
Hölderlin will soon train his eye—remain unconsidered.32
 While Schelling places Oedipus’ plight in the service of the Idealist 
project, then, for Hölderlin the central question of the tragedy is rather 
how Oedipus reflects—or rather attempts and fails to reflect—the Idealist 
“will to system.” If Oedipus’ suffering remains for Hölderlin “indescribable, 
unspeakable, inexpressible,” its semblance in language necessarily involves 
the containment, within the limits of reflection, of a confrontation that can-
not be wholly absorbed. However, Hölderlin also opens up another path by 
evoking an image that exceeds its own representational form. By disrupting 
the subject’s relation to the mirror with his “one eye too many”—a human 
form that suggests its own unrecognizability—Oedipus presents the nega-
tive side of the post-Kantian problem of the unmistakable, yet unknowable 
difference that shatters the mirror of speculation.33 In the figure of Oedipus, 
Hölderlin gives form to a difficult suspension within the subject between the 
grounding of self-consciousness in reflection and a negativity that cannot be 
contained by that ground. His conception of the tragic hero thus implies 
that this negativity reveals itself as an other that can never be known.34
 In this respect, it is appropriate that Oedipus appears as disfigured in a 
text written near the end of Hölderlin’s productive life, a point at which trag-
edy had already for some time been the focal point of a protest and a shift 
with respect to attempts to contain subjectivity within a model of reflection. 
While the development of a philosophy of the tragic in speculative Idealism 
 32.  See Jan Mieszkowski’s concise and articulate summary of Schelling’s text and Szondi’s read-
ing, “Tragedy and the War of the Aesthetic,” in Schelling and Romanticism, ed. David Ferris (Romantic 
Circles Praxis Series, June 2000) http://www.rc.umd.edu/praxis/schelling/mieszkowski/mieszkowski.
html.
 33. For a thorough discussion of the significance of the mirror and the trope of reflection in 
post-Enlightenment philosophy, see Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror. See also Mark Taylor’s substantive 
review, “Foiling Reflection,” Diacritics 18:2 (Spring 1988): 60.
 34. Schelling’s later work can also be read in the context of this countermovement, which David 
L. Clark names as the “tropic of negativity”: “to engage rather than sublate that which resists all pre-
tensions to wholly systematic thought.” Schelling’s recognition that the structure of reflection always 
bears something irreducible to a self-present origin marks the entrance into a phase of self-critique 
that already approaches the radical thinking of “the unprescribable” characteristic of Derrida’s concept 
of différance and De Man’s materiality of the letter. Clark, “‘The Necessary Heritage of Darkness’: 
Tropics of Negativity in Schelling, Derrida, and de Man,” in Rajan and Clark 82ff. Pfau develops a 
similar argument with regard to Schelling’s contribution to contemporary theory in his critical intro-
duction to a translation of three late essays by the philosopher (Pfau 1994, 1–57). See also Andrew 
Bowie’s article in Rajan and Clark, “Non-Identity: The German Romantics, Schelling, and Adorno,” 
243–60.
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bears witness to the rise and fall of the attempt to build a system around 
the subject, Hölderlin’s tragic figures—Oedipus and Antigone as well as 
Empedocles before them—suffer precisely the untenability of the “will to 
system.” For Hölderlin it is this suffering, voiced in a solitary lament, which 
situates the tragic hero with respect to the modern subject who encounters 
him. Insofar as our view of Oedipus’ fate is defined by the margins of what 
can be known, the representation of suffering itself becomes another kind of 
suffering, one instigated—also parallel to Oedipus—by a reluctant recogni-
tion of limits. The effect that the structure of tragedy engenders, however, 
unlike the inexpressible suffering of Oedipus, must not necessarily bring on 
despair. That strange rupture, once acknowledged, in fact becomes some-
thing of a fascination, a momentary encounter with the outer reaches of 
comprehensibility, otherwise enveloped and disguised by the rush of signi-
fication: “that soon it is no longer the change of representation (der Wechsel 
der Vorstellung) that appears but the representation itself ” (FA 16: 250). At 
the same time, language also comes up against an uncrossable horizon of 
difference from itself and expresses itself finally—and logically, even appro-
priately—by translation rather than figuration.35
 This is the point at which Hölderlin’s Empedocles, standing at the edge 
of Mt. Etna, reaches the limits of his usefulness as a figure of speculative 
thought and where Oedipus, perhaps, becomes necessary.36 While Empedo-
cles suffers from the impossibility of union with the gods—in other words, 
the limits of self-recognition and representation from which essentially all 
German Idealists suffered—Hölderlin’s Oedipus reflects the consequences of 
that monstrous union. Moreover, the translation allows that problem to be 
reframed as an exposure to the alienation that sets in with the transfer from 
ancient text to modern context. The conflict, then, is not merely represented 
in the character of the tragic hero but interwoven into the modern subject’s 
experience of the translated text as well.
 35. Hölderlin often expresses despair at the limitations of poetic language to achieve the kind of 
revelation he sought in aesthetics, so that a final turn to translation makes perfect sense. From a letter 
to his friend Neuffer from 12 November 1798: “ . . . und es ergreift mich oft, daß ich weinen muß, 
wie ein Kind, wenn ich um und um fühle, wie es meinen Darstellungen an einem und dem andern 
fehlt, und ich doch aus den poetischen Irren, in denen ich herumwandele, mich nicht herauswinden 
kann” (StA VI:1, 289 (and it often seizes me, so that I must weep like a child, when I feel all around me 
how my representations lack this and that, and yet that I cannot extricate myself out of the poetic drift in 
which I wander about).
 36. See David Ferrell Krell, The Tragic Absolute (University of Nebraska Press, 2005), where he 
claims that both Hyperion and Empedokles should be understood as “steps toward Sophoclean tragedy, 
not departures from or progressions beyond it” (281).
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Hölderlin’s oediPus  is above all a figure that shuns limits, trans-
gressing with the force that only his feverish desire to know his past and 
his parentage can produce, regardless of the consequences. Andrzej Warm-
inski has this specifically Hölderlinian valence in mind when he describes 
Oedipus’s dilemma as an “Empedocles complex”37: the imperative to know, 
to draw connections, that too often leads to the tragedy of misread signs. 
Although Jocasta, his mother and wife, implores him to halt at a limit that 
keeps him at a remove from his past, to accept ignorance of his identity as 
a safeguard against self-destruction, he presses on; the tamer of the Sphinx 
will not be denied access to absolute knowledge. And thus in Hölderlin’s 
remarks on the tragedy it is not only Oedipus’s knowledge that proves to 
exceed certain ethical limits—the discovery that, contrary to his previous 
assumptions, he has fulfilled the words of the oracle at Delphi by murder-
ing his father and marrying his mother—but also that desire for knowledge 
itself: “because knowledge, when it has torn through its barriers, spurs itself 
on to know more than it can bear or grasp” (weil das Wissen, wenn es seine 
Schranke durchrissen hat . . . sich selbst reizt, mehr zu wissen, als es tragen oder 
fassen kann [FA 16: 253]). What he sees with his one eye too many—and, 
in effect, what we see him seeing—is therefore perhaps nothing more than 
the existence of that same, excess eye, insofar as that eye both brings a trace 
of the abyss into focus and names that trace as too much to bear. Hence it 
will be the fate of Oedipus to destroy his other eyes in the eternally futile 
attempt to shut this one, as if to say that, after having witnessed the return of 
this unspeakable excess—as we shall soon hear it called in Hölderlin’s texts, 
the monstrous, “das Ungeheure”—no eye will ever see anything else again.
Die goldnen Nadeln riß er vom Gewand,
Mit denen sie geschmückt war, that es auf,
Und stach ins Helle seiner Augen sich und sprach,
So ungefähr, es sei, damit er sie nicht säh
Und was er leid’ und was er schlimm gethan,
Damit in Finsterniß er anderer in Zukunft,
Die er nicht sehen dürft,’ ansichtig werden mög’
Und denen er bekannt sei, unbekannt. (FA 16, 221)
The golden needles ornamenting her
He tore them from her dress and opened them
 37. Readings in Interpretation: Hölderlin, Hegel, Heidegger (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1987), 18.
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And stabbed into the bright of his eyes and said
This thereabouts: so that he would not see them
And not what he was suffering and what bad he had done
So that in darkness in the future that would be
How he saw others whom he must not see
And those that he was known to, unbeknownst. (Constantine 55; trans. 
modifed)38
 While a more correct rendering of the Greek would have Oedipus pierc-
ing his own eyes so that they would not see him in his misery, Hölderlin 
radically mistranslates the passage here, placing Oedipus into the subjective 
position of seeing (or more precisely, of not seeing) his own eyes and thus 
situating the view of the eyes themselves on a level with what those eyes 
have seen: “And stabbed into the bright of his eyes and said this there-
abouts: so that he would not see them (damit er sie nicht säh) and what he 
was suffering and what bad he had done.39 As we will see throughout our 
discussion of Hölderlin’s translations, his choice here is a telling “mistake.” 
Sophocles unmistakably places Oedipus in the objective position (oth’ ounek’ 
ouk opsointo nin), but Hölderlin’s use of the nominative masculine pronoun 
er leaves no doubt that Oedipus is the subject, sie (referring to the eyes in 
accusative plural) the object. If Oedipus no longer wishes to see his own 
eyes (“damit er sie nicht säh,’” so that he should not see them), and if seeing 
with one’s own eyes is analogous to knowing, then it is not only the knowing 
that is dangerous but also the awareness of that knowledge. What Oedipus 
suffers retroactively is rooted both in his will to delve too deeply into his 
own past and in the realization that this will confronts him finally with the 
simple knowledge that he has advanced too far. With the knowledge that he 
has propelled himself into a place of solitude, of darkness from which his 
eyes can no longer recognize any other, at all.
 Whether it is deliberate or not, this moment of mistranslation reflects 
 38. Constantine translates the accusative object “sie” in Hölderlin’s translation as “her” rather 
than “them,” extending the reference to Jocasta rather than Oedipus’s own eyes. In this case, the im-
plication would not be that Oedipus should never see his own eyes but rather that he should not see 
Jocasta before him.
 39. The Greek line reads “oth’ ounek’ ouk opsointo nin” (that they should not see him). Most 
modern translators get this pronoun pair right, including Solger, a near-contemporary of Hölderlin: 
“Denn aus der Frau Gewändern goldgetriebene / Brustspangen reißend, ihre Schmuckbefestigung, / 
Erhob er die, und traf der Augenkreise Paar, / Mit solchem Laut: nie sollten ihn sie wiederschaun, / 
Noch was er duldet, oder was er Böses that . . . ” [57] (Tearing the golden clasps from the woman’s robes, 
he raised the jeweled fastenings and struck his pair of eyes while saying this: never should they see him again, 
nor what he endured, nor the evil he has done).
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something considerably larger than itself, for Hölderlin’s interest in the con-
tours and limits of knowledge—and the consequences of transgressing those 
limits—colors his work on tragedy from the start. Sophocles underscores 
the distinction between mere sight and insight, using the verb eidon/oida, 
which suggests both seeing and knowing, for Tiresias, while Oedipus is 
connected primarily with verbs implying discovery or a superficial kind of 
sight, heurisko and blepo.40 For Hölderlin, however, Oedipus emerges as a 
counterpart to Empedocles, as the hero in dogged pursuit of an insight, a 
theoretical instance greater than the human subject can bear. This Oedipus, 
Hölderlin’s Oedipus of 1804, is thus a product of both the poet’s method of 
translation and a post-Idealist thinking inspired by his lengthy and intensive 
engagement with tragedy.
 Hölderlin’s earliest musings on the subject, from around 1794, already 
evince a struggle between the attempt to “unite ourselves with nature in an 
infinite whole” in an aesthetic realm and the theoretical awareness, gained 
from intensive study of Kant and Fichte at the university in Jena, that the 
subject is necessarily split from itself in the moment of consciousness.41 This 
is Empedocles’ conflict, not to mention the probable source of Hölderlin’s 
frustration at his own inability to be “done” with the death of Empedocles 
(see Warminski xx). Indeed, his struggle to finish this text seems to have 
taken on the cast of what he calls “infinite approximation” (unendliche 
Annäherung). replicating Empedocles’ distaste at existing in a world which 
cannot support the ultimate speculative solution in any other form than 
that of suicide—or, in the author’s case, the killing of representation.42 This 
 40. I am grateful to Jennifer Ballengee for this observation. See Chapter 2 of her book The Wound 
and the Witness: The Rhetoric of Torture (SUNY Press, 2009), 45f.
 41. The clearest articulation of his theoretical doubts about achieving a unified self comes in 
his 1794 fragment Urteil und Sein, which directs itself in particular against Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre 
and its conception of intellectual intuition; for Hölderlin here, the “Ur-teilung” of the self-conscious 
subject constitutes a limit that speculative thought cannot exceed. The relationship between self and 
self-same image remains theoretically intact only until another view (“eine andere Rücksicht”) recalls 
the forgotten distance that separates them. Could this “andere Rücksicht” not represent an earlier 
manifestation of the third eye of Oedipus? Warminski offers a thorough and excellent reading of the 
text, particularly of this idea of the “andere Rücksicht” in Readings in Interpretation: Hölderlin, Hegel, 
Heidegger. See also Dieter Henrich’s essay “Hölderlin über Urteil und Sein: Eine Studie zur Entste-
hungsgeschichte des Idealismus” (Hölderlin-Jahrbuch 1965/66: 73–96), in which the author accords 
Hölderlin’s fragment a nearly seminal position in the development of Idealism from Fichte to Hegel. 
For a contrary argument that situates Hölderlin’s essay more closely in relation to Fichte, see Helmut 
Bachmaier, “Theoretische Aporie und tragische Negativität. Zur Genesis der tragischen Reflexion bei 
Hölderlin,” in Bachmaier, Horst, and Reisinger, Hölderlin: Transzendentale Reflexion der Poesie (Stutt-
gart: Klett-Cotta, 1979), 105–8.
 42. Corngold describes the development, in the course of the three versions, of Empedocles’ 
self-reflexive autonomy as an isolation from the possibility of representation as image. “Disowning 
Contingencies in Hölderlin’s Empedocles,” in Fioretos 233.
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problem is already reflected in the earliest outline of the tragedy of Emped-
ocles, the so-called Frankfurter Plan of 1797, in which the hero, dissatisfied 
with and contemptuous of the “one-sided existence” and “particular rela-
tions” among humans that fall short of the “great harmony with all living 
things” enjoyed by the gods, decides to end his life by plunging headlong 
into Mt. Etna.43 His chosen mode of suicide is itself significant, for in order 
to become one with the gods, Empedocles needs a death that represents a 
total disappearance from the mortal world, that precludes the possibility of 
mourning.44 If his contact with the despised “particular relations” is to dis-
sipate as well, Empedocles must depart from the world without a physical 
trace, must be commemorated in no other form than signification through 
name and legend.
 But already in this earliest sketch of the tragedy of Empedocles’ death, 
the necessity of that pure disappearance for closure of the gap between god 
and man is undermined by the very human problem of a remainder that 
can (and thus must) be mourned.
Soon afterward Empedocles hurls himself into the flames of Etna. His favor-
ite disciple, who wanders about restlessly and anxiously nearby, finds soon 
thereafter the iron shoes of the master that the fiery emission had flung out 
of the abyss, recognizes them, presents them to the family of Empedocles, 
to his disciples among the people, and gathers with them at the volcano to 
mourn and celebrate the great man’s death.45
 43. It is in part for this drive for completion or “Ergänzung” that Hölderlin chooses the figure of 
Empedocles as protagonist after considering Socrates for a time. Empedocles, a pre-Socratic philoso-
pher and physician who will also become a favorite of Nietzsche’s, suffers the burden of communicat-
ing a union between god and man that humanity is in fact incapable of grasping, at least not with 
the tools of reflection. Thus Hoffmeister emphasizes the parallels between the communicative crisis of 
the poet and that of his hero, who assumes the task of conveying the presence of the divine in human 
existence. Johannes Hoffmeister, Hölderlins Empedokles (Bonn: Bouvier, 1963), 96. In this context see 
also Klaus-Rüdiger Wöhrmann, who reads the attempts to write an Empedocles tragedy as expressive 
of “the monstrous striving to be All” and its ultimate failure: Hölderlins Wille zur Tragödie (Munich: 
Fink, 1967), 162.
 44. See Hoffmeister’s still-relevant account, 38: “What is immortal cannot be seen as dying, 
having died; it cannot leave behind a mortal hull. It must simply disappear from the earth, so to 
speak, in a bodily ascent to heaven. . . . But Empedocles—according to the legendary reproach against 
him—attempted to exploit this belief in order to reach the whiff [Geruch] of immortality.”
 45. “Bald drauf stürzt sich Empedokles in den lodernden Aetna. Sein Liebling, der unruhig und 
bekümmert in dieser Gegend umherirrt, findet bald drauf die eisernen Schuhe des Meisters, die der 
Feuerauswurf aus dem Abgrund geschleudert hatte, erkennt sie, zeigt sie der Familie des Empedokles, 
seinen Anhängern im Volke, und versammelt sich mit diesem an dem Vulkan, um Laid zu tragen, und 
den Tod des großen Mannes zu feiern” (FA 13: 546).
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With the discovery of the iron shoes belonging to the master, capable of 
resisting the intensity of volcanic heat for long enough to be spat out of 
the abyss, the disciples of Empedocles can mourn his death, thus claiming 
him as one of their own. Echoing the funereal traditions of ancient Greece, 
their ceremonial mourning, made possible with the discovery of an object 
of permanence, permits them to transform his death into “something done” 
(in Hegel’s words, ein Getanes) and thereby preserve the memory, the name 
of their leader both as member of the community and as individual.46 Had 
Empedocles succeeded in his quest to disappear without a trace, without 
even the physical remains that would signify his death to others, his legacy 
might have taken on mythic form, thus unifying him with the gods as he 
had wished; as it stands, however, his very real death, cast for eternity in the 
iron of his own sandals, is painfully, only human. Hölderlin’s three unsuc-
cessful attempts to write the death of Empedocles may also pay homage to 
this misfortune of being only human, even as his quest, like his Empedocles 
in suicide, was to achieve something more.47
 Although the determined search for an unreflected access to union 
clearly contributes strongly to the shape of Hölderlin’s early poetic intent, 
then, it is often undermined, even at the start, by his own theoretical and 
formal considerations. An insistent question imposes itself, therefore, upon 
that framework of aspiration and failure that literary criticism has often 
assigned to Hölderlin’s dramatic texts, a question that more recent scholar-
ship addresses:48 what if, at least by the time he decides to formulate a second 
version of the Death of Empedocles, his attempt is not at all to represent the 
vicissitudes of the speculative system in tragedy, at which he clearly fails? 
What if, rather, his translations perform in deliberate fashion another failure, 
namely, the impossibility of precisely that system? What could that failure, 
 46. For a discussion of funeral customs in ancient Greece, see Vernant, “‘A Beautiful Death and 
the Disfigured Corpse in Homeric Epic,’” in Mortals and Immortals: Collected Essays, ed. and trans. 
Froma Zeitlin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 50–74. See also my discussion of Hegel 
in Chapter 3.
 47. Eric Santner goes so far as to read the Frankfurter Plan as a “rather frank and astute self-
analysis,” but more with regard to Hölderlin’s awareness of and frustration at his own limitations, 
linking the discussion of Empedokles’ “Kulturhaß” to the poet’s exploration of his own weaknesses. 
Friedrich Hölderlin: Narrative Vigilance and the Poetic Imagination (New Brunswick and London (Rut-
gers University Press, 1986), 63f.
 48. Lacoue-Labarthe and Warminski led the attempt to figure this strain of negativity in Hölder-
lin in the 1980s, but Szondi seems to have instigated the move toward understanding Hölderlin’s 
views as a poetics of difference, not totality, in his important reading of the 1801 letter to Böhlendorff, 
“Überwindung des Klassizismus,” Hölderlin-Studien (Frankfurt: Insel, 1967), 85–104. For more re-
cent work, see also Aris Fioretos, “Color Read,” and Rainer Nägele, “Ancient Sports and Modern 
Transports,” both in Fioretos 268–87, 247–67.
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then, represent? It may be that it cannot represent at all, nor can it be rep-
resented, except as disruption. The failure of representation in Empedocles 
leads Hölderlin to translation as an experimental mode of expression, to 
Oedipus as the tragic figure that Empedocles could not successfully embody. 
Yet the distance between Empedocles and his Greek other—the failed recon-
ciliation between ancient and modern modes of representation—must itself 
remain part of the performance. After the unfulfilling death of Empedocles, 
Hölderlin needs Oedipus—his Oedipus.
 Lacoue-Labarthe called this performance the “caesura of the specula-
tive,” referring to a famous trope of Hölderlin’s that we will have to examine 
shortly; however, it is also more than that. Hölderlin’s exploration of the 
dynamics of difference within tragedy and in translation should not be seen 
to offer, as Lacoue-Labarthe’s argument implies, the inadvertent interruption 
of the speculative dialectic.49 Rather, they introduce and track a movement 
that describes both the literal crossing-over inherent in the word “über-
setzen” and the trajectory of the subject itself in time, the difference that 
translated words continually trace and the disquieting effect of that trace 
on the subject who is exposed to it. In both cases, it is a difference that will 
be, as Bettina von Arnim sensed astutely upon reading Hölderlin’s Oedipus, 
“borne with pain.”50
in “in lovely blueness,”  the suffering of Oedipus remained beyond 
description, speech, expression. The modern subject cannot see through the 
excess eye of Oedipus, let alone identify with his plight, and yet our view of 
that eye is directed toward an unrecognizable element that refuses capture 
within the act of seeing. This drive to comprehend that the spectator faces 
in confronting a figure so wholly other contains within it an element of 
danger that the tragedy of Oedipus itself, particularly as Hölderlin reads it, 
does not leave unexamined. For as he states in the remarks on Oedipus, this 
desire to see and thus to know with specificity, as irresistible as it may seem, 
is also what brings on the hero’s tragic fall.
 49. Although he does argue that Hölderlin’s project of translation dislocates the speculative from 
within, Lacoue-Labarthe does not concede that it has any aim other than the speculative closure of 
the Kantian rift: “It is not that Hölderlin wanted it that way—he wanted, if he wanted anything at 
all (and for some time he did want something), the resolution of the crisis . . . ” (213). Later: “Once 
again, I am not saying this with a view toward extricating Hölderlin from the speculative and making 
him, if you will, the “positive hero” of this adventure. The theory put forward by Hölderlin is specula-
tive through and through” (224).
 50. “  .  .  .  mit Schmerzen hineingetragen”: Bettina von Arnim, Die Günderode, ed. Elisabeth 
Bronfen (Munich: Matthes & Seitz, 1982), 146.
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 Presented with the opportunity to recognize the direction of his fate, 
Oedipus interprets the enigmatic words of the oracle with a gesture that 
advances too far into specific knowledge, thereby edging too closely toward 
divine privilege and crossing into the space that Hölderlin deems “too infi-
nite.”
Die Verständlichkeit des Ganzen beruhet vorzüglich darauf, daß man die 
Scene ins Auge faßt, wo Oedipus den Orakelspruch zu unendlich deutet, 
zum nefas versucht wird.
 Nemlich der Orakelspruch heißt:
 Geboten hat uns Phöbus klar, der König,
 Man soll des Landes Schmach, auf diesem Grund genährt,
 Verfolgen, nicht Unheilbares ernähren.
Das könnte heißen: Richtet, allgemein, ein streng und rein Gericht, haltet 
gute bürgerliche Ordnung. Oedipus aber spricht gleich darauf priesterlich:
 Durch welche Reinigung, etc.
Und gehet ins besondere,
 Und welchem Mann bedeutet er diß Schicksal?
Und bringet so die Gedanken des Kreon auf das furchtbare Wort:
 Uns war, o König, Lajos vormals Herr
 In diesem Land,’ eh du die Stadt gelenket.
So wird der Orakelspruch und die nicht nothwendig darunter gehörige 
Geschichte von Lajos’ Tod zusammengebracht. (FA 16: 251)
To understand the whole we must above all look closely at the scene in 
which Oedipus interprets the oracle too infinitely, is tempted into nefas.
 For the oracle says:
 Phoebus has bidden us, the King has, clearly,
 We must hunt down the shame our country’s ground
 Has nourished, not nurture the incurable.
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That could mean: Judge, in a general way, with strict and pure judgments, 
keep good civic order. But Oedipus at once responds in priestly language:
 Through what cleansing, . . . etc.
And goes into the particular,
 And to which man does he pronounce this fate?
And so brings Creon’s thoughts to the terrible utterance:
 Lord of us formerly, O King, was Laius
 Here in the land before you led the city.
In this way the words of the oracle are brought into a connection they 
do not necessarily have with the story of Laius’ death. (Constantine 64f.; 
trans. modified)
Hölderlin’s observation here suggests that the oracle’s bearing on Oedipus’ 
crime is arbitrary, thus defining the tragic conflict as a problem with the 
“insane” quest for knowledge and not with the cruel irony of fate.51 In this 
sense it poses an intriguing contrast to Schelling’s interpretation of Oedi-
pus’ fall, in which the hero, doomed by fate, is still allowed to struggle 
against that superior power, thereby affirming human freedom even in defeat 
and rendering the contradictions of fate tolerable. For Hölderlin, the hero’s 
hubris amounts to a refusal to allow fate to take its course at all, to the desire 
for a forbidden choice—made without permission and subject to punish-
ment—that makes tragedy quite intolerable.
In der gleich darauf folgenden Scene spricht aber, in zorniger Ahnung, der 
Geist des Oedipus, alles wissend, das nefas eigentlich aus, indem er das all-
gemeine Gebot argwöhnisch ins Besondere deutet, und auf einen Mörder 
des Lajos anwendet, und dann auch die Sünde als unendlich nimmt. (FA 
16: 252)
 51. See Horst Turk, “Das Beispiel Hölderlins,” Hölderlin-Jahrbuch 1988–89: 261. Beissner of-
fers as well that Hölderlin’s translation of the oracle is indeed given in more general language than 
the usual versions, indicating also that it could be interpreted as having less directly to do with the 
outcome of the tragedy (Hölderlins Übersetzungen aus dem Griechischen). Bernofsky expands on this 
idea, claiming that Hölderlin, in translating miasma (literally “stain,” “defilement”) with the relatively 
vague term Schmach (“disgrace”), transforms the specific into the general in order to emphasize the 
extent to which Oedipus “goes into the particular” (gehet ins besondere) with his interpretation (217).
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[ .  .  . ] Daher, im nachfolgenden Gespräche mit Tiresias, die wunderbare 
zornige Neugier, weil das Wissen, wenn es seine Schranke durchrissen hat, 
wie trunken in seiner herrlichen harmonischen Form, vorerst, sich selbst 
reizt, mehr zu wissen, als es tragen oder fassen kann . . . (FA 16: 253)
Then in the very next scene the spirit of Oedipus, all-knowing, actually 
utters the nefas in furious presentiment, by mistrustfully interpreting the 
general commandment into the particular and applying it to a murderer of 
Laius, and then taking the sin as infinite.
[  .  .  .  ] Hence, in the conversation that follows with Tiresias, the won-
drously furious curiosity of a knowledge that it has torn through its bar-
riers and now, as though drunk in its lordly harmonious form . . . first of 
all incites itself to know more than it can bear or grasp. (Constantine 65; 
trans. modified)
 Provoking itself to know too much, knowledge spirals into excess, tearing 
through its own barriers, while the individual is swept along by the formi-
dable force of this desire. As Bernofsky points out, by invoking the Latin 
term ne-fas Hölderlin already gives voice to the particular transgression of 
which Oedipus is guilty: the negation of fas, a Latin term for the divine law 
which derives from fari (to speak), is a negation of the divine word itself, a 
presumptuous readiness to interpret or “translate” the words of the oracle 
and thereby claim the status of a god (217f.). For Hölderlin the recogni-
tion of this transgression is central to the understanding of the tragedy as 
a whole. Yet the aims of this knowledge remain obscure, as does the motor 
of choice: if knowledge provokes itself to know more than it can bear, and 
if the subject must necessarily succumb to a “wondrously furious curiosity,” 
how can an individual choice also bring on the hero’s downfall, as the first 
part of the passage would suggest? More specifically, what does it mean for 
Oedipus to interpret “into the particular,” and through what sort of limit 
or barrier does this particularity tear?
 As the passage indicates, the limit is integrally related to speech; not 
only knowledge itself but the articulation of that knowledge set Oedipus’ 
demise into motion (“the spirit of Oedipus, all-knowing, articulates the 
nefas”). This prospect of a limit to what may be said bears significance for 
Hölderlin’s work in more than one sense. For Empedocles it is linked to the 
naming of gods, to the privileged status that allows some mortals to touch 
the divine—representing, in other words, an articulation of the problem of 
logos. As enunciated in the second draft of Empedocles, the naming of gods 
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is depicted as the worst possible crime, not because human beings do not 
dwell in proximity to those gods but rather because that relationship must 
remain unspoken. As the priest Hermokrates explains, to give voice to that 
link is tantamount to the betrayal of a terrible secret:
Verderblicher denn Schwerd und Feuer ist
Der Menschengeist, der götterähnliche,
Wenn er nicht schweigen kann, und sein Geheimnis
Unaufgedekt bewahren . . . 
Hinweg mit ihm, der seine Seele blos
Und ihre Götter giebt. . . . (FA 13: 821f.,1. 168–71, 175–76)
More ruinous than sword or fire is the human spirit, the god-like, if he 
cannot be silent and preserve his secret unrevealed. . . . Cursed be he who 
bares his soul and its gods . . . 
 Is this critique of professed knowledge a protest to the aims of speculative 
Idealism itself, to a will which might be described, like that of Oedipus, as 
the desire to “know more than it can bear or grasp”? Although the paral-
lel is certainly present, the problem as Hölderlin formulates it is also more 
complex, requiring an accounting of the wide temporal gap between the 
ancient model and its modern reflection. Hölderlin was interested in the 
implications of this gap well before he settled on the Sophocles project. 
In a footnote to the first version of Empedocles (ca. 1798), he insists that 
ancient and modern conceptions of a tragic figure’s hubris emerge from 
fundamentally different attitudes about the nature of “crime.” Even if there 
is a correspondence between these two “sins,” that relation reveals little more 
than another insurmountable difference:
For us, something like this is more a sin against knowledge, while for the 
ancients it was more excusable from this aspect, because it was more com-
prehensible to them. For them is was not <merely> inconsistency <but> 
crime. But they do not forgive it, because their sense of freedom would 
not bear such a statement. Precisely because they honored and understood 
it more, they were also more fearful of the hubris of the genius. To us it is 
not dangerous, because we are not affected by it.52
 52. See StA IV:2 (Lesarten), Empedokles I,1.188: “Bei uns ist so etwas mehr eine Sünde gegen 
den Verstand, bei den Altern war es von dieser Seite verzeihlicher, weil es ihnen begreiflich war. Nicht 
<etwa bloß> Ungereimtheit, <sondern> Verbrechen war es ihnen. Aber sie verzeihen es nicht, weil ihr 
Freiheitssinn kein solches Wort ertragen wollte. Eben weil sie es mehr ehrten und verstanden, fürchte-
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The hubris of the genius is not a source of dread for us as it was for the 
ancients, he argues, because we see only a strange inconsistency, a lack of 
judgment, perhaps, where they saw unequivocal crime. But even if we do 
not regard Oedipus’s actions as the grave misstep that they were for the 
ancient Greeks, we cannot help but be struck by our own distance from 
him. We cannot entirely grasp the magnitude of his transgressions for the 
Greeks, just as we cannot entirely conceive of the unwritten law that drives 
Antigone to bury her brother Polynices beneath a thin layer of dust. The 
modern reader or spectator thus encounters a limit of her own, marked out 
by the immensity of the gap between Sophocles and Hölderlin (and in turn 
with respect to the reader herself ), a limit through which she may strive to 
tear but ultimately must find another way to address.
 This pattern of persistent limitation to what can and should be known 
and articulated seems to run counter to Hölderlin’s earlier sentiment of 
revelatory potential in aesthetic representation—but does it, actually? In 
effect, something is named here, even if the gods are not. Although he 
attempts unsuccessfully to formulate the tragedy of Empedocles’ death no 
less than four times, with respect to the work on Sophocles Hölderlin does 
not concede failure. This much we know from his correspondence, that he 
did consider his translations to be at least a qualified success and above all 
believed that success to be contingent upon his having communicated some-
thing that no previous translator had. He addresses that aim when he writes 
to his publisher Wilmans in September 1803 that he wishes to represent 
Greek art as “more alive than usual” in a modern context by emphasizing 
the “Oriental” and correcting its “artistic errors.” Seven months later, the 
manuscript printed, he writes again to Wilmans: “I believe to have written 
in the direction of eccentric enthusiasm and thus achieved Greek simplicity” 
(FA 16: 19).53
 Much has been said about these passages, especially in relation to 
Hölderlin’s earlier letter to his friend Böhlendorff from December 1801, in 
which he delineates his idiosyncratic but quite complex view of the differ-
ences between ancient and modern modes of representation. In that letter, 
the great potential of artistic representation lies in the capacity to recog-
nize one’s “nature,” which is for Hölderlin the most difficult task of all. 
Hölderlin provides an example of this idea with a comparison of Greek and 
ten sie auch mehr den Übermut des Genies. Uns ist es nicht gefährlich, weil wir nicht berührbar sind 
dafür.”
 53. “Ich glaube durchaus gegen die exzentrische Begeisterung geschrieben zu haben und so die 
griechische Einfalt erreicht.” Beissner pointed out the likelihood that “gegen” refers to “toward” rather 
than “against” here.
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“Hesperian” modes of representation that underscores the importance of 
Greek art in a modern age. While the Greeks’ “nature” was “fire from 
heaven,” their culture contributed “Darstellungsgaabe,” a talent for form-
giving; on the other hand, the duality of nature and culture in the Hesperian 
mode of representation is precisely opposite: the “Junonian sobriety” that 
is our nature corresponds to the Greeks’ culture of representation, while 
our culture ought to provide the “fire.”54 In the end, the Greeks are useful 
to us not insofar as they reflect to us our own nature—indeed, that would 
be impossible, since one’s own nature cannot be assimilated from another 
source—but rather as an example of a process: just as Homer imposed sobri-
ety on the “fire from heaven,” form on chaos, thereby reconciling “nature” 
with acquired culture, we can learn to bring chaos into form.
 However, a distinction should be drawn between the letter to Böhlen-
dorff, written as Hölderlin was beginning to translate Sophocles in earnest 
after years of toying with the idea, and the letters to Wilmans that reflect 
on the finished product. To be sure, his interest in the possibility of achiev-
ing “Greek simplicity” by writing “in the direction of eccentric enthusiasm” 
carries echoes of that earlier model. However, Hölderlin has moved beyond 
the chiasmic structure of the Böhlendorff letter, in which each side acquires 
from the other the aspect of representation that it lacks. In his explanation 
of how he aims to render Greek art as “more alive than usual” by tracing the 
mistakenly repudiated “Oriental,” the crossing is no longer a closed system, 
for the Greeks now have their own inaccessible other, the traces of which 
remain within tragic representation. The status of the other with respect to 
the self thus transforms into a relationship of slippage rather than of opposi-
tion. Even if the Greeks are “our” other, the Oriental sphere represents the 
other of the Greeks; thus no specular relation is possible, and no original 
can become present at all.55
 Achieving Greek “simplicity,” then, requires a shift in emphasis from the 
problem of representing tragedy’s modern resonance solely within a thematic 
register. If the suffering borne on the body of Oedipus is unreadable, if the 
violence it implies is too monstrous to represent in familiar terms, then 
those terms themselves must be reframed through dramatic text and rhythm. 
As his cryptic remarks on the tragedy begin to suggest, translation itself— 
 54. The death of the modern subject, for example, is dry and soulless compared with the deaths 
depicted by the Greeks: “For this is the tragic to us: that, packed up in any container, we very quietly 
move away from the realm of the living, [and] not that—consumed in flames—we expiate the flames 
which we could not tame” (Pfau 1988, 150).
 55. See Warminski, in particular the section “Caesura: Hölderlin and the Egyptians,” in Readings 
in Interpretation, 17–22.
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translation, that is, as a mode of transmission that emphatically does not 
erase its own traces—will bear responsibility for marking that otherwise 
unspeakable excess.
 In the opening paragraph of the remarks on Oedipus, Hölderlin imme-
diately distances himself from modern readers who would seek tragedy’s 
beauty in material impressions or characterizations; here, the notable char-
acteristic of tragedy emerges from a meticulousness that has less to do with 
the classical-Romantic idea of genius, with the Idealist attainment of a har-
monious whole, or with the impressions that either gesture might leave on 
the spectator, than with an almost plodding exactitude of structure:
Auch andern Kunstwerken fehlt, mit den griechischen verglichen, die 
Zuverlässigkeit; wenigstens sind sie bis izt mehr nach Eindrüken beurtheilt 
worden, die sie machen, als nach ihrem gesetzlichen Kalkul und sonstiger 
Verfahrungsart, wodurch das Schöne hervorgebracht wird. Der modernen 
Poesie fehlt es aber besonders an der Schule und am Handwerksmäßigen, 
daß nemlich ihre Verfahrungsart berechnet und gelehrt, und wenn sie 
gelernt ist, in der Ausübung immer zuverlässig wiederhohlt werden kann. 
(FA 16: 249)
Other works of art, too, compared with the Greek, lack reliability; at least, 
until now they have always been judged according to the impressions they 
make rather than according to their calculable laws and their other proce-
dures by which beauty is brought into being. But modern poetry is espe-
cially lacking in schooling and craft which would enable its procedures to 
be calculated and taught and once learned be always reliably repeated in 
practice. (Constantine 63; trans. modified)
In a post-Idealist, post-tragic age, the possibility of a repetition that is “reli-
able” depends for Hölderlin on the skill of the poet, more artisan than artist, 
to follow the “lawful calculation” of form and adhere to the “mechane of 
the ancients.”56 Yet this repetition of form does not simply accompany the 
echoes of a familiar plot in the form of rules, as in the neoclassical model 
promoted in the previous century by Gottsched. In fact, form’s iterability 
 56. Norbert von Hellingrath emphasized for the first time the importance of Hölderlin’s interest 
in this notion of mechane; by doing so Hellingrath is able to situate that interest within a progression 
that leads from its origins in Greek rhetoric all the way to Symbolist poetry and finally to the school of 
Stefan George. In this way, Hölderlin’s poetry offers a crucial space of correspondence and transition 
between the legacy of antiquity and modern poetics. See Alessandro Pellegrini, Friedrich Hölderlin: 
Sein Bild in der Forschung (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1965), 60.
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runs precisely counter to the textual material, which we cannot grasp and 
certainly should not attempt to repeat. Repetition takes place on a purely 
mechanical level and not a thematic one. While content is brought into 
“relation” with form in the body of text, the “living sense” remains incalcu-
lable even when projected into a familiar shape.
Dann hat man darauf zu sehen, wie der Innhalt sich von diesem unter-
scheidet, durch welche Verfahrungsart, und wie im unendlichen, aber 
durchgängig bestimmten Zusammenhange der besondern Innhalt sich 
zum allgemeinen Kalkul verhält, und der Gang und das Vestzusetzende, 
der lebendige Sinn, der nicht berechnet werden kann, mit dem kalkulablen 
Geseze in Beziehung gebracht wird. (FA 16: 249f.)
We have to see then in what way the content of a work differs from this law, 
through what procedure, and how in an infinite but thoroughly determined 
interconnection the particular content relates to the general calculation, and 
how the onward march of the work, the things it has to bring into shape, 
the living sense which cannot be achieved by calculation, how all that is 
related to the calculable law. (Constantine 63)
The relationship between classical art and its modern framework is twofold: 
not only does it demand a mechanical repetition of classical form, it also 
highlights a difference that the content of art must aim to reflect. In this 
respect Hölderlin echoes Herder’s admonition to “steal the art of imitation” 
rather than merely imitating the classics; while form may not change over 
time, content must change, insofar as its relation to form is “infinite yet 
continuously determined.” Content can neither be calculated nor naively 
repeated, since its effects can only be determined within a given historical 
context. Producing art after the Greeks thus requires the synthesis of cal-
culable and incalculable elements, not in order to sublate their difference 
but rather to allow that difference itself to unsettle the work of art; as a 
result the work is always recognizable and at the same time hints at its own 
unfathomable depth.
 This strict sameness of form differs significantly from the rigid applica-
tion of Aristotelian unities of time, space, and plot upon which the Ger-
man literary establishment insisted before the breakthrough of Lessing’s 
dramaturgy. Notably, however, Hölderlin’s model does return to another 
key aspect of the Poetics, echoing Aristotle’s conception of mimesis, in which 
the activity of making and responding to likenesses involves the pleasurable 
process of “work[ing] out what each thing is,” thus coming to appreciate its 
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intrinsic rationale and the craft (techne) underlying its creation.57 As Chris-
topher Fynsk notes, Hölderlin does cite the Poetics (in Greek) in the third 
section of these remarks on Oedipus; could it be that Hölderlin hews more 
closely to the Greek model than his rather more pedantic predecessors ever 
did?58 To be sure, he has grasped a different element of Aristotle’s argument 
and incorporated it into his methodology as a translator. What is repeated 
here—far more insightfully than the rigidity of “unities” of space, time, and 
plot—is a form that itself has an effect, and not because of its absorption 
into the dramatic momentum of plot but precisely in spite of it. The stuff 
of tragedy wields power for Hölderlin largely because it is recognizable in 
its representative form, its “Erscheinung”: “Most important for humankind 
is to see with respect to everything that it is Something, in other words that 
it is knowable in the medium of its appearance” (Constantine 63: Man hat, 
unter Menschen, bei jedem Dinge, vor allem darauf zu sehen, daß es Etwas ist, 
d.h. daß es in dem Mittel (moyen) seiner Erscheinung erkennbar ist  .  .  . [FA 
16: 249]). To be “Something” a tragic work must expose itself entirely to the 
light of day; not only the materiality of plot, but also the bare structure of 
performance, the nature of dialogic exchange, even the rhythm of language 
contribute to the intensity of tragic experience.59
 For Hölderlin, this framework from which modern tragedy can emerge 
is about nothing at all: “For the transport in tragedy is of itself empty, and 
the most unbounded” (Constantine 65: Der tragische Transport ist nemlich 
eigentlich leer, und der ungebundenste [FA 16: 250]). Unconstrained by what 
Schiller called the “category of causality,”60 tragic transport can be defined 
only by its relation to absence. Moreover, this movement through absence 
traces its trajectory not by any discernible progress toward its own comple-
tion but rather only in terms of a restoration of structural balance between 
two sides.
Das Gesez, der Kalkul, die Art, wie, ein Empfindungssystem, der ganze 
Mensch, als unter dem Einflusse des Elements sich entwickelt, und Vor-
 57. Aristotle, Poetics, trans. Heath 7. The translation in the revised Oxford edition of The Com-
plete Works of Aristotle: vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) reads 
less emphatically than Heath’s translation: “one is at the same time learning – gathering the meaning 
of things . . . ” (2318).
 58. See Christopher Fynsk, “Reading the ‘Poetics’ after the ‘Remarks,’” in Fioretis, The Solid Let-
ter, 239.
 59. As Fynsk points out, Hölderlin’s emphasis on the role of rhythm in his model of tragic effect 
also resembles aspects of Aristotle’s (admittedly sparse) comments on catharsis. See Fynsk 243–45.
 60. Beissner, Erläuterungen zu Oedipus Tyrannus, StA V, 483 (letter from Schiller to Goethe, 25 
April 1797): “ . . . daß der dramatische Dichter unter der Kategorie der Kausalität, der Epiker unter 
der der Substantialität steht.”
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stellung und Empfindung und Räsonnement, in verschiedenen Successio-
nen, aber immer nach einer sichern Regel nacheinander hervorgehn, ist im 
Tragischen mehr Gleichgewicht, als reine Aufeinanderfolge. (FA 16: 250)
The law, the calculation, the way in which a sensuous system, the whole 
person, under an elemental influence develops, and representation, sensa-
tion and reason, in different sequences, but always according to a sure and 
certain rule, is in tragedy more a matter of weighting and balance than of 
pure sequence. (Constantine 63; trans. modified)
 To calculate the precise point of “balance” in this model, however, is a 
tricky matter. Like the flow of poetic language, the events represented in 
the tragic form possess a rhythm for Hölderlin that resonates more rapidly 
and thus generates more dramatic urgency at a particular point. Hölderlin’s 
assertion is thus that a caesura, a rupture in the rhythm of language, allows 
the parts of the tragedy to balance as a whole but must be placed asym-
metrically, as a counterweight to the “heavier,” more insistently active part 
of dramatic action. In Oedipus, the greater weight comes at the end, so 
that the caesura must be placed closer to the beginning, while for Antigone, 
the opposite is true. In both cases, the caesura arrests action in its path, 
opening a perspective to the viewing eye that would otherwise have been 
incommensurate with the progression of scenes on the stage: “that soon it 
is no longer the change of representation that appears but the representa-
tion itself ” (250). What does it mean to obtain access to “the representation 
itself ” in this arrested form? Representation, rather than effacing distance 
by upholding itself as the vehicle of tragic effect, is momentarily revealed 
as a pivotal part of the illusion, leaving the form of tragic transport to gape 
open in its emptiness.
 Expressed in concrete terms, the words of the seer Tiresias represent 
for Hölderlin this doubly crucial slash in the movement of action, which 
both stops the tragic transport, the movement of language and form, in its 
path and propels the individual character, be it Oedipus or Antigone, into 
a solitary confrontation with death.
Er tritt in den Gang des Schiksaals, als Aufseher über die Naturmacht, 
die tragisch, den Menschen seiner Lebenssphäre, dem Mittelpuncte seines 
inneren Lebens in eine andere Welt entrükt und in die exzentrische Sphäre 
der Todten reißt. (FA 16: 251)
He enters the course of fate as overseer of the natural order which, in a tragic 
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manner, removes man from his own sphere of life, from the midpoint of 
his inner life into another world and carries him into the eccentric sphere 
of the dead. (Constantine 64; trans. modified)
 Rainer Nägele has described the manner in which Hölderlin’s texts in 
general are marked by topological orders, both vertical and horizontal. The 
clearest analogy is the vertical relation of the mortal world to that of the 
gods, while the horizontal current of the river leaves its unmistakable inscrip-
tion in Hölderlin’s later lyric poetry (see Nägele 1988 and Binder 1981). 
Here, in the discussion of the caesura that interrupts the horizontal flow of 
rhythmic language and the march of fate, the image of the sphere introduces 
another topography, that of interior and exterior. The words of the seer tear 
one violently from one’s path, revealing not the inscription of the hero as 
king of the text but rather his unexpected abduction from a position of 
centrality; the caesura orchestrates the tragic figure’s bitter expulsion from 
internal center (Mittelpunkt) to ex-centric outcast. Revealing to Oedipus the 
inevitability of this expulsion, Hölderlin’s Tiresias appeals to those senses 
that do not yet heed the suffering which will soon confront them:
Tiresias: Gesehen hast auch du, siehst nicht, woran du bist,
 Im Übel, wo du wohnst, womit du haußest.
 Weißt du, woher du bist? . . . 
 Fühlst du die Hochzeit, wie du landetest
 Auf guter Schiffahrt an der Uferlosen?
 Der andern Übel Menge fühlst du auch nicht,
 Die dich zugleich und deine Kinder treffen.
 Nun schimpfe noch auf Kreon und auch mir
 Ins Angesicht, denn schlimmer ist, als du,
 Kein Sterblicher, der jemals wird gezeugt sein. (FA 16: 123: 418–20, 
428–34)
Tiresias: You, having seen, don’t see what you are at
 In evil, where you live, with what you house.
 Do you know where you are from? . . . 
 Do you feel the marriage as you landed
 Voyaging well, along the bankless shore.
 Nor do you feel the multitude of other evils
 That strike you with your children equally.
 But scold at Creon still and also
 Into my face for worse than you there is
 No mortal man who ever will be fathered. (Constantine 28)
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 Hölderlin’s progression of verbs describing modes of perception and 
knowledge (sehen, wissen, fühlen) at first hews closely to the Greek blépo (to 
see, to have sight) and oida (to know), but then he collapses kataisthanomai 
and epaisthanomai (both: to perceive, to understand) into the more physi-
cal fühlen, to feel. This shift introduces physicality as a hinge between key 
concepts in Hölderlin’s language, perception as feeling and understanding 
as grasping, greifen or begreifen. If Oedipus does not feel “the multitude of 
other evils,” he cannot grasp their significance; yet if he grasps at too much, 
he will feel the consequences as physical suffering. The concealment, even 
the foreclosure of “the multitude of other evils” in an unseen, unknown, 
unfelt register may therefore allow Oedipus to enjoy a certain perception of 
centrality or mastery, but continuing to pursue that “multitude” threatens, 
in the damning words of the Chorus, to unleash the force of something 
previously untouched and strictly speaking untouchable.
Wenn aber überschauend einer mit Händen wandelt, oder
Mit Worten, und fürchtet das Recht nicht, und
Die Thronen nicht der Dämonen verehrt,
Den hab ein böses Schicksal,
Unschicklichen Prangens wegen,
Wenn nicht Gewinn er gewinnet recht,
Und offenbares verschleußt
Und unberührbares angreifft albern. (FA 16: 173–74: 906–13)
But if a man lives carelessly and wanders with hands or
With words and does not fear what is right and
Does not honor the thrones of the daimons
Let a bad fate have him
For his unseemly showing
If his winnings are not won right
If he shuts up what is manifest,
And seizes what is untouchable, the fool. (Constantine 43; trans. modified)
And seizes what is untouchable .  .  .  : whether with words or with hands, it 
is possible to grasp at too much. And as in the example of Empedocles, 
there are consequences. If it is a reckless misstep on the part of the hero, a 
failure to maintain the enigma of the gods that brings this contact with the 
untouchable, then the only possible outcome—a radical, purifying separa-
tion from that contact—is also the impulse for tragedy’s denouément. For 
Hölderlin this rupture, the doubled caesura which exposes both the hero’s 
inherent ex-centricity and “the representation itself,” becomes most neces-
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sary in the moment of his greatest hubris, when the representation has taken 
on its most dreadful cast.
Die Darstellung des Tragischen beruht vorzüglich darauf, daß das Unge-
heure, wie der Gott und Mensch sich paart, und grenzenlos die Naturmacht 
und des Menschen innerstes im Zorn Eins wird, dadurch sich begreift, daß 
das grenzenlose Eineswerden durch grenzenloses Scheiden sich reiniget. (FA 
16: 257)
The presentation of the tragic rests chiefly in this: that the monstrousness 
of the pairing of God and Man, and the boundless coming together in fury 
of the powers of nature and man’s innermost, grasps itself in the purifica-
tion of that boundless union through boundless separation. (Constantine 
67; trans. modified)
 In the words of Tiresias, this inhuman coupling emerges most powerfully 
as an effect of revelation either through speech or handiwork, and Hölderlin 
also formulates Oedipus’s self-imposed will to knowledge in terms of a bur-
den both physical and conceptual, “to know more than it can bear or grasp.” 
The accumulation of that burden in the text ends tragically, in the words 
that Oedipus has no choice but to hear, even though the words themselves, 
in being uttered for the first time, also initiate his downfall.
Der Diener: Oh! Oh! das Schrökliche selbst zu sagen bin ich dran.
Oedipus: Und ich zu hören. Dennoch hören muß ich. (FA 16: 209: 
1190–91)
Servant: Oh! Oh! I am about to say the terrible itself.
Oedipus: And I to hear it. Yet hear I must.
“Das Schrökliche selbst” (the terrible itself ) here stands in for the Greek 
deinon, a term that will take on greater significance in Hölderlin’s Antigone, 
where he translates it as “Ungeheuer,” the monstrous. Here, deinon refers 
more obliquely to the coupling of god and man, the grand monstrosity that 
tragedy exposes in the words of its characters. And while Oedipus recognizes 
here that he has no other choice but to perceive that monstrosity when it is 
revealed to him, Antigone’s chorus will face a similar dilemma—conveyed, 
however, by sight rather than hearing—in its confrontation with a heroine 
that is in many ways equally monstrous.
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Jezt aber komm ich, eben, selber, aus
Dem Geseze. Denn ansehn muß ich diß, und halten kann ich
Nicht mehr die Quelle der Tränen,
Da in das alles schwaigende Bett
Ich seh’ Antigone wandeln. (FA 16: 349: 830–34; my emphasis])
But now even I myself am brought outside of
The law. For I must look at this, and I can hold back
The spring of tears no longer,
As into the all-silent bed
I see Antigone wander.
 One is unable to close one’s ears or one’s eyes to the monstrosity, and 
yet for Hölderlin there is recourse, at least at this point; with monstrosity 
already realized literally in the listening and speaking figure of Oedipus, and 
soon to be inspired by the very sight of Antigone, the purification from a 
proximity to the excess he embodies depends on the ability of tragic form 
to generate distance.61 This saving attitude of rupture is already inscribed in 
form; a permanent division between the words of the Chorus and those of 
the hero concretizes the painful remedy for a pronouncement from which 
no one could possibly turn, for a relationship to the divine that could not 
keep its distance.
Darum der immerwiederstreitende Dialog, darum der Chor als Gegensaz 
gegen diesen. Darum das allzukeusche, allzumechanische und factisch endi-
gende Ineinandergreifen zwischen den verschiedenen Theilen, im Dialog, 
und zwischen dem Chor und Dialog und den großen Parthien oder Dra-
maten, welche aus Chor und Dialog bestehen. (FA 16: 257)
Hence the constant to and fro of the dialogue, hence the chorus as its antith-
esis. Hence the all too chaste, all too mechanical interplay (ending in facts) 
of the different parts, in the dialogue, and between chorus and dialogue 
and the large passages made up of chorus and dialogue. (Constantine 67)
 If Hölderlin portrays this process as dialectical in spirit—“Everything 
is speech against speech, one sublating the other”—it is a dialectic without 
 61. Quite plausibly, Fynsk describes this dynamics of separation as a form of catharsis, expanding 
on Aristotle’s model to suggest that “tragic catharsis is effected at least in part through participation in 
a rhythmic movement” (Fynsk 245).
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the possibility of synthetic closure, as the pattern of splitting through speech 
becomes the defining condition for both the hero and the representation 
of tragedy (the nearly untranslatable participial phrase immerwiederstreitend 
ironically lending unified form to that condition of rupture). This division 
represents a loss for the individual, insofar as the speaker who dares to utter 
the true names of the gods loses the former innocence of a tacit relation to 
the divine. Hölderlin compels Empedocles, like Oedipus after him, to bear 
the crushing burden of mourning this ephemeral object, once heard, once 
seen, now disappeared forever:
  . . . er achtets nicht, er trauert nur,
Und siehet seinen Fall, er sucht
Rükkehrend das verlorne Leben
Den Gott, den er aus sich
Hinweggeschwätzt. (FA 13: 823,1. 218–21)
. . . he does not heed it, he only mourns, and sees only his dilemma; turn-
ing back, he seeks his lost life, the god that he banished from himself with 
his chatter.
Similarly, just as he was doomed by Tiresias’ words to perceive with every 
sense the multitude of evils he embodies, Oedipus suffers and commemo-
rates the depth of his own loss with every piercing blow to the eyes he 
destroys.
  o mir! o mir!
Wie fährt in mich zugleich
Mit diesen Stacheln
Ein Treiben und Erinnerung der Übel! (FA 16: 225: 1347–50)
oh me, oh me
How with these stabs
There enters into me
At once a working and a memory of these evils. (Constantine 56)
 Like Empedocles, who dared convey the monstrous god-human coupling 
directly in speech, Oedipus crosses a limit by articulating his own trangres-
sion, only discovering too late that the act of interpreting the oracle had 
initiated a process of thought that was “too infinite.” In both cases, once 
that coupling has been put into words, it can only be taken away; only as a 
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lost remnant of a painful but necessary split can the former aspiration to the 
untouchable be known. And in the interminably conflictual form of trag-
edy as Hölderlin understands it, it becomes possible to enact an otherwise 
unspoken mourning, that mourning for something of which one cannot 
possibly speak; so that in a final state of suffering, there is nothing left but 
the pure possibility of differentiation in empty space and empty time: “For 
at the outermost limit of suffering nothing else stands but the conditions 
of time and space” (258).62 In a Kantian framework of space and time, this 
“nothing else” would be impossible; although temporal and spatial condi-
tions indeed represent the pure forms of intuition a priori, they are literally 
nothing without the sensual experience to which they lend form.63 The suf-
fering here, however, which will resemble Antigone’s suffering in the empty 
tomb as the space between life and death, represents precisely the pain of 
nothing but difference, without the solace of a positive concept to ground 
opposition.
 Yet in this place where nothing exists other than pure differentiation, we 
are nowhere if not in language.64 There can be little doubt that for Hölderlin 
one goal of these translations was to locate the space in which that “nowhere” 
of pure distancing might be most immediately felt. Comprehending words 
in logical relationships to one another becomes impossible when the most 
fundamental sense slips away from language, as it does so frequently in 
these translations. What emerges in the absence of “sense” in its customary 
form, however, is an impression of the obscurity contained in-between—
between ancient and modern, source text and translation, subject and other. 
Hölderlin’s task as translator is to surround that obscurity and preserve it 
in the dynamics of translation.65 The remarks on Antigone will demonstrate 
 62. “In der äußersten Grenze des Leidens bestehet nämlich nichts mehr, als die Bedingungen der 
Zeit und des Raums” (FA 16: 258).
 63. See Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Transszendentale Ästhetik, 1. Abschnitt: Vom Raume and 2. 
Abschnitt: Von der Zeit, especially B42 and B51.
 64. This formulation recalls Ferdinand de Saussure’s contribution to the conception of language 
in contemporary theory, including both Lacanian psychoanalysis and deconstruction; the difference 
he posits in language, like Hölderlin’s figuration of suffering here, undermines the possibility of op-
position: “ .  .  .  in language there are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally 
implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differ-
ences without positive terms.” Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1959), 120. 
 65. In his 1921 essay “The Task of the Translator,” Walter Benjamin follows a trajectory similar to 
Hölderlin’s formal movement of differentiation, describing that task as the conveyance of something 
incommunicable (“Nicht-Mitteilbares”), namely a complicated relation to a “pure language” (reine 
Sprache) that emerges not from the representative potential of language but from a sense of its “be-
coming” in the spaces between languages. At its best, translation leaves those spaces intact, like “royal 
robes” surrounding content “with ample folds.” Benjamin, Selected Writings, Vol. 1: 1913–1926, ed. 
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even more explicitly the potential effects of this preservation of obscurity in 
translation. As we will see next, the effects of an even more peculiar trans-
lation—a text that, in key moments, forecloses its own translatability—are 
inseparable from the experience of tragedy as Hölderlin conceives it from a 
modern standpoint.
 Perhaps this obscurity, at once begotten and borne by language, ulti-
mately resembles what Hölderlin himself perceived while examining the 
final proofs of the Oedipus translation. As he attempts to explain in a very 
curious letter to Wilmans just prior to publication in April 1804, he senses a 
strange interference with the solidity of the letters on the page—an interfer-
ence which might not only undermine the ground of the text but already, 
as he contends with perhaps uncanny foresight, contribute to a perception 
of instability in the “creator” himself.
Der rohe Druck hat mir fast besser gefallen, wahrscheinlich, weil die Züge, 
welche an den Buchstaben das Feste anzeigen, gegen das Modifizierende 
so gut aushalten in dieser Typographie, und dieses im rohen Druck noch 
bemerkbarer ist als im gefeilten. Der Erfinder ist oft verschämt gegen sein 
Publikum, und verlieret über die Galanterie dann das Eigentümliche über-
haupt, besonders das Feste, was diese Typographie charakterisiert. (FA 16: 
19)
The raw printing almost appealed to me more, likely because in this typog-
raphy those traits, which in the letters indicate the solid, hold out so well 
against the modifying, and because this is even more noticeable in the raw 
printing than in the finished one. The creator is often ashamed before his 
public, and through his gallantry loses the particular as such, especially the 
solid that characterizes this typography.
In the very next sentence he essentially dismisses what he has just written 
about the mysteriously “modifying” typeface: “Incidentally, the typography 
in this case has lost more in appearance than in reality.” But the concern 
for the “solid” remains on the page here, as if removing it now would itself 
constitute a lack of “gallantry”: “I say this in order to demonstrate to you 
the extent to which I comprehend this excellent notion.”66 What could this 
mean for his view of poetic language, if he “comprehends” here that words 
cannot even be grounded reliably on a page?
Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 258. See also 
chapter 4, “The Translator’s Courage.”
 66. “Übrigens hat die Typographie in diesem Vorzug nur mehr dem Scheine nach verloren als der 
Wirklichkeit. . . . Ich sage dies, um Ihnen zu bezeugen, wie weit ich diese Vortrefflichkeit verstehe.”
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 Given the timing of the letter, the problem that appears to consume 
Hölderlin’s thoughts could easily be attributed to the onset of his mental 
deterioration. However, in light of his insights into the empty movement 
of differentiation that inscribes “tragic transport,” that concern suddenly 
appears very much justified. The permanence of letters becomes untenable 
after the disruptive force of these translations.67 Perhaps because of this 
struggle with the instability of letters, Hölderlin will return to problems of 
signification and difference in the remarks on Antigone. Within that same 
space, however, he will introduce the degree to which the unstable ground 
of translation not only describes the relation between subject and world but 
also demarcates the subject as such.
 67. A powerful expression of the poetic will to maintain the solidity of letters appears in Hölder-
lin’s hymn “Patmos,” written around 1803:
Wir haben gedienet der Mutter Erd
Und haben jüngst dem Sonnenlichte gedient,
Unwissend, der Vater aber liebt,
Der über allen waltet,
Am meisten, daß gepfleget werde
Der feste Buchstab, und Bestehendes gut
Gedeutet. Dem folgt deutscher Gesang.
We have served Mother Earth.
And lately have served the sunlight,
Unwittingly, but what the father
Who reigns over all loves most
Is that the solid letter
Be given scrupulous care, and the existing
Be well interpreted. This German song observes. (Hamburger 477)
Ungeheuer ist viel. Doch nichts
Ungeheuerer, als der Mensch. (FA 16: 299)
Much is monstrous. Yet nothing
More monstrous than the human.
t HougH Few  are like Hölderlin, as Susette Gontard noted, and even fewer like solitary Oedipus, still we all are, unsettling as it is, like Anti-
gone. With a judicious word choice, Hölderlin makes his Chorus of The-
ban elders suggest as much: as monstrous as she may appear to man in her 
singular determination, she cannot exceed him in this regard, for nothing is 
more monstrous than the human.1 Though Hölderlin had already attempted 
a translation of the Choral ode in 1800, rendering these lines as “Vieles 
Gewaltige giebt’s. Doch nichts / Ist gewaltiger als der Mensch” (FA 16: 
56: There is much that is powerful. But nothing / Is more powerful than the 
human), his published translation of 1804 marks a radical shift that forms 
one of the most striking passages in the entire play: the word that in the 
remarks on Oedipus had described the monstrous link between human and 
divine—das Ungeheure, the monstrous—now confirms our uncomfortable 
likeness to Antigone.2 And if we seem eternally tempted to identify with 
 1. Modern commentators on Sophocles’ tragedy seem in general to agree with this assessment of 
Antigone as strange or uncanny. Besides Heidegger, whose reading will be discussed in more detail in 
the following chapter, Luce Irigaray describes her act of burying her brother against the decree of the 
state as “a perversity,” linking it to her femininity and her relationship to the gods of the underworld; 
Lacan, arguing more closely along Hölderlin’s line of reasoning (as we shall see), discusses the extent 
to which that act appears “inhuman” to us. Irigaray, “The Eternal Irony of the Community,” trans. 
Gillian C. Gill, rpt. in Feminist Interpretations of Hegel (University Park, PA: Penn State University 
Press, 1996), 49; Lacan 263.
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Antigone’s plight, if much of the modern history of her tragedy’s reception 
reflects that effort, this may turn out to be the resemblance that drives the 
temptation in a most fundamental sense. A resemblance colored by shades 
of both universality and particularity—though we are all “ungeheuer,” Anti-
gone’s own haunting justification for burying her brother Polynices insists 
upon a distance at its very ground—that monstrosity marks a cipher that 
will soon reveal itself in Hölderlin’s translation and reading to be strangely 
familiar. While our fascination with Hölderlin’s Oedipus has everything to 
do with his particular solitude, coded as a distance from that which can be 
grasped as exemplarily or timelessly human, the unique solitude with which 
Antigone moves toward her chosen death is exposed by Hölderlin’s Chorus 
to inhabit each and every subject.3
 Although they were conceived as part of a larger project and cannot 
easily be separated within his body of work, it is nonetheless productive 
to consider what makes this text distinct from the translation and remarks 
on Oedipus. (In his translation of the translations, Constantine reflects on 
the greater difficulty of Hölderlin’s Oedipus compared with his Antigone.) 
Because this second translation shifts our focus from the exposure of pure 
difference in language and figure to a register that involves the modern sub-
ject more intimately in the tragic situation, the question of transitions comes 
into play: How does the confrontation with ancient text affect a modern 
subject? To what extent can the translation itself reflect the conflicts inher-
ent in that temporal and conceptual crossing? On the whole, despite being 
involved in translating from the Greek throughout most of his productive 
life, Hölderlin made few comments on the practice in his theoretical writ-
ings; in this text, however—starting with the passage above—it becomes 
possible to map out a theory of how the significance of Greek tragedy in 
a modern register might be inseparable from the effects of its translation. 
Ultimately Hölderlin’s translation achieves something of a performance of 
transition as such, not only as a problem of translation but as an exposure 
of the radical instability of modern subjectivity.
 Antigone of Thebes, the daughter of Oedipus and Jocasta, sister of Eteo-
cles, Polynices, and Ismene, acknowledges only one task at the beginning 
of her tragedy, one that she is determined to meet regardless of the conse-
quences. In the aftermath of the battle waged by her brothers against one 
 3. Lacan’s reading of the tragedy also takes note of this disquietude mixed with familiarity 
brought on by the figure of Antigone, but underlines at the same time the power of undeniable at-
traction that the discomfort engenders: “ . . . it is Antigone herself who fascinates us, Antigone in her 
unbearable splendor. She has a quality that both attracts and startles us, in the sense of intimidates us 
[nous interdit]; this terrible, self-willed victim disturbs us” (Lacan 247).
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another, one protecting the city and the other attacking it, both have fallen. 
Creon, as acting ruler of Thebes, decrees that one brother, Eteocles, will be 
honored in death for his heroism while the other, Polynices, will be punished 
for his betrayal of the city; rather than being buried within the community, 
his body will be left to wild dogs and birds. Yet Antigone is determined to 
offer Polynices a proper burial, even though that act disobeys Creon’s law; 
plainly unconcerned with the fact of that disobedience, she acts even as she 
prepares to face the inevitable repercussions for that action. Even after Creon 
has sentenced her to her own death for doing so, she makes it clear that she 
had no other choice.
 No other figure on the stage claims to agree with Antigone’s decision, 
and no one else is a party to it. Though Karl Reinhardt has taken note of 
the special solitude characterizing all of Sophocles’ heroes—the abandon-
ment that all are ultimately forced to recognize4—Antigone’s solitude may 
be most special of all. To be sure, her situation presents a compelling ethical 
dilemma, a universally felt tension, perhaps, between being good, if “the 
Good is what the Law says,”5 and being loyal to a brother who otherwise has 
no one to defend his position. Yet a closer look at her moving words upon 
entering the tomb reveal not universality but something strangely other, for 
they form an elegy to that brother alone:
   Nun, Polynikes,
Indem ich deke deinen Leib, erlang’ ich diß,
Obgleich ich dich geehrt, vor Wohlgesinnten.
Nie nemlich, weder, wenn ich Mutter
Von Kindern wäre, oder ein Gemahl
Im Tode sich verzehret, hätt’ ich mit Gewalt,
Als wollt’ ich einen Aufstand, dies errungen.
Und welchem Geseze sag’ ich diß zu Dank?
Wär’ ein Gemahl gestorben, gäb’ es andre,
Und auch ein Kind von einem andern Manne,
Wenn diesen ich umarmt. Wenn aber Mutter
Und Vater schläft, im Ort der Todten beides,
Stehts nicht, als wüchs’ ein andrer Bruder wieder.
Nach solchem Geseze hab’ ich dich geehrt . . . (FA 16: 359: 936–49)
 4. For Reinhardt, the “Sophoclean situation”—the conflict that develops on multiple levels 
within the tragedy—involves above all the hero’s recognition of his own utter solitude. Reinhardt 
1947, 10.
 5. Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, x. Lacan has pointed out the similarity between Creon’s 
position as arbiter of the law and Kant’s articulation of the forms of practical reason (259).
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   Now, Polynices,
Covering your corpse I have come to this,
Though in well-minded eyes I honoured you.
For never had I either been a mother
Of children or if in death a husband
Had lain rotting would I with force,
As though wanting revolt, have brought this off.
And to what law do I say thanks for this?
A husband dying there would be other husbands
And even children by another man,
If I embraced that man. But when the mother
And father sleep both in the place of death
It cannot be another brother will grow.
According to that law I honoured you. (Constantine 98)
Here is the claim that shocked Goethe, that Lacan declared a “scandal,” that 
in its stark simplicity resists so much of what is held dear in the community 
of humans organized around Christian declarations of universal love and 
charity:6 Antigone values her brother, this brother, above all others, because 
unlike all others she regards his particularity as irreplaceable and his ethi-
cal position as otherwise indefensible. In justifying her actions before the 
Theban community she invokes no other law than this one, which applies 
to their relationship alone. At no point in her tragedy does Antigone claim 
to stand for anyone but herself and her own, particular, fallen brother. Not 
even Ismene, who offers her advice to Antigone in their exchange in the 
very first scene, may take part in the relationship that her sister defends, and 
Hölderlin’s translation underscores this insistent solitude:
Magst du so etwas sagen, hass’ ich dich,
Hasst auch dich der Gestorbene mit Recht.
Laß mich aber und meinen irren Rat
Das Gewaltige leiden. (FA 16: 273: 95–98)
If you can say that and the like, I hate you,
Also the dead man hates you and is right to.
But let me and my errant counsel
Suffer the violent/the powerful.
 6. Lacan discusses Goethe’s apparent hope that this passage would prove corrupt (255).
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 Yet to leave Antigone to suffer her fate alone has hardly ever been as 
self-evident as she would wish here, as countless revisions of her tragedy and 
invocations of her character in every conceivable context evince.7 Nor was 
Hölderlin any less susceptible to her allure; his first attempt at translating 
the second choral ode goes back five years previous to the publication of 
the Sophocles project, to 1799.8 However, the particular attraction of this 
“most Greek of tragedies,” as Lacoue-Labarthe calls Antigone in contrast to 
Oedipus, must have lain for Hölderlin in its sheer conceptual distance from 
modernity, its status as “not ‘reconstitutable’—if not wholly untransposable” 
(Lacoue-Labarthe 1998, 220). While Oedipus acts excessively in his reliance 
upon logos—a point of departure more recognizable to a modern audience—
Antigone calls upon laws ancient and unwritten even in Sophocles’s time. 
And Hölderlin, to a far greater extent than many contemporary readers, 
seems to have understood the importance of maintaining this distinction. 
Rather than coaxing Antigone into a form that would resonate with the 
experience of modern subjectivity, Hölderlin’s translation and remarks pre-
serve in their central figure a difference that remains unquestionably alone, 
thwarting readers who would seek to make an example of her—that is, 
until Antigone exposes difference itself to be oddly exemplary, even as she 
continues to claim it as her very own.
 Indeed, it is precisely within this exposure of exemplarity in difference 
that Hölderlin locates the special resonance of Antigone’s tragedy for moder-
nity: on one hand in what one critic has called its enactment of the “trag-
edy of being human,”9 but at the same time in its strict particularity, its 
insistence that the pivotal act to which her tragedy bears witness has in its 
essence nothing to do with anyone else. This sentiment already emerges in 
the passage cited at the start of this chapter, drawn from one of the most 
discussed passages in any Greek tragedy. While most translators fashion out 
of the second choral ode a paean to the magnitude of humankind in the face 
of adversity,10 Hölderlin’s rendering guides the proceedings of the tragedy in 
 7. For an exhaustive account of numerous examples, see Steiner, Antigones (New York: Oxford, 
1984).
 8. Hölderlin first reflects upon Antigone as an exemplary figure in his philosophical fragments 
on religion at approximately the same time.
 9. Kathleen Wright, “Heidegger’s Hölderlin and the Mo(u)rning of History,” Philosophy Today 
37: 4 (Winter 1993): 430. Wright adds “among the Greeks,” which will become unnecessary in a 
discussion of das Unheimliche as Heidegger poses it with respect to Hölderlin; the translation from 
Greece to modernity even doubles the experience of this notion of monstrosity.
 10. Compare, for example the Loeb edition, translated by Hugh Lloyd-Jones: “Many things 
are formidable, and none more formidable than man!” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1994):35. In the introduction to his translation of Antigone, Robert Fagles describes the ode as 
“celebrat[ing] Man’s progress and powers” (Fagles 42); meanwhile, his translation captures some of the 
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a more unsettling direction: “Ungeheuer ist viel. Doch nichts / Ungeheuerer, 
als der Mensch” (299: 349–50: Much is monstrous. Yet nothing more monstrous 
than the human).
 The word “ungeheuer” is an astute translation choice for the Greek dei-
non, as the two terms share a fundamental ambiguity that cuts to the heart 
of the Chorus’s words. In describing the human being as deinon, Sophocles 
famously evokes both man’s greatness and his dreadfulness, his autonomy 
and his excessiveness in his interactions with nature and the gods. This 
conflicting range of meanings in a single term underscores the fundamental 
tolerance of contradiction inherent in ancient Greek cosmology, as Oude-
mans and Lardinois have argued.11 Indeed, Sophocles employs contradictory 
imagery and language throughout the entire stasimon in order to emphasize 
the extent to which deinon is both the precondition for human achieve-
ment and a transgression of the boundaries that separate humans from the 
gods; again, Oudemans and Lardinois point out how Sophocles uses mul-
tivalent terms (not just deinon but also perao, to traverse or transgress, and 
tolma, daring but also recklessness) to convey the idea of the human being’s 
tendency to overreach in his confrontations with nature (Oudemans and 
Lardinois 126).12 Even the reference to man’s venturing and advancing in 
the notion of seafaring has an ambiguous status, as Mark Griffith points out 
in the Cambridge edition of the Antigone, “as a positive symbol of adven-
ture and technical mastery, but also a negative one of temerity, violation of 
boundaries, and unnatural greed.”13
 Unlike many modern translators, including his contemporaries, who 
tend to emphasize in their translations the “wonders” of human achieve-
ment, Hölderlin manages to convey this broad and ambivalent range of 
human characteristics with an understanding of its significance as the essen-
tial marker of a tragic universe. While the customary choice of German 
translators of the nineteenth century, gewaltig, evokes above all a sense of 
power, ungeheuer signifies both strength and excess, immensity and mon-
ambiguity of Hölderlin’s: “Numberless wonders/terrible wonders walk the world but none the match 
for man” (76). Sophocles, The Three Theban Plays, trans. Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin, 1982). 
 11. Th. C. W. Oudemans and A. P. M. H. Lardinois, Tragic Ambiguity: Anthropology, Philosophy, 
and Sophocles’ Antigone (Leiden: Brill, 1987), 4.
 12. See also Darien Shanske’s discussion of the concept of deinon from its pretragic manifesta-
tions in Homer to its role in the historical writings of Thucydides. Shanske argues that for Sophocles, 
the relation of the human to deinon is “not just a question but a leitmotiv, that is, a question that must 
be answered.” Thucydides and the Philosophical Origins of History (Cambridge 2006), 85.
 13. Sophocles, Antigone, ed. Mark Griffith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
185.
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strosity.14 If by valuing her brother uniquely and refusing any other earthly 
contingency Antigone approaches the limits of what is commonly under-
stood to be human nature, this statement’s open appeal to the monstros-
ity of humankind indicates that the rest of us might share her taste for 
transgression. Indeed, Hölderlin’s adjectival phrases throughout the passage 
emphasize the disturbance caused by the actions of humankind, continu-
ally marking contrasts between the untouched, raw status of nature and the 
ambition and industry of humans:
Und der Himmlischen erhabene Erde,
Die unverderbliche, unermüdete,
Reibet er auf; mit dem strebenden Pfluge,
Von Jahr zu Jahr.
And the noble earth of the gods in heaven
The unspoilable, unweary,
He rips up with the striving plough
From year to year. (Constantine 81; trans. modified)
Hölderlin’s use of the term aufreiben for the Greek apotribo points up with 
intense physicality the negative repercussions of human ambition; aufreiben, 
to tear up or ream out, implies the annihilation of its object, here the “unper-
ishable” earth.15 The form of the passage redoubles this destructive intensity, 
as Hölderlin modifies the tonal continuity of the passage in Greek (aphthi-
ton, akamatan apotruetai) in favor of a visual and acoustic disruption: he 
begins with a pattern similar to the Greek (unverderblich, unermüdet), only 
to break it with the phrase “reibet er auf,” in which a verb with a separable 
prefix (aufreiben) is itself literally torn in two.
 Hölderlin’s rendering certainly demonstrates his unusually keen com-
prehension of the ambiguities inherent in both the language and the world-
view of the ancient Greeks, yet there is more at stake here than a “correct” 
translation. Deinon, which Hölderlin translates elsewhere and at other times 
as “das Gewaltige” (signifying, more univocally, the powerful or the great) 
now disturbs in the very act of signifying; its translation into the ambiguous 
 14. Hölderlin begins here as well, translating the passage in 1799 as “Vieles Gewaltige giebt’s. 
Doch nichts Gewaltiger, als der Mensch” (There is much that is powerful. Yet nothing as powerful as the 
human being). Compare K. W. F. Solger’s translation from 1824: “Vieles Gewalt’ge lebt, und doch / 
Nichts gewaltiger, denn der Mensch . . . ” (Des Sophokles Tragödien [Berlin 1808], 159).
 15. Griffith and others point out the oxymoron of this passage in Greek, in which man wears out 
the unwearying earth (Griffith 186; see also Joan O’Brien, Guide to Sophocles’ Antigone [Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1978], 54).
diFFerenCe beCoMes antigone 93
“ungeheuer” produces an effect of foreignness in the same gesture that ought 
to render it comprehensible. At the same time, Greek wordplay (the oxy-
moron of man wearing out the unwearying earth) gives way to a translation 
that performs visually and aurally what it also represents conceptually. In a 
striking enactment of what his remarks will ultimately explore, translation 
begins to take action here, to speak its own name even as it stands in for an 
other that will not be silenced; for rather than approximating (and thereby 
flattening) the Greek text in terms unproblematic to a modern context, 
the translation maintains and even intensifies the disquieting movement, 
staged in tragedy, through which man will become unrecognizable to him-
self: Much is monstrous, but nothing is more monstrous than the human.
 To be sure, this choral passage is not the first place where Hölderlin 
articulates the problem of accounting for an unrecognizable element within 
the self. As a host of Hölderlin scholars have noted, his December 1801 let-
ter to friend Böhlendorff already invokes the imperative of approaching that 
which is one’s own, a lesson that is an infinitely greater challenge than the 
encounter with the foreign: “But that which is one’s own must be learned 
just as well as the foreign. . . . The free use of that which is one’s own is the 
most difficult” (FA 16: 16).16 However, the remarks on Antigone, completed 
nearly three years later, extend this point to an unsettling (and unsettled) 
conclusion, indicating that the shock of exposure to one’s own “character” 
may reveal the consequence of this difficult lesson in the simple discovery 
that one is not at all “one” with oneself.
Der kühnste Moment eines Taglaufs oder Kunstwerks ist, wo der Geist 
der Zeit und Natur, das Himmlische, was den Menschen ergreift, und der 
Gegenstand, für welchen er sich interessirt, am wildesten gegeneinander ste-
hen [ . . . ] In diesem Momente muß der Mensch sich am meisten festhalten, 
deswegen steht er auch da am offensten in seinem Karakter. (FA 16: 412).
The boldest moment in the course of a day or a work of art comes when the 
spirit of time and nature, the divine/heavenly that seizes hold of the human 
being, and the object in which he is interested are most wildly opposed to 
one another. [ . . . ] At that moment the human being must keep the firmest 
hold on himself, for which reason he also stands most openly there in his 
character. (Constantine 114; trans. modified)
 16. “Aber das Eigene muß genau so gut gelernt seyn, wie das Fremde. . . . [Der] freie Gebrauch 
des Eigenen [ist] das Schwerste” (FA 16: 16).
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Whether it happens in the work of art or the course of an ordinary day, 
Hölderlin’s subject finds herself not only isolated but suspended in a gap 
between her own experience of the phenomenal world (“the object in which 
he is interested”) and the divine spirit of time and space that frames that 
experience (“the spirit of time and nature”). However, while the former rep-
resents the subject’s “interest”—the object that she herself has determined, 
“her” other—the force of the latter guarantees that this appropriative gesture 
is eternally accompanied by a disruption that seizes the subject and shows 
her, otherwise, the extent to which that other exceeds her.
 Hölderlin’s Antigone, precisely insofar as it is at once tragedy and transla-
tion, proposes to make that event happen; exposing the subject’s character 
will demand the effects of both separate dynamics. Although the remarks on 
Oedipus Tyrannus similarly emphasize the hero’s solitude in the context of the 
tragedy, they leave aside the crucial question of how translation itself may 
become involved in that process of exposure. In effect, the formidable tem-
poral lag between Sophocles’ text and Hölderlin’s age itself becomes a player, 
as characters’ words mark not a form of privileged access but a glimpse into 
the experience of transition as such. While Hölderlin’s friend and classmate, 
G. W. F. Hegel, produces an account which places Antigone on one side of 
an ethical impasse in the ascent towards universal Spirit, then, Hölderlin’s 
version of the tragedy (published three years before Hegel’s Phenomenology) 
anticipates a different ethics that tragedy and translation together have the 
potential to enact. In this model difference becomes Antigone; that is, the 
interplay between familiar and foreign that the heroine embodies in the 
text—not coincidentally, the exchange that also describes the relationship 
between original and translation—defines, suits, and illuminates her as a 
source of potentially limitless fascination. And as a final consequence, it 
becomes the modern subject as well.
 Long before Hölderlin’s remarks begin to sketch the outline of this dif-
ference expressed in translation, she is there. And some of the most com-
pelling moments of the translation actively nourish a lasting fascination 
with her, the mysterious girl who has for so long brought this tragedy to 
life. Unlike the necessary distancing that informed the reading of Oedi-
pus, however, Antigone’s allure is meant directly to engage the subject who 
makes contact with it, seizing him with the force of an ancient passion 
returning—perhaps, as Hölderlin will soon specify, through nothing more 
than the utterance of a single word. Just as it seizes the Chorus, which soon 
enough has little choice but to look on, through tears aroused from a distant 
and forgotten source, as a figure roams its field of vision like a wandering 
spirit.
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Jezt aber komm’ ich, eben, selber, aus
Dem Geseze. Denn ansehn muß ich diß, und halten kann ich
Nicht mehr die Quelle der Tränen,
Da in das alles schwaigende Bett’
Ich seh’ Antigonä wandeln. (FA 16: 349: 830–34)
But now even I myself am brought outside of
The law. For I must look at this, and I can hold back
The spring of tears no longer,
As into the all-silent bed
I see Antigone wander.
 Early in the remarks on Antigone, Hölderlin reiterates a crucial element 
of his argument from the remarks on Oedipus by insisting that the “lawful 
calculus” (gesezlicher Kalkul ) fundamental to tragic form must be reproduced 
in modern terms, culminating in the caesura that marks the balance between 
two irreconcilable halves.17 In this passage from the translation, however, 
we seem to have reached a space in which laws no longer apply. Before the 
vision recognized by my very own eye—for I must look at this—even I 
myself am brought outside of the system of laws through which I constitute 
myself, and hence I myself am shattered. In fact, I do it to myself, ich, eben, 
selber; echoed in the jagged rhythm of the Chorus’s lines, culminating in the 
visually and aurally arresting “aus / Dem Geseze,” the disturbance emerges 
not from without but from within the subject who sees Antigone enter 
her tomb.18 This production of an internal “outside” is clearly distant from 
Lessing’s influential reformulation of tragic catharsis, in which the viewing 
subject identifies with the figure onstage through pity and its self-reflexive 
component, fear. If the possibility of identifying with the tragic heroine 
in Lessing’s view is contingent upon our recognition of her likeness to us 
(and even the extent to which we “like” her), the attraction that the Chorus 
describes here does not replicate that movement into the sphere of famil-
iarity. Rather, a process is initiated in the opposite direction: because it is 
 17. “Die Regel, das kalkulable Gesez der Antigonä verhält sich zu dem des Ödipus, wie __/__ 
zum __\__, so daß sich das Gleichgewicht mehr vom Anfang gegen das Ende, als vom Ende gegen 
den Anfang zu neigt” (FA 16: 411) (The rule, the calculable law of the Antigone relates to that of Oedipus 
as __/__ to __\__, so that the balance leans more from the beginning towards the end than from the end 
towards the beginning).
 18. In his 1948 adaptation of Hölderlin’s Antigonä, Bertolt Brecht accentuates the rhythmic 
caesura of these lines—“Jetzt aber komm ich, eben, selber/Aus dem Takte” (Now even I myself am put 
off the rhythm)—while inexplicably failing to retain the formal line break that performs it. See Brecht, 
Die Antigone des Sophokles, 44.
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impossible to tear one’s eyes from the sight of her, we must follow Antigone, 
like the Chorus, “outside of the law.” Something other than identification 
brings one outside of the comprehensible here, and not only as an effect of 
tragic form and poetic language, where one would expect to find it after his 
remarks on Oedipus. To be sure, that resonance of form is again essential to 
the tragedy’s potential for affirming an uncrossable distance between subject 
and world, self and other; however, an equally powerful kind of difference 
comes to be expressed directly by the fascinating and haunting figure we 
see before us: Ich seh’ Antigonä wandeln. . . . The German word “wandeln” 
refers here to her movement into the tomb, but it also denotes change, thus 
evoking the idea of a crossing from life into the “all-silent bed” of death. 
What brings one “outside of the law” here—hence beyond the potential 
for understanding or “grasping” (begreifen) that underlies the speculative 
effort—is precisely this captivating vision confronting the Chorus, the vision 
of a wandering, changing Antigone. Thus it cannot wrest its tearful eyes 
from the sight of her, despite that sight’s evocation of something almost 
chilling, something so marked by the allure of its difference that Heidegger 
will eventually describe it as “unheimlich”: For I must look at this. . . .
 The Chorus is not alone in its bewilderment, for the reader of Hölderlin’s 
remarks on the tragedy cannot help but find herself similarly unsettled in 
facing the density of these articulations. In this sense, translation and inter-
pretation also initiate a movement “outside of the law” in the challenging 
language of this Antigone. While in Oedipus Hölderlin allows text to decenter 
itself through translation and form, disrupting and endlessly deferring the 
dialectical resolution that other modern readers would wish to give it, here 
the word and its form affect the subject directly, with translation as the 
vehicle of that effect. As Hölderlin theorizes it in the remarks, it is ultimately 
the word that seizes (“ergreift”) the subject, compelling it to murder, insti-
gating tragedy; and the experience through translation of this word’s force 
and its proximity to death both undermines the solid ground on which the 
subject believes itself to be standing and establishes that vertiginous differ-
ence itself as constitutive. Thus every subject becomes at once as particular, 
as exemplary and as monstrous as Antigone.19 This, as we will see, brings 
 19. Derrida’s discussion of the singular and the universal is significant in this context, see for ex-
ample “Passages—from Traumatism to Promise” (in Points . . . Interviews, 1974–1994, ed. E. Weber, 
trans. P. Kamuf [Stanford University Press, 1995], 378). In his discussion of the date here as well as in 
Shibboleth, singularity is both kept and lost by virtue of the fact that a unique moment repeated, made 
readable is no longer entirely unique; a similar structure would correspond to the figure of Antigone 
here, except that in this case what is readable and iterable must stand alongside that which cannot be 
read but imposes itself onto the text nevertheless. Derrida also treats this element of unreadability in 
the same interview by introducing—like Hölderlin—the figure of the monster (385ff.).
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the whole operation all the more proximate to that space between life and 
death in which Antigone will choose to linger.
striCtly sPeaking,  the chronology of my discussion of Hölderlin’s 
reflections on tragedy is both right and wrong; although the translation of 
Oedipus appears first in print in 1804, Antigone makes her first entrance 
into Hölderlin’s writings several years earlier.20 She enters the scene, like 
the Oedipus figure of “In lovely blueness  .  .  .  ,” not yet in the specific 
context of Sophoclean tragedy but rather as a disruption within a moment 
of philosophical posturing by the poet, again with respect to the nature of 
speculative reflection.
 This initial link to Antigone appears in a period in which Hölderlin, first 
studying with Fichte in Jena and then living in close proximity to Hegel in 
Frankfurt, was concerned not only with poetic production but also the very 
current problem of accounting for a fundamental self-recognition.21 As he 
describes a new set of philosophical letters to Niethammer early in 1796, he 
intends to coax the conflictual tones of reflective subjectivity into pulling a 
disappearing act.
In the philosophical letters I wish to find the principle that will explain for 
me the separations in which we think and exist, that however is also capable 
of making the conflict vanish, that conflict between subject and object, 
between our self and the world, yes even between reason and revelation.22
The unlikely image of conflict being made to vanish into thin air suggests 
that even at this early juncture, Hölderlin poses these questions with more 
desire than conviction; not only must the principle he seeks elucidate the 
nature of division but must also, in order to repair that division, perform 
something like a feat of magic. The desire to formulate a philosophical 
system thus continues to be irritated by his awareness of an ineffaceable 
distance defining self-consciousness. As a result, in the philosophical letters 
he mentions to Niethammer, Hölderlin resorts to a bizarre grammar of 
 20. Hölderlin first confronts that unsettling choral ode from the Antigone (“Ungeheuer ist 
viel . . . ”) in 1800. At that time, his translation is closer to the traditional one: “Vieles gewaltige gibt’s. 
Doch nichts / Ist gewaltiger, als der Mensch” (FA 16, 56).
 21. See Henrich, “Hölderlin über Urteil und Sein,” 73–77.
 22. “In den philosophischen Briefen will ich das Prinzip finden, das mir die Trennungen, in 
denen wir denken und existieren, erklärt, das aber auch vermögend ist, den Widerstreit verschwinden 
zu machen, den Widerstreit zwischen dem Subjekt und dem Objekt, zwischen unserem Selbst und 
der Welt, ja auch zwischen Vernunft und Offenbarung” (24. February 1796, StA VI:1: 203).
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relativity in which a subject’s approach to the unreflected absolute is never 
defined by what it is or is not, but rather by that which it is constantly 
becoming: “then there exists, in every sphere that is proper to him, a more 
than necessity-based, higher life, thus a more than necessity-based, a more 
infinite satisfaction (Pfau 1988, 90; trans. modified) (so giebt es für ihn, 
in jeder ihm eigentümlichen Sphäre, ein mehr als nothdürftiges, ein höheres 
Leben, also eine mehr als nothdürftige, eine unendlichere Befriedigung [StA 
IV: 275]). As such this approach is not different from a rigorously dialecti-
cal structure of patient ascension toward absolute “satisfaction.” However, 
while for Hölderlin aesthetic representation had previously formed, at least 
in his direct address of the problem, the means to enable the disappearance 
of conflict, in this text that same work of art—specifically, tragedy—will 
exemplify conflict’s permanence. Within this context, Antigone appears as 
a foreign entity, wholly unassimilable to the thinking subject who is con-
fronted with her.
. . . those infinite, more than necessary relations of life can be thought, to 
be sure, but not merely thought; thought does not exhaust them . . . and if 
there exist unwritten divine laws of which Antigone speaks, . . . then they 
are insufficient insofar as they are grasped, represented only by themselves 
and not in life because  .  .  .  the law and the particular world in which it 
is enacted interrelate more infinitely; and because the law, even if it were 
universal for civilized people, could never be conceived of abstractly with-
out a particular case unless one were to take away from it its peculiarity, its 
intimate relation with the sphere in which it is enacted. (Pfau 1988, 91; 
trans. modified)23
 In Hölderlin’s view, Antigone’s unwritten laws cannot be grasped or 
even thought in the abstract, outside of their own lost particularity; mod-
ern thought and religion simply cannot account for what emerges in this 
representation of a tragic hero, for a difference that cannot be known in the 
terms constituting a speculative approach to knowledge, even knowledge of 
 23. “. . . jene unendlicheren mehr als nothwendigen Beziehungen des Lebens können zwar auch 
gedacht, aber nur nicht blos gedacht werden; der Gedanke erschöpft sie nicht . . . und wenn es un-
geschriebene göttliche Gesetze giebt, von denen Antigonä spricht, . . . so sind sie, in so fern sie blos 
für sich und nicht im Leben begriffen werden, vorgestellt werden, unzulänglich, einmal weil . . . das 
Gesez, und die besondere Welt in der es ausgeübt wird, unendlicher verbunden ist und eben deswegen 
das Gesez, wenn es auch gleich ein für gesittete Menschen allgemeines wäre, doch niemals ohne einen 
besonderen Fall, niemals abstract gedacht werden könnte, wenn man ihm nicht seine Eigentümlich-
keit, seine innige Verbundenheit mit der Sphäre in der es ausgeübt wird, nehmen wollte” (StA IV: 
277).
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“difference.” Understanding her law as universally legitimate thus becomes 
impossible, her experience too particular to be grasped as fuel for the dialec-
tical force of history. Tragedy reveals not proximity but rather the formidable 
presence of a barrier to the absolute in the structure of thought itself. The 
dynamics of endless approach, already familiar in Hölderlin’s reflections by 
this time, are replicated in the text of Antigone by the permanent division 
between us and her, between familiar self and a radically foreign other.
 This view of the inaccessible laws that govern Antigone’s actions remains 
largely unchanged for Hölderlin, even as his approach to tragedy continues 
to evolve from philosophical reflection to translation. Despite his emphasis 
on “lawful calculus” in the remarks on Oedipus, Hölderlin’s Antigone demon-
strates that this evolution will remain distant from the question of legitimacy 
in any conventional sense. It is with respect to this question that the dif-
ferences between his and Hegel’s accounts come to a distinct point. While 
Hegel lets Antigone and Creon exemplify the ethical divide between the 
equally legitimate duties of family and community, the divine and human 
laws embodied by woman and man, Hölderlin manages to call into question 
the demand of legitimacy as such.
 In the sixth chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel situates the 
tragic universe as a vital step within the dialectical advance toward universal 
spirit, where the ethical conflicts that both define and divide the commu-
nity are confronted in stark and brutal terms. Every human being within 
the tragic universe has a legitimate duty upon which he or she, of neces-
sity upholding one or the other aspect of the ethical order, must act with-
out reservation; the human law of the community and state is consciously 
maintained by man, whereas the divine law, that of the family, is intuitively, 
unconsciously preserved by the woman.24 The guardian of the divine law—
for Hegel, the sister—has as her only responsibility precisely that which 
Antigone is compelled to perform: in the name of an individual helplessly 
facing the threat of a return to pure universality in death, she must see to it 
that this death become an act of consciousness, that the very destruction of 
the body not be left to nature but be transformed into “something done” (ein 
Getanes).25 Although in carrying out this duty the sister violates the human 
law, this in no way alleviates its necessity. Indeed, as in Antigone’s case, 
 24. Hegel’s structure of opposing laws is, however, far from simple division. The two sides of 
the law and the groups they represent cannot be seen as mutually exclusive in the lives of individuals 
but rather intersect necessarily and constantly, that law which constitutes the positive side for each 
individual determines his or her fundamental duty. See Chanter, “Antigone’s Dilemma,” 138.
 25. G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 
1952), 321. Subsequent page number references will be given in parentheses directly after citations.
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precisely when her brother is excluded from the community and denied a 
public funeral before the state, it is the duty of the sister alone, made neces-
sary by bonds of blood, to make death into an act of consciousness, to ensure 
that her brother’s singular place will be maintained at least in memory.26
 Ostensibly at least, these two divisions of the law remain equally legiti-
mate for Hegel, because they represent the two equally necessary elements 
of the ethical order: family and community, woman and man, singularity 
and universality. What is more, though Antigone may be guilty of violat-
ing the law of the state, that guilt is inevitable; in the Hegelian system, 
pure innocence only equals inertia, in the manner of nothing but a stone.27 
In fact, as it turns out the crime itself is unavoidable, irreversible in any 
case; as Derrida asserts in Glas, by the very nature of the Hegelian system 
that introduces sexual difference as intrinsic conflict, the crime constitutes 
a “fatal necessity.”28 There is no other means to act within the ethical world 
but through crime. Thus Creon, too, must act criminally, and even if Hegel 
does not discuss this prospect explicitly, the tragedy itself supports it; in 
the end he, too, will acknowledge his guilt and bear his punishment in 
the loss of his entire family. Merely by acting, both man and woman are 
guilty by definition; meanwhile, ethical consciousness benefits dialectically 
from the eventual restoration of an equilibrium which Hegel calls “justice” 
(Gerechtigkeit).29
 Yet even as Hegel insists that the two sides are equal in their culpability 
as well as their legitimacy, his conception of that guilt takes on various forms 
in his use of tragic material. In fact, one man and one woman in particular, 
Oedipus and his daughter Antigone, embody the limits of those forms in a 
manner that curiously seems to contradict his previously universal distinc-
tions of gender. Citing a passage from Antigone’s final lament before she 
enters the tomb out of which she will never return, Hegel argues that her 
guilt is purer (“reiner”) than her father’s, insofar as she is fully aware at the 
 26. The other possibility in death, a “dishonoring” operation of unconscious desires, would con-
stitute, as Derrida points out in Glas, desecration and decomposition “at the mercy of every lower 
individuality and the forces of abstract material elements,” an expression that would destroy the dead 
one in his being für sich, would leave him an “empty singular”; this desire is suppressed by the act 
of the sister for her brother [145]. Derrida also links this “dishonoring operation” to what he calls a 
“probably cannibal desire” that the family must suppress by taking on this duty.
 27. Hegel, Phänomenologie, 334: “Unschuldig ist daher nur das Nichttun wie das Sein eines 
Steines, nicht einmal eines Kindes.”
 28. Derrida, Glas, 172.
 29. Lacan openly questions this possibility of reconciliation, echoing the critical voice of Erwin 
Rohde, who argues against the view that the outcome of tragedy is “ennobling”; in disagreement with 
what he calls “conventional literary interpretation.” Rohde, Psyche: The Cult of Souls and Belief in Im-
mortality among the Greeks (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950), 431. See also Lacan 249ff.
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same time that she must obey the law that constitutes her “intuition” of the 
divine law and that this act of obedience violates the human law that governs 
the community:
weil wir leiden, anerkennen wir, daß wir gefehlt—(336)
because we suffer we acknowledge that we have erred—(Miller 284)
Because she can acknowledge the certainty of her crime, yet still proceeds 
with her duty under the divine law, Antigone represents a higher level of 
self-consciousness than her father Oedipus, who remained blind to the pos-
sibility that his actions, which in this model appear “right” according to 
his duty to the human law, might inscribe into him a terrible, unavoidable 
guilt:30 “the ethical consciousness is more complete, its guilt more inexcus-
able, if it knows beforehand the law and the power which it opposes, if it 
takes them to be violence and wrong, to be ethical merely by accident, and, 
like Antigone, knowingly commits the crime” (Miller 284).31
 Miller’s translation poses a semantic problem for nonreaders of German 
here by presenting Antigone’s “reinere Schuld” (literally, purer guilt) as “more 
inexcusable.” The question of “excuse” does not actually arise in Hegel’s 
account. What is clear in the German text is that Antigone’s act represents 
a more complete ethical consciousness than her father Oedipus, to whom 
Hegel obviously alludes here. Since in Hegel’s system one is guilty as soon 
as one acts, acting with awareness is more productive, for then one may turn 
a temporary, personal loss into a gain in the universal direction of Spirit.32 
Her guilt involves two independent movements: on the one hand, she acts 
without question in the name of the divine law, which she has (been) chosen 
to represent; on the other hand, she recognizes that another (in this system, 
equally just) side exists, a law of the state that she grasps but nevertheless 
must violate for the sake of the laws of the family.33 Still, Derrida emphasizes 
 30. This sharply contrasts Hegel’s view of effective tragedy with Aristotle’s; while it is clear, of 
course, that for Hegel the question of guilt extends far beyond the scope of Aristotle’s poetics, still it 
is interesting to note the exact reversal of Aristotle’s view of Oedipus as the most successful tragedy 
precisely because the hero remains until the end completely unaware of his guilt.
 31. “ . . . das sittliche Bewußtseyn ist vollständiger, seine Schuld reiner, wenn es das Gesetz und 
die Macht vorher kennt, der es gegenüber tritt, sie für Gewalt und Unrecht, für eine sittliche Zufäl-
ligkeit nimmt, und wissentlich, wie Antigone, das Verbrechen begeht” [336]).
 32. Antigone’s act thus illuminates, in Derrida’s words, an opposition between two laws that is of 
the order of universality, even if the crime is committed in the name of singularity (Glas, 173). Within 
Hegel’s logic of scxual difference, as Judith Butler notes, she thus acts more like a man. See Butler 8f.
 33. Binder, by contrast, valorizes Antigone’s act as divinely inspired and condemns Creon’s as 
excessive, thus curiously naming him as the hero whose hubris leads to his ruin. “Ein gotterfüllter und 
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that Antigone remains “in the middle of the ascent,” that her act does not 
yet constitute “ethical plenitude”; while her recognition for itself represents 
an advance toward self-conscious understanding of the ethical system as 
evolving unity of opposing factors, she herself remains only the “figure of 
the fall”—the individual who disobeys even as she obeys, who even as she 
performs this advance also ensures that the subsequent fall on both sides of 
the law will restore equilibrium through justice (Glas 174f.). Nevertheless, 
for Hegel the consequences of both her act and her acknowledgment of it 
offer signs that, in its advancement toward universal Spirit, the ethical realm 
of community and individual is certainly getting somewhere.
 To be sure, Antigone’s acknowledgment of her own guilt here does not 
exonerate her, since her act still reflects the disruptive status of woman-
kind—Hegel’s famous internal enemy, the “eternal irony of the commu-
nity”—that unsettles the community’s stability from within. One might 
wonder, however, if another force of irony doesn’t play havoc with Hegel’s 
own approach to the universal conflict of laws he presents; for precisely 
in this turn to the tragedy that ought to exemplify a crucial step in his 
progression, the structure of his argument begins likewise to unravel. That 
single reference to Antigone’s recognition of her guilt is taken badly out of 
context, while Hölderlin’s translation of the passage emphasizes that context 
as crucial to any inquiry into Antigone’s relation to the law. Citing a pas-
sage from Antigone’s final lament (his only direct reference to Sophocles’ 
text in translation), Hegel notes her recognition that an act of obedience to 
her “intuition” of the divine law would at the same time violate the human 
law that governs the community, a recognition brought on by the suffering 
she endures: “because we suffer we acknowledge that we have erred” (Miller 
284). In contrast to the apparent clarity of Hegelian oppositions, however, 
for Hölderlin Antigone’s statement expresses neither intuitive conviction nor 
acceptance of inevitable guilt, but rather bitter frustration with the gods and 
their power to force their laws arbitrarily upon the acts of individuals.
Was soll ich Arme noch zu himmlischen
Gewalten schaun? Wen singen der Waffengenossen?
Da ich Gottlosigkeit aus Frömmigkeit empfangen.
Doch wenn nun dieses schön ist vor den Göttern,
So leiden wir und bitten ab, was wir
Gesündiget . . . (359: 958–963; emphasis added)
ein selbstherrlicher Mensch stehen sich gegenüber und also nicht mehr Wille gegen Wille, sondern 
Wissen gegen Ichsucht, religio gegen Hybris” (Hölderlin und Sophokles: Turmvorträge [Tübingen: 
Hölderlin-Gesellschaft, 1992], 151).
diFFerenCe beCoMes antigone 103
Poor girl, why look henceforth
To heavenly powers? What comrade sing for help?
Since I from piety got godlessness.
But if this thing is lovely to the gods
We suffer it and beg forgiveness for
How we have sinned. (Constantine 99; emphasis added)
 As we saw in the previous chapter, an inquiry into the problem of exer-
cising free will shapes Hölderlin’s reading and translation of the oracle in 
Oedipus; for Hölderlin, it is not the force of fate or the will of the gods but 
Oedipus’ own unfortunate interpretation of the oracle that places him on 
the path of despair. But while Oedipus’ downfall comes with his excessive 
drive to interpret what ought to have remained general, Antigone is trapped 
finally by her refusal of the arbitrary exercise of law and punishment: her act 
is neither sanctioned by the state nor “beautiful to the gods,” and yet still she 
makes her choice, like Oedipus, without that permission. If her action were 
beautiful to the gods, circumstances would be simpler, the outcome more 
conventionally acceptable; she could atone for her sins by suffering and be 
excused for them. The passage that Hegel cites to establish Antigone’s con-
scious guilt therefore signifies in Hölderlin’s reading nothing more than her 
assurance that suffering in a manner pleasing to the gods would constitute 
(and encompass) atonement; meanwhile, she also recognizes that her own 
suffering will be far more abysmal. Indeed, Hölderlin locates the foundation 
of Antigone’s law neither in intuitive adherence nor in strict opposition to 
any law, whether just or arbitrary, human or divine. Rather, his translation 
points the question of legitimacy in quite another direction.
Kreon: Was wagtest du, ein solch Gesez zu brechen?
Antigone: Darum. Mein Zevs berichtete mirs nicht;
 Noch hier im Haus das Recht der Todesgötter,
 Die unter Menschen das Gesez begränzet . . . (309: 466–69)
Creon: Why did you dare to break a law like that?
Antigone: Because. My Zeus did not tell it to me;
 Nor did the justice of the gods of death,
 Here in the house who limit human laws. (Constantine 84; trans. modi-
fied)
 These lines have inspired some controversy among Hölderlin’s critics, for 
Antigone’s justification for her action may be understood in different ways. 
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Neither Zeus nor the gods of the underworld instructed her to follow Creon’s 
law; that much is clear. (This is consistent with the prevalence of negatives 
in the Greek original [Griffith counts nine negatives in the passage, 200]). 
However, her position here is not a mere conflation of the laws of “her own” 
Zeus and those of Hades, as some critics have unproblematically stipulated 
in citing Hölderlin’s proximity to Hegel’s model on this point.34 Given the 
dramatic quality of Hölderlin’s punctuation in this passage, in fact, it is 
possible to read Antigone’s response here in direct defiance of her image in 
Hegelian eyes: by insisting that she trangressed the law “Darum” (followed 
by a striking full stop); she refuses to appeal to any formal law at all, only to 
the “Satzungen,” the unwritten customs or principles that the gods represent 
and that the law of the state keeps at bay.35 If she is beholden to anything, 
it is only to rights which remain forever unwritten and untraceable.36
 In the remarks on Antigone Hölderlin elaborates further in comparing 
the tragedy’s two protagonists, describing the conflict between Creon and 
Antigone more precisely as the perception of the law and its absence.
Einmal das, was den Antitheos karakterisirt, wo einer, in Gottes Sinne, 
wie gegen Gott sich verhält, und den Geist des Höchsten gesezlos erkennt. 
Dann die fromme Furcht vor dem Schiksaal, hiemit das Ehren Gottes, als 
eines gesezten.[ . . . ] Im ersten Sinne mehr Antigonä handelnd. Im zweiten 
Kreon. (FA 16: 416)
First in what characterises the antitheos, where one, after God’s own mind, 
acts, as it seems, against god and recognises the spirit of the highest with-
 34. See in particular Wolfgang Binder’s lecture, Hölderlin und Sophokles. Turmvorträge, where the 
speaker’s adherence to a dialectical model of tragedy leads to a strange reversal of Hölderlin’s actual 
translation: “Jetzt aber, in dem Moment, da sie im Streit mit Kreon sich auf den höchsten Gott beruft, 
wird ihr auf einmal klar, daß hinter dem allgemeinen Brauch der einmalige Wille des Gottes steht. 
Und der meint sie und verlangt hier und jetzt von ihr das Unerhörte. Deshalb übersetzt Hölderlin: 
‘Mein Zeus’ hat mir’s befohlen’” [150]. (But now, in the moment in which she, in her struggle with 
Creon, calls upon the highest god, it becomes clear to her that the singular will of the god stands behind the 
common practice. And this refers to her and demands from her, here and now, the inconceivable. For this 
reason, Hölderlin translates: “‘My Zeus commanded me to do it.’” )
 35. Jean Beaufret acknowledges very carefully in his reading of Hölderlin’s translations that it 
would be possible to read the Greek text in light of Antigone’s independence from laws of any kind—
“Il est, à l’extrême rigeur, théoretiquement possible de lire ainsi le texte de Sophocle”—although in 
his view it is the translation alone that represents this independence as hubris in direct relation to 
that of Oedipus: “Comme Œdipe solicitant d’une manière ‘trop infinie’ la parole d’oracle, l’hérétique 
Antigone s’arroge le partage des dieux.” Hölderlin et Sophocle (Brionne: Monfort, 1983), 36ff.
 36. Griffith points out that Antigone’s formulation of “unwritten law” here, agrapta nomima, is 
the earliest extant reference to a concept that “by the late fifth and early fourth century are frequently 
invoked in appeals to universal codes of morality” (201).
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out laws. Then, the pious fear of fate, and with it the honouring of God as 
something set in law . . . Antigone acting more in the first sense. Creon in 
the second. (Constantine 116; trans. modified)
Even if Hölderlin’s translation of the relevant passage in the tragedy remains 
ambiguous, then, here he responds directly to those who would legitimize 
Antigone’s act as divinely ordained, by introducing a “pious” (fromm) fear 
that is not Antigone’s impulse but rather Creon’s: he views the divine as 
gesetzt, grounded both in law and in a sense of destiny. Meanwhile, Antigone 
embodies an outlaw recognition (gesezlos). (Thus she also leaves the chorus 
no choice but to follow her “outside of the law.”) She asserts her position in 
the absence of law, and that position does not claim conventional legitimacy 
any more than it can contribute to the dialectical advancement of Spirit’s 
ethical substance. Antigone’s conviction, at least as Hölderlin presents it, 
leads her elsewhere.
 Having moved beyond questions of legitimacy, then, we are left with 
an empty space at the very heart of this model: while it is evident that the 
human is equated with the “monstrous” in Hölderlin’s account just as tragic 
experience is aligned with the experience of being “outside of the law,” that 
double experience is thus far discernible only in a negative sense, only as that 
which it is not—the Un-geheuer of the human as un-recognizable, ex-centric, 
un-speakable. In Hölderlin’s translation both Antigone and her act of defi-
ance are at first couched in words that defy signification, for the messenger 
bearing the news of Polynices’ burial is clearly at a loss to say anything at all 
about her:
Der Bote: Ich sag’ es dir. Es hat den Todten eben
 Begraben eines, das entkam, die Haut zweimal
 Mit Staub bestreut, und, wies geziemt, gefeiert.
Kreon: Was meinst du? Wer hat diß sich unterfangen?
Der Bote: Undenklich. Nirgend war von einem Karst
 Ein Schlag; und nicht der Stoß von einer Schaufel,
 Und dicht das Land; der Boden ungegraben;
 Von Rädern nicht befahren. Zeichenlos war
 Der Meister, und wie das der erste Tagesblik
 Anzeigte, kams unhold uns all’ an, wie ein Wunder. (FA 16: 289: 255–
64)
Messenger: I’ll tell you. Just now something which escaped
 Has buried the dead man, twice sprinkled the skin
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 With dust, and in the fit way honoured him.
Creon: What do you mean? Who was it dared do this?
Messenger: Unthinkable. Nowhere had any mattock
 Gone in or any shovel thrust, the land
 Was solid, the earth nowhere dug up;
 Not ridden over by wheels. Without sign was
 The master, and when the day’s first glimpse denounced it
 It seemed monstrous [unhold ] to us, like a miracle. (Constantine 78; 
trans. modified)
Thus Antigone’s act is “unthinkable” from the start. Not only is the mes-
senger at a loss to identify for Creon the one who has done the deed, but 
that “something” (eines) which has acted is itself inconceivable. And that is 
not all. The prominent absence of any trace, already so striking in the images 
of untouched ground, extends to the “master” herself; Antigone does not 
only leave no sign in this translation, she literally is no sign (“Without sign 
[Zeichenlos] was / The master”]). The messenger describes her lack of sign 
or trace as unhold, fiendish or monstrous where the Greek duscheres signifies 
something that is difficult to handle or manage. The valence of both terms 
is more unequivocally negative than deinon and Ungeheuer were in the ear-
lier choral passage, but Hölderlin’s choice of unhold here—along with the 
messenger’s judgment of the events as undenklich, unthinkable—establishes 
more plainly a relationship between this passage and the earlier reference to 
monstrosity. Un-geheuer, un-denklich, un-hold: Antigone is pressed firmly 
into the service of the negative even before she is identified as the one who 
has left no trace. Just what does Antigone reach? When she finally does 
appear before Creon and the Chorus, what does her vision inspire? Hölderlin 
attempts to theorize it, again with a negative signifier: Sophocles’ language, 
he writes, brings human understanding to wander “amidst the unthinkable” 
(unter Undenkbarem wandelnd [FA 16: 413]).37 As we shall see, it is the 
responsibility of the translation to sustain that inconceivable moment, that 
trace of nothing that is visible in Antigone yet monstrous (unhold ) to all.38
 37. The tendency to translate this phrase as “wandering beneath/below the unthinkable” (cf. Pfau 
110, and Schmidt 2001, 153) obscures Hölderlin’s image unnecessarily, since “unter” can denote 
“amongst” or “amidst” as well as “under” or “beneath.”
 38. In his reflections on the role of Eros in and for the translated text, Nägele discusses how 
Antigone is first presented in the text in a “curious mixture of an appeasing familiarity (hê pais) and 
disconcerting strangeness (ornythos oxyn phthoggon).” When she does finally appear to the Chorus, she 
is described as a “demonic sign” (es daimonion teras); Hölderlin, in fact, elides that direct description 
of Antigone as sign by translating the passage as “wie Gottesversuchung” (like a temptation of the gods) 
(Echoes of Translation, 106).
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 But what does it mean to produce such a trace in intelligible form? We 
have seen how Antigone’s act of burying her brother attains universal sig-
nificance for Hegel, translated into an operation representative of familial 
duty and legitimized as tacit intuition. By contrast, Hölderlin is more apt 
to leave Antigone in peace to do what she must.
Laß aber mich und meinen irren Rath
Das Gewaltige leiden. (FA 16: 273: 97–98)
But leave me and my errant counsel
To suffer the powerful/violent.
As we already know, Hölderlin’s Antigone speaks these words in the open-
ing dialogue with Ismene, in which she reveals her determination to dis-
obey Creon’s edict. This time deinon, Hölderlin’s Ungeheuer, is translated 
as Gewaltiges (the powerful), and even if elsewhere it describes the human 
being as such, here Antigone states unequivocally that she intends to suffer 
it alone. But she will not suffer passively. Rather, her suffering is the result 
of a certain choice (although not exactly of a free will, since Antigone asserts 
from the start that she has no other choice): leave me to suffer the powerful. 
Antigone asks for a suffering, asks to endure it, and thus takes it actively 
upon herself.
 The sensible Ismene already knows that her sister’s plan is impossible, 
and she tells her so: “Gleich Anfangs muß niemand Unthunliches jagen” (FA 
16: 273, No one need pursue the impossible from the start). And while every 
indication is that Antigone knows it as well, that knowledge does not stop 
her. Nor does the certainty that by pursuing the impossible—by taking on 
a suffering that no one else will assume—she is acting improperly, against 
the law of the state and solely in the name of a brother whose identity, as 
she also knows, might otherwise crumble to dust. Suffering the powerful 
and the violent implies being exposed to that impossibility, recognizing it 
as such and taking it on nonetheless.
Nein, denke du, wie dir’s gefällt; doch ihn
Begrab’ ich. Schön ist es hernach, zu sterben.
Lieb werd’ ich bei ihm liegen, bei dem Lieben,
Wenn Heiligs ich vollbracht. (FA 16; 271)
No, you think as you like; but I
Will bury him. To die after is beautiful then
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And lovely to lie by him then, my loved one,
When I’ve done what is holy. (Constantine 73)
 While it is arguably possible to discern an erotic tone to this passage in 
German—which would stand in stark contrast to Hegel’s central assertion 
that the relation of sister to brother is devoid of desire, hence pure in its 
ethical obligation—it is perhaps even more striking that the desire expressed 
by the figure of Antigone here is linked to her suffering (“To die after is 
beautiful then”). Her desire is to suffer deinon in the name of her brother, 
and nothing else. And if the Chorus follows her “outside of the law,” once it 
is captivated, as Lacan emphasized, by “the powerful plea on the eyelid of the 
bridal girl” (das Mächtigbittende am Augenliede der hochzeitlichen Jungfrau), 
it already finds itself implicated in that suffering as well.39
 For Hölderlin, then, the tragedy of Antigone stages the confrontation 
with an impossibility beyond limits and “outside of the law”; it is this con-
frontation that Antigone fiercely desires and for which she “powerfully begs.” 
Hölderlin describes the effects of this confrontation in terms of time. In a 
single eventful moment—the deinon moment in which Antigone begs and 
we have no choice but to follow—the subject finds itself implicated in the 
flow of time, in which it has only to hang on, powerless, for dear life. In 
this moment of “wildest opposition,” the subject is utterly decentered, in the 
first place insofar as she is not even active in the struggle that engulfs her; 
the “spirit of time and nature” contends with the object, while the subject 
is seized by that same spirit.
 However, the opposition Hölderlin posits here no longer has solely the 
character of an insurmountable distance between subject and world, as it did 
in his reading of a solitary Oedipus. In the remarks on Antigone, the most 
compelling threat to the self-posited unity of the subject takes the form of 
what Hölderlin will call the “tearing spirit of time” (der reißende Zeitgeist). 
Where the “lawful calculus” of tragedy required a careful evaluation of the 
order and timing of oppositions between nature and culture, Greek and 
Hesperian worlds, the tearing spirit of time introduces the chaos of a close 
encounter with the untamed wilderness of death: “not, like a ghost in day-
light, sparing man at all, but quite pitiless, as the spirit of the always alive, 
unwritten wilderness and the world of the dead” (Constantine 114: nicht, 
dass er die Menschen schonte, wie ein Geist am tage, sondern er ist schonungslos, 
 39. See Lacan 281: “And it is from the same place that the image of Antigone appears before us 
as something that causes the Chorus to lose its head, as it tells us itself, makes the just appear unjust, 
and makes the Chorus transgress all limits. . . . Nothing is more moving than the himeros energes, than 
the desire that visibly emanates from the eyelids of this admirable girl.”
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als Geist der ewig lebenden ungeschriebenen Wildniß und der Todtenwelt [FA 16: 
266]).
 Unwritten, unsparing, infinite: the world of the dead and of its “Geist,” 
the conceptually unthinkable world to which Antigone opens herself in per-
forming the forbidden funeral rites for her brother, can only be represented 
oppositionally, as darkness in contrast to daylight, obscurity to clarity. And 
yet its effects are most sharply felt not in this simple opposition of dark and 
light, but rather in the mysteries of the movement that encompasses both, 
that of time. The most uncompromising expression of this “tearing spirit of 
time”—onrushing like an angry river, but also tearing, as through a single 
piece of cloth—is that moment of wildest opposition in which the subject 
is revealed “in his character.” Like the caesura in the remarks on Oedipus, 
which interrupted the flow of “tragic transport” with the exposure of “rep-
resentation itself,” wild opposition interrupts the dramatic order with the 
unsettling proximity of the limit zone between life and death.
 The “wilderness” represented by both formal interruption and concep-
tual liminality is also expressed in dramatic language. The structural point 
of caesura itself for Hölderlin—the scene in which Tiresias berates Creon for 
his failure to understand the importance of maintaining the separate registers 
of life and death—contains as its dominant image the beasts that enable the 
blind man to “see” by means of a signification that scorns representation by 
either word or image.
Du weist es; hörst die Zeichen meiner Kunst.
Denn auf dem alten Stuhle, Vögel schauend,
Saß ich, wo vor mir war ein Hafen aller Vögel,
Da hört’ ich unbekannt von denen ein Geschrei,
Mit üblem Wüthen schrien sie und wild,
Und zerrten mit den Klauen sich einander,
In Mord, das merkt’ ich, denn nicht unverständlich war
Der Flügel Sausen. (FA 16: 369: 1034–42)
You know it, you hear the signings of my art.
I sat in the ancient chair, scrying the birds
And had before me a haven of all the birds
And heard an unknown screaming out of them,
Wildly in an evil raging they were screaming
And tearing at one another with their claws
In murder, I marked that, for the rush of the wings
Were not incomprehensible (Constantine 102; trans. modified)
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With its description of the birds’ cry and their untamed, violent behavior, 
Tiresias’ speech enacts its own disruption; the birds’ wail, the center of his 
reading of “signings,” is both “unknown” (unbekannt) and “not incompre-
hensible” (nicht unverständlich), outside of the limits of language and yet 
still signifying. Once again, Hölderlin employs negative (and even double 
negative) terminology to evoke an otherwise unattainable “outside.” How-
ever, the reverberations set off by the intrusion of a beastly sound here also 
contribute in a different way to the events of the tragedy. They form a layer 
over an earlier scene in which Antigone herself signifies in the same doubled 
tone as Tiresias’ birds, both “unknown” and “not incomprehensible.”
Der Bote: So wird das Kind gesehn und weinet auf,
 Mit scharfer Stimme, wie ein Vogel trauert,
 Wenn in dem leeren Nest verwaist von Jungen er
 Das Lager sieht. So sie, da sie entblößt
 Erblikt den Todten, jammerte sie laut auf,
 Und fluchte böse Flüche, wers gethan,
 Und bringet Staub mit beiden Händen, schnell,
 Und aus dem wohlgeschlagnen Eisenkruge kränzt
 Sie dreimal mit Ergießungen den Todten. (FA 16: 307: 440–48)
Messenger: The child was seen and she was weeping loudly
 With a sharp voice the way a bird will grieve
 When in an empty nest orphaned of young
 She sees the sleeping place. So she when she
 Espied the dead man bare, she howled
 And cursed whoever had done it with bad curses
 And in both hands brought dust, quickly,
 And from the jug of hammered iron three times
 With waterings she wreathed the dead man. (Constantine 83)
Thus a chorus of beastly cries does not only disrupt the otherwise unevent-
ful movement of time, revealing the ruptures inherent in representation; 
by evoking the plaintive wail and mournful countenance of the girl as she 
pursues the impossible, this event approaches not only the limits of language 
but also—foreshadowing her later banishment to the tomb—the very mar-
gin of life and death.
 Yet the solitude of Antigone’s pursuit of that limit zone need not imply 
that her inscription in the movement of time, and that of her tragedy, are 
likewise solitary. If Hölderlin insists upon the singularity of Antigone’s 
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suffering, that is not to say that he refuses to translate it, only that his trans-
lation aims to convey what remains of that solitude. As a result, Antigone’s 
unflinching movement toward the impossible will expose a curious commu-
nion among subjects, both in spite of and because of the act of translation. 
In spite of translation we are nothing like Antigone, and yet because of 
translation we follow her; and in the process, something is disclosed to us 
even as we find nothing. To be sure, the modern subject discovers something 
in viewing Antigone; condemned to a live burial, she stands between life 
and death, facing the inevitability of this end with open eyes: “I, poor girl! 
Not among mortals, not among the dead” (Ich Arme! Nicht unter Sterblichen, 
nicht unter Todten [353: 880–81]). Advancing without question towards the 
liminal space of her tomb, she lends credence to the words of Hölderlin’s 
Chorus in the second choral ode, in which the human, perhaps reveal-
ing the monstrosity at its heart, is indelibly marked by its own relation to 
death: “Only the future place of the dead / He does not know how to flee” 
(Constantine 81: Der Toten künftigen Ort nur / Zu fliehen weiß er nicht [301: 
377–78]). The Chorus already makes it clear: human beings cannot escape 
the encounter with their own finitude, no matter what crafts they employ 
to avert its inevitability—not as long as the “tearing spirit of time” holds 
dominion over subjective experience.
 However, even as Antigone leads us to an end that takes the form of 
something, death, in this translation she also defies any merely teleological 
description. The Chorus’s reference to human beings’ inability to escape “the 
place of the dead” is followed closely by a call to a different register: “All-
traveled, untraveled. He comes to nothing” (Allbewandert, unbewandert. Zu 
nichts kommt er [301: 376]). Strictly speaking, this translation is, once again, 
inaccurate; the logic and syntax of the Greek passage suggest a separation 
or pause between pantoporos and aporos, not a pairing as Hölderlin would 
have it here, and most modern translators recognize this, resulting in a more 
stable reading: “He meets nothing in the future without resource” (Lloyd-
Jones 37; see also Solger 159, Fagles 77).40 The logic underlying Hölderlin’s 
incorrect syntax resonates with his overall reading of the Choral passage, 
however, leaving the parallel terms allbewandert, unbewandert to encapsulate 
 40. Stathis Gourgouris notes this translation error in Heidegger’s discussion of the same passage 
in his lecture on “Der Ister,” a reading which was almost certainly inspired by Hölderlin’s translation. 
In both cases the incorrect juxtaposition of pantoporos aporos, rather than its separation, implies an 
echo effect with the phrase hypsispolis; apolis (high in the city; cast out of the city). Gourgouris em-
phasizes in convincing fashion the productivity of this error for Heidegger’s reading of deinon as onto-
logical condition; I would merely argue that although it clearly represents a misreading of Sophocles’ 
Antigone, it responds directly to Hölderlin’s Antigone. Does Literature Think? Literature as Theory for an 
Antimythical Era (Stanford University Press, 2003), 138.
CHaPter tHree112
the ambiguity that describes human beings, who have traveled much but 
nevertheless must reach the conclusion that they have arrived nowhere at all.
 Even more revealing in the context of Hölderlin’s view of the tragic is 
the second part of that descriptive phrase: “He comes to nothing.” While 
the expression zu etwas kommen signals an arrival at a destination, a con-
clusive “getting somewhere” (and the reflexive zu sich kommen implies a 
moment of self-conscious realization) the human’s only destination here is 
nowhere—or more precisely, nothing.41 Advancing towards nothing as she 
faces her inevitable death in the tomb, Antigone confronts that impossible, 
unthinkable suffering that she chose at the very start. She takes a step that 
the Chorus attributes to the human being as such, a step “to nothing” that 
brings a subject to the precipice of meaning, to a limit that can only be 
represented as death. All fascination aside, it seems that Antigone’s suffering 
means “nothing” to us after all.
 Yet it is a nothing that is not meaningless, far from it. It is inseparable 
from a tragic experience made possible in translation alone. In fact, for 
Hölderlin it is only because of this particular experience of translation that 
the tragedy can be “vaterländische Sache,” of concern at all to his time and 
place. Translation, like Antigone’s tragedy, brings the subject to arrive at no 
place—at nothing; translation will both trace and intensify a movement 
that Antigone already enacts. Whatever may be “lost” in translation in a 
conventional sense, therefore, pales in comparison to what may be gained.
tHis intensiFying MoveMent of translation is delineated in some of 
the most challenging passages of the remarks; in fact, reading these reflec-
tions often demands something of a translation in its own right. Neverthe-
less they remain crucial to any understanding of the project’s model of tragic 
experience. Its movement is based on an exchange of structural generality 
and material specificity, and in this sense follows logically from Hölderlin’s 
slightly more legible remarks on Oedipus, where, as we have already seen, he 
takes a similar point of departure. Arguing in those remarks for a rigidity of 
form, a “lawful calculus” that would permit the modern poet, artisan-like, 
to create beauty with the tools of antiquity, Hölderlin resists (or at least re-
thinks) the lure of imitation to which his contemporaries often succumbed.42 
For although the mathematical markings of tragic form bear repeating in a 
modern era, the words that give life to that form remain necessarily specific, 
 41. On the semantic implications of zu sich kommen within the discourse of tragedy and classical 
drama see Nägele 1991, 11.
 42. Lacoue-Labarthe has shown this convincingly in “Hölderlin and the Greeks,” 237–38.
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a “living sense that cannot be calculated”; from age to age the content of 
a text cannot bear the same resonance. A tension thus arises between form 
and content, and the moments in which the translated text conveys this 
distinction shed light from another angle—as we will see, from an “askew 
perspective”—on that which brings tragedy to “life” for a modern audience.
 At its heart, this model of linguistic and discursive exchange is a theory 
of tragic experience, of how ancient tragedy may “translate” into a mod-
ern context. Hölderlin specifies that the effects of tragedy change with the 
introduction of language that moves the modern subject differently, bring-
ing facets to light that were only implicit in the Greek text. In the passage 
from antiquity to modernity, Hölderlin asserts that something has solidified 
“in the course of events, in the grouping of characters against one another” 
(in die Art des Hergangs, in der Gruppierung der Personen gegeneinander [419]), 
something which may have underlain the movement of Greek tragedy in its 
time, but which only becomes readable in our time.
Vorzüglich aber bestehet die tragische Darstellung in dem factischen Worte, 
das, mehr Zusammenhang, als ausgesprochen, schiksaalsweise, vom Anfang 
bis zum Ende gehet; in die Art des Hergangs, in der Gruppirung der Perso-
nen gegeneinander; in der Vernunftform, die sich in der furchtbaren Muße 
einer tragischen Zeit bildet, und so wie sie in Gegensätzen sich darstellte, in 
ihrer wilden Entstehung, nachher, in humaner Zeit, als feste aus göttlichem 
Schicksal geborene Meinung gilt. (FA 16: 419)
However, tragic representation principally consists of the factual word 
which, being more a relation than something that is stated explicitly, moves 
by means of fate from beginning to end; in the specific course of events, in 
the grouping of characters against one another; in the form of reason that 
constitutes itself in the dreadful idleness of tragic time, and just as at its 
wild origin it represented itself in oppositions, afterwards, in human time, 
it counts as a firm opinion born of divine fate. (Pfau 1988, 114; trans. 
modified)
If what was formed (gebildet) in a “tragic time”—Antigone’s solitary suffer-
ing unto death, here the “dreadful idleness of tragic time”—is solidified into 
a “firm opinion” that counts (gilt) only in our time, then that experience 
must logically make itself felt as a consequence of not only tragedy but also 
translation. Translation has the potential to expose the subject to the very 
effect of difference upon which Antigone’s tragedy always already insists. 
Familiarity gives way to foreignness, and vice versa, in a most radical sense 
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when the subject’s own representative mode (Vorstellungsart) confronts him 
with an experience that is profoundly other.
 This experience lies at the core of Hölderlin’s distinction of the “Greek” 
word from the “Hesperian,” and given the stakes of Antigone’s own pursuit, 
it is perhaps fitting that the distinction on the level of words takes shape with 
respect to the representation of death.43 Where once the Chorus was seized 
by the haunting vision of a wandering Antigone, now the viewing subject 
is likewise seized simply by a word—and here, the context of that seizure, 
whether Greek or modern, makes all the difference. In the “Greek” sense, 
words seize the physical body in a mediated way, bringing that body to kill: 
“The Greek-tragic word is deadly-factual, because the body that it seizes 
actually kills” (Pfau 116; trans. modified: Das griechischtragische Wort ist 
tödtlichfaktisch, weil der Leib, den es ergreifet, wirklich tödtet [FA 16: 417f.]). 
Meanwhile, in “our” time and mode of representation, words seize the spirit 
immediately, so that the word itself kills by seizing the “more spiritual body.” 
Admittedly, this train of thought is extremely opaque, but upon reflection it 
becomes clearer. In the “more Greek” sense, words always bring a body to kill 
on the tragic stage, always mediate the theatrical representation of murder, 
insofar as killings are never actually shown on stage but rather described by a 
messenger. Particularly the deaths of women in Sophocles, including Jocasta, 
Eurydice, and Antigone, remain fiercely private scenes only “visible” to an 
audience through description.44 When the word itself kills, however, it has 
a more immediate effect on the tragic heroine as well as the viewing subject:
Eine vaterländische mag . . . mehr tödtendfactisches, als tödtlichfactisches 
Wort sein; nicht eigentlich mit Mord oder Tod endigen, weil doch hie-
ran das Tragische muß gefaßt werden, sondern mehr im Geschmake des 
Oedipus auf Kolonos, so daß das Wort aus begeistertem Munde schreklich 
ist, und tödtet, nicht griechisch faßlich, in athletischem und plastischem 
Geiste, wo das Wort den Körper ergreift, daß dieser tödtet.
Such an art of our homeland . . . may be a language that is killingly-factual 
rather than deadly-factual; so not actually ending with murder or death as 
that through which tragedy must be apprehended, but more in the man-
ner of Oedipus at Colonus, where the words spoken by a mouth inspired 
 43. Hölderlin confronts this tension between the “Vorstellungsarten” of different ages in other 
texts as well, particularly the letter to Böhlendorff discussed in the last section and the 1799 essay “Der 
Gesichtspunct, aus dem wir das Altertum anzusehen haben” (FA 14: 95–96).
 44. In this context, see in particular Nicole Loraux’s detailed and interesting study, Tragic Ways of 
Killing a Woman.
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are terrible, and kill, but not in a graspable Greek way, in an athletic and 
plastic spirit, where the words seize the body so that it kills. (Constantine 
117; trans. modified)
In modern tragic experience, initiated as thinking spirit is seized by a word 
that kills when “spoken by a mouth,” words lead one in thought along a 
certain trajectory that ends in death. That ends, perhaps, in nothing but the 
space of the unthinkable that houses Antigone’s suffering. As the Chorus 
concludes, “Thinking is more, much more / Than happiness” (Um vieles ist 
das Denken mehr, denn / Glükseeligkeit [FA 16: 405: 1397–98]).
 If, however, the disclosure of this tragic movement unto death is to 
become particularly evident “in human time,” in what form does it reveal 
itself to the modern subject? For if Hölderlin is justified in suggesting that 
our experience of Antigone’s suffering is intensified through something 
which only counts (gilt) in this time, “standing as we do under a Zeus more 
our own” (Constantine 116; da wir unter dem eigentlicheren Zeus stehen), 
then the form of that experience must make itself felt as a consequence of 
not only tragedy but also translation. In these remarks, that trajectory takes 
the form of what he calls “infinite reversal” (unendlicher Umkehr).45 Rever-
sal here does not refer, as it did in other contexts in Hölderlin’s age, to the 
return to Greek ideals or to a mythic national origin. As Hölderlin already 
explains in the remarks on Oedipus, the reversal characteristic of tragedy in 
translation cannot possibly resolve itself in a return to an origin, if only for 
the epidemic of forgetting that accompanies it.
In dieser (i.e. der äußersten Grenze des Leidens) vergißt sich der Mensch, 
weil er ganz im Moment ist; der Gott, weil er nichts als Zeit ist; und 
beides ist untreu, die Zeit, weil sie in solchem Momente sich kategorisch 
wendet, und Anfang und Ende sich in ihr schlechterdings nicht reimen 
läßt; der Mensch, weil er in diesem Momente der kategorischen Umkehr 
folgen muß, hiermit im Folgenden schlechterdings nicht dem Anfänglichen 
gleichen kann. (FA 16: 258)46
 45. Reversal or “Umkehr” frequently appears in Hölderlin’s writings as “patriotic” reversal (vater-
ländische Umkehr), which as Szondi discusses often construed in the earlier part of this century to 
refer to the German ability to supercede the legacy of antiquity (“Überwindung des Klassizismus,” 
89ff.) Henning Bothe points out in contrast that George and his school celebrated in Hölderlin the 
German proximity to the greatness of Greece, the “heilige Heirat” of Nüchternheit (sobriety) and 
Heiterkeit (exhilaration). “Ein Zeichen sind wir, deutungslos  .  .  . “ die Rezeption Hölderlins von ihren 
Anfängen bis zu Stefan George (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1992), 108ff.
 46. For Heidegger in “Der Ister,” this notion of forgetting becomes significant, since it describes 
the human in relation to Sein. However, while Hölderlin demonstrates here that the hero and the god 
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At that limit the human being forgets himself, because he is wholly in 
the moment; and the god forgets himself, because he is nothing but time; 
and both are unfaithful, time because in such a moment it is a categorical 
turning-point in which beginning and end cannot rhyme at all; the human 
being, because at that moment he must follow the categorical moment of 
turning but in what follows he cannot at all match what was there in the 
beginning. (Constantine 68; trans. modified)
While the process of reversal in this tragic context is a must—it is our 
only concern, “vaterländische Sache”—its destination remains unknown; the 
subject has forgotten itself in the force of the moment, the god in the rush 
of time, and thus neither has the possibility of returning to anything famil-
iar.47 No origin remains to which reversal could refer here; what remains is 
only the movement that reversal generates, only the recognition that in and 
through this movement everything has changed, irrevocably: “For patriotic 
reversal is the reversal of all modes and forms of representation” (Constan-
tine 117; trans. modified: Denn vaterländische Umkehr ist die Umkehr aller 
Vorstellungsarten und Formen [FA 16: 419]). 
 How, then, is this movement of reversal directed, if not to a conceptual 
origin? Perhaps it leads to nowhere but that space of nothingness which 
Antigone already occupies, to the possibility that the subject somehow par-
takes of her final, solitary confrontation with impossibility. For as it turns 
out, it is a space that she shares with another. While at the moment of her 
death the god is already present “in the figure (Gestalt) of death,” another 
human literally shares Antigone’s tomb; and he is also one prototype for 
the man who, forgetting himself in the event, finds himself moving sud-
denly and inexplicably in reverse. In the remarks on Oedipus, Hölderlin 
describes the moment of Umkehr as personified by two characters in particu-
lar: “Hämon stands thus in Antigone, and Oedipus himself thus in the centre 
of the tragedy of Oedipus” (Constantine 68; So stehet Hämon in der Antigonä. 
So Oedipus selbst in der Mitte der Tragödie von Oedipus [FA 16: 258]).
both “forget,” Heidegger suggests that Antigone represents a relation to Being that the rest of human-
ity has forgotten (para. 18, “Das Herd als das Sein,” 134ff.).
 47. In a discussion of the ode “Patmos,” Warminski addresses the notion of “wiederkehren” in 
Hölderlin as a nonsymmetrical relation, arguing that the verb “wiederkommen” would more clearly 
communicate absolute return: “But for that which is human such a coming back would be mere iden-
tity, sterile one-sidedness; only the God can come back: ‘Denn wiederkommen sollt es / Zu rechter 
Zeit” (StA II:168). The poem’s wiederkehren is a re-turning: a going over and a turning again. . . . 
The asymmetry of ‘hinüberzugehen’ and ‘wiederzukehren’ is a loss of identity and a gain of meaning” 
(Warminski 89). “Umkehren” is an even more ambiguous, less symmetrical action than “wiederkeh-
ren,” for it signifies only a turning “around” without any implication of an absolute reversal.
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 The prospect of reversal as the exposure of the impossible is perhaps more 
intuitively at hand in Oedipus, since the process of unveiling information 
in his tragedy clearly turns the proceedings in a previously inconceivable 
direction. Within this context it is also more clearly related to Aristotelian 
peripateia, which generates its effect through the development of plot struc-
ture.48 In Antigone, however, reversal is less evident. Only her betrothed, the 
son of Creon—only Haemon, whose name occurs neither before nor after 
this point in any of Hölderlin’s remarks—follows its trajectory. What status 
does Haemon take on in the tomb, what direction is he compelled to follow 
that will also concern Hölderlin’s age? And what does his reversal have to do 
with Antigone, who after all maintains her solitude to the end?
 A messenger’s description of Haemon’s confrontation with his father in 
the tomb—the Greeks’ “real” killing through speech that will soon drive 
Eurydice to suicide—begins to shed light upon these questions, which 
finally lead to a reversal even more shattering than that of Oedipus the King.
Schnöd blikend, nichts entgegensagend, starrt
Mit wilden Augen gegen ihn der Sohn;
Und zieht das Schwert, zweischneidig, gegen ihn erst.
Und da der Vater, aufgeschrökt, zur Flucht
Sich wandte, fehlt’ er. Grimmig dann im Geiste,
Der Unglückliche sties, so wie er ausgestrekt stand,
Die Spize mitten sich in seine Seite.
Den feuchten Arm, bei Sinnen noch, küßt er
Der Jungfrau . . . 
Das Todte liegt beim Todten, bräutliche
Erfüllung trifft es schüchtern in den Häußern
Der Todtenwelt, und zeigt der Menschen rathlos Wesen,
Und wie als größtes Übel diß der Mann hat. (FA 16: 393–95: 1285–98)
 48. Aristotle’s introduction of the term peripateia in the Poetics appears together with that of 
recognition (anagnorisis) in the section dealing with “simple and complex plots” (Aristotle 2322–27). 
In general, Aristotle argues that plot should be just long enough to show “the hero passing by a series 
of probable or necessary stages from bad fortune to good, or from good to bad . . . ”[2322]; however, 
a peripatetic shift comes about when an action has an effect opposite to what was expected, thus tak-
ing both the hero and the audience by surprise. Combined with the effect of recognition—a “change 
from ignorance to knowledge” (36)—peripateia will excite feelings of pity and fear in the spectator. 
The difference from Hölderlin’s notion of reversal, as we will see soon, is that “recognition” in Hölder-
lin’s sense takes place with regard to a different register of knowledge; the question is no longer one of 
identification with the hero in his misfortune, which would excite pity and fear in the spectator, but 
rather of an experience of isolation that seizes the viewer directly, not through the mediation of plot, 
and with the same force that it enacts a reversal for the hero.
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With baleful eyes and saying nothing in return
Wildly the son stared back at him
And drew his two-edged sword against him first.
But when the father, frightened into flight,
Turned, he failed. Then savage-mindedly,
Outstretched, standing there, the unhappy man
Thrust with the point of it full in his side.
Before his senses went he kissed the girl’s
Moist arm, on her white cheek he frothed
Sharp breaths of bloody droplets out.
The dead one lies by the dead one, shyly they came to
Their wedding’s consummation in the houses in
The world of the dead and show how lost for counsel
Humans are and how the man has this as greatest ill (Constantine 109; 
trans. modified)
 The messenger’s monologue forms one of the most affecting passages in 
Sophocles’ text as well as Hölderlin’s translation, insofar as it bears witness to 
a transformation unprecedented in a text that relies otherwise on the stony 
resolve of its central figures. After bitterly raising his sword against his terri-
fied father, Haemon demonstrates concretely why he may occupy the place 
of infinite reversal for Hölderlin. Now sharing the tomb with his bride Anti-
gone is the son who had once sought to achieve a balance, to quell through 
words of persuasion his father’s fatal obsession; from his proclamation that 
“Father, I’m yours” (Constantine 90; Vater, dein bin ich) in his first line of 
the play, Haemon has literally reversed his allegiance. And consequently, a 
marriage is consummated in the world of the dead rather than of the living, 
a tardy union of bride and groom being one result of this double suicide. 
Just as this union hints at a moment of reconciliation, however, the linguistic 
neutralization of gender in the very next line stands as a stark reminder of 
the death’s anonymity: “the dead one lies by the dead one” (das Todte liegt 
beim Todten). Given that both the Greek word for corpse, ho nekròs, and the 
German term, der Leichnam, are masculine, Hölderlin’s choice of the neu-
ter term das Todte is surely not coincidental; rather, it represents a striking 
transformation of gendered beings into neutral bodies.
 Hölderlin’s play with gender in his rendition of the messenger’s words 
also complicates the reversal that Haemon enacts in another way, by vir-
tue of an astute choice in the disclosure of “how lost for counsel (rathlos) 
humans are and how the man has this as greatest ill.” For in contrast to 
the un-gendering of the dead in the tomb, here Hölderlin maintains the 
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gender specificity of Sophocles’ language, naming the bearer of greatest ill 
as masculine: der Mann. Allowing the other, more universal masculine term 
for humankind, der Mensch, to stand in for the Greek ho anēr here would 
link the passage to the second Choral ode (where, however, the human is not 
anēr but anthropos) as part of a larger statement about the status of human-
kind. (For example, the translator for the Loeb edition, Hugh Lloyd-Jones, 
uses “mortals” [117].). Ho anēr refers specifically to a man, however, and 
for Hölderlin this point was important enough not to elide; der Mann can 
only refer to a man or husband, never a woman or wife. What this implies 
for his rendition of the line is that of the three human beings in the tomb, 
only Antigone is exempt from the greatest ill of being “lost for counsel.” 
While Sophocles’ language seems to refer to Haemon here, Hölderlin’s ver-
sion maintains a more ambiguous stance, so that it is not entirely clear which 
man is called to recognize how “lost for counsel” he is. Is it the would-be 
husband Haemon? the man, father, and king Creon?
 If it is the man’s greatest ill that he is at a loss at this limit, that the pros-
pect of facing the “wilderness” that Antigone confronts leaves him despairing 
of his next move, as Hölderlin’s translation implies with the word rathlos, 
then this tragic uncertainty must characterize Creon in particular, for it 
stands in stark contrast to the determination with which Antigone—and 
now Haemon—act. Evident from the first scene has been Antigone’s own 
certainty that she must take on and pursue the impossible without question; 
this is what makes her appear solitary, unsettling, monstrous to a modern 
audience. However, in the reversal enacted by Haemon, precisely this ten-
sion between acting decisively and being at a loss comes to light, along with 
the direction that reversal must take as a consequence, even if it does not 
know its destination. If Antigone unsettles us for reasons we do not entirely 
grasp, therefore, Haemon demonstrates the process of this destabilization 
for the subject, the shocking reversal that also succeeded in unsettling and 
unseating Oedipus the King. Indeed, by unveiling this process of destabi-
lization Haemon also demonstrates that the trope of reversal as Hölderlin 
describes it may itself be a radical form of translation. That the movement 
of translation, in a fundamental sense, thus generates the essence of tragic 
effect from the very start.
 The reversal that represents “our” concern in tragedy, therefore, involves 
nothing less than the discovery of an abysmal form of thinking—call it 
“thinking in translation”—that not only preserves an irreducible difference 
with which the translated other refuses to part but also reveals a monstrous 
aspect at the very heart of both subject and text that is itself, in effect, 
untranslatable—and signifies precisely as the untranslatable. In our time 
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and in translation as Hölderlin conceives of it, the word kills in tragedy by 
compelling us to think this process that seizes and shocks us, to be shaken 
by that recognition, to be led along the same trajectory that Antigone traces 
and Haemon follows unto death, into an infinite nothing that bears no other 
name, no other sign. It compels us to experience radically, in other words, 
tragedy’s particular form of rebellion:
Die Art des Hergangs in der Antigonä ist die bei einem Aufruhr, wo es, 
so fern es vaterländische Sache ist, darauf ankommt, daß jedes, als von 
unendlicher Umkehr ergriffen, und erschüttert, in unendlicher Form sich 
fühlt, in der es erschüttert ist. (FA 16: 419)
The course of events in the Antigone has the form of an unrest/rebellion 
where, so far as it is a matter for the nation, it is essential that every thing, 
caught up in infinite reversal and shattered by it, feels itself in the infinite 
form in which it is shattered. (Constantine 117; trans. modified)
 Had Antigone moved alone in the direction of death, one could almost 
have left her to her solitude. With Haemon joining her in that sheer deter-
mination, however, and with the emergence of the word’s potential to 
compel spirit to conceive of the limit between life and death through the 
introduction of translation, the link to the human being in general can no 
longer be denied. If the Greek subject in Hölderlin’s model suffered this 
course of events along with the figures on the stage, a subject “in human 
time” has the potential to think through that suffering in its own infinite 
relation to itself. This is vaterländische Sache, of concern to Hölderlin’s time 
and place; it is the “established opinion, born of a divine fate,” the ethical 
experience that counts in Hölderlin’s presentation of tragedy in translation: 
May the subject’s “character,” its “highest consciousness” be awakened at the 
moment in which it is confronted with the infinity both outside and within; 
may it call attention to the impossible, unthinkable movement “to nothing” 
to which Antigone, and with her the human being as such, is always sub-
ject, “this most steadfast abiding in the passage of time” (Constantine 115). 
Translation presents the modern subject with a glimpse into the infinite 
from another perspective, not unlike the perspective that allows one to view 
the intensity of the sun in eclipse: “For us such a form is exactly suitable, 
because the infinite, like the spirit of states and of the world, can in any case 
only be grasped from an askew perspective [aus linkischem Gesichtspunkt]” 
(Constantine 118; trans. modified).49
 49. Für uns ist eine solche Form gerade tauglich, weil das Unendliche, wie der Geist der Staaten 
und der Welt, ohnehin nicht anders, als aus linkischem Gesichtspunkt kann gefaßt werden. (FA 16: 
421)
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 Only when implicated in this peculiar dynamics of translation can the 
modern subject come to recognize this unsettling communion with each 
and every subject, because any other vantage point would leave it beyond 
our grasp. The limits of translatability, laid bare in both the awkward spaces 
in which translation speaks and the idiosyncratic beauty of Hölderlin’s 
“mistakes,” do not place this recognition into doubt; indeed, they set it in 
motion. Through Hölderlin’s model of translation, a strange and solitary girl 
escapes the status of Hegel’s internal enemy, exceeds the visceral fascination 
that attracts us inexplicably to her strange plight, to expose the slippage 
fundamental to the human as such. Acting “outside of the law,” she embod-
ies a relation to the other that exists alongside the experience of selfhood as 
it is posited within speculative thought. As we recognize through the lens 
of translation, Antigone performs the impossible movement “to nothing” 
for us, and yet we must also acknowledge the responsibility we bear for her 
solitude, for a common thread of untranslatable difference that both isolates 
and sustains, that penetrates subject and text alike, that no act of interpreta-
tion can entirely bridge and yet no dialectics can fully dismiss. Difference 
becomes Antigone, to be sure, but in her solitude she proves to be anything 
but alone.
i n 1806,  just two years after publishing the Sophocles translations, Hölderlin was institutionalized at the Autenrieth clinic in Tübingen. A 
year later he was released into the care of the Zimmer family and spent the 
next thirty-seven years—half of his life—in a small tower overlooking the 
Neckar river. Until his death in 1843 he remained an object of considerable 
fascination and sentimentalization among fellow poets and thinkers of his 
age (to whom he often introduced himself as “Scardanelli”).1 As poetic and 
cultural phenomenon, then, Hölderlin hardly spent the nineteenth century 
in an enchanted sleep. The later decades of the nineteeth century saw the 
publication of several editions of his poetry, and he came to be regarded 
as one of the major poets in the German literary tradition, the so-called 
“Werther of the Greeks,” tragically brought low at the height of his cre-
ative powers. The Sophocles project, however, did languish in obscurity as 
the German penchant for all things Greek moved on to other discussions 
and controversies, notably the excavation program promoted by the archae-
ologist Ernst Curtius, Heinrich Schliemann’s discovery of the lost city of 
Troy, and academic disputes initiated by the classical philologist Ulrich von 
Wilamowitz-Moellendorf with Nietzsche and Wagner.2
 1. Hölderlin attracted numerous prominent visitors to the tower, including Achim and Bettina 
von Arnim, the young Eduard Mörike, and the editor Christoph Theodor Schwab. On the history of 
Hölderlin reception see Lawrence Ryan, Friedrich Hölderlin (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1962), 1–4. Today the 
Hölderlin tower in Tübingen is the seat of the Hölderlin-Gesellschaft, the literary society founded on 
the hundredth anniversary of his death in 1943. See http://www.hoelderlin-gesellschaft.info.
 2. For a fascinating and detailed discussion of these developments, see Marchand’s chapter 4, 





tHe translator’s Courage 123
 Indeed, Hölderlin’s translations and late poetry garnered little attention 
until the start of the next century, when the reception of his work was 
marked by a genuine turning of fortune. Critical and popular interest blos-
somed after the Munich doctoral student Friedrich Norbert von Hellingrath 
published a dissertation on the previously unpublished Pindar translations 
in 1910. A celebrated critical edition followed, including a volume of the 
late poetry (also heretofore unpublished), which was popular reading mate-
rial among the troops stationed at the front in the Great War.3 Hellingrath 
edited two other volumes, one containing Hölderlin’s earliest writings and 
the other his translations from the Greek, before falling at Verdun in 1916. 
This critical edition (completed by Friedrich Seebass and Ludwig von Pig-
enot after Hellingrath’s death) has had considerable cultural resonance, and 
considering the progression of thinkers that has engaged with Hölderlin 
in direct and measurable response to Hellingrath’s edition, it is fair to say 
that there would be no twentieth-century Hölderlin without him. One of 
the primary thrusts of Hölderlin scholarship in the twentieth century, the 
examination of his engagement with the Greeks and its influence on the 
composition and revision of his late poetry, is particularly indebted to the 
framework of Hellingrath’s doctoral thesis.4
 One of the earliest respondents to Hellingrath’s critical reintroduction 
has also proved, in belated fashion, to be one of the most noteworthy: 
in 1914 a 22-year-old philosophy student in Berlin named Walter Benja-
min took up a direct challenge from the pages of Hellingrath’s dissertation. 
Reflecting on the potentially rich vein of poetic development contained in 
Hölderlin’s habitual revisions of earlier poems, Hellingrath writes: “One 
has only to compare ‘Timidity’ with the first version of ‘The Poet’s Cour-
age’ to see that each passage acquires a fullness of being only as a result of 
these changes.”5 The product of Benjamin’s acceptance of this assignment is 
the essay “Two Poems by Friedrich Hölderlin” (Zwei Gedichte von Friedrich 
Hölderlin), at once a close and often exemplary reading of the two poems 
mentioned by Hellingrath and a primer for a concept of literary criticism 
 3. Friedrich Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke: historisch-kritische Ausgabe, ed. Norbert von Hellin-
grath, Friedrich Seebass (Berlin: Propyläen, 1923).
 4. See Rudolf Speth, Wahrheit und Ästhetik: Untersuchungen zum Frühwerk Walter Benjamins 
(Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1991), 10.
 5. “Man vergleiche nur Blödigkeit mit der ersten Fassung von Dichtermut, um die Verände-
rung in Hölderlins Dichtung anschaulich machen zu können.” Friedrich Norbert von Hellingrath, 
Hölderlin-Vermächtnis, ed. Ludwig von Pigenot (Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1936), 65. Stanley Corn-
gold considers Benjamin’s acceptance of this explicit challenge in light of his development of the idea 
of the “task” in Complex Pleasure: Forms of Feeling in German Literature (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1998), 152.
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that informs Benjamin’s thought in a much larger sense.6 Unpublished in 
his lifetime, the essay represents a kind of youthful exuberance of expression 
that is both impulsive and derivative in its approach to the material; the 
sometimes breathless characterization of the poet as purveyor of a higher 
truth marks the influence of Stefan George’s reception of Hölderlin, for 
example, and also looks forward, as critics have pointed out, to Heidegger’s 
“elucidations” (Erläuterungen) on the poet.7 Yet despite its stylistic shortcom-
ings—Stanley Corngold describes the essay as “in places written in a German 
whose tortuousness defies deciphering” (Corngold 1988, 152)—Benjamin 
himself saw the essay as more than the relic of an youthful phase, later deem-
ing his reflections there as one of the “magnificent foundations” (herrliche 
Grundlagen) of his thought.8
 Like so much of Benjamin’s work today, the “Two Poems” essay has been 
exceptionally well covered by many of the lions of literary scholarship.9 My 
aim here is not to add to that rich collection of commentary on the essay as 
a textual whole. Rather, I wish to follow a delicate thread, interlaced within 
the complex web of associations in Benjamin’s thought here and yet clearly 
central to it, implicit within the lines of poetry that Benjamin cites yet also, 
clearly, extending beyond them. Benjamin demonstrates in the essay that 
he has read more of Hölderlin than just the two poems that anchor his dis-
cussion, and this peripheral reading illuminates connections that otherwise 
remain obscure within the text’s stated motives. At the same time, by taking 
a closer look at a few briefer and apparently more spontaneous references 
to Hölderlin’s work in Benjamin’s later writing I hope to show how the 
texts at the center of this book project—the translations and remarks on 
Sophocles—form a crucial link among several of Benjamin’s key concepts 
in his theory of the work of art.
 6. Speth cites a letter to Ernst Schön in which Benjamin states that he intended to send the 
essay to Hellingrath before learning that he had been killed (9).
 7. See Lacoue-Labarthe, “Poetry’s Courage,” in which he compares Benjamin’s discussion of 
the poet’s courage with Heidegger’s “arche-ethical” quality of courage as outlined in his “Letter on 
Humanism.” While Heidegger’s definition of the poet’s courage relies on a theological-political model 
that reinforces the mythological basis of fascism, Benjamin’s theological-poetical project posits the 
failure of the theological in poetry and the “conquest of objectivity and the concrete” (88). In Fioretos 
88–93.
 8. Michael W. Jennings, “Benjamin as a Reader of Hölderlin: The Origins of Benjamin’s Theory 
of Literary Criticism,” German Quarterly 56:4 (Nov. 1983): 545. Corngold speculates that the timing 
of the essay, composed when “only an ultimately high seriousness could make a contribution suited 
to . . . world war” (153), indicates its author’s desire to “secure the very idea of a foundation” (154).
 9. See, for example, Corngold, Complex Pleasure; Lacoue-Labarthe, “Poetry’s Courage”; Mi-
chael W. Jennings, “Benjamin as a Reader of Hölderlin”; Rainer Nägele, “Benjamin’s Ground”; David 
Wellbery, “Benjamin’s Theory of the Lyric”; Beatrice Hanssen, “‘Dichtermut’ and ‘Blödigkeit’: Two 
Poems by Hölderlin Interpreted by Walter Benjamin,” MLN 112:5 (Dec. 1997): 786–816. Jennings 
also devotes a chapter to the essay in Dialectical Images.
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 Little would indicate at the start of “Two Poems” that Benjamin intends 
to engage with Hölderlin’s writings on tragedy at all, let alone with the 
Sophocles project. In fact, he distances himself from tragedy in the very first 
lines of the essay, stipulating that the type of aesthetic commentary he is 
about to attempt more typically applies to the “great works of classical lit-
erature,” such as tragedy, but that he will apply it instead to Hölderlin’s lyric. 
In the pages that follow, Benjamin outlines the emergence, within each of 
the poems and between the lines of their development, of what he calls “das 
Gedichtete” (only awkwardly translatable as “the poetized”), a term meant 
to describe the a priori truth content contained within, but not openly 
expressed by, poetic language: the poem’s “task (Aufgabe) and precondition.” 
The basic thrust of his very complex argument is that the second, revised 
poem, “Blödigkeit,” succeeds in revealing the truth content that the first 
poem represents only in a limited sense, the “poet’s courage” (Dichtermut). 
Toward the end of the essay, however, he makes the allusion that is most 
interesting for our purposes here. Reflecting on how the development of the 
poem from the first to the final version represents a more nuanced relation 
to the forms of classical Greece, he writes:
Dies Leben [i.e., the life traced out in the second version of the poem] ist in For-
men des griechischen Mythos gebildet, aber—das ist entscheidend—nicht 
in ihnen allein; gerade das griechische Element ist in der letzten Fassung 
aufgehoben und ausgeglichen gegen ein andres, das (zwar ohne ausdrück-
liche Rechtfertigung) das orientalische genannt war. Fast alle Änderungen 
der spätern Fassung streben in dieser Richtung . . .(GS II:1,126)
This life is shaped in the forms of Greek myth, but—this is crucial—not in 
them alone; the Greek element is sublated in the last version and balanced 
against another element that (without express justification, to be sure) was 
called the Oriental. Almost all the changes in the later version strive in this 
direction . . . (SW 1: 35).
The formulation is peculiar: this expression of life was called the Oriental, 
and Benjamin himself is only relaying the news. His use of the passive voice 
here is consistent with a stylistic tendency within the essay, perhaps reflec-
tive of Benjamin’s attempt to sound academic in response to Hellingrath’s 
challenge.10 However, the passive construction also removes the speaker from 
responsibility for a naming that took place “without express justification”; as 
 10. As Corngold writes, to “go one better than the academic source of his ‘assignment,’” Hellin-
grath (153).
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Benjamin clearly states here, the term “Oriental” is not of his own invention. 
The one who did the naming is, of course, Hölderlin, in a letter to his pub-
lisher Friedrich Wilmans from September 1803; what is named is a particular 
quality that he attempted to lend to his translations of Sophocles. The letter 
appears in the volume of Hellingrath’s edition devoted to the translations 
from the Greek, and in light of Benjamin’s obvious interest in Hellingrath’s 
work, his familiarity with this particular letter is not only possible but likely:
Ich hoffe, die griechische Kunst, die uns fremd ist, durch Nationalkonve-
nienz und Fehler, mit denen sie sich immer herum beholfen hat, dadurch 
lebendiger, als gewöhnlich dem Publikum darzustellen, dass ich das Ori-
entalische, das sie verläugnet hat, mehr heraushebe, und ihren Kunstfehler, 
wo er vorkommt, verbessere. (FA 16: 19)11
I hope to represent Greek art, which is foreign to us through the conformity 
to the native and the flaws to which it has always resorted, as more alive 
than usual to the public by bringing out the Oriental element that it has 
disavowed and by correcting its artistic flaw where it occurs.
Perhaps surprisingly, given the prominence of the Oriental as an organizing 
principle in Benjamin’s essay, this letter to Wilmans is the only place in his 
body of work where Hölderlin calls that term by its name. Benjamin has a 
point, moreover, in stating that he names it “without express justification,” 
as Hölderlin does not offer any further explanation for his use of the term. 
In other letters and essays Hölderlin constructs similar oppositions, such 
as in the letter to Böhlendorff, where he compares the Greeks’ “fire from 
heaven” with our “Junonian sobriety,” or in the discussion of Greek vs. 
Hesperian “modes of representation” (Vorstellungsarten) in the remarks on 
Antigone. At no other point, however, does Hölderlin invoke the exact term 
“Oriental,” which indicates that already in 1914, Benjamin was not only 
familiar with the apparatus surrounding the translations of Sophocles but 
considered it a key to understanding the logic and process of Hölderlin’s late 
poetic production. From the start of his engagement with Hölderlin, then, 
Benjamin regards him not merely as a poet but also, always, as a translator. 
By placing the Oriental alongside the Greek as an organizing principle of 
Hölderlin’s process of revision, he casts the poet, in a sense, as translator of 
his own poem.12
 11. See Hölderlins Sämtliche Werke: Fünfter Band, ed. Norbert von Hellingrath (Berlin: Pro-
pyläen, 1923), 325f.
 12. Lacoue-Labarthe calls Hölderlin’s process of revision as Benjamin describes it “internal trans-
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 Benjamin’s introduction of the term “Oriental” warrants closer examina-
tion here, as it plays a subtle role at several points in the essay. He brings 
it into the discussion literally at surface level, as surface, in his reading of 
Hölderlin’s revision of the second line of the poem, from “Does not the 
Parca herself nourish you for service?” (first version, Dichtermut) to “Does 
not your foot stride upon what is true, as upon carpets?” (in the final ver-
sion, Blödigkeit).13 Throughout the essay Benjamin aims to demonstrate that 
the poem in its initial version, with its primarily Greek imagery and static, 
mythic quality, needs the transition to a less form-giving, more independent 
poetic language in order to allow for the emergence of its truth, das Gedich-
tete. The first version of the poem is limited by its dependence on Greece 
as a model, since the principle that underlies Greek beauty and mythology 
cannot become fully manifest in the modern world. The final version, on 
the other hand, accomplishes (as Corngold discusses) a transition from the 
mythic world of Greece to the “myth of modernity,” “to a modernity that 
reflects on Greece  .  .  .  [and] whose essential shape must be produced by 
poetry . . . ” (Corngold 161; my italics).
 That transition as Benjamin theorizes it is already apparent in the first 
lines of the poem; he points out the telling shift from dependency (being 
nourished) to positing (striding) and the image, “with a vastness evoking the 
oriental” (SW 1: 26) (an Orientalisches gemahnender Weitläufigkeit [GS II:1, 
113]), of a carpet spreading out beneath the feet of the poet, connecting the 
living as “ . . . the extension of space, the plane spread out, in which . . . des-
tiny extends itself ” (SW 1: 26) (die Erstreckung des Raumes, der gebreitete 
Plan, in dem sich das Schicksal erstreckt [GS II:1, 113]). The exemplarity of 
the image of the carpet (its Musterhaftigkeit, a term that also plays on the 
idea of its woven pattern) also reflects for Benjamin “a great deal, a very great 
deal, of Hölderlin’s cosmos . . . once again foreign-sounding, as if from the 
world of the East, and yet much more primordial than the Parca . . . ” (SW 
1: 26) (viel, sehr viel über den Kosmos Hölderlins  .  .  . wieder fremd wie aus 
östlicher Welt und doch wieviel ursprünglicher als die griechische Parze . . . [GS 
II:1, 114]). The same stanza continues its representation of the poet’s strid-
ing forth in the final version: “Therefore, my genius, only step / Naked into 
life and have no care!” (Drum, mein Genius, tritt nur / Bar ins Leben und sorge 
nicht!) As the poet strides forward and enters naked, vulnerable, into life, 
he also acknowledges for Benjamin an underlying sense of connection, of 
interweaving, with the living. This, too, is the legacy of the Oriental carpet: 
lation.” “Poetry’s Courage,” in Fioretos 82.
 13. In the original, “Nährt zum Dienste denn nicht selber die Parze dich?” becomes “Geht auf 
Wahrem dein Fuß nicht, wie auf Teppichen?” (GS II:1, 114)
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“ . . . it [life] is not the precondition but the object of a movement accom-
plished with a mighty freedom: the poet enters into life; he does not wander 
forth in it,” revealing “connectedness, in destiny, between the living and the 
poet” (SW 1: 28).14 The Oriental, as a tone emerging in balance with the 
Greek, form-giving gesture, thus makes it possible to grasp the essential rela-
tion between this poem and its “life-context” (Lebenszusammenhang) (SW 1: 
20). In a sense crucial for Benjamin’s way of thinking, this life-context is not 
determined by the “individual life-mood (Lebensbestimmung) of the artist” 
(SW 1: 20) but rather marks the poem as an effect of historical experience.15 
The courage named in the first poem’s title, then, emerges in the second 
poem as a willingness to allow this connectedness—the “innermost identity 
of the poet with the world” (SW 1: 34)—to appear without intervention.
 This mode of reading, which Benjamin here calls “aesthetic commen-
tary,” is not only a fine example of literary criticism in its own right but 
also underscores the role of criticism for the fulfillment of the poetic task. 
For Benjamin, criticism allows relationships to unfold that are only implicit 
in the original text, shedding light where the poetic text only testifies to 
its relation to the poetized; it reveals a “life-context” that the text bears 
silently within itself.16 But this belated unfolding of something intrinsic 
yet unarticulated within the work of art is also the fundamental logic of 
Hölderlin’s “Oriental” as he applies it to his translations. His letter to Wil-
mans contains its own references to the “life” contained within poetic texts, 
for by incorporating the Oriental in his translations he hopes to render the 
Greek text “more alive than usual.” His line of argumentation is strikingly 
similar to Benjamin’s: Greek art is foreign to us, and when we try to make 
it conform to our mode of representation (making mistakes “durch Nation-
alkonvenienz,” for the sake of the native), we only highlight the flaws that 
this process creates.17 By bringing out what he perceives as the “Oriental”—a 
 14. “ . . . es ist in der neuen Fassung nicht Voraussetzung, sondern Gegenstand einer mit mächti-
ger Freiheit vollzognen Bewegung: der Dichter tritt ins Leben, er wandelt nicht in ihm fort” (GS II:1, 
116).
 15. Jennings thus describes the essay as “Benjamin’s first attempt to formulate an anti-subjective 
position” (Jennings 1983,  553).
 16. Although he does not use the term Kritik in the essay on Hölderlin, there is ample evidence 
that the “aesthetic commentary” he describes here represents an early formulation of that concept. For 
a discussion of Hölderlin’s influence on Benjamin’s theory of literary criticism (Kritik), see Jennings 
1983, 550f.
 17. On the other hand, Benjamin’s comparison of tragedy and Trauerspiel follows something of a 
reverse trajectory in the Origin of German Tragic Drama: modern readers of tragedy have tried for too 
long to understand the Baroque and modern mourning play as the heirs of classical Greece, whereas 
Benjamin regards each form as the product of the specific historical moment in which it emerges. 
When we attempt to make sense of tragedy as a primordial form of modern drama and a representa-
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mode disavowed by the Greeks, but nevertheless persistent as an undertone 
within the Greek text—he means to let the text become more relevant, hence 
“more alive,” to a modern audience. Although Hölderlin speaks nowhere of 
what Benjamin calls the balance between Greek and Oriental registers, the 
idea of a balance is implicitly necessary; the Greek text will appear (to us) 
more authentic, more alive, more Greek, if a foreign element is introduced 
into it, making the text not just objectively foreign to us moderns but also 
foreign to itself, in its very linguistic essence.
 The complexity of the relationship between languages and the reawak-
ened “life” of the text in Hölderlin’s model once again evokes the interwoven 
threads of the Oriental carpet, the “life-context determined by art” (durch 
die Kunst bestimmter Lebenszusammenhang [GS II:1, 107]) at the heart of 
Benjamin’s reflections here. Languages, modes of representation, the passage 
of time—all must interact dynamically for the text to come alive in a given 
moment, and the text must bear the traces of that interaction. The weaving 
of an imagined past and present, of Greek and Hesperian and “Oriental,” 
is the life of the text, and only a translator who recognizes this and brings 
it to bear upon the process of translation can render a text “more alive” to 
a modern audience. Conventional measures of a translation’s quality since 
the age of Luther—its rendering of the sense of the original, or its lyrical 
beauty—thus become irrelevant, as the key task of the translator, at least in 
Hölderlin’s model, involves the rejuvenation of the text through the care-
ful retention—even restoration—of its polyvalence as an object of history. 
Translation (in Hölderlin’s sense) and aesthetic commentary (in Benjamin’s 
sense) may have the potential, therefore, to achieve a similar goal. Moreover, 
if we return to the initial point that Benjamin regards Hölderlin’s final revi-
sion of Dichtermut as likewise Oriental in tone, then the pieces fall together: 
revision, criticism, and translation all appear as facets of the same stone.18
 Given its fleeting appearance in the essay, it is not entirely certain 
whether his reference to Hölderlin’s concept of the “Oriental” only func-
tions for Benjamin as an offhand allusion, a convenient point of departure, 
or if he means for the term to underlie his commentary as a foundation of 
tion of something “universally human,” he argues, we lose sight of the separate logics underlying both 
tragedy and Trauerspiel. See Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 53–54 and 100–101; 
Gesammelte Schriften I:1, 234–35 and 279–80.
 18. Critics have noted the circularity of Benjamin’s argumentation here, that in the end he con-
veniently achieves what he has just defined at the start of the essay as the poetological “task” at hand, 
namely, the constitution of das Gedichtete as the truth of poetry through the work of aesthetic com-
mentary (see, for example, Corngold 157). In a slightly different vein, Wellbery discusses Benjamin’s 
“strategy of displacement,” his habit of invoking classical technique to create a foundation for his own 
argument and at the same time to break out of its limits. “Benjamin’s Theory of the Lyric,” 42.
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Hölderlin’s poetic project. (To be sure, there is little reason to believe that 
the “Oriental” even plays this role for Hölderlin, since he only uses the 
term once, as we have seen, and with reference to the Sophocles transla-
tion rather than a poetic text.) If Benjamin’s interest is based on the latter, 
however—if the Oriental represents a fundamental term in his reading of 
“Hölderlin’s cosmos,” as his language here would indicate—then there is 
ample justification for asking about the larger significance of Hölderlin’s 
Sophocles translations for Benjamin’s thought. For there is no doubt that 
Benjamin frequently taps into Hölderlin’s Sophocles when he is in need of 
exemplary material. Upon closer consideration it reveals itself as something 
of a shadow text, lending substance to and revealing connections among key 
concepts: the life of the work of art, history, criticism, translation.
 Benjamin, of course, had more explicit thoughts of his own about the 
status of translations and their role in the life of texts, and those remarks 
again bear a heavy debt to Hölderlin, though they also venture further. 
His 1921 essay “The Task of the Translator” (Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers), 
published in 1923 as a foreword to his own translations of Baudelaire’s Tab-
leaux Parisiens, may already represent in its form an homage to Hölderlin’s 
esoteric remarks. It also contains several direct references to the Sophocles 
project, and its theoretical justification of translation bears unmistakable 
echoes of Hölderlin’s thoughts on rendering a text “more alive than usual.” 
However, already at the start of the the essay, Benjamin draws a fundamen-
tal distinction between his train of thought and Hölderlin’s idea of the text 
come “alive” for its audience, for in Benjamin’s estimation the translation’s 
quality of being “alive” has little to do with its audience or, for that matter, 
the poet or the translator.19 Any translation concerned with the quality of 
communicating to its audience represents in his estimation “the inaccurate 
transmission of an inessential content” (SW 1: 253) (eine ungenaue Über-
mittlung eines unwesentlichen Inhalts [GS IV:1, 9]). Instead, translation itself 
marks a text’s “stage of continued life” (SW 1: 254), if a life can be conceived 
in terms of the history of a thing rather than its status as organic matter. 
In the case of translations produced in the historical moment of a text’s 
“fame,” “the life of the original attains its latest, continually renewed, and 
most complete unfolding” (SW 1: 255) (das Leben des Originals [erreicht] 
seine stets erneute späteste und umfassendste Entfaltung [GS IV:1, 11]) in the 
form of an “afterlife” (Fortleben, literally “living on”) that reinscribes a text’s 
contemporary relevance.20 For Benjamin translation as Fortleben marks not 
 19. See Carol Jacobs, “Letters from Walter Benjamin”: The translator is given up and abandoned 
as a matter of course . . . ” In the Language of Walter Benjamin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1999), 13.
 20. This concept of “fame” is reminiscent of what Franz Rosenzweig called the “miraculous” mo-
tHe translator’s Courage 131
only the passage from one language to another but also the passage of time, 
effecting for the original text the expansion of its significance within a new 
historical context. Although he will state later that translations themselves 
cannot be re-translated, the possibility of continual renewal inheres in the 
production of new translations that extend a text’s lifespan.
 In this sense translation is once again a gesture akin to criticism within 
his theory of the work of art as bearer of its own history; both are not simply 
a reaction to a text but a continued exploration of, even a crystallization 
of, its relation to an abstract notion of truth.21 Just as criticism (and revi-
sion, in Hölderlin’s case) bear the potential of unlocking the relationship to 
das Gedichtete, the poem’s fundamental connection to its particular “life-
context,” so too a translation can begin to illuminate the source text’s fun-
damental connection to what Benjamin calls “pure” language. Pure language 
is that which all individual languages “want to express” (SW 1: 255) but 
cannot quite achieve as individual languages, because each single language, 
being alive, is in a “constant state of flux” (SW 1: 256) that changes its 
relation to the ideas it means to express. Even the words of dead languages 
undergo a process of change as they emerge into the light of the present 
day. Translation, “of all literary forms,” is “the one charged with the special 
mission of watching over the maturing process of the original language and 
the birth pangs of its own” (SW 1: 256);22 it bears responsibility not only 
for the transfer of a text’s meaning to another language but for marking the 
space between languages, for illuminating the fact that language exists at all. 
Pure language makes itself heard most distinctly here, in the looser relation 
between language and content that a translation represents—in place of the 
organic connection of language to content in the original (“like a fruit and 
its skin”), we find in translation the “royal robes” that envelop content “with 
ample folds” (SW 1: 258, GS IV:1, 15).
 The task of translation is of a piece, then, with the role of criticism, 
which opens a path from the poem to the poetized: whereas in criticism 
the poem itself is displaced by “the world beyond the poem,” the “meta-
ment in which a foreign work becomes part of the receiving culture, when “the receiving people comes 
forth of its own desire and in its own utterance to meet the wingbeat of the foreign work.” “Scrip-
ture and Luther,” in Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig, Scripture and Translation, trans. Lawrence 
Rosenfeld and Everett Fox (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 53.
 21. In a similar vein, De Man notes the resemblance between translation and philosophy “in the 
sense that it is critical, in the same way that philosophy is critical, of a simple notion of imitation . . . ” 
(The Resistance to Theory, 81). Both translation and philosophy, De Man claims, fulfill Benjamin’s no-
tion of the ironic gesture, undoing the stability of the original that would otherwise go unnoticed.
 22. “ . . . daß gerade unter allen Formen ihr als Eigenstes es zufällt, auf jene Nachreife des frem-
den Wortes, auf die Wehen des eigenen zu merken” (GS IV:1, 13).
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physical substructure upon which the poem is based” (Jennings 1987, 192), 
translation as the transfer from one language to another reveals the interde-
pendence among languages and their various ways of expressing the same 
thing: “the totality of their intentions supplementing one another: the pure 
language” (SW 1: 257).23 Both forms point in their internal logic toward 
the obliteration of the artist (and the audience) in favor of a concept of the 
work as “organ of history”;24 both suggest that the unfolding that takes place 
in the engagement with a literary work is as much a part of the life of that 
work as the original composition. Criticism and translation, far from dilut-
ing or complicating the work’s access to its own truth content, offer another 
way of looking (what Hölderlin called an “askew perspective,” ein linkischer 
Gesichtspunkt) that can render that truth more evident, if only fleetingly.25
 In each case, to be sure, this access to truth remains a theoretical con-
struct, “a purely methodological, ideal goal” (SW 1: 21) (das rein meth-
odische, ideele Ziel [GS II:1, 108]). Not unlike Hölderlin’s characterization 
of intellectual intuition as “infinite approximation,” the project of both the 
critic and the translator is a task in the true sense of the German word Auf-
gabe, which implies both the imposition of duty and resignation (aufgeben, 
to give up).26 Any tentative step in the direction of truth is fleeting, frag-
mentary; nevertheless, there is no possibility of access other than by means 
of such fragments.27
 In contrast to criticism, however, Benjamin’s mode of translation allows 
this relation to truth to unfold not by way of meaningful engagement but 
by a radical fidelity to individual words at the expense of meaning. Because 
“ripening the seed of pure language in a translation” (SW 1: 259) has noth-
 23. “ . . . dass dennoch keiner einzelnen von ihnen, sondern nur der Allheit ihrer einander ergän-
zenden Intentionen erreichbar ist: die reine Sprache” (GS IV:1, 13). Benjamin describes the Roman-
tics’ concept of criticism as “another, if lesser factor in the continued life of literary works” compared 
with translation (SW 1: 258). He justly points out as well that the Romantics, though not explicitly 
concerned with translation in their theoretical writings, produced great translations that “testify to 
their sense of the essential nature and the dignity of this literary mode” [SW 1: 258].
 24. Benjamin’s formulation in the 1931 essay “Literaturgeschichte und Literaturwissenschaft,” 
cited in Jennings 1987, 142. The entire passage is instructive: “Works must be considered quite as 
much according to the totality of their afterlife and reception as according to the history of their 
composition. We must interest ourselves in their destiny, their contemporary reception, their transla-
tions, their fame. Only thus does the work form itself internally into a microcosm, or rather, into a 
microaeon. . . . Literature in this way becomes an organ of history.”
 25. Contemporary translation theory tends to embrace Benjamin’s point about the displacement 
of origins; see Bachmann-Medick 2009 and Buden and Novotny, Translation Studies Forum 2009.
 26. On this dual notion of ‘aufgeben” see Nägele, “Benjamin’s Ground,” 25.
 27. In a sense this is the basis of Jennings’s whole book-length argument: “His [Benjamin’s] entire 
project can be read as the attempt to recognize these revelatory shards and, in particular, to exploit 
their revolutionary potential” (Jennings 1987, 128).
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ing to do with the reproduction of a text’s meaning, moreover, the translator 
need not aim at achieving sense, for revelation occurs on a level other than 
the semantic.28 On the contrary, what is essential is what happens when a 
word-for-word translation, divorced from the demands of making sense, 
allows language to speak. Fidelity to the literal word (Wörtlichkeit), rather 
than to the “sense” of a text at the sentence level, brings a transparency to the 
translation that lets the spaces between languages shine through instead of 
smoothing over those gaps. The fragments that represent the potential access 
to truth are directly related to this fragmentation of sense in translations, for 
only by breaking up the coherence of language and content in the source 
text is it possible to discern the interaction among the elements that make 
up pure language. This attitude allows Benjamin to recast the translator’s 
traditional categories of fidelity and freedom as operating in concert with 
one another rather than as conflicting tendencies; while fidelity conveys a 
connection to pure language through literalness, freedom is associated with 
the liberation of one’s own language from within its “decayed barriers.” 
Benjamin’s well-known image of a collection of fragments (Scherben) that 
makes both original and translation “recognizable as fragments of a greater 
language” (SW 1: 260) thus describes a radical form of fidelity as literal-
ness, which finds its highest expression in the translation of Holy Writ, 
where “meaning has ceased to be the watershed for the flow of language 
and the flow of revelation” (SW 1: 262) (in dem der Sinn aufgehört hat, die 
Wasserscheide für die strömende Sprache und die strömende Offenbarung zu 
sein, GS IV: 1, 21). At the same time, however, the imperative that these 
broken pieces somehow fit together—like “fragments of a vessel that are 
to be glued together” (SW 1: 260)29—also underscores the significance of 
freedom, of relaxing the boundaries of the receiving language to allow the 
breathing room necessary to “release . . . that pure language which is exiled 
among alien tongues, to liberate the language imprisoned in a work in his 
re-creation of a work” (SW 1: 261).30
 Benjamin’s reconsideration of the categories of fidelity and freedom 
at this point—as both divorced from the limitations of making sense and 
 28. On this point see Beatrice Hanssen, “Language and Mimesis in Walter Benjamin’s Work,” 
in The Cambridge Companion to Walter Benjamin, ed. David S. Ferris (Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 62–63.
 29. Carol Jacobs is rigorously literal in claiming that Benjamin’s twin notions of a) fragments as 
the broken part of a vessel (Scherben als Bruchstück eines Gefäßes [18]) and b) translation and original as 
the broken part of a greater language (Bruchstück einer größeren Sprache) suggest together that language 
remains broken, incomplete in the passage from original to translation. “The Monstrosity of Transla-
tion,” 84f.
 30. “Jene reine Sprache, die in fremde gebannt ist, in der eigenen zu erlösen, die im Werk gefan-
gene in der Umdichtung zu befreien, ist die Aufgabe des Übersetzers” (GS IV:1, 19).
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pressed into the service of releasing pure language—also opens up more 
space for his reading of Hölderlin’s translations, which now represent an 
extreme example of the linguistic fragmentation that Benjamin names as 
essential to the “task of the translator.” Early in the essay he relates how 
in the nineteenth century the Sophocles translations were characterized as 
“monstrous examples” of the literalness that leads to incomprehensibility, 
apparently casting them as an intriguing yet failed project. Yet near the end 
of the essay he refines this description to complement his own theory of 
translation:
Hierfür wie in jeder andern wesentlichen Hinsicht stellen sich Hölderlins 
Übertragungen, besonders die der beiden Sophokleischen Tragödien, bestä-
tigend dar. In ihnen ist die Harmonie der Sprachen so tief, daß der Sinn 
nur noch wie eine Äolsharfe vom Winde von der Sprache berührt wird. 
Hölderlins Übersetzungen sind Urbilder ihrer Form; sie verhalten sich auch 
zu den vollkommensten Übertragungen ihrer Texte als das Urbild zum Vor-
bild . . . (GS IV:1, 20f.)
Confirmation of this as well as every other important aspect is supplied by 
Hölderlin’s translations, particularly those of the two tragedies by Sopho-
cles. In them the harmony of the languages is so profound that sense is 
touched by language only the way an aeolian harp is touched by the wind. 
Hölderlin’s translations are originary images/prototypes (Urbilder) of their 
form; they are to even the most perfect renderings of their texts as a origi-
nary image/prototype is to a model . . . (SW 1: 262)
As Urbilder, originary images or prototypes, the translations take on a very 
different status from that of the “monstrous”: they become both representa-
tive and inimitable. All other translations of Sophocles—even those that are 
“most perfect”—are mere approximations of the Urbild that is Hölderlin’s 
translation.
 Here Benjamin performs a twofold gesture that implicitly explains his 
particular, even personal interest in Hölderlin’s project: he marks Hölderlin’s 
Sophocles as “originary,” as the first of its form, and claims at the same time 
that this translation confirms the essence of his own argument. Could we 
then regard Benjamin’s essay as something of a translation (qua criticism, 
the illumination of that which inheres silently in the original) of that “origi-
nary” form? To be sure, Benjamin would not be the only reader of Hölder-
lin’s translations to suggest that they might require a translation of their 
own. Whatever he has said here, he claims, finds confirmation in Hölderlin’s 
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Urbild, yet the language of the translations only maintains the most delicate 
contact with the sense of the Greek text: “in them meaning plunges from 
abyss to abyss until it threatens to become lost in the bottomless depths of 
language” (SW 1: 262) (In ihnen stürzt der Sinn von Abgrund zu Abgrund, 
bis er droht in bodenlosen Sprachtiefen sich zu verlieren, GS IV:1, 21). In an 
obvious and extreme way, the translation cannot shed light on its own truth 
content, because its translator has stretched the boundaries of his language so 
far that its gates “slam shut and enclose [him] in silence” (zufallen und den 
Übersetzer ins Schweigen schließen [GS IV:1, 21]). Given his evident inter-
est in and even identification with Hölderlin as thinker, poet, and transla-
tor, we could indeed see Benjamin’s response to Hölderlin’s Sophocles as a 
dynamic expression of that text’s “living on”—not a translation of a transla-
tion (which, as he states, would be impossible) but an engagement with it 
that extends and expands its historical relevance.31
 Benjamin’s apparent tendency to identify with Hölderlin throughout 
the early stages of his scholarly career also sheds light on some intrigu-
ing weaknesses in his argument here. Like so many readers both before 
and after him, he indulges in an overly neat conflation of the “monstrous” 
translation with the fallen translator. He does not miss the opportunity to 
point out that the translations are Hölderlin’s “last work” (SW 1: 262), thus 
suggesting that the “monstrous (ungeheure) and originary danger” to which 
he exposed himself in the process also made it impossible for him to fend 
off madness. Benjamin’s tendency to valorize this translator in particular 
begins to undermine his view that the subject is relatively unimportant in 
the process of producing a text’s truth content; here, Hölderlin rather hero-
ically obliterates himself for the sake of the text (and, one could argue, for 
the sake of his audience). Perhaps it is no coincidence, then, that Benjamin 
invokes one of Hölderlin’s most prominent terms from the translations here, 
ungeheuer, to describe the “originary danger” that the translator faces. In 
Hölderlin’s translation of Antigone, ungeheuer stood in for the Greek deinon 
and nearly matched its ambivalent complexity, evoking at once the exalted 
and the monstrous: “Ungeheuer ist viel, doch nichts ungeheurer als / Der 
Mensch” (Much is monstrous, but nothing is more monstrous than the human). 
 31. Samuel Weber reflects astutely on Benjamin’s concept of origin, outlined in the Trauerspiel-
buch, as it relates to translation. The origin is “the springing-forth that emerges out of coming-to-be 
and passing-away” (dem Werden und Vergehen Entspringendes), thus not a static moment but a relation 
to historical time, always in flux: “Its historicality resides . . . in its power to return incessantly to the 
past and through the rhythm of its ever-changing repetitions set the pace for the future.” Translation 
is similarly the “stopping place of an ongoing movement,” a gesture that touches the text without tak-
ing possession of it. “A Touch of Translation: On Benjamin’s ‘Task of the Translator,” in Bermann and 
Wood, Nation, Language, and the Ethics of Translation (Princeton, 2005), 73.
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This term, which the Chorus first used to describe humankind in general, 
came to be embodied by Antigone in our stead; ungeheuer encompassed the 
unfamiliar, unsettling quality that, through Antigone, the human subject is 
brought to recognize in himself. If Hölderlin as translator exposed himself 
to a danger within language that was ungeheuer—monstrous, enormous, 
disconcerting—then by Benjamin’s logic he, like Antigone, could only with-
draw from the world as a result. His “last work” causes the gates to shut, 
just as Antigone’s ceremonial act of burial effectively causes the tomb to be 
sealed.
 Like Antigone, then, the translator in Benjamin’s view has already taken 
on a sacrificial role—“for the sake of pure language, he breaks through 
decayed barriers (morsche Schranken) of his own language” (SW 1: 261) 
—and if Benjamin associates Hölderlin in particular with this mode of sac-
rifice, that gesture only reveals a certain consistency in his method. Though 
not in such an explicit form, he has already made this association in “Two 
Poems,” where he develops, in conversation with Hölderlin’s poetry, a radical 
concept of the poet’s courage. The implicit characterization of the transla-
tor as heroic—as attempting a task both dangerous and necessary—thus 
demands that we wind our way back to Benjamin’s very first engagement 
with Hölderlin. In the earlier essay, Benjamin finds that the poet’s courage 
in facing the danger of death and the dissolution of the self in pure related-
ness (the revelation of das Gedichtete, the truth content of the text) brings 
salvation to the world. Benjamin first rejects the notion of Dichtermut that 
lends Hölderlin’s first version its title, claiming that its lack of clarity places 
it in line with vulgar locutions such as Weibertreue, too close to the plastic-
ity of life to attain the purity of connection to the poetized that Benjamin’s 
concept requires. Courage as he conceives of it, on the other hand, may be 
the primary stance of both versions of the poem but only reaches the level 
of intellectual insight in the final version, where courage is not merely a 
static quality (“Man and death stand rigid, opposing one another”) but a 
dynamic recognition of relationship in the poet’s surrender to death, “the 
innermost identity of the poet with the world” (SW 1: 34). With this gesture 
of surrender, which in the context of the poetic text is also recognition and 
revelation, “the poet does not have to fear death; he is a hero because he 
lives at the center of all relations.”32
 The authentically “heroic” stance of the poet is thus not that of the first 
version, Dichtermut, in its static confrontation with death, but of Blödigkeit, 
 32. “Der Dichter hat den Tod nicht zu fürchten, er ist Held, weil er die Mitte aller Beziehungen 
lebt” (II:1, 124).
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timidity, a characteristic that does not automatically invite associations with 
boldness or risk. The courage that Benjamin locates in timidity seems to 
inhere in the willingness to do nothing at all.
In die Mitte des Lebens versetzt, bleibt ihm nichts, als das reglose Dasein, 
die völlige Passivität, die das Wesen des Mutigen ist; als sich ganz hinzuge-
ben der Beziehung. (GS IV:1, 125)
Since he has been transposed into the middle of life, nothing awaits him 
but motionless existence, complete passivity, which is the essence of the 
courageous man—nothing except to surrender himself wholly to relation-
ship. (SW 1: 34)
One result of this surrender is the dissolution of the poet as subject, the 
collapse of poet and poetry at the “untouchable center of all relation” (SW 
1: 35).33 The form-giving gesture of Greek art, the realm of the first version, 
thus makes space for the Oriental, the overcoming of the limits and bound-
aries of form. The distance the poet has traveled, from being an individual 
part of the world of form to the formlessness of the center, ultimately finds 
expression, Benjamin claims, in the “intrusive caesura” of the poem’s final 
lines:
Gut auch sind und geschikt einem zu etwas wir,
Wenn wir kommen, mit Kunst, und von den Himmlischen
Einen bringen. Doch selber
Bringen schikliche Hände wir.
Good, too, are we and skillful for [or sent to] someone to some end,
When we come, with art, and bring one
From among the heavenly beings. Yet we ourselves
Bring suitable [or appropriate, fitting] hands. (SW 1: 22; my italics)
 Benjamin’s use of the poetic term “caesura” (Zäsur) here doubtless refers 
at surface level to enjambments in the last two lines, but the term has a 
loaded significance for Hölderlin’s Sophocles project as well, as Benjamin 
surely knew: in the remarks on Oedipus, the caesura underlay Hölderlin’s 
theory of the relation between the structure of tragedy and its effects, mark-
ing that point of “counter-rhythmic rupture” at which the tragic hero is 
 33. On understanding the poet’s courage in relation to passivity see Corngold 1998, 163–64.
CHaPter Four138
banished from the centrality of life into the “excentric sphere of the dead.” 
At this moment, which for Hölderlin coincides with the appearance of the 
seer Tiresias, “representation itself appears.” Benjamin is a bit cryptic here, 
however, and the single mention of the caesura is perhaps not truly help-
ful unless we understand it through another lens. Although in this passage 
“caesura” seems to refer primarily to a rhythmic disruption, Benjamin makes 
evident in other writings that he understands the depth that the concept pos-
sessed for Hölderlin. In the essay on Goethe’s Elective Affinities, he invokes 
Hölderlin’s definition of the caesura as “the pure word, the counter-rhythmic 
rupture” (das reine Wort, die gegenrhythmische Unterbrechung) to describe a 
moment in which “something beyond the poet interrupts the language of 
the poetry” (SW 1: 341) (etwas jenseits des Dichters der Dichtung ins Wort 
fällt [GS I:1, 182]—literally, it falls into language, underscoring the poet’s 
inertia in that process).34 And here we find a deeper connection to the 
notion of courage expressed as passivity; at the point of caesura the poet’s 
primary role, for Benjamin, is to give room to something larger than himself: 
“Every expression comes to a standstill, in order to give space to an expres-
sionless power inside all artistic media” (SW 1: 340f.; trans. modified) (in 
der . . . zugleich jeder Ausdruck sich legt, um einer innerhalb aller Kunstmittel 
ausdruckslosen Gewalt Raum zu geben).
 Benjamin goes on to draw a logical parallel, which for our purposes pos-
sesses an almost tantalizing potential:
Solche Gewalt ist kaum je deutlicher geworden als in der griechischen Tra-
gödie einer-, der Hölderlinschen Hymnik andererseits. In der Tragödie als 
Verstummen des Helden, in der Hymne als Einspruch im Rhythmus ver-
nehmbar. (GS I:1, 182)
Such power has rarely become clearer than in Greek tragedy, on the one 
hand, and in Hölderlin’s hymnic poetry, on the other. Perceptible in tragedy 
as the falling silent of the hero, and in the rhythm of the hymn as objec-
tion. (341)
Composed in 1919–1922 and published in 1924–5, the essay on Elective 
 34. Lacoue-Labarthe offers another highly evocative image of the caesura in an interview in the 
documentary film “The Ister,” where he describes it as an historical moment in which “humanity is all 
of a sudden short of breath.” This is, in a sense, another dimension of the “expressionless” moment of 
which Benjamin speaks; Lacoue-Labarthe ultimately associates the caesura as historical phenomenon 
with the reality of the Shoah, as an inexpressible moment after which “we will always have trouble 
catching our breath.” In Barison and Ross, “The Ister,” Black Box Sound and Image, 2004.
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Affinities marks almost exactly the chronological span between the “Task of 
the Translator” (1921) and Benjamin’s habilitation, the Origin of German 
Tragic Drama (Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels), which he completed in 
1925. Perhaps it is fitting, then, that this passage incorporates elements of 
the earlier essays (Benjamin’s interest in Hölderlin’s writings on translation 
and his poetry) as well as the later study. The “falling silent” of the tragic 
hero to which Benjamin refers here is a trope identified by Franz Rosenzweig 
in the Star of Redemption, and it will play a significant role in Benjamin’s 
reading of Greek tragedy in contrast to the Baroque Trauerspiel. In the Trau-
erspiel book, the tragic conflict marks a transitional and ambiguous moment 
in which the hero must sacrifice himself for the sake of the world, and that 
sacrifice is both “first and final,” because at once he moves to invalidate the 
gods and to announce the onset of a new order:
Die tragische Dichtung ruht auf der Opferidee. Das tragische Opfer aber 
ist in seinem Gegenstande—dem Helden—unterschieden von jedem ande-
ren und ein erstes und letztes zugleich. Ein letztes im Sinne des Sühnop-
fers, das Göttern, die ein altes Recht behüten, fällt; ein erstes im Sinn der 
stellvertretenden Handlung, in welcher neue Inhalte des Volkslebens sich 
ankündigen. (GS I:1, 285)
Tragic poetry is based on the idea of sacrifice. But in respect of its victim, 
the hero, the tragic sacrifice differs from any other kind, being at once a first 
and a final sacrifice. A final sacrifice in the sense of the atoning sacrifice to 
gods who are upholding an ancient right; a first sacrifice in the sense of the 
representative action, in which new aspects of the life of the nation become 
manifest.35 (Origin, 106f.)
In the midst of this turmoil of transition, the tragic hero remains notably 
silent, confined for Rosenzweig within “the icy loneliness of the self ” (Ori-
gin 107). The hero is emphatically not an object of identification for the 
audience but rather embodies change; his silence is the “sublime element” 
that generates a tipping point from the gods’ complete dominion to their 
decline, as the audience sees “not the guilt of the accused but the evidence of 
speechless suffering” (Origin 109) (nicht die Betroffenheit des Angeschuldigten, 
sondern das Zeugnis sprachlosen Leidens, GS I:1, 288). In tragedy Rosenzweig 
recognizes the “paradox of the birth of the genius in moral speechlessness, 
 35. Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London and 
New York: Verso, 2009), 106f.  Hereafter cited in body of text as Origin.
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moral infantility” (Origin 110) (Das Paradoxon der Geburt des Genius in 
moralischer Sprachlosigkeit, moralischer Infantilität, 289).36
 A sustained reading of the Trauerspiel book would take me too far afield 
here, but surely it is impossible not to be tempted by the apparent similari-
ties between the respective portraits of the tragic hero in Trauerspiel and 
the poet in “Zwei Gedichte.” Indeed, when in the Elective Affinities essay 
Benjamin calls attention to the caesura’s convergence in the falling-silent of 
the tragic hero and the rhythm of Hölderlin’s late poetry, he more or less 
invites that comparison. To what extent, however, can we push the analogy? 
Can it lead us from Hölderlin as poet to Hölderlin as translator of Greek 
tragedy—the Hölderlin who, for Benjamin, stands alongside the poet from 
the very start?
 Both Jennings and Beatrice Hanssen have noted the proximity of the 
poet in “Zwei Gedichte” to the character of the tragic hero, though not in 
direct relation to the Trauerspiel book. Jennings draws a specific parallel to 
Hölderlin by pointing out the similarities between the courageous poet and 
the tragic hero Empedocles, both of whom must save the world by surren-
dering their own subjectivity:
[T]he poet and Empedokles are at once privileged and condemned to lead 
a life above and outside that of the ‘Volk.’ And again like Empedokles, the 
poet in Benjamin’s reading is able by virtue of his song to impose a new 
order and meaning on the lives of the people. . . . And finally, just as the 
problem of Empedokles’ death stands at the center of the drama, so, too, 
does the death of the poet in Benjamin’s interpretation figure as the major 
and necessary event in the realization of the new order. The poet’s death 
frees his song from the bounds of his subjectivity and thus objectifies and 
universalizes it. (Jennings 1983, 554)
This comparison is compelling and largely persuasive but does not go far 
enough. In Hölderlin’s dramatic text Empedocles is heroic not just because 
he speaks but because he first speaks too much—articulating too clearly his 
own privileged status as conduit to the divine—and then falls silent. He does 
not “impose a new order and meaning on the lives of the people” merely 
 36. Rainer Nägele associates this pivotal quality of Greek tragedy in Benjamin’s view with Hölder-
lin’s distinction of Greeks and moderns in the relationship between word and body (the Greeks’ more 
physically mediated relation [deadly-factual, tödlichfaktisch] vs. the moderns’ more spiritual and un-
mediated relation [“killing-factual,” tödtendfaktisch]); both describe the “scene of the formation of the 
yet unformed, of giving language to the yet unspoken,” linking them to Kant’s concept of becoming 
mündig, that process of coming to consciousness that amounts literally to receiving a mouth. Nägele, 
Theater, Theory, Speculation, 38. The discussion of Kant appears on pp. 7–8.
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because of his song but also by his silencing of that song. The thrust of the 
tragedy rests on his recognition of this very point, as the priest Hermocrates 
describes:
Verderblicher denn Schwert und Feuer ist
Der Menschengeist, der götterähnliche,
Wenn er nicht schweigen kann, und sein Geheimnis
Unaufgedekt bewahren . . . (FA 13: 821f.,1. 168–71)
More ruinous than sword or fire is the human spirit, the god-like, if he 
cannot be silent and preserve his secret unrevealed . . . 
While Empedocles achieves heroic status not just through his song but 
also through his silence, we also find a similar situation in Oedipus, whose 
self-blinding is another expression of the silencing which follows too much 
speech (where “the spirit of Oedipus, all-knowing, articulates the nefas” [FA 
16:252]). This is the aspect of tragic heroism that Rosenzweig elides but 
Hölderlin underscores: in the end, the hero’s silence is a necessary conse-
quence of having said too much.
 How can this description of the tragic hero’s silence possibly relate to the 
poet, as Benjamin suggests? By definition, after all, a poet cannot be silent. 
For Benjamin, however, he does embody “timidity,” and the association 
with the tragic hero may offer insight into the question of how to under-
stand the somewhat problematic formulation Blödigkeit. Corngold calls it a 
“troublesome word . . . which while unquestionably meaning ‘timidity,’ also, 
like Blödheit, suggests short-sightedness and, in certain contexts, stupidity” 
(162). And indeed, at least in a contemporary sense it is difficult to separate 
the word Blödigkeit from the common exhortation blöd, meaning stupid.37 
(Grimms’ dictionary, by the way, includes both infirmitas (feebleness) and 
timiditas as possible definitions along with hebetudo, mental dullness.38) The 
quality of timidity or weakness that Benjamin locates in Hölderlin’s poem, 
however, implies above all a receding from the spotlight into a realm of 
insignificance: “The poet is nothing but a limit with respect to life, the point 
of indifference . . . ” (SW 1: 35) (Er ist nichts als Grenze gegen das Leben, die 
Indifferenz . . . [II:1, 125]). The kind of courage denoted by Blödigkeit is the 
 37. See Avital Ronell’s commentary in Stupidity (University of Illinois Press, 2002, where she 
discusses the “tradition” among commentators since Benjamin “of diverting the title from its disturb-
ing implications” [7], whereas she sees Hölderlin’s shift from the poet’s courage to his Blödigkeit as 
“bringing forth stupidity as a crucial poetic sign” [8] in the tradition of Rousseau.
 38. See the Grimm’s dictionary online at http://germazope.uni-trier.de/Projekte/DWB.
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courage to withdraw into the marginality of death for the sake of a truth 
that will bestow itself on the living. The courage, in effect, to be tragically, 
heroically silent.
 This concept of courage strongly recalls Hölderlin’s remarks on Oedipus, 
where he identifies the caesura as the moment in which Tiresias banishes the 
hero from a position of centrality to one of excentricity:
Er tritt in den Gang des Schiksaals, als Aufseher über die Naturmacht, 
die tragisch, den Menschen seiner Lebenssphäre, dem Mittelpuncte seines 
inneren Lebens in eine andere Welt entrükt und in die exzentrische Sphäre 
der Todten reißt. (FA 16: 251)
He steps into the course of fate as overseer of the natural order which tragi-
cally displaces the human being from his own sphere of life, from the mid-
point of his inner life into another world and tears him into the excentric 
sphere of the dead. (Constantine 64; trans. modified)
While the instance of caesura in tragedy denotes the hero’s silencing in the 
case of Oedipus (and Empedocles by association), it also represents in the 
remarks on Antigone “the moment of greatest risk in the course of day or a 
work of art”—the moment in which “the human being must hold onto him-
self the most” and therefore also “stand most openly there in his character.” 
In that moment of risk, which the human being confronts by holding on 
more tightly, the tragic hero, by contrast, must let go. Benjamin’s poet, with 
his stance of passive courage, must effectively do the same.
 The weak and distant pulse that remains as mark of Hölderlin’s tragic 
hero thus links him conceptually to Benjamin’s poet, who lets go of his own 
form for the sake of the relatedness of the whole; both figures succumb to 
silence rather than “holding onto themselves” in the way that the human 
being typically must, at least for Hölderlin. Yet if letting go of oneself is 
related, for both Hölderlin and Benjamin, to accepting silence as opposed 
to maintaining one’s own voice—not being silent—then we find ourselves 
facing yet another intriguing triangulation. For who is more silent in this 
sense than the translator? Much more obviously than the poet, after all, he is 
meant to be as silent as possible in the course of fulfilling his task—silent not 
in the sense of creating a smooth and seamless translation (for that degree 
of intervention would in fact be the opposite of silence), but in the manner 
that Benjamin describes: as a surrender of control over the sense of a text in 
the name of a radical fidelity to its language. Perhaps one could even go so 
far as to say that the translator has no choice but to make himself “blöd,” if 
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he wants to achieve a translation of the peculiar quality that both Hölderlin 
and Benjamin demand.
 Interestingly enough, Schleiermacher realized this a hundred years before 
Benjamin.
The attempt seems to be the most extraordinary form of humiliation that 
a writer, who is not a bad writer, could inflict upon himself. Who would 
not like to have his native tongue appear everywhere in its most enticing 
beauty, of which every literary genre is capable? Who would not rather 
beget children who are in their parents’ image rather than bastards? Who 
would like to show himself in less attractive and less graceful movements 
than he is capable of, and at least sometimes appear harsh and stiff, and 
shock the reader as much as is necessary to keep him aware of what he is 
doing? . . . These are the sacrifices that every translator must make; these are 
the dangers to which he exposes himself. . . . (Schulte and Biguenet 46f.)
The translator, in “keep[ing] the reader aware of what he is doing” and sac-
rificing his own poetic capacity for the sake of the text before him, must be 
willing to face humiliation, not just to accept the passive silence of Blödigkeit 
but also to risk the exposure of Blödigkeit in its other sense: to look stupid. 
At least in the eyes of many of his contemporaries, Hölderlin as transla-
tor certainly exposed himself in this respect. Schleiermacher recognizes and 
sheds light upon the injustice of such characterizations: the translator looks 
stupid, yes, but it is probably not his fault. Benjamin, on the other hand, 
takes that charge of stupidity, as it was applied specifically to these transla-
tions and this translator, and reformulates it as an asset. Hölderlin’s transla-
tions look stupid because as a translator he is blöd, and with respect to the 
“living-on” (Fortleben, the afterlife) of both the text and the languages that 
mark a crossroads within it, that is courage par excellence.
 This process is in no way effortless, and a hint of the tragic hero’s “speech-
less suffering” is implicit in the stance of the poet or translator who gives 
space to a truth that otherwise defies expression. Much later, in a text of 
1936 entitled German Men and Women, Benjamin revisits the idea of a suf-
fering that this translator-poet must bear; taking up the language of a second 
letter to Casimir Ulrich Böhlendorff from 1802 (subsequent to the more 
famous letter of 1801 regarding the interplay of the foreign and that which 
is one’s own, das Fremde und das Eigene) he describes the suffering that con-
nects Hölderlin’s world to that of ancient Greece, not as “blossoming ideal-
ized world” but as “the desolate real one”: “This suffering is the secret of the 
historical transformation, the transubstantiation, of the Greek spirit, which 
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is the subject of Hölderlin’s last hymns” (SW 3:181). In historical transfor-
mation we find the same insufficiency with which the “desolate real” world 
of the Greeks would have met alongside its idealized image. For Hölderlin 
the best solution was to embed that suffering within his poetry by marking 
out, in language, the distance that this “Greek spirit” would have traveled.
 In an interview in the fascinating documentary film “The Ister,” the 
filmmaker Hans-Jürgen Syberberg describes his visual concept of Hölder-
lin’s relation to Greek sources, which offers a similar, but more affirmative 
version of transubstantiation than the one Benjamin constructs: the image 
of a “little,” empty model of a stage marks the insufficient reflection of an 
idealized Greece, juxtaposed by Hölderlin’s words.
To have Greek theater in our life . . . the best . . . is . . . as a little model, 
not too small, but very precisely made, full in light. And if you then hear 
the words of Hölderlin, together with this empty stage, and see this piece, 
this model of Greece, then you have it. You have what he means.39
Taken as a reflection on the challenges of historical transformation, Syb-
erberg’s concept is no pessimistic statement on translation’s impossibility. 
Nor does this process of reconstruction demand, as it does for Benjamin at 
the endpoint of the “Task of the Translator,” submitting to a strictly literal 
mode of translation. The reconstruction may be of smaller stature than its 
idealized source, but it is precise, and its contours are brightly illuminated. 
This offers a worthy counterpoint to the model of “invisible” translator and 
“transparent” text, effectively redefining the set of values that traditionally 
underlie perceptions of “good” translation: Hölderlin’s translations of ancient 
text—as well as their transubstantiation in poetic form, which for Benjamin 
involves a similar process—make no particular claim to transparency, and 
that is their virtue. What they do claim instead is the reconstruction of a text 
that lives on. The translator’s courage, the courage to be small, perhaps, and 
to allow one’s words to echo around an empty stage, is ultimately a stance 
more liberating than constrictive. It sheds light on language as language, 
on the unexpected relationships between languages and between texts and 
contexts that let a text live and breathe; and at the same time, it ennobles the 
gesture of Aufgabe as surrender, perhaps, but not failure. Translation in this 
sense is essential to the living-on (Fortleben) of texts in new contexts, and 
the translator bears responsibility for that living-on; like the tragic hero, she 
is the silent pivot that lets the source text cross barriers, whether temporal 
or spatial, and resonate anew.
 39. David Barison and Daniel Ross, The Ister (Black Box Sound and Image, 2004).
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 Only a few years after Benjamin reflects in German Men and Women on 
the rupture between the distant, idealized world of the Greeks and the harsh 
glare of the “real”—implicitly situating the translator-poet, once again, as 
ethically bound to a purely passive courage—Martin Heidegger takes on the 
question of courage as well, also binding it to the figure of the translator-
poet (and particularly the poet who engages in an exchange with classical 
Greece) in his 1943 lecture “Hölderlins Hymne ‘Der Ister.’” As we will see 
in the next chapter, Heidegger brings together Sophocles’ Antigone and 
Hölderlin’s late hymn “Der Ister” to consider the exchange or “conversation” 
(Zwiesprache) between the two texts as well as to engage in his own dialogue 
with them. In some ways, Benjamin and Heidegger are intriguingly close to 
one another in their respective assessments of the role of translation and the 
“foreign” in the development of one’s own language. The two seem to agree, 
for example, that the exchange with the foreign should remain transparent, 
that the translator-poet ought never to erase the tracks that lead him out-
ward into the unknown and back to the “Eigenes,” that which is one’s own. 
For Heidegger, however, the ultimate goal of the “conversation” with ancient 
text is not, as it was for Benjamin, a glimpse of the connection to a universal 
truth inherent in the space between languages; rather, insofar as the poet 
represents the voice of his people, the Germans, his expression of courage 
serves a political rather than an ethical purpose, standing in the service of 
consolidating national identity during the crisis of wartime. This concept 
of identity, moreover, is not universal but rather originates precisely in the 
specific relationship of the Germans and the ancient Greeks—the idealized 
Greeks, once again, and not their “desolate real” world, in harmony with 
a no less idealized version of the Germans. Yet however emphatically Hei-
degger attempts to embed patriotic sympathies in his lecture, delivered in the 
period of the siege at Stalingrad, his reading and simultaneous performance 
of the concept of dialogue or Zwiesprache renders problematic any possibility 
of triumphant homecoming.
Die Gedichte [Hölderlins] sind im Lärm der “undichterischen 
Sprachen” wie eine Glocke, die im Freien hängt und schon durch 
einen leichten, über sie kommenden Schneefall verstimmt wird. 
Vielleicht deshalb sagt Hölderlin in späteren Versen einmal das 
Wort, das wie Prosa klingt und doch dichterisch ist wie kaum 
eines (Entwurf zu Kolomb IV, 395):
Von wegen geringer Dinge




Vielleicht ist jede Erläuterung dieser Gedichte ein Schneefall auf 
die Glocke.1
Amidst the noise of “unpoetic languages”(IV, 257) the poems (i.e., 
Hölderlin’s) are like a bell, hanging in the open air and already 
brought out of tune by a light snowfall that is coming over it. Per-
haps this is why Hölderlin once, in later verses, speaks the word 
that sounds like prose and yet is poetic in a way that few others 
are (Draft for “Colombus,” IV, 395):
Put out of tune
By humble things, as by snow
 1. Martin Heidegger, “Vorwort zur zweiten Auflage [1951],” Gesamtausgabe 4: Erläuterungen zu 
Hölderlins Dichtung (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1944), 7f. Henceforth abbreviated as GA, with volume 
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Was the bell, with which
The hour is rung
For the evening meal.
Perhaps every elucidation of these poems is a falling of snow on 
the bell.
Sage mir, was du vom Übersetzen hältst, und ich sage dir, wer 
du bist.
Tell me what you think of translation, and I will tell you who you 
are. (GA 53: 76)
J ust as snow  falls softly upon a bell, reading touches lightly upon a text. And leaves a trace, however faint. A Verstimmung, a disordering, 
resounds from within, leaving the voice of the bell out of tune, the tenor 
of the text inescapably other than it was before—allowing existing forms 
to be unsettled by “humble things,” revealing a new dimension of the past 
that only becomes audible through its echoes in the present, in the moment 
of reading. In the 1951 foreword to his Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry 
(Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung), Martin Heidegger claims that the 
act of reading Hölderlin (and, by extension, of attempting to illuminate his 
poetry amid the clamor of “unpoetic languages”) requires the active engage-
ment with a poetic text that both demands elucidation and resists mere 
ordering. Indeed, these preliminary remarks suggest that when confronted 
with those most conceptually distant examples of Hölderlin’s poetry, the late 
hymns, interpretation can perhaps only take place as dis-ordering.2
 And yet, as Heidegger goes on to insist in this same passage, the task of 
the interpreter—“the last, but also the most difficult step of each interpreta-
tion”—is to erase every vestige of that dismantling operation she has only 
just undertaken. While a reader’s elucidations may let the poem ring out 
otherwise than before, they may not make themselves heard as such; after her 
attempts at clarification the reader must aim to disappear without a trace.
 2. Dirk de Schutters argues similarly that for Heidegger, the “Umstimmung” that characterizes 
reading in an authentic sense requires a “Verstimmung,” a disordering in the act of reading: in order 
for the text to give itself “the law according to which it can be.” “The Parergonality of Reading: Hei-
degger reading Hölderlin,” in Die Aufgabe des Lesers: On the Ethics of Reading, ed. L. Verbeeck and B. 
Philipsen (Leuven: Peeters, 1992), 126.
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. . . damit das im Gedicht rein Gedichtete um einiges klarer dastehe, muß 
die erläuternde Rede sich und ihr Versuchtes jedesmal zerbrechen. Um des 
Gedichteten willen muß die Erläuterung des Gedichtes danach trachten, 
sich selbst überflüssig zu machen. (GA 4: 8)
. . . so that what has been composed purely into a poem may stand forth a 
little clearer, the elucidating speech must each time shatter itself and what it 
had attempted to do. For the sake of preserving the poetized, the elucidation 
of the poem must strive to make itself superfluous.
In other words, the lucidity of the poem must appear to have always been 
there, in spite of the many steps, however arduous, taken to attain it. The 
practice of reading as Heidegger describes it here is thus not so distant from 
a historically stable concept of translation that bears the similarly impossible 
demand of seamless transfer: like translation, Erläuterung remains suspended 
between the inevitable disturbance of the text—its Verstimmung, its status 
out of tune—and the imperative to preserve its pristine integrity.3
 There is a point at which Heidegger does not only aim to elucidate 
Hölderlin’s writings but also acknowledges the need to “translate” them—
and thus to reveal the nearly imperceptible layers of a text’s history that inter-
pretation must uncover. In his 1942 lecture on Hölderlin’s hymn “Der Ister,” 
Heidegger asserts that the interpretation or laying-out (Auslegung) of any 
great work (he includes the Phenomenology and the Critique of Pure Reason in 
this category) amounts to “a translating within our German language” (75). 
To designate such works as “in need of translation” (übersetzungsbedürftig) 
is not at all to suggest, as one might intuitively guess, that they suffer from 
a lack of clarity; quite the contrary, their “need of translation” only under-
scores their significance insofar as it confronts us with other possible ways 
in which to “understand.”
 In translating Sophocles, as we have seen, Hölderlin performed a double 
gesture that preserved intact a tension between fidelity and transformation, 
oscillating between a pure, often nearly absurd fidelity to the ancient text 
and an unsettling reorganization that, in the eyes of most of his contempo-
raries, hardly approximated the source text at all. As we have also seen, Ben-
 3. Although the German word Erläuterung is commonly translated as “elucidations,” it is worth 
mentioning in this context that it derives from the verb “läuten,” to sound or ring out, rather than 
from the description of an action implying visual clarification. Thus the practice of interpretation im-
plicitly (perhaps even explicitly, given Heidegger’s close attention to language and etymology) involves 
the process of allowing a text not only to become “lucid” but to ring out more clearly. This emphasis 
on sound extends in Heidegger’s discourse to terms like “Anklang.”
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jamin identified this mode of translation, informed by the relation to “pure 
language” as such, as the most dangerous and hence most courageous of its 
kind. Thus it may appear upon first glance that what Heidegger describes 
as Erläuterung here—that stroking of the text that leaves no fingerprint 
behind—hews more closely to conventional modes of translation, insofar 
as they construct order from the artifacts of the past and reestablish it in 
the form of untainted identity. After all, for many of its practitioners the 
ideal translation has always been one that, like Heidegger’s ideal elucidation, 
leaves no trace at all. Yet in laying out the text of Sophocles’ Antigone in 
his “Ister” lecture, Heidegger turns to no other translation than Hölderlin’s 
(and, ultimately and with more satisfaction, his own). If, as Heidegger asserts 
in this lecture, all interpretation is a form of translation, all translation a 
form of interpretation—an interpretation that, moreover, must constantly 
cover its own tracks—why does he consult a translation that never ceases 
to speak its name? For there is no question that Hölderlin’s Oedipus and 
Antigone are far from pitch-perfect; one might even say that their status of 
being out of tune is what defines them.
 One approach to the question may lie in the contrast of the second cita-
tion above, culled from the 1942 lecture: “Tell me what you think of transla-
tion, and I will tell you who you are.” Here it is not translation itself that 
secures identity—who you are—but the act of reflecting on it. Heidegger’s 
rather audacious statement claims the authority to interpret not merely a 
translated text but a reader of translation as well. The evaluative gesture 
concerns the manner in which translation ought to take place rather than 
the product of that taking-place; the rhetorical tone, meanwhile, mimicking 
the syntax of both the distinguished professor and the seer, conveys a sweep-
ing command that nullifies the discordant complexity of the interpretive 
process and leaves one with—clarity. Yet it is a clarity that ultimately rings 
false within the larger framework of this text, which repeatedly indicates that 
the apparent simplicity of this exchange—tell me, and I’ll tell you—can only 
result from the stifling of an inherent discord that both tempts and vexes 
the lecturer throughout his lecture. In short, despite first appearances it is a 
highly ambivalent piece of work.
 In this chapter I wish to focus on the stakes inherent in that ambivalence 
as they bear upon the reading Heidegger produces: a reading of tragedy and 
translation, of poetry and history, and finally of reading itself. The tension 
contained there may be most clearly expressed in a conflict, already evident 
in this single statement about translation, between a certain argumentative 
position—a position that might at best be called exclusionary, at worst total-
izing—and a tendency to undermine that position’s stability in the rhetorical 
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form of the lecture. While the practice of transmission from one language 
to another as well as that from text to elucidation hardly appears from the 
perspective of his discussion to be an object of debate, the demonstrative 
specimen that Heidegger produces emerges precisely in the form of, if not 
debate, then at least dialogue: Tell me, and I’ll tell you. Interpretation—qua 
translation—is in this sense not a usurpation of difference but an exchange 
with it, and that exchange with the foreign elements of text and language has 
lasting consequences. Consequences that cannot be swept away without a 
trace, that prove to extend far beyond the limits of what that initial promise 
of identity, of discovering “who you are,” may have indicated.
 The remarks that frame this statement on translation contain both famil-
iar and foreign elements, endowing the text itself with a somewhat fractured 
identity. On one hand, Heidegger’s lecture represents yet another chapter in 
his decades-long effort to articulate the singular status of Hölderlin’s poetry 
within a metaphysical tradition that had, in his view, thus far failed to com-
prehend it. It is not the first place in which he argues that Hölderlin’s writ-
ing offers a departure from the discourse of metaphysics that has shaped not 
only the course of philosophy but those of history and technology as well. 
And it will not be the last place; Hölderlin plays a crucial role in Heidegger’s 
thought up until his interview with Spiegel magazine in 1966.4 However, 
in this particular lecture Heidegger’s commentary on Hölderlin’s later work 
is unique insofar as it takes shape as an extended reflection on transla-
tion, even featuring Heidegger’s own practical attempts to render Sophocles’ 
Greek into his particular formulation of German. This foray into transla-
tion happens not only because Hölderlin’s texts require, as Heidegger puts 
it, a translation within their own language. Rather, Heidegger attempts to 
demonstrate how the poetic texts he considers here articulate a relationship 
between the foreign and the familiar that both dovetails with Hölderlin’s 
simultaneous work of translation, particularly his work on Sophocles, and 
allows the concept of translation itself to resonate distinctly with the experi-
ence of language and history. Hölderlin’s often obscure practice of carrying 
ideas and words across millennia in translated and otherwise transmitted 
forms demonstrates for Heidegger the radical expression of a language not 
at home with itself. This, in turn, evokes the ebb and flow of history as it 
shapes and is shaped within modernity. As a mode of representation, trans-
lation expresses in language an unsettling, disordering movement underly-
 4. The volume Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung (GA 4) alone contains a collection of essays 
and lectures published between 1936 and 1963. In addition, the Gesamtausgabe includes three lectures 
on Hölderlin’s poetry, “Germanien/Der Rhein” (GA 39), “Der Ister” (GA 43) and “Andenken” (GA 
52).
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ing Heidegger’s concept of history and the status of the modern subject 
within it.
 Not surprisingly, this reading brings Heidegger well beyond Hölderlin’s 
poetry and indeed beyond the poet himself, to the ancient texts that make 
themselves heard in his work. Reading Hölderlin’s late hymns demands at 
the same time an engagement with the Greek text that dominates his work 
of translation, and thus an interpretation of Sophocles’ (and Hölderlin’s) 
Antigone constitutes the central portion of this lecture.5 For Heidegger, not 
only Hölderlin’s theories of translation and modern tragic experience but 
also the poetry he composed at approximately the same time find agreement 
or Anklang (harmony) with Sophoclean language; the Greek text sets a tone 
that Hölderlin’s work echoes, both in active interlocution with Sophocles 
and in more subtle moments of influence.6 The difference between these reg-
isters of translation and contemporaneous poetic production is only slight, 
for both are part of a body of work that comes to acknowledge the foreign 
as crucial to the recognition of that which is one’s own. Reading and writing 
take place within a dynamics of exchange or dialogue (Zwiesprache) in which 
the foreign touches lightly upon the ownmost and changes it irrevocably, 
in which the distant past is brought to bear upon the present and leaves its 
own disturbance there. And at the same time, the concurrent acts of turning 
back to that past and reaching out towards the foreign together open another 
dimension that reveals the momentary convergence (Anklang) of past with 
present, of the foreign with that which is one’s own. The exchange between 
 5. Because I am primarily interested in the interplay between translation and tragedy structur-
ing the “Ister” lecture, I have chosen not to foreground my discussion with Heidegger’s comments 
on Antigone from his Einführung in die Metaphysik. Although many of the same issues arise in that 
earlier text, such as the relationship of history to the deinon or Unheimliches, Heidegger does not relate 
them to Hölderlin’s poetry, nor to the dynamics of Zwiesprache as it informs his conception of both 
translation and history. For a thorough discussion of the role of tragedy and particularly sacrifice in 
the Einführung, see Schmidt, On Germans and 245–54, as well as his “Ruins and Roses: Hegel and 
Heidegger on Sacrifice, Mourning, and Memory,” in Endings: Questions of Memory in Hegel and Hei-
degger, ed. Rebecca Comay and John McCumber. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999), 
97–113.
 6. With his concept of “Anklang” Heidegger means to distance his reading from one of “influ-
ence” in a conventional sense, and the result seems to epitomize the dynamics of “Zwiesprache”: 
“What we must keep constantly in mind is this: It is the prerogative of great poets, thinkers and artists 
that they alone are capable of letting themselves be influenced. . . . What the great ones give they do 
not have by way of their originality, but rather from another origin, one that makes them sensitive 
to the ‘influence’ of that which is originary in the other great ones” (I 50: Bedenken müssen wir stets 
dieses: Es ist das Vorrecht der grossen Dichter, Denker und Künstler, dass sie allein das Vermögen haben, sich 
beeinflussen zu lassen. . . . Die Großen haben das, was sie geben, nicht aus ihrer Originalität, sondern aus 
anderem Ursprung, der sie empfindlich macht für den ‘Einfluss’ des Ursprünglichen der anderen Großen” 
[62]).
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Sophocles and Hölderlin, with its staggering heights of poetic achievement 
alongside glaring and often baffling insufficiencies, may therefore represent 
in many ways a literary anomaly within the modern tradition of imitat-
ing Greek tragedy, but the regenerative process that it also models proves 
for Heidegger to be a fundamental characteristic of modernity experienced 
authentically. The concept of Zwiesprache that Heidegger develops in his 
readings of Hölderlin and Sophocles becomes in this lecture the primary 
trope of poetic production, of translation, and of history itself.
 This emphasis in the lecture on the role of translation as means of 
exchange between present and past, identity and difference, tends to produce 
at least two distinct results. On a substantive level, the discussion of Zwie-
sprache inspires Heidegger to ever greater hyperbole regarding the special 
affinity of the Germans with the Greeks. It is on this point that the lecture 
has been most widely, and deservedly, criticized.7 As with his authoritative 
claim to know “who you are” on the basis of “what you think of transla-
tion,” this attitude clashes with the notion of Zwiesprache as he develops it 
in the lecture.8 At the same time, however, the modality of Zwiesprache also 
lends the lecture its shape and movement in another sense, for ultimately 
Heidegger will be unable to keep his distance from the dialogic structure 
that he identifies. As a result his lecture does not merely present a detached 
account of the exchange between Sophocles and Hölderlin (and thus of the 
symbiotic relationship between modern Germany and ancient Greece) but 
participates in that exchange, allowing points of reference to shift in the 
process of reading, owning the possibility—even the necessity—of being 
moved, unsettled, dis-ordered by the past (both ancient and modern) and 
its foreignness in the act of interpretation.9 In this respect his lecture con-
stantly undermines what it argues, indicating that precisely those attempts 
to account for a more concrete relationship between difference and identity, 
 7. See, for example, Véronique Foti, Heidegger and the Poets (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 
1992), 47 and 54, and Kathleen Wright, “Heidegger’s Hölderlin and the Mo(u)rning of History,” 
Philosophy Today 37:4 (Winter 1993): 423–35.
 8. In a similar vein, his presentation of the form of “Gespräch” in the later “Aus einem Gespräch 
von der Sprache zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden” (Unterwegs zur Sprache, 83–157) 
implies an absurdly obvious manipulation of the interlocutor. See Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, “Martin 
Heidegger and His Japanese Interlocutors: About a Limit of Western Metaphysics,” Diacritics 30:4 
(Winter 2000): 83–101.
 9. Fred Dallmayr describes Heidegger’s understanding of the Hölderlinian concept of recollec-
tion (“Andenken”) in similar terms, “not as a return to a finished past but rather as a meeting ground 
where past or alien experience reveals itself as also an impending prospect.” Rather than representing 
something “gone or vanished,” “the recollected experience returns to the greeting poet in a vivid coun-
tergreeting, one not confined to the given moment.” Fred Dallmayr, The Other Heidegger (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1993), 153.
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the foreign and the ownmost, are fundamentally troubled by the disordering 
that must accompany its expression.
 To revisit once again Heidegger’s encounter with Hölderlin’s poetry 
requires some justification. Few intersections of poetry and philosophy 
have been more closely examined, more exhaustively analyzed, and more 
painstakingly criticized than this one. One result of this scrutiny has been a 
frequent discrediting of Heidegger’s work on Hölderlin as reductive, decon-
textualizing, even violent. Heidegger strikes a dissonant chord for both read-
ers approaching his texts on Hölderlin from a literary standpoint and those 
rooted in philosophy, and that dissonance has itself become the irresistible 
center of many analyses.10 Consequently, the practice of reading Heidegger 
reading Hölderlin has consisted virtually from the start in calling Heidegger’s 
controversial interpretations into question.
 As Heidegger himself insists in his own defense, however (and not only 
in this lecture), his concern with Hölderlin’s writings has nothing to do 
with the “science of literature” (Literaturwissenschaft) in any conventional 
sense. With respect to this distinction, the lecture on “Der Ister” may rep-
resent something of a specimen piece. Leaving open more obvious questions 
regarding the content of the poem, Heidegger introduces the concept of 
attentiveness (Aufmerksamkeit) to describe his technique of reading in these 
remarks: “attentiveness in the sense of a fundamental attunement, out of 
which we have a sense only for the essential and have the sole vocation 
of marking out the essential from everything else so as to retain it in the 
future, to ‘attend’ to it (die Aufmerksamkeit im Sinne einer Grundstimmung, 
aus der wir stets und nur den Sinn haben für das Wesentliche, die Bestim-
mung, dieses Wesentliche aus dem Übrigen herauszumerken, um es künftig zu 
behalten, zu “merken” [GA 53: 14]).11 “Merken” appears in quotes here, as 
if to emphasize its dual valence in this context, where it refers to both the 
need to “take note” of the essential in an attitude of Aufmerksamkeit and 
the gesture of remembrance, of “marking,” that allows the essential to be 
preserved for itself. In contrast to a method, grounded in metaphysics, that 
 10. The critical voices are legion and include Christopher Fynsk, Heidegger: Thought and Histo-
ricity (Ithaca: Cornell, 1986), who locates in Heidegger’s early readings of Hölderlin the stabilizing 
gesture of “mimetic violence” (194); Warminski, “Monstrous History”; Foti, Heidegger and the Poets; 
Wright, “Heidegger’s Hölderlin”; Lacoue-Labarthe, “Poetry’s Courage,” in The Solid Letter: Readings 
of Friedrich Holderlin, ed. Aris Fioretos (Stanford, 2000), 74–93.
 11. Hölderlin’s Hymn “Der Ister,” trans. William McNeil and Julia Davis (Bloomington: Indi-
ana University Press, 1996), 13f. Henceforth designated in the body of text as I, with relevant page 
number reference. Since, however, Heidegger’s writings are understandably difficult to translate in a 
manner that maintains the peculiar polyvalence of his German, it will often be necessary for me to 
modify the published translation or even depart from it completely.
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would seek to decide the undecidable rather than engage with it—a “cal-
culating, discovering, and conquering measurement of the world” (I 48, 
trans. modified: eine rechnende, entdeckende, erobernde Durchmessung der Welt 
[GA 53: 59])—Heidegger follows a mode of reading that does not gener-
ate understanding so much as submit to a moment in which understand-
ing falls short. (This submission indicates an astute interpretive perspective 
in its own right, for it acknowledges and reiterates Hölderlin’s gesture of 
allowing the untranslatable to represent itself as such.) Insofar as Heidegger 
confronts the pitfalls of translation—and the translation of Greek tragedy 
in particular—this lecture might constitute nothing less than a reorganiza-
tion (and reenactment) of Hölderlin’s own remarks on translation; yet it is 
a reorganization not based on the attempt to comprehend that earlier text 
but rather constructed around the impossibility of comprehension. Thus 
Heidegger preempts criticism of his interpretive practice by implicitly mak-
ing his reading call itself into question as a reading, call reading as such into 
question insofar as he insists on an ineffaceable element of unreadability. As 
a result, while he consistently resists the call to formulate an ethics per se (as 
in the Letter on Humanism, for example), this lecture carves out another kind 
of ethical stance in the place of translation and finally in that of interpreta-
tion as such: a stance that questions the violence inherent in a practice of 
reading that erases its own tracks, that affirms instead, through the concept 
and technique of Zwiesprache, the excess gathered along the path. The snow 
on the bell. The subtle slide out of tune. Translation, as he writes elsewhere, 
should be a passing-on (Überlieferung) rather than a transformation; should 
reflect that which it collects along the trajectory of its history.12
 If his lecture on “Der Ister” holds as a central insight the ambivalent 
practice of reading (and writing, or lecturing) as Zwiesprache, however, it is 
not long before he retreats from this insight. Only a year later, in a lecture 
commemorating the hundredth anniversary of Hölderlin’s death in 1843, 
he reduces the encounter with the foreign to the process of bringing the 
Germans “home.” The swiftness with which Heidegger backpedals to a more 
stable position in “Homecoming/To Kindred Ones” (Heimkunft/An die Ver-
wandten), which appeared along with “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry” 
(Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung) in the first edition of the Elucidations 
(1944), will ultimately highlight the radicality of his process in the “Ister” 
lecture. For—as this lecture illustrates both conceptually and rhetorically—if 
reading must engage in a dialogue with its object, then it always leaves a 
trace, on reader and text alike, that cannot be erased or made “one’s own.” 
 12. Der Satz vom Grund (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1997), 164.
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The subsequent fading of that trace does not imply that the process of 
reading as Zwiesprache has reached its culmination but rather indicates the 
unfortunate retreat to another kind of reading altogether.
Hölderlin’s Poetry Flows. It does not posit, nor does it attempt to 
situate itself on solid ground. For Heidegger, this is the sole characteristic of 
the late hymns, their only concern (Sorge); they comprise what he describes 
as the “poetry of streams” (Dichtung der Ströme), of movement without halt, 
of incessant wandering for its own sake. In contrast to the metaphysical tra-
dition extending from Plato to Kant, in which the artist depicts a series of 
“symbolic images” (Sinnbilder) whose representations of the physical world 
remain subordinate to the ideas and values they approximate (GA 53: 19), 
Hölderlin’s poetry presents the reader with an image that is not at all “sinn-
bildlich,” whose sense or “Sinn” remains an enigma encompassed by the 
river in its glorious flow:
Wenn nun aber die Ströme in Hölderlins Dichtung in Wahrheit keine 
“Sinnbilder” sind, was sollen sie dann sonst sein? Wie sollen wir dann noch 
von ihnen etwas wissen können, wo doch all unser Wissen, und die Wis-
senschaft erst recht, in der Metaphysik Grund und Halt hat? Fast scheint 
es so, als sagte der Dichter selbst, dass wir von den Strömen nichts wissen 
können. Die Ister-Hymne schliesst, genauer: sie hört auf, mit dem Wort:
 Was aber jener thuet der Strom
 Weis niemand. (GA 53: 21)
But if the streams in Hölderlin’s poetry are in truth not “symbolic images,” 
then what else can they be? How are we to know anything of them when 
all of our knowledge, and especially scientific knowledge, has its ground and 
foothold in metaphysics? It almost seems as though the poet himself were 
saying that we can know nothing of the streams. The Ister hymn closes, or 
more precisely, it comes to a halt, with the word:
 But what that one does, that stream
 No one knows. (I 19; trans. modified)
 Despite attempts to define it in symbolic terms, the enigma remains 
intact, loosening knowledge’s every potential foothold. In fact, no knowl-
edge can contain it—or rather, as we will see, it challenges the possibility 
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of knowledge as such. In Hölderlin’s poetry, that enigma takes shape con-
ceptually as the river and rhetorically as a flow to which the reader can only 
succumb, even if she cannot know to what foreign soil it might convey her. 
For Heidegger, it is this perpetual motion that counts, that passage into the 
unknown that models the peculiar dwelling-place of humankind as a locus 
without rest, an “Ortschaft der Wanderschaft” (GA 53: 39).13 The stream is 
utterly foreign to the human being, “dem Menschen fern und fremd,” and 
yet at the same time it is irresistible, inciting a “going along” (ein Mitgehen) 
that undermines any stable or static notion of locality, Ortschaft. Indeed, it 
tears the human being away from that notion of locality in a most Hölder-
linian sense: “The tearing and the certainty of the streams’ own path is 
precisely what tears human beings out of the habitual center of their lives” 
(Das Reissende und Gewisse der eigenen Bahn der Ströme ist es gerade, was den 
Menschen aus der gewöhnlichen Mitte seines Lebens herausreisst [GA 53: 32]). 
Hölderlin’s familiar image of the “eccentric path” becomes for Heidegger the 
unsettled dwelling-place of the human. And there is no other Ortschaft to 
which one might aspire.
 From the start, then, Heidegger’s discussion of the “poetry of streams” 
alludes to sources other than the hymn featured in the lecture’s title, and 
these alternate sources soon assume center stage. Upon closer examination, 
the outline of geographical space in the lecture—the shape of the river, the 
curve of the path—reveals a relationship to time, to the conveyance of a 
lifetime, and in this sense Heidegger’s remarks begin to converge even more 
closely with Hölderlin’s own theory of tragedy; from this point, in fact, 
that convergence takes on a certain primacy. Heidegger’s assertion that the 
human being is torn out of a position of centrality by the sure motion of 
poetry is a close paraphrase of Hölderlin’s own remarks on Oedipus, drawn 
from a passage in which he names the poetic caesura as the rhythmic inter-
ruption upon which the entire balance of the tragedy turns. After this point 
in dramatic time—the point at which the blind seer Tiresias enters the 
scene—nothing will ever be the same again.
Er tritt ein in den Gang des Schicksals, als Aufseher über die Naturmacht, 
die tragisch, den Menschen aus seiner Lebenssphäre, dem Mittelpuncte 
seines innern Lebens in eine andere Welt entrückt und in die exzentrische 
Sphäre der Todten reisst. (FA 16: 251)
 13. The published translation “locality of journeying” (I 33) is perfectly serviceable but does 
not present the internal relationship of these two opposing terms, captured in the doubling of the 
suffix “-schaft.” The juxtaposed words in German evoke both the stark difference between situated-
ness (Ortschaft) and restlessness (Wanderschaft) and the oscillating movement linking the two in Hei-
degger’s reading.
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He (i.e., Tiresias) steps into the course of fate as overseer of the natural 
order which tragically displaces the human being from his own sphere of 
life, from the midpoint of his inner life into another world, and tears him 
into the excentric sphere of the dead. (Constantine 64; trans. modified)
Where Tiresias steps in to stand guard over nature’s powerful force, presented 
elsewhere in Hölderlin’s remarks as the “tearing spirit of time” (FA 16: 370), 
the familiar march of fate is permanently disrupted, the direction of the 
tragic hero’s future derailed in a single moment. Yet it is a temporal shift not 
entirely fulfilled by its forward orientation; for not only the future assumes 
a different shape, but the past—most plainly evident in the havoc of Oedi-
pus’ own memories when he learns the truth of his heritage—takes on an 
unexpectedly malleable texture. Remembered events, however distant, words 
spoken, sins committed with and without awareness signify something quite 
other than they once did. In this sense they only illustrate further the extent 
to which the tragic hero’s perception of centrality has always already been 
a false assumption.
 In these passages, the remains of the past thus contain within them a 
potentiality not yet realized, not yet unleashed; and this acknowledgment, as 
we have seen, lies not only at the core of Hölderlin’s theory of tragic expe-
rience but also in his practice of translation. As we have already seen, the 
temporal disruption staged before an audience in Greek tragedy is reflected 
and intensified in Hölderlin’s translation through the experience of a frac-
tured syntax, neither Greek nor German, and of an “Oriental” element that 
is explicitly foreign to both registers but brought to light through a particular 
attitude of translation. Within that emergent dimension of “the Oriental,” 
Hölderlin aims to reveal within the tragedy something older than the Greek 
text—something other than that text—and that expression of internal differ-
ence proves to be integral both to tragic effect and to its redoubled intensity 
in translation. Once the exclusive referentiality of original and translation, 
the tragic text’s perceived origin and its proper afterlife, become as unsettled 
as the hero they depict, there is no turning back to a familiar understanding 
of the past, for it has become as uncertain as the future.
 For Heidegger in the “Ister” lecture, the streaming motion that epito-
mizes the dynamism of Hölderlin’s river poetry inscribes a similarly unmis-
takable temporality, for the streams too are “zwiefach gerichtet” (GA 53: 
33) (oriented in a twofold direction [I 29]): “The stream is a wandering of 
a singular kind, insofar as it goes simultaneously into what has been and 
what is to come” (I 29; trans. modified: Der Strom ist eine Wanderung von 
einziger Art, sofern sie zumal in das Gewesene und in das Kommende geht). Yet 
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identity proves to be even more elusive than it was for Oedipus, who does 
ultimately survey the ruins of his once-unknown past. Like the tragic hero 
wrenched out of his perceived centrality, the human being who cannot help 
but go along—whose ensuing Wanderschaft proves simultaneously to be his 
Ortschaft—becomes subject to a temporality that changes remembrance as 
well as anticipation, ebb as well as tide. Anticipation opens up not only that 
which is to come but also what has been; and even more crucially, remem-
brance in a genuine sense is no longer encompassed by the mere orientation 
toward past events. Rather, it confronts an inwardness whose meaning is still 
to come, that retains within it a hint of the undecided: “Genuine remem-
brance is a turning toward the undisclosed inwardness of what has been” 
(Echte Erinnerung ist Zuwendung zum unerschlossenen Inwendigen des Gewe-
senen [GA 53: 34]). The contradictory movement (gegenwendige Bewegung) 
that Heidegger views as inherent in both Hölderlin’s poetry of streams and 
his remarks on tragedy thus figures human experience in flux, as flux: as the 
continuous wandering both toward and away from an untapped interiority 
“to come,” as the endless oscillation between the familiar and the unknown, 
even if that unknown proves to be part of that which is most one’s own. Thus 
the movement of Heimischwerden im Unheimischsein (an awkward but close 
translation is “coming to be at home in not being at home”), constantly set 
into motion through the encounter with the foreign essential to translation, 
also describes the process by which history comes to be grasped.
 At the same time, however, this dynamics of a poetry of streams also 
opens a radically other dimension of reading. For Heidegger’s discussion 
of the fluidity of Hölderlin’s poetry in relation to the contradictory move-
ment of history is also a reflection on a particular mode of interpretation 
that he both names and performs in this text. If the poetry’s only concern 
is “coming to be at home within that which is one’s own” (Heimischwerden 
im Eigenen)—within that which is, in Heidegger’s paraphrase of Hölderlin, 
most difficult to find—then its flow must logically lead the human being in 
the direction of that “home.” Yet that movement, like the Gegenwendigkeit 
of the streams, proves to be far more elusive. Drawing explicitly on the ter-
minology of Hölderlin’s letter to Casimir Ulrich Böhlendorff of December 
1801, in which he discusses the difficulty of confronting not only the for-
eign (das Fremde) but also that which is one’s own (das Eigene), Heidegger 
describes the turn of Heimischwerden as a “passage through the foreign” 
(Durchgang durch das Fremde). Thus the poet’s orientation towards Hei-
mischwerden can only come about as the result of a dialogue (Zwiesprache) 
with foreign voices, and the process of interpreting the poetry that results 
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must involve this dialogue. Not a relationship of influence per se, Heidegger 
describes the dynamics of Zwiesprache as a confrontation with difference that 
ultimately conveys the ownmost back to itself. Within this model, Hölderlin 
engages in a particular mode of exchange with the Greek poets Pindar and 
Sophocles, and not only in his translations of their work; his dialogue with 
the Greeks, particularly Sophocles, resonates throughout the hymns he pro-
duced during that period of translation.
 But what does this “ownmost” turn out to be? In the course of Heidegger’s 
lecture it tends to diverge into two distinct directions—one determined by 
a static relationship of Eigenes to Fremdes (evident in his reductive com-
ments on the letter to Böhlendorff), the other by a more dynamic concept 
of translation as the fluid dialogue that maintains the locality of wandering, 
the Ortschaft der Wanderschaft.14 Indeed, this latter concept seems even to 
infect Heidegger’s style of argumentation, which is not precisely linear but 
rather more spiral; in the first and second parts of the lecture, every forward 
advance is interrupted by a repetition (Wiederholung), producing an effect 
of halting momentum not unlike Hölderlin’s own description of the Ister 
river itself: “Der scheinet aber fast/Rükwärts zu gehen . . . ” (4) (But it [the 
river] seems nearly to go backwards .  .  . ). By the conclusion of the lecture, 
this more fluid mode of conceiving the ownmost seems to have assumed 
precedence—even if Heidegger does not quite acknowledge it—as the pos-
sibility of reaching mastery of so much “foreign” material is foreclosed again 
and again.
 Hölderlin’s letter to Böhlendorff from December 1801 has long inspired 
commentaries on its theory of the relation between the foreign and that 
which is one’s own, and Heidegger eagerly takes up the discussion in the 
“Ister” lecture as well as in the essay “Andenken,” published in 1943. For 
Heidegger, the letter articulates what he terms Hölderlin’s “law of history”: 
for a people to approach that which is proper to it, it must first encounter 
that which is foreign. Citing the famous lines from the letter, “but that 
which is one’s own (das Eigene) must be learned just as well as the foreign 
(das Fremde),” he describes the conflict between foreign and ownmost among 
the Greeks as a process of attaining ownership, effectively of both elements: 
“Only through that which is foreign to them . .  . does that which is their 
 14. The former conception of “Eigenes” is the one found more frequently in Heidegger’s writings 
on Hölderlin, including the essay “Andenken,” which was written in the same period as the lecture 
and published in 1943 during the National Socialists’ highly publicized commemoration of the hun-
dredth anniversary of Hölderlin’s death. For extensive comments on the relationship of the foreign to 
the ownmost in that lecture, see Fynsk, Heidegger: Thought and Historicity, 198–205.
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own become theirs” (Durch das ihnen Fremde hindurch . . . wird ihnen erst 
ihr Eigenes zum Eigentum [GA 4: 87]).15
 Heidegger’s assertions with respect to this interplay of the foreign with 
the ownmost leave his presentation at some distance from Hölderlin’s actual 
statements in the letter. At no point, for example, does Hölderlin claim 
directly that the encounter with the foreign will result in a greater under-
standing of what is one’s own. Rather, his primary argument is that moder-
nity cannot simply adopt the aesthetic principles of the Greeks as its own, 
since their “culture”—the “talent for representation” that he calls “Junonian 
sobriety”—is our “nature” and cannot be assimilated from another source.16 
Precisely this impossibility of obtaining that which is most our own from 
the experience of the foreign ensures that achieving our “nature” will remain 
our most difficult task.
 Heidegger’s model is not Hölderlin’s. In fact, structurally it often appears 
closer to Schleiermacher’s notion of authentic translation as the openness 
to the foreign in the interest of expanding the self, as the practice of bring-
ing the reader to the author while “leaving the author alone” as much as 
possible.17 However, Heidegger explicitly denies this particular provenance, 
insisting that his model of translation operates not in the interest of Bil-
dung but rather the movement of history and the unconcealment of “the 
concealed essence of our own historical commencement (I 66: das verbor-
gene Wesen unseres eigenen geschichtlichen Anfangs [GA 53: 81]). Moreover, 
the inherently expansive tone of the Romantic model also contrasts sharply 
with Heidegger’s narrower notion of Zwiesprache. For while Schleiermacher’s 
proposed methodology of negotiating difference in translation stipulates an 
openness to the foreign conceived universally, in the terms of Goethe’s notion 
of Weltliteratur, Zwiesprache for Heidegger is a gesture that is “removed from 
all coincidence” (jedem Zufall enthoben) by an unmistakable claim to histori-
cal specificity. “What is one’s own is that which belongs to the fatherland of 
the Germans” (I 49: Das Eigene ist das Vaterländische des Deutschen [GA 53: 
60]), and its interlocutor in a proper sense is “the foreign that relates to the 
 15. See Dallmayr’s discussion of the Böhlendorff letter, which focuses on the significance of 
estrangement in the recognition of the self (153–55).
 16. See Warminski 26–37.
 17. Miguel de Beistegui notes this similarity as well in a footnote to his interesting discussion of 
Heidegger’s conception of translation. He perceives a difference, however, in the two thinkers’ views 
of how the foreign affects the ownmost: while Schleiermacher’s perception of translation remains gov-
erned by a logic of appropriation (even if it is impossible) and hospitality (“the other idiom is invited 
to penetrate the sphere of my own”),  for Heidegger it’s the other way around: “my own language is 
to become other, foreign to myself; translation is an experience of dis-propriation.” Thinking with 
Heidegger: Displacement (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 203n.
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return home, that is, is one with it” (I 54: das auf die Heimkehr bezogene, 
d.h. mit ihr einige Fremde [GA 53: 67]), the foreignness precisely of that 
which is one’s own—in other words, of the Greeks vis-à-vis the Germans.18 
The proper negotiation of difference in Heidegger’s reading does indeed 
depend on the preservation of the foreign as such, but only insofar as that 
foreignness already stands in intimate relation to identity. Which raises the 
suspicion that, in its current form, it may not be so foreign after all.
Weil der Bezug Hölderlins zum Griechentum  .  .  . weder klassisch, noch 
romantisch, noch metaphysisch ist, deshalb wird die Bindung Hölderlins 
an das Griechentum nicht lockerer, sondern umgekehrt inniger. Denn erst 
dort, wo das Fremde in seiner wesenhaften Gegensätzlichkeit erkannt und 
anerkannt ist, besteht die Möglichkeit der echten Beziehung, und d.h. der 
Einigung, die nicht wirre Vermischung, sondern fügende Unterscheidung 
ist. (GA 53: 67f.)
Because Hölderlin’s relationship to the Greek world is . . . neither classical 
nor Romantic nor metaphysical, his tie to the Greek world does not loosen; 
on the contrary, it becomes more intimate. For only where the foreign is 
recognized and acknowledged in its essential oppositeness do we find the 
possibility of a true relationship, i.e., of a union that is not a confused mix-
ing but a conjoining in differentiation. (I 54)
 Though he depicts their difference as a juxtaposition rather than a blur-
ring of boundaries, Heidegger still continues to insist upon the “essential 
oppositeness” of German and Greek worlds. By arguing for the fundamental 
union of the two in Hölderlin’s work, he lets their relationship function as a 
mirror, while for Hölderlin the relationship was far more complex.19 From 
this perspective his description of the specific dialogue between Germany 
and Greece appears at odds with his presentation of Hölderlin’s poetry of 
streams as an ambivalent movement through the foreign, an infinite move-
ment without clear origin or destination.
 However, another strain of his argument begins to develop alongside this 
predominant oppositional structure, one that underscores the movement of 
infinite differentiation proposed by Hölderlin:
 18. “For Hölderlin, that which is foreign to the historical humankind of the Germans is the 
Greek world” (I 54: Dieses Fremde des geschichtlichen Menschentums der Deutschen ist für Hölderlin das 
Griechentum [GA 53:67])
 19. Fynsk notes Heidegger’s tendency to overstabilize the complexity of Hölderlin’s insights, par-
ticularly in the later writings and the work on tragedy. See Heidegger: Thought and Historicity, 187–88.
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Weil Hölderlin wie keiner seiner Zeitgenossen das innere Vermögen besit-
zen durfte, von Pindar und Sophokles beeinflusst, d.h. jetzt, dem fremden 
Ursprünglichen aus dem eigenen Ursprung ursprünglich hörig zu sein, des-
halb hat auch Hölderlin allein aus der geschichtlichen Zwiesprache und 
Entsprechung es vermocht, uns diese Dichter und ihre Dichtung in einem 
ursprünglicheren Lichte zu zeigen. (GA 53: 62)
Because Hölderlin was able to possess, like no other of his contemporaries, 
the inner capacity to be influenced by Pindar and Sophocles—and that now 
means, of being subject, out of one’s own origin, to a foreign originariness 
in an originary sense—for this reason Hölderlin was also alone in his ability 
to reveal these poets and their poetry to us in a more originary light, out of 
historical dialogue and approximation. (I 50; trans. modified)
To be sure, the emphasis here on “Hölderlin alone” continues to support 
the problematic assertion that Sophocles and the Greeks are the privileged 
counterpart of Hölderlin and the Germans, that they present a “more origi-
nary” sense of history that will bring German identity back to itself. How-
ever, the passage also begins to undermine that relation. The purpose of 
the exchange with the foreign here is not only to search for one’s ownmost 
origin; if it were, perhaps that origin would not be as difficult to find as 
Hölderlin asserts. Rather, the origin itself becomes pliable in the process of 
searching: the ancient poets appear not in a more accessible form but “in a 
more originary light” as a result of their exchange with modernity. In allud-
ing to Hölderlin’s contribution within the discourse of modern tragedy and 
of tragedy in a modern age—the idea that, even as the present is continually 
permeated by its relationship to the past, the past is not static—Heidegger 
begins to suggest that its translation as a mode of reading can shed another 
light, can send tremors through both the ancient edifice and its modern 
remains. That the oscillating movement to and from the past, the search 
altering both past and present—and not the return to a specific historical 
origin—may define both the act of reading and the experience of history 
within modernity.
 Read along these lines, Heidegger’s account of Hölderlin reading Sopho-
cles begins to take shape as something other than the violent appropriation 
of poetry in the interest of philosophical posturing. Like Hölderlin’s dia-
logue with Sophocles, it is also a moment of participation, a performance of 
Zwiesprache that has the potential to effect change in both past and present; 
Heidegger’s remarks both reflect and perpetuate the gesture they describe. 
And since that description presents a mode of interpretation and translation 
that refuses to be done with its source, that lets itself be disordered by their 
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contact, the effect of its continuation here is to undermine any definitive 
status of reading as such. This slippage becomes particularly evident in pas-
sages in which Heidegger must confront Hölderlin’s reading of Sophocles 
with his own, for in doing so he is forced to construct a reading of a reading, 
to take on a double original that always already exists both in Greek and 
in German and therefore maintains its own internal dissonance. In hearing 
this dissonance as it bears upon Heidegger’s own efforts here, one cannot 
help but observe how it tends to subvert the other, more dominant strain of 
thought at the heart of the text: that of the dynamics of foreign and famil-
iar, Fremdes and Eigenes, in the interest of establishing the special affinity 
between Germany and Greece. And if that subversive reading occasionally 
comes across as violent, it is in a sense other than the blind appropriation 
of the other into the economy of identity; rather, it is a violence through 
which the other makes itself counted.
 Given the path that leads him through the texts in this lecture, Hei-
degger has no choice: he must translate Sophocles via Hölderlin, by involv-
ing himself in the same form of dialogue that he wishes to investigate. This 
involvement already becomes evident on more than one level in his exten-
sive account of a single key passage, where he reflects on both Sophocles’s 
and Hölderlin’s renditions of the choral ode Polla ta deina . . . , Ungeheuer 
ist viel.  .  .  . Rather than simply using Hölderlin’s version of the passage 
to augment his discussion, Heidegger argues that that particular version 
is comprehensible only in the context of Hölderlin’s translation (literally 
his carrying-over, Übertragung) of the tragedy as a whole, and he indicates 
that his more serviceable translation will effectively “translate” that incom-
prehensible element left by Hölderlin. Warminski unpacks the complexity 
of Heidegger’s justification: “In order to think the same of what Hölderlin 
says, it is necessary to say what he leaves unsaid, in other words, to say it 
differently, to say it otherwise” (Warminski 1990, 199).
 Yet precisely by attempting to “say the unsaid” in the act of translation, 
Heidegger invokes the precedent of Hölderlin’s own emphasis on the “Ori-
ental” element that had remained silent in the Greek. That link is further 
reinforced insofar as Heidegger describes his commentary as “remarks” or 
“Anmerkungen” (appearing in quotes in the text) in contrast to the ostensibly 
fuller notion of Auslegung, laying out.20 Consequently, the expected result of 
his translation and “remarks” also carries familiar echoes:
 20. Heidegger clearly distinguishes between the remarks he intends to present here and the more 
encompassing notion of an interpretation, further suggesting that his practice of reading will remain 
distant from conventional modes: “That an adequate interpretation of his choral ode . . . is beyond 
our capabilities in all respects, requires no further elaboration. Here too, remarks must suffice” (I 59: 
Dass eine zureichende Auslegung dieses Chorliedes . . . unser Vermögen nach allen Hinsichten übersteigt, 
bedarf keiner umständlichen Versicherung. Auch hier müssen Anmerkungen genügen [GA 53:72]).
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.  .  . wir müssen uns aber im Aufgaben-Bezirk dieser “Anmerkungen” zur 
Isterhymne mit einer Aushilfe begnügen, d.h. mit einer Übersetzung, die im 
Hinblick auf das, was es zu durchdenken gilt, einiges deutlicher umschreibt 
und heraushebt. . . . (GA 53: 70)
. . . yet within the context of our task in these “remarks” on the Ister hymn, 
we must be content with some makeshift assistance; that is, we must make 
do with a translation that, with respect to what we have to think through, 
demarcates and emphasizes some things more clearly.  .  .  . (I 57; trans. 
modified)
What must be more clearly “demarcated” and “emphasized” in Heidegger’s 
version of translation? “Some things” (Einiges) may not only refer here to 
difficult sections of the Greek text but also that which he deems less than 
comprehensible in Hölderlin’s own version, for otherwise there would be no 
need for clarification, let alone for (re)translation. This raises the intriguing 
possibility that Heidegger aims to locate within Hölderlin’s work on Sopho-
cles a line of inquiry that has thus far remained untranslated, unarticulated, 
unthought. Does Hölderlin’s constellation of poetry and translations after 
1800 contain, like the Greek text with which it is constantly engaged, its 
own “Oriental” shadows? Heidegger, after all, deems not only the work of 
Sophocles but also of Hölderlin to be “in need of translation,” and of a pecu-
liar sort of translation at that: one that itself might be called Hölderlinian, 
for as Heidegger explains, it “can even bring connections to light that lie 
within the translated language but are not laid out” (kann sogar Zusammen-
hänge ans Licht bringen, die in der übersetzten Sprache zwar liegen, aber nicht 
herausgelegt sind [GA 53: 75]). Heidegger’s “remarks”—his confrontation 
with both the text of Sophocles’ Antigone and Hölderlin’s complex process 
of working through that same text—aspire to illuminate those shadows, to 
set into motion just such a (Hölderlinian) translation. But what does that 
process of illumination imply for the shadowy texts it “translates”?
 Here again, Heidegger displays an unexpected affinity with the Romantic 
model of translation and with Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics in particular.21 
Translation is an act of interpretation, and every interpretation is a transla-
tion. Even within a single language there is need of translation, insofar as 
translation figures a space in which understanding is necessarily negotiated 
 21. Schleiermacher’s view of translation was influenced to a great extent by his interest in herme-
neutics; therefore the negotiation of meaning and the affirmation not only of commonality but also 
of difference are his central concerns. See his lecture “On the Different Methods of Translating” in 
Schulte and Biguenet 36–54.
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rather than presupposed or even superimposed. However, for Heidegger 
the result of such negotiations is an understanding of an unusual sort: more 
precisely, it is an understanding that does not establish itself on solid ground 
but rather calls itself constantly into question. For as with knowledge when 
faced with the poetry of streams, the foothold given to understanding here 
proves to be extremely precarious.
Verständlichmachen darf nie heißen, eine Dichtung und ein Denken 
jedem beliebigen Meinen und dessen Verständnis-Horizont anzugleichen; 
verständlich machen heißt, das Verständnis dafür wecken, daß der blinde 
Eigensinn des gewöhnlichen Meinens gebrochen und verlassen werden 
muß, wenn die Wahrheit eines Werkes sich enthüllen soll. (GA 53: 76)
Making understandable can never be the same as assimilating a poetry and 
a thought to any arbitrary opinion or its horizon of understanding; making 
understandable means awakening our understanding that the blind obsti-
nacy of conventional opinion must be broken and abandoned if the truth 
of a work is to unveil itself. (I 63; trans. modified)
The approximation of understanding is not understanding. Securing a place 
for the exchange between text and translation within the domain of what 
is already known, what is comprehensible, is tantamount to bringing its 
incessant and ambivalent movement, zwiefach gerichtet, to a grinding halt. 
On the other hand, if understanding comes to be aligned with attentiveness 
(Aufmerksamkeit) rather than knowledge—if, far from gaining mastery over 
the inherent difference of the foreign, understanding implies being radically 
exposed to, and learning to listen to, its offering of the not-known—then 
translation, and hence reading, itself becomes unsettling, or as he will soon 
name it, unheimlich. This is for Heidegger the “own and only element” 
(eigenes und einziges Element [81]) of translation and interpretation; the pos-
sibility of the “truth” of the work revealing itself, of “the true reading of the 
true word” (das echte Lesen des echten Wortes), depends on this exposure of 
and in the unsettling process of reading.22
 22. Heidegger gives a very clear definition of translation as a gesture that moves well beyond the 
literal approximation of one language for another: “Translating is not so much a “trans-lating” and 
passing-over into a foreign language with the help of one’s own. Rather, translating is an awakening, 
clarifying, unfolding of one’s own language with the help of an encounter with the foreign language (I 
66: Übersetzen ist gar nicht so sehr ein “Über-setzen” und Hinübergehen in die fremde Sprache mit Hilfe 
des eigenen. Das Übersetzen ist vielmehr eine Erweckung, Klärung, Entfaltung der eigenen Sprache durch 
die Hilfe der Auseinandersetzung mit der fremden [ GA 53:80]). This is not quite as close to Benjamin 
as it might appear at first glance; in the “Task of the Translator” (SW 1, GS IV:1) Benjamin is not 
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 Within this context, both Sophocles and Hölderlin are exemplary for 
Heidegger because they produce texts that not only incite this unsettling 
reading but articulate it as well. Do not only perform in a structural sense 
the contradictory movement of which Heidegger speaks but reflect upon it 
as human experience at the same time. Their exchange, as conceived in the 
“Ister” lecture, demonstrates that the logic of translation is the fundamental 
movement of Heimischwerden in one’s own language and identity, yet that 
that movement’s only real effect is to underscore the extent to which one 
is “not at home” (unheimisch) within those registers. It is thus a movement 
that represents not the mere expansion of acquired knowledge through Bil-
dung, as Schleiermacher’s model of translation once promised, but a dialogue 
with the foreign that brings the ownmost to what it is but cannot know: das 
Unheimliche, to deinon.
Vielfältig das Unheimliche, nichts doch
Über den Menschen hinaus Unheimlicheres ragend sich regt. (GA 53: 71)
Manifold is the unsettling, yet nothing
More unsettling looms beyond the human.23
no longer  is the human being merely monstrous; now, in Heidegger’s 
language, he is unheimlich, and in fact the most unheimlich of all things. 
While the centrality of the second choral ode of the Antigone (polla ta 
deina  .  .  .  ) was implicit in Hölderlin’s translations, Heidegger explicitly 
identifies the passage as exemplary not only for the poetic dialogue between 
ancient and modern texts but also for the historical movement, the Ortschaft 
und Wanderschaft that their exchange names. The focal point of this assertion 
is his emphasis on the Greek word to deinon, which Hölderlin rendered as 
“das Ungeheure” and Heidegger retranslates, with ardent justification, as 
“das Unheimliche.”24 In his reading an “inner relation” (GA 53: 84) emerges 
primarily concerned with the expansion of one’s own language but rather with the possibility that 
translation can illuminate the relation of each individual language to a “pure” language. I would argue 
instead that Heidegger remains, as he has throughout this lecture, more proximate to the tradition of 
translation within German Romanticism.
 23. In what follows, I have chosen to translate unheimlich as “unsettling.” To be sure, this ex-
change erases some crucial nuances of the German concept; however, I choose “unsettling” here over 
“uncanny” insofar as it evokes the concept of “heim”—the home, that which is “settled”—which is 
central to Heidegger’s representation of the term.
 24. As we will see below, Heidegger submits that this translation may be technically “wrong” but 
it is also “true.” This distinction highlights another one crucial to his thought, namely, that between 
truth as correctness (“adaequatio”) and truth as unconcealment, historically determined (aletheia). See 
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between the concern for “coming to be at home” (Heimischwerden) expressed 
in Hölderlin’s poetry—a movement of endless deferral that logically implies 
a state of “being not-at-home” (Unheimischsein)—and the Unheimlichkeit of 
the human in Sophocles’ tragedy, expressed in the choral ode and incarnated 
by Antigone herself. Thus the same passage that revealed for Hölderlin the 
strange but universal relation of the human to the monstrous now represents 
for Heidegger both the founding moment of the poetic Anklang between 
Hölderlin and Sophocles and the very condition of being human—for the 
Greek word that marks the human as a monstrosity is also revealed to be its 
unsettling “ground.”
 Not surprisingly, then, Heidegger makes a case for a translation that 
expresses the choral passage’s intimate relation to the ambivalence at the 
heart of his concept of Zwiesprache, a translation in which “the contradictory 
holds sway” (das Gegenwendige waltet) (GA 53: 76). To deinon as he defines 
it reflects an internal structure of contradiction as such:
Es bedeutet das Dreifache: das Furchtbare, das Gewaltige, das Ungewöhn-
liche. Jedesmal ist es gegensätzlich bestimmbar: das Furchtbare als das 
Fürchterliche und als das Ehrwürdige; das Gewaltige als das Überragende 
und als das nur Gewalttätige; das Ungewöhnliche als das Ungeheure und 
als das in allem Geschickte. (GA 53:78)
It signifies all three: the terrible, the powerful, the uncommon. Each time 
it can be determined oppositionally: the terrible as the dreadful and the 
venerable; the powerful as the overwhelming and the merely violent; the 
uncommon as the monstrous and as that which is destined in all.
For Hölderlin, the articulation of to deinon had everything to do with this 
final opposition: “the uncommon as the monstrous and as that which is 
destined in all.” Indeed, what is unsettling for Hölderlin is that unexpected 
contradiction, the recognition that the monstrous is also “destined in all.” 
Monstrosity beyond is perhaps bearable, comprehensible; monstrosity 
within, repressed and returning, is nothing less than awe-inspiring. And yet 
it also cannot be destroyed, only guarded carefully to thwart its inevitable 
emergence, only left to exist, in the nearly-silent form of a trace, alongside 
what we know as identity.25
Beistegui’s excellent discussion in Thinking with Heidegger: Displacements, 170–74.
 25. Also in the context of this notion of trace, see Adorno’s critique of Heidegger’s early reading 
of Hölderlin in “Parataxis—Zur späten Lyrik Hölderlins,” 166. Interestingly enough, Adorno, though 
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 Heidegger’s insistence on the term Unheimliches likewise evokes the 
internal dissonance within the experience of being human, but in far more 
concrete and calculated terms. As articulated by the Chorus of Theban 
elders, the movement of Heimischwerden, in its indivisible relation to Unhei-
mischsein, is hardly an Odyssean journey of exploration and return, nor is it a 
quest that can have any particular destination at all. Indeed, the “adventurer” 
who thrives on the state of being “not-at-home,” of being, according to the 
Chorus, pantoporos—überallhinausfahrend is Heidegger’s translation—ulti-
mately comes to nothing, because for him there is no essential difference 
between being at home and not being at home; he finds a “home” (in an 
inauthentic sense) in the foreign as such and takes that wilderness as his 
absolute.26 The authentically “not-at-home,” on the other hand, assumes the 
Heimisch as a point of reference despite its inaccessibility, thus remaining in a 
perpetual state of “not-attaining” (Nicht-Erlangen [91]). Presence prevails in 
the form of absence (Abwesung in der Art der Anwesung) as “doing without” 
(das Entbehren) becomes the only authentic relation to Heimischsein.
 For Heidegger the Chorus’s revelation of das Unheimliche is crucial both 
in the context of the play and as an homage to the unique elasticity of the 
Greek language itself. With the invocation of deinotaton, he claims, Sopho-
cles names precisely the contradictory tension which the human being bears 
as identity.27 Though he readily concedes that his translation is “falsch” in 
a conventional sense, Heidegger asserts that the polyvalence of his chosen 
term is not at all a modern superimposition upon the Greek text. On the 
contrary, he argues that by unifying the manifold possibilities inherent in to 
deinon, das Unheimliche throws into relief a frame that already delimits the 
Greek concept, if only implicitly; meanwhile, it is our reluctance to bring 
this frame to light in interpretations and translations of these lines that stems 
from modern interference. In fact he claims that an “internal contradiction” 
(inwendige Gegenwendigkeit [103]) was fundamental to the Greek sense of 
explicitly and often sharply critical of Heidegger, presents a very similar argument to that of “Der Is-
ter,” figuring the vestiges of poetic language, “‘die Waffen des Worts,’ die dem Dichter übrig bleiben,” 
not as “Stiftung” in the (early) Heideggerian sense but rather as unassimilated memory traces which 
remain “überschattet” but ever-present, perhaps not unlike the wandering figure of Antigone from 
which the Chorus cannot turn away.
 26. Hans Sluga claims that this (for Heidegger, inauthentic) form of being “not-at-home” in fact 
describes the modern condition as outlined by Nietzsche: “it is in the wilderness that we construct our 
shelters.” However, this distinction relies upon a somewhat reductive reading of Heidegger’s idea of 
Heimischwerden im Unheimischsein as the mere precursor to “coming home”—which is, if one reads 
Heidegger carefully, itself an impossibility here. “Homelessness and Homecoming: Nietzsche, Hei-
degger, Hölderlin,” in India and Beyond: Aspects of Literature, Meaning, Ritual and Thought, ed. Dick 
van der Meij (London: Kegan Paul International, 1997), 509.
 27. See the discussion of the Greek term deinon in Chapter 2.
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being; not at all a dilemma to be overcome, ambiguity was preserved and 
valued:
Das Negative [der Griechen] behält sein eigenes Wesen und steht nicht in 
der Rolle dessen, was beseitigt und überwunden werden könnte und sollte. 
Weil es als Gegenwesen eigenen Wesens ist, muß es mit seinem Gegenwesen 
aus dem Grunde ihrer Einheit getragen und gewürdigt werden. (GA 53: 104)
The negative [for the Greeks] retains its own essence and does not exist in 
the role of that which could or ought to be cast aside and overcome. Because 
it exists as the counteressence of its own essence, it must be sustained and 
respected along with its counteressence on the basis of their unity. (I 84; 
trans. modified)
 The status of being “unheimlich” in a Greek sense, therefore, retains 
for Heidegger a more measured connotation than the Christian notion of 
banishment from paradise. Only since Plato and the birth of metaphysics 
has Western culture given up this willful preservation of ambiguity, this 
tolerance of the negative in a radical sense, in favor of a “reductive and 
negating conception of the negative” (79: herabsetzende negierende Fassung 
des Negativen [GA 53: 95])—in other words, dialectics par excellence.28 Only 
with the essential privilege of the positive in metaphysical terms has the 
negative become intolerable. Thus das Unheimliche, insofar as it is framed 
by contradiction, names what is contained but not yet explicit in to deinon, 
a non-dialectical coextensivity of identity and difference: “in such a man-
ner that the concealed ground of the unity of the manifold significations of 
deinon, in its concealed being, is grasped within das Unheimliche (so, dass 
mit dem Unheimlichen der verborgene Grund der Einheit der mannigfaltigen 
Bedeutungen des deinon und dieses so in seinem verborgenen Wesen gefasst wird 
[GA 53: 78]).
 Ultimately, however, Heidegger’s translation is not merely concerned 
with the Greek word here but also with the German; for he expressly intends 
his line, “Vielfältig das Unheimliche,” to be a “translation” of Hölderlin’s 
“Ungeheuer ist viel” as well (GA 53: 85–86). In this sense he deliberately 
confronts the original in doubled form, effecting a displacement that leaves 
his version simultaneously at a greater remove from the Greek and more 
involved in its afterlife. For while his choice in rendering to deinon as das 
 28. Nussbaum is not far from this argument in her study of ethics and luck in Greek tragedy, in 
which she also claims that Greek culture tolerated a more ambiguous stance with respect to the tragic 
hero’s fate, a stance that from a modern perspective seems “repugnant to reason” (Nussbaum 25).
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Unheimliche aims to expose a facet heretofore concealed by its conventional 
translation, concealed even in its original language, his “translation” of 
Hölderlin is no less an attempt to bring to light what its “original” had 
not yet said: “[We] must learn to recognize the concealed essence of the 
monstrous” ([Wir] müssen . . . das verborgene Wesen des Ungeheuren erkennen 
lernen):
Das “Ungeheure” braucht nicht notwendig nur im Sinne des Riesenhaften 
gedacht zu werden. Das Ungeheure ist zugleich und eigentlich das Nicht-
Geheure. Das Geheure ist das Vertraute, Heimische. Das Ungeheure ist das 
Un-heimische. (GA 53: 86)
The “monstrous” need not necessarily be thought only in the sense of the 
enormous. The monstrous is properly and at the same time the not-ordinary 
(das Nicht-Geheure). The ordinary [das Geheure] is the familiar, that with 
which one is at home. The monstrous is the not-at-home.
 The reductiveness of this equation, the readiness with which it dispenses 
with the possibility that Hölderlin’s translation may express something other 
than what Heidegger now offers with his, presents a frustrating problem in 
Heidegger’s approach, to be sure. The implication is clear: if Hölderlin alone 
possessed the capacity to reveal Sophocles in a more originary light, so it 
must be for Heidegger alone in his exchange with Hölderlin. For Heidegger, 
Hölderlin evokes in his dialogue with Sophocles the same contradictory 
movement of history that he recognizes in both the choral ode and the 
“poetry of streams.” If that gesture remained unspoken in the “original,” it 
is the task of the “translator”—this particular translator—to release it into 
language.
 However, while the acute violence of his transformation is barely con-
cealed, Heidegger’s remarks here also demonstrate as much an engagement 
with the problematics of that violence as an exercise of it. It is in this sense 
that he describes to deinon as a “real word” (ein echtes Wort) that also names 
what it says, “itself an unsettling (unheimliches) word” (GA 53: 83); in the 
very polyvalence in which it revels, the word itself breaks down the pos-
sibility of resting upon understanding, undermines the stabilizing effects 
of violent translation—remains, at its heart, untranslatable. The translation 
that bears this foreign body within itself is the only kind that does not do 
away with the unsettling effect of the “real word.” Das Unheimliche thus 
no longer only describes the human being in Sophocles’ choral ode; it also 
gives a name to Heidegger’s practice of translation as a form of reading that 
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disrupts what precedes it, brings on a Verstimmung that changes its original 
from within—and thereby leaves itself vulnerable to change as well. The 
movement of Heimischwerden im Unheimischen may inhabit the choral ode 
on a denotative level, but it guides its “translation” on a structural level as 
well; Heidegger’s double translation of Sophocles and Hölderlin performs 
what it also purports to expose.
 Perhaps that very performance, insofar as it enacts on a rhetorical level 
the epistemological engagement inherent in Heidegger’s notion of Zwie-
sprache, is essential in bringing human beings to the limit that the choral 
passage describes. Indeed, for Heidegger there may be no other way to pres-
ent it. Taken alone, Unheimliches is “named poetically with the word deinon, 
but not unfolded on the level of thought” (I 91; trans. modified: dichterisch 
mit dem Wort deinon genannt, aber nicht denkerisch entfaltet [GA 53: 114]), 
relegated to the domain of “the scarcely sayable” (kaum Sagbares). Its very 
reticence marks an inaccessibility to knowledge in any conventional sense; 
Unheimliches can only only come to light as a “poetic knowledge” (dichtendes 
Wissen), as a particular aesthetic relation that renders useless all overtures of 
consciousness and lets its effects be heard only alongside a remainder which 
must remain silent, evoked in the negation of un- in Heidegger’s leading 
term. It is an aesthetic relation of imperfect “translation,” in other words, 
one that transmits its own lacunae rather than its abundance. In Heidegger’s 
view, Hölderlin achieved this form of translation—perhaps it was the only 
kind of which he was capable—and thus constructed a mode of reading and 
writing that took that incompletion, rather than the negotiation of sense in 
representation (the Sinnbild ), as its framework. As a reader of those texts 
alone and in dialogue with Sophocles, has Heidegger any choice but to fol-
low suit? For if a knowledge established solely in a poetic register cannot be 
entirely grasped by consciousness (let alone by philosophy), it is conceivable 
only as that which signifies simultaneously as the translated and the untrans-
latable, and therefore it cannot entirely “make sense.” What it communicates 
can emerge only in dialogue with the poetic text—in a dialogue that leaves 
room for that unheard element to remain as such.
 But what would such a dialogue resemble, and what would it commu-
nicate? Turning from Sophocles’ Chorus to the first scene of the tragedy, 
Heidegger expands upon these questions by attending to the particular lit-
erariness of the tragic text. As with the Chorus’s unsettling invocation of 
the Unheimliches, the opening scene between Antigone and Ismene presents 
for Heidegger what it names at the same time, causing its thematic content 
to double over into its form. In underscoring this duality Heidegger both 
indicates what Zwiesprache is not—namely, a stable dialogue between two 
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immutable sides—and begins to point towards what it might be, within 
both the process of reading and, in a larger sense, the movement of history.
iMMediately evident from his discussion of the choral ode is that Hei-
degger’s reading of the Antigone approaches the text from a different point 
of departure than that of other modern readers. As he asserts unequivocally, 
his concern is not with the conflict of state and family laws as represented by 
the opposing figures Antigone and Creon, but rather with an internal con-
flict that Antigone bears in an exemplary fashion.29 That different emphasis 
is reflected in the passages he chooses to discuss, for not only does he give 
primacy to the Chorus’s invocation of to deinon, he also bypasses the tradi-
tional focus on the clash between Antigone and Creon in favor of Antigone’s 
initial confrontation with her sister in a section entitled “The introductory 
dialogue (Zwiesprache) between Antigone and Ismene.” Whether it is by 
coincidence that Heidegger describes this textual exchange as “Zwiesprache” 
remains to be considered.
 As in his remarks on the choral ode, Heidegger frames the section by 
distancing his account of the scene from Hölderlin’s translation, claiming 
repeatedly that the latter “does not attain the essential (das Wesentliche)” 
(GA 53: 122, 125). This “essential” element apparently inheres in the stark, 
graphic style of the Greek dialogue between the sisters:
Wort und Gegenwort der beiden Schwestern ist hier wie das Begegnen 
zweier Schwerter, deren Schärfe, Glanz und Wucht wir erfahren müssen, 
um etwas von dem Blitz zu vernehmen, der aus ihrem Ineinanderschlagen 
leuchtet. (GA 53: 122)
The word and counter-word of the two sisters is here like the meeting of 
two swords, whose sharpness, luster and force we must experience in order 
to apprehend something of the lightning that flashes when they strike one 
another. (I 98; trans. modified)
Within the scope of a literary exchange between sisters, then, we encoun-
 29. GA 53: 147: “Von hier aus wird deutlich, daß das Gegenspiel dieser Tragödie nicht spielt in 
dem Gegensatz zwischen ‘Staat’ auf der einen und ‘Religion’ auf der anderen Seite, sondern zwischen 
dem, was die innerste Gegenwendigkeit des deinon selbst ausmacht, sofern dieses als das Unheimische 
gedacht wird . . . ” (From here it becomes clear that the counterplay of this tragedy is not played out in the 
opposition between the “state“ on the one hand and “religion“ on the other, but between what consitutes the 
innermost counterturning of the deinon itself, insofar as the deinon is thought as the unhomely . . . [I 118]).
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ter a violence that is essential, wesentlich. Their dialogue must strike us 
with the force of clashing swords in order to have its proper effect. The 
sisters’ language may not cohere, or complement, or meet in compromise; 
their exchange is defined by its bellicose character. Yet it, too, is named as 
Zwiesprache, dialogue, just like the poetic-historical relation exemplified by 
Hölderlin and Sophocles, the exchange that inscribes reading in writing, the 
past in the present. Can the essential violence of this single textual exam-
ple—Antigone’s dialogue with Ismene—extend to the dynamics underlying 
poetic Zwiesprache?
 If the progress of Heidegger’s argument is any indication, the two modes 
of exchange may indeed have something in common. In his translation 
Ismene and Antigone do fire intense reproaches at one another—Ismene 
accuses Antigone of having a “hot heart” (heißes  .  .  .  Herz) turned only 
towards “the cold one” (den Kalten, i.e., her dead brother), while Antigone 
denounces her sister for standing before her and Polynices “in hate” (GA 
53: 123)—but their altercation is also balanced in a specific passage by the 
familiar notion of Anklang (126). In a single verse, Ismene invokes for Hei-
degger both the urgency that drives her sister to act and the thrust of the 
entire tragedy:
Als Anfang aber jenes zu erjagen, unschicklich bleibt’s,
wogegen auszurichten nichts. (GA 53: 124)
But it remains improper to start out in pursuit of
that against which nothing can be done.
As Heidegger points out, the image of pursuit here recalls the gesture already 
described in the choral ode as characteristic of the human being, his ten-
dency to be pantoporos, “überall hinausfahrend”: the improper pursuit (Erja-
gen) of this passage and man’s Jagen in the later one are both derived from 
the Greek theran, and therefore represent a hinge connecting Ismene’s words 
to the Chorus’s song: “Everywhere venturing forth, underway experience-
less without a way out, he comes to nothing” (I 59; trans. modified: Über-
all hinausfahrend unterwegs erfahrungslos ohne Ausweg kommt er zum Nichts 
[71]). Yet the object of pursuit in Ismene’s claim is something quite other 
than the machanóen (Gemache, machinations) of the human in that example. 
What Antigone pursues (and what Ismene deems “improper,” unschicklich) 
is ta amechana, that against which nothing can be done (wogegen auszurich-
ten nichts, GA 53: 126). While the human being with all of his might and 
machinations may have the power to cheat sickness and ill fortune, only 
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death leaves him “without escape” (ohne Ausweg). This much is clear from 
the choral ode; quite literally, nothing can be done to stop death from taking 
its inevitable place. But Antigone, far from struggling to escape, pursues that 
inescapable end. What does it mean for her to do this?
 To be sure, it takes her in another direction than that of the human 
beings who are pantoporos. It is thus tempting, Heidegger concedes, to hold 
Antigone’s deed separate from the actions of other human beings and in 
particular from that which renders them unheimlich (GA 53: 121). She is, 
after all, a heroine, a selfless figure who protests with her own body and her 
own life the injustice imposed upon her brother by her uncle the king. Yet 
in light of her insistence on pursuing the impossible in the exchange with 
Ismene, Antigone is hardly excluded from the realm of the unsettling. On 
the contrary, Heidegger submits that with a single gesture she reveals herself 
to be the most unsettling of all, das höchste Unheimliche. That gesture is 
simply the taking-on, the enduring, the suffering of to deinon.
Doch überlaß dies mir und jenem, was aus mir Gefährlich-Schweres rät, ins 
eigene Wesen aufzunehmen das Unheimliche, das jetzt und hier erscheint. 
(GA 53: 127)
Yet leave this to me and to that in me that counsels the dangerous and 
difficult, to take into my own essence the unsettling that appears here and 
now. (I 103; trans. modified)
The human being has no means by which to orchestrate this taking-on, the 
Greek pathein, as an act of will; rather, it is a gesture intimately linked to 
what he is: “the not-at-home is nothing that human beings make themselves 
but rather the converse: something that makes them into what they are and 
who they can be (I 103; trans. modified: das Unheimische [ist] nichts, was 
der Mensch selbst macht, sondern was umgekehrt ihn macht zu dem, was er 
ist und der er sein kann [GA 53: 128]). Yet by undertaking this pursuit of 
the impossible, that against which nothing can be done, Antigone takes das 
Unheimliche into her essence (ins eigene Wesen) and thereby supersedes all 
others in her Unheimlichkeit. She is “ausgenommen,” an exception, but not 
as a figure excused from that unsettling quality which the Chorus invokes; 
on the contrary, she is the most authentic representative of it insofar as she 
takes deinon into her very being (GA 53: 146).30
 30. In a brief reading of the lecture, Schmidt points out that this reading of Antigone’s Unheim-
lichkeit suggests Heidegger’s attempt to understand “the nature which drives us into catastrophe,” by 
means of a rigorous thinking beyond good and evil; in this regard Heidegger’s reading is “exquisitely 
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 Thus, like the Anklang that echoes through the poetic relation between 
Hölderlin and Sophocles, Ismene’s admonition against pursuing das Unaus-
richtbare resonates both with Antigone’s essence (Wesen) and the essential 
character (das Wesentliche) of the piece as expressed by the Chorus: that 
pursuit, precisely insofar as it is both impossible and irresistible, makes Anti-
gone most unheimlich from the very start. While that resonance remains 
at this point “not yet grasped” (noch unbegriffen) (GA 53: 124), the disso-
nant language of the scene between Antigone and Ismene allows it to flash 
momentarily in its keenness.
 What is modeled in this first literary Zwiesprache is therefore a violence 
other than that instigated by the act of interpretation qua appropriation, the 
violence of translation. That violence would involve the erasure of difference 
within the economy of the same. But the discord of this exchange between 
the sisters, like a translation that clashes starkly and on equal ground with its 
original, lets its uncomprehended (and perhaps incomprehensible) essence 
make itself heard. The opening dialogue of the tragedy thus takes prelimi-
nary shape as a literalization—“not yet grasped”—of the disordering dynam-
ics of Zwiesprache that for Heidegger both provide the central theme of the 
tragedy and underlie its reception in modern poetry and history.
 If the very first scene alludes to an awareness not yet grasped, however, 
how does that consciousness emerge poetically in the course of the tragedy, 
and from where? Heidegger locates it again within the Chorus’s words:
Nicht werde dem Herde ein Trauter mir der,
nicht auch teile mit mir sein Wähnen mein Wissen
der dieses führet ins Werk. (GA 53: 74)
Such shall not be entrusted to my hearth,
Nor share their delusion with my knowing,
Who put such a thing to work. (I 61)
The hearth (der Herd, hestia) that the Chorus evokes here is for Heidegger 
the site of being-at-home (Heimischsein); yet, as he points out, this would 
logically imply that the Chorus of Theban elders possesses some knowledge 
of that place—in contrast to the remainder of humankind, which remains 
suspended within the movement of Heimischwerden and is therefore unhei-
misch—for they speak of banishing from the hearth those who do not share 
‘Greek’” insofar as it avoids placing the tragedy within the context of Christian morality (Schmidt 
259).
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their insight. Is the Chorus not made up of human beings? Does its knowl-
edge endow it with a status other than that of the human?
 In fact, the Chorus remains entirely human, Heidegger states, because 
it does not know the knowledge of which it speaks, if knowledge refers to 
the certainty of consciousness. A distinct kind of knowledge of Unheimliches 
emerges in the Chorus’s words, but it is an Ahnen, a sense—an awareness not 
entirely aware of itself, because its materiality always withdraws in the very 
moment of its emergence. Though as the central figure of the tragedy the 
Chorus speaks the “poetic truth” (die dichterische Wahrheit [GA 53: 148]), 
“what is properly to be said” (I 106) (das eigentlich zu Sagende) remains 
unsaid in any explicit sense: “The ‘content’ of what is enunciated does not 
exhaust the truth of what is said” (I 106: Der ‘Inhalt’ des Ausgesprochenen 
erschöpft nicht die Wahrheit des Gesagten [GA 53: 132]). The spoken word 
conceals within itself something other than its own meaning that eludes 
any representation, however precise; whatever it means to say, therefore, 
language constantly speaks of its own Unheimlichkeit. And it is at this point 
that Heidegger stops, withdraws: “So no account of the ‘content’ of what is 
expressed, however precise, can bring us to the truth of this poetry’s word” 
(GA 53: 133: Also bringt uns auch keine noch so genaue Angabe des ‘Inhaltes’ 
des Ausgesprochenen zur Wahrheit des Wortes dieser Dichtung). Though his 
interpretation of the passage goes on after this statement, it has no place to 
go any longer. And yet in this moment in which reading exhausts itself, there 
is insight: “it is only with this insight that we arrive at the true beginning of 
understanding” ( . . . mit dieser Einsicht kommen wir nun erst an den echten 
Beginn des Verstehens [GA 53: 134]).
 What the Chorus finally presents us with, then, is a moment of failed 
reading, a moment at which no attempt to understand the meaning of words 
will find resolution, at which no consideration of the work’s content will 
generate a satisfactory account of the knowledge that these last lines of the 
choral ode convey. That knowledge “does not express itself immediately” 
(spricht sich nicht unmittelbar aus [GA 53: 134]), but remains at the level of 
Ahnen, where there is no possibility of translation—at least not of a transla-
tion that insists upon its own seamless completion. Yet even if it does defy 
the negotiation of understanding in a conventional sense, knowledge as 
Ahnen is no vague intuition: “It has its own lucidity and decisiveness and 
yet remains fundamentally distinct from the self-assuredness of calculative 
understanding” (I 108: Es hat seine Helle und Entschiedenheit und bleibt doch 
von der Selbstsicherheit des rechnenden Verstandes grundverschieden [GA 53: 
134]). It is, to put it plainly, possible both to know and not to know at the 
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same time. Both to hear what is said in the act of reading and to absorb 
what is not said, even if it remains beyond one’s conscious grasp.
 So what does this “knowledge” know? Above all, it knows a difference, 
for there are fundamentally distinct modes of being “not at home.” And 
that difference, expressed poetically by the Chorus, reflects a relation to 
the ontic-ontological difference at the very heart of Heidegger’s thought: 
the relationship of being (Seiendes) to Being (Sein) itself. For Heidegger, 
the hearth is the center, the “at home”—is Being (GA 53: 140), and the 
Chorus’s reflection on das Unheimliche sheds light upon “the Being of all 
beings” (das Sein alles Seienden [GA 53: 135]). Though being “not at home” 
in no way implies exclusion from the sphere of Being—indeed, as Heidegger 
notes, there are no limits on the movement of “hinausfahren,” however 
extreme—the human being that the Chorus describes as “überall hinaus-
fahrend unterwegs erfahrungslos” (pantoporos aporos) has adopted a way of 
being “not at home” that leaves him blind to any relation to Being. And it is 
this particular blindness, this inauthentic way of Unheimischsein that merits 
his banishment from the hearth; it is of this human being that the Chorus 
speaks in the final lines of the crucial ode.
 Yet there is another course of Unheimischsein, one that entails far more risk 
and reveals its subject as far more unsettling—in fact as the most unsettling 
of all things. This is the course that Antigone takes in pursuing that against 
which nothing can be done (das Unausrichtbare) despite not knowing the 
outcome of that pursuit, in taking Unheimliches into her very being despite 
its futility. The risk (tolma, Wagnis) of taking on das Unheimliche ennobles 
her and excludes her from the Chorus’s condemnation, for precisely in that 
state of uncertainty lies the relation to Being. Her determination to confront 
that risk, already evident in the very first scene of the tragedy, points to the 
possibility of authentic experiencing itself, das eigentliche Erfahren.
Das Schlusswort verbirgt in sich den Wink auf die unentfaltete und noch 
unvollzogene, aber im Ganzen der Tragödie sich vollziehende Wagnis, zwi-
schen dem eigentlichen Unheimischsein des Menschen und dem uneigent-
lichen zu scheiden und zu entscheiden. Antigone selbst ist diese höchste 
Wagnis innerhalb des Bereichs des deinon. Diese Wagnis zu sein, ist ihr 
Wesen. (GA 53: 146)
The closing word conceals within itself the sign toward that risk that has 
yet to be unfolded and accomplished but that is accomplishing itself in 
the tragedy as a whole, the risk of distinguishing and deciding between the 
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authentic and the inauthentic not being at home of the human. Antigone 
herself is this supreme risk within the realm of the deinon. To be this risk 
is her essence. (I 117; trans. modified)
Where the human being takes on this risk—takes it into her being, as 
Antigone does—there is a possibility, still undeveloped, but nevertheless in 
motion: the possibility of being “at home,” the “not yet awakened, not yet 
decided, not yet assumed potential for being at home and coming to be at 
home” (I 115; trans. modified: das noch nicht erweckte, noch nicht entschie-
dene, noch nicht übernommene Heimischseinkönnen und Heimischwerden [GA 
53: 144]). It is a mode of experiencing that demands “doing without” (das 
Entbehren) with respect to its center, however, for any knowledge of that 
center can only consist in the revelation of a contradictory movement (gegen-
wendige Bewegung) from the nearness to being “at home” to the withdrawal 
from that relation. At the center, it turns out, there is nothing that can be 
found; the authenticity of Heimischwerden im Unheimischsein consists of the 
decision to pursue a particular mode of approach that allows for the experi-
ence of being unsettled, of taking on the risk in that which is unsettling and 
owning its central role in what we understand as being.
 Sophocles’ tragedy reveals all of this—or rather points toward it in its 
refusal to reveal—but it is not alone in doing so. Poetry as such has the 
potential to participate in this refusal to be “found,” standing as a moment 
in which a question is posed and a “searching” is founded precisely where 
there is no hope of finding anything: “this poetizing finding-out . . . is the 
purest find of a purest searching that does not restrict itself to being” (dieses 
dichtende Er-finden . . . ist das reinste Finden eines reinsten Suchens, das sich 
nicht an das Seiende hält [GA 53: 149]). Like the possibility of being at home 
(Heimischseinkönnen), the poetic knowledge that a reader seeks in text always 
remains “to come,” “to be poetized” (zu-dichtend ) even if it already appears 
on the page to be read.
 And it is precisely this prefatory status of poetic knowledge as “the unde-
cided, but still to be decided, for this poetry and in it” (das Unentschie-
dene, aber erst zu Entscheidende für diese Dichtung und in ihr [GA 53: 151]) 
that leaves it open to Zwiesprache, indeed marks that underlying process 
of exchange as a task both essential and infinite. The dialogic approach to 
the poetic text demands the same assumption of risk that Antigone takes 
on, the risk both of being unsettled and of unsettling the text in the act of 
reading. That Sophocles’ choral ode not only demands such a precarious 
relation to its reader but also depicts it allows that ode to resonate with the 
poetic-historical dialogue that will follow it, whether the reader is Hölderlin 
or anyone else, into infinity.
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Und wenn demnach dieses Chorlied die höchste Dichtung des höchsten 
Dichtungswürdigen ist, dann könnte das wohl der Grund dafür sein, daß 
dieses Chorlied dem Dichter Hölderlin in der Zeit seiner Hymnendichtung 
immer neu zugesprochen wurde. (GA 53: 152)
And if, accordingly, this choral ode is the supreme poetic work of what is 
supremely worthy of poetizing, then this might well be the reason why this 
choral ode came to speak ever anew to the poet Hölderlin during the period 
of his poetizing of the hymns. (I 121f.)
The authentic relation to Being that the Chorus invokes in negative form, 
that Antigone embodies in her tragedy thus finds an analogue in the practice 
of reading as Zwiesprache, in the open development of possibility and the 
perpetual subversion of interpretive certainty.
 Despite the assurance with which Heidegger outlines this task “to come” 
in the act of reading as well as poetizing (indeed, both are now part of the 
same process), therefore, his lecture ultimately offers anything but a resolu-
tion of that task. To do so would be to forfeit a responsibility inherent in 
the task itself. Thus the final section of the lecture is in some ways the most 
subversive of all; with its recurrent withdrawal from any conclusive position, 
it succeeds in undermining much of what it also attempts to construct. In 
the end, it shifts the focus of the lecture towards an essentially ethical dimen-
sion of reading, one based upon a curious conception of love.
tHe tHird  and final portion of Heidegger’s lecture on “Der Ister” was 
never delivered. The semester in Freiburg ended with the conclusion of 
the second part, and part III, entitled “Hölderlins Dichten des Wesens 
des Dichters als Halbgott” (Hölderlin’s Poetizing of the Essence of the Poet as 
Demigod ) languished in a drawer until the lecture’s belated publication in 
1984. If, as Hans Sluga has asserted, the form of the lecture course itself 
resembles the movement that it describes—a wandering from the origin 
(Hölderlin’s poetry) toward the foreign (Sophocles) and back to the own-
most31—then this premature ending suggests that its final journey back 
to das Eigene was never entirely accomplished, because it was never heard, 
only implied by what preceded it. As it turns out, of course, this state of 
incompletion is oddly appropriate within the logic of Heimischwerden im 
Unheimischsein as Heidegger has already outlined it, for it only underscores 
the notion that the authentic relation to the hearth as Being cannot be 
 31. Sluga, “Homelessness and Homecoming,” 506.
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“known” in any conventional sense. Interestingly enough, what Heidegger 
does say within this strange echo chamber both represents an attempt to 
return to the origin—not only to the start of this lecture, but to his other 
writings on Hölderlin as well—and forecloses the possibility of that return, 
now that, as Hölderlin writes in another context, what follows cannot 
resemble the beginning at all.
 Consistent with the ongoing structure of forward motion and circling 
repetition that characterizes the lecture, the third section begins by return-
ing—in this case to the Böhlendorff letter, which, as Heidegger states now, 
does not simply outline an aesthetics of “literature” but calls attention to a 
fundamental responsibility native to the poets: the responsibility to speak 
of the “coming-to-be-at-home of the historical mankind of the Germans 
within the history of the West” (I 124; trans. modified: das Heimischwerden 
des geschichtlichen Menschentums der Deutschen innerhalb der abendländischen 
Geschichte [154]). The “law of history” itself is this movement of coming to 
be at home, and history is accomplished in this movement, which must be; 
for Heidegger, Hölderlin is the first poet to “experience poetically” the “Ger-
man necessity of being not-at-home” (die deutsche Not des Unheimischseins 
[155]). Throughout this section, however, Heidegger also clearly vacillates 
between statements that affirm the concept of “homecoming” as the destiny 
of the Germans and those that emphasize the practical impossibility of such 
a return.
 Virtually every page in which Heidegger discusses the law of Heimis-
chwerden seems to treat the subject differently. At times he emphasizes the 
dynamism of a return to das Eigene with active verbs of opportunity such as 
“lernen” and “heimisch werden” (GA 53: 156),32 while only a few pages later 
he appears to retract that enthusiasm with verbs of stasis (“sein,” “bleiben”):
Das Finden des Schicklichen um Unheimischsein ist das Heimischwer-
den. . . . Das Zugeschickte und Schickliche aber bleibt für den Menschen 
stets das auf ihn Zukommende, Zukünftige. . . . Das Zugeschickte schickt 
sich so und anders und bleibt stets im Kommen. (GA 53: 159)
 32. “The law of being-at-home as coming-to-be-at-home consists in the fact that historical hu-
man beings, at the beginning of their history, are not intimate with what is at home, and indeed must 
even become not-at-home with respect to this, in order to learn the proper appropriation of that 
which is one’s own in venturing to the foreign, and only to come to be at-home in the return from 
the foreign. [ . . . ] For history is nothing other than this return to the hearth” (I 156: Das Gesetz des 
Heimischseins als eines Heimischwerdens besteht darin, dass der geschichtliche Mensch im Beginn seiner Ge-
schichte nicht im Heimischen vertraut ist, ja sogar unheimisch zu diesem werden muss, um in der Ausfahrt 
zum Fremden von diesem die Aneignung des Eigenen zu lernen und erst in der Rückkehr aus ihm heimisch 
zu werden. [ . . . ] Denn Geschichte ist nichts anderes als solche Rückkehr zum Herde [GA 53: 125]).
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Finding what is fitting in being not-at-home is coming-to-be-at-home. . . . 
Yet what is fitting and fittingly destined for them always remains for human 
beings that which is coming toward them, that which is futural. . . . What 
is fittingly destined for us sends its destining in one way and another and 
always remains in coming. (I 128)
At the midpoint of a sort of ontological to-do list (the “zu”-prefix in Ger-
man here indicating both completed and future tasks), Heidegger situates 
the poet; that which is to be realized, “das Kommende in seinem Kom-
men,” can only be preserved in poetry. Thus the poet speaks from between 
two possibilities, that of Heimischwerden and that of Unheimischsein, and 
the constant oscillation between the two implies the “doing-without” (Ent-
behren) that has already characterized the only authentic relation to Hei-
mischsein (GA 53: 91). The poet must have the “courage” (“Mut,” also in 
quotation marks in Heidegger’s text) to record this movement, the trajectory 
of “historically grounding spirit” (I 128) (der geschichtlich gründende Geist 
[GA 53: 160]).
 How does this “courage” express itself? In contrast to Benjamin, who 
located his concept of courage in the poet-translator’s self-sacrifice for the 
sake of the poetic truth to which the work of art inherently refers, Heidegger 
locates the poet’s courage in an internalizing, even self-motivated gesture. He 
calls this motivation “love”—a love that emerges as a longing for one’s own 
essence (Sehnsucht zu seinem eigenen Wesen), a desire to move outward into 
the foreign in order to return from a distance to that which is one’s own. 
Love is thus not entirely self-love, but it is also not entirely altruistic. Above 
all, it is the poet’s responsibility to channel that love into a preservation 
of “what is coming in its coming” (I 128) (das Kommende in seinem Kom-
men [GA 53: 160]). How can poetry express and preserve within it such a 
movement? And to what extent can it become intelligible in the process of 
reading?
 Calling upon one of his favorite passages from “Brod und Wein,” Hei-
degger turns to this problem of love as it bears upon the experience of the 
foreign with a reading of the line “Kolonie liebt, und tapferes Vergessen der 
Geist  .  .  .  ” (The spirit loves colony, and bold forgetting). Here true love—
spirit’s devotion to the “colony” as well as the particular sort of forgetting 
endemic to it—is distinct from a mere infatuation with difference.
Den Geist befällt nicht eine zufällige Lust nach dem Fremden. Der Geist 
“liebt” Kolonie. Liebe ist der wesentliche Wille zum Wesentlichen. (GA 
53: 164)
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Spirit is not befallen by some arbitary desire for the foreign. Spirit “loves” 
colony. Love is the essential will for the essential. (I 131; trans. modified)
The thrust outward into the foreign thus also reflects a desire to attain “the 
essential,” das Wesentliche, thus in some sense to lay claim to it—in effect, 
to colonize it. For Heidegger, “love” refers to the desire to recognize within 
the foreign the ownmost, which has not yet been disclosed but can only be 
“won” upon returning.33 “Love” for the foreign thus implies a commitment 
to being “not at home” for the sake of coming to be at home (GA 53: 164). 
It is for this reason, moreover, that Spirit (Hölderlin’s Geist, which for Hei-
degger remains distinct from the Idealists’ Geist) has the courage to “forget” 
its origin in the interest of recognizing the foreign:
Die Tapferkeit des Vergessens in der Liebe zur Kolonie ist die Bereitschaft, 
im Fremden vom Fremden um des eigenen Willen zu lernen und dergestalt 
das Eigene, bis es die Zeit ist, hintanzustellen. (GA 53: 165)
The boldness of forgetting in the love of colony is the readiness, while in 
the foreign, to learn from the foreign for the sake of what is one’s own, so 
as to defer what is one’s own until it is time. (I 132)
 The very idea of the foreign as “colony” obviously renders problematic 
the idea of an encounter on equal terms. “Colony” for Heidegger here refers 
to the “the daughter-land that is related and refers back to the motherland” 
(I 131, trans. modified: auf das Mutterland zurückbezogene Tochterland [GA 
53: 164]); foreign and ownmost remain symbiotically linked, ensuring not 
only their fundamental relatedness but also their unequal standing in a rela-
tion of dependency. There would be no foreign, in other words, if it did not 
in some way give the ownmost back to itself.
 This raises the question of how Heidegger thinks the concept of turning-
back (Rückkehr) in his discussion of Hölderlin’s writings here. Insofar as it 
implies a return to the source, the “motherland,” the “hearth,” it inappro-
priately stabilizes one of Hölderlin’s key concepts in his reading of tragedy. 
As we have already seen, Hölderlin’s tragic vision ends in a moment of 
frightening stasis, in which “nothing more (exists) but the conditions of time 
and space,” in which suffering prevails and offers no path back to a more 
innocent state:
 33. I 131: “in the foreign, Spirit essentially wills the mother who . . . is indeed “difficult to attain: 
the closed one (Der Geist . . . will im Fremden wesentlich die Mutter, die freilich . . . ‘schwer zu gewinnen: 
die Verschlossene’ [GA 53: 164]).
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In dieser (i.e. der äußersten Grenze des Leidens) vergißt sich der Mensch, 
weil er ganz im Moment ist; der Gott, weil er nichts als Zeit ist; und 
beides ist untreu, die Zeit, weil sie in solchem Momente sich kategorisch 
wendet, und Anfang und Ende sich in ihr schlechterdings nicht reimen 
läßt; der Mensch, weil er in diesem Momente der kategorischen Umkehr 
folgen muß, hiermit im Folgenden schlechterdings nicht dem Anfänglichen 
gleichen kann. (FA 16: 258)
In this [i.e., the outermost limit of suffering] the human being forgets him-
self, because he is entirely in the moment; the god, because he is nothing 
but time; and each one is disloyal: time, because in such a moment it turns 
itself round categorically and does not allow beginning and end to rhyme in 
it at all; the human being, because he must follow the categorical reversal in 
this moment and thus in what follows cannot resemble the beginning at all.
The end cannot resemble the beginning at all; the reversal that Hölderlin 
describes in tragedy explicitly forecloses the possibility of returning to famil-
iar ground, for that ground has become unrecognizable. Strictly speaking, 
this is the only way to conceive of reversal (“Umkehr”) as Hölderlin presents 
it in his writings on tragedy.
 Strangely enough, although his remarks here often contradict it, Hei-
degger seems to know this. Or if not to “know” it in an explicit sense, 
perhaps to know it in the spirit of Ahnen, that poetic knowledge (dichtendes 
Wissen) that acknowledges the unknown. For although he initially turns 
back to his own earlier writings in the attempt to stabilize his reading, he 
soon arrives at a recognition that this lecture, this mode of reading, does 
not resemble those others at all. In a discussion of the “poetic spirit” as the 
“Stromgeist” (spirit of the stream), Heidegger returns to the river poem he 
had scrutinized nine years earlier, “Der Rhein.” That which the poets must 
express, das Zu-Dichtende, is the holy (das Heilige), the determination of 
both the gods and the dwelling of humankind, which emerges from Hei-
mischwerden im Unheimischsein (GA 53: 175). The poet who presents this 
structure as such must therefore stand between gods and men as a demigod 
(Halbgott), as an outsider capable of measuring the distance, and the differ-
ence, between mortals and immortals. Heidegger sums up and concretizes 
as follows:
Das “Dichterische” ist der Geist und das Wesen der Ströme. Der Dichter 
des Dichterischen ist der Halbgott. Diese Bezüge sind von Hölderlin in 
der Einfachheit ihrer Wesensvollendung klar geschaut und gesagt in dem 
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vollendetsten der Stromgesänge, in der Hymne “Der Rhein.” (GA 53: 
173)
The “poetic” is spirit and the essence of the streams. The poet of the poetic 
is the demigod. Hölderlin clearly perceives these relations in the simplicity 
of their essential completeness and tells of them in the most complete of 
the river songs, in the hymn “The Rhine.” (I 139)
The terms are all present, front and center: simplicity, clarity, completion. 
Whereas the “Ister” leaves no one, neither the poet nor the reader, invulner-
able to the unsettling effects of Zwiesprache, the “Rhein” offers everyone a 
place from which to take measure of others. “Der Rhein” simplifies what 
the “Ister” complicates; it clarifies what the “Ister” conceals. And perhaps, 
therefore, it offers, in contrast to its unruly counterpart, the possibility of a 
“complete” (vollendet) reading. This is the difference.
Aber gleichwie die Rheinhymne im Wesen des Rheins das Wesen der 
Ströme dichtet, so dichtet die Isterhymne im Wesen des Isters das Wesen 
der Ströme, und d.h. Wanderschaft und Ortschaft. (GA 53: 175)
Yet just as the Rhine hymn poetizes according to the essence of streams in 
the essence of the Rhine, so too the Ister hymn poetizes according to the 
essence of streams in the essence of the Ister, that is, journeying and locality. 
(I 140; trans. modified)
That is to say: in the movement from stream to stream, the essence of the 
streams itself has changed. Has presented itself otherwise. The source has 
divided itself in two, and in this sense it has unsettled its own status as 
source. The poetry of streams now contains within it a fundamental dis-
sonance.
 However, that dissonance cannot be reduced to mere opposition, for the 
“Ister” hymn insists on its own internal difference as well in its relationship 
to the foreign, which Heidegger now terms “hospitality” (Gastlichkeit).
So wundert
Mich nicht, dass er (der Ister)
Den Herkules zu Gaste geladen. . . . (GA 53: 175)
Thus it surprises
Me not, that he [the Ister]
Invited Hercules as guest. . . . (I 140)
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By inviting the Greek Heracles to itself, the Ister does not only continue to 
distinguish itself from the quintessentially German Rhine but underscores 
the distance traveled between the age of tragedy and the age of Reason; in 
this sense the hymn “thinks an entirely different and new relation” (GA 53: 
177) between ancient and modern registers, a relation that is only possible 
through Zwiesprache.34
 But what exactly is “hospitality,” and how does it relate to the question 
of return that Heidegger continues to pose in this section? The “guest” is 
the one who remains who he is: the foreigner in his foreignness. Gastlichkeit 
refers to the capacity to recognize that foreignness and the decision to allow 
it to remain as such.
Herkules ist vom Ister nur zu Gast geladen. Er bleibt, der er ist, und ist 
doch als der Fremde “vom heißen Isthmos” aus dem Lande des “Feuers” 
im deutschen Lande gegenwärtig. In dieser Gastlichkeit des Isters liegt die 
Bereitschaft der Anerkennung des Fremden und seiner Fremde. . . . In der 
Gastfreundschaft liegt aber zugleich die Entschiedenheit, das Eigene als das 
Eigene nicht mit dem Fremden zu mischen, sondern den Fremden sein zu 
lassen, der er ist. (GA 53: 175f.)
Hercules has been invited by the Ister only as a guest. He remains the one 
he is and yet, as the foreigner “from the sultry Isthmus,” from the land of 
the “fire,” is present in the German land. In this hospitality on the part of 
the Ister there lies the readiness to acknowledge the foreigner and his for-
eignness. .  .  . In guest-friendship, however, there also lies the decisiveness 
not to mix what is one’s own, as one’s own, with the foreign, but to let the 
foreigner be the one he is. (I 141)
 What the “Ister” hymn says in its Zwiesprache with the foreign is thus 
analogous to Hölderlin’s notes on the modern encounter with ancient 
Greece; crucial in both cases is not only the recognition of the foreign but 
the decision to bear its traces as difference. That decision, in effect, represents 
the ethical dimension of Zwiesprache, where the act of reading amounts 
to a renunciation (Entbehren, doing-without) of certainty, of stability, of 
Ortschaft: “The presence of the guest in the homely locale tells us that even 
in, indeed precisely in the locality of the homely, journeying still prevails and 
 34. Thus it would seem that Heidegger states the obvious when he claims that such a relation 
would have been both unnecessary and impossible for the Greek poets to conceive. However, if one 
takes seriously Hölderlin’s thoughts on the role of the “Oriental” in Greek tragedy, it becomes likelier 
that what he was attempting to uncover in Sophoclean language was precisely the trace of such a 
relationship to the foreign.
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remains determinative, albeit in a transformed manner” (I 142: Die Gegen-
wart des Gastes im heimischen Ort sagt, daß auch und gerade in der Ortschaft 
des Heimischen noch die Wanderschaft west und bestimmend bleibt, wenngleich 
gewandelt [GA 53: 177]). Approaching that which is one’s own “is only as 
the encounter and guest-like dialogue with the foreign” (I 142: ist nur als 
die Auseinandersetzung und gastliche Zwiesprache mit dem Fremden [GA 53: 
177]).
 With the introduction of this idea of hospitality, Heidegger’s concept of 
return has changed. His own attempt to return to the “source” (Hölderlin’s 
poetry and his own earlier lectures) after the encounter with the foreignness 
of Greek tragedy leaves the certainty of the ownmost very much in doubt. 
This is true not least because the Ister hymn locates the foreign at its very 
source; its strange current, which seems almost to flow backward (Der schei-
net aber fast / Rückwärts zu gehen . . . ), gives the river a different relationship 
to itself:
Hier, in diesem Fast-rückwärts-gehen, ist noch ein anderes Nicht-vergessen-
können des Ursprunges. Hier wohnt einer so nahe dem Ursprung, daß er 
ihn schwer verläßt  .  .  .  ; nicht weil er nur im Heimischen  .  .  .  verharrt, 
sondern weil er schon an der Quelle das Unheimische zu Gast geladen hat und 
vom Unheimischen ins Heimische gedrängt wird. Der Ister ist jener Strom, 
bei dem schon an der Quelle das Fremde zu Gast und gegenwärtig ist, in dessen 
Strömen die Zwiesprache des Eigenen und Fremden ständig spricht. (GA 
53: 182; my emphasis)
Here, in this almost going backwards, there is yet another not being able to 
forget the origin. Here someone dwells so near to the origin that he aban-
dons it with difficulty . . . not because he simply remains at-home . . . but 
because already at the source he has invited the not-at-home as guest and is 
pushed toward the at-home by the not-at-home. The Ister is that stream in 
which the foreign is already present as guest at its source, that stream in whose 
flowing the dialogue between one’s own and the foreign constantly speaks. 
(I 146; trans. modified; my emphasis)
If the “Ister” hymn speaks of a way back to the source, then, that return does 
not only require the journey outward into the foreign. It demands that we 
recognize the presence of the foreign guest already at the source, “schon an 
der Quelle.” Zwiesprache itself is not a matter of choice; it speaks continu-
ally, whether we hear it or not. But to hear that speaking whether or not 
it is understandable, to allow for its unsettling effects, is to act as Antigone 
does in taking das Unheimliche into her very being. There is nothing more 
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unheimlich than the human, as Antigone shows in the highest sense, for the 
Zwiesprache that guarantees its permanent instability also describes its very 
ground. Heidegger’s early promise to tell his listeners “who they are” on the 
basis of their thoughts on translation thus attains another level of signifi-
cance, as translation presents this logic of Zwiesprache in nuce.
 Perhaps it is because he reaches this unstable place that Heidegger cannot 
reach a conclusion, except for the conviction that it would be impossible 
to conclude. In the final pages of the lecture (again, pages that were never 
delivered to their addressees as a lecture) he struggles to qualify the essential 
incompletion that his reading represents: “Nor should the opinion arise 
that these remarks might in themselves suffice in order to think the truth of 
this poetry, or even to experience the poetic word and the word itself in its 
own essential space (Wesensraum)” (I 166).35 If the reading is incomplete, 
however, that is not to say that Heidegger regards the poetry in question 
as having exhausted itself; on the contrary: “This poetry demands of us a 
transformation in our ways of thinking and experiencing, one that concerns 
Being in its entirety” (I 166: Diese Dichtung fordert von uns eine Umwandlung 
der Denkungsart und des Erfahrens, die das Ganze des Seins angeht [205]). 
There is still much “to do” before we can think the exchange with the foreign 
in relation to the movement of history, to the determination of Being.
 Yet the task that reading poses here, the task of “turning over” (umwan-
deln) our way of thinking and experiencing, is one that Heidegger soon 
abandons. His next turn to Hölderlin’s poetry, the lecture and essay “Home-
coming/To Kindred Ones (Heimkunft/An die Verwandten), shuts down the 
subversive operations of the “Ister” lecture by eliminating the problem of 
the tragic and thus stabilizing two key terms essential to das Unheimliche; 
grounding “homecoming” in understanding (Verstehen), he lets Hölderlin’s 
poetry once again speak of the special destiny of the Germans.
tHe eneMy  is foreign. The Germans are “the thinking and poetizing peo-
ple” (das Volk des Dichtens und des Denkens, GA 4: 30). In 1943, the year 
that marked the hundredth anniversary of Hölderlin’s death and the end of 
the siege of Stalingrad, there is a certain urgency in that distinction. Now 
Heidegger no longer speaks of Heimischwerden, of the idea that Hölderlin’s 
poetry speaks of the incessant exchange with the foreign while preserving 
its essential difference; now another poem enacts a literal homecoming:
 35. “Auch soll nicht die Meinung aufkommen, diese Anmerkungen reichten schon aus, um die 
Wahrheit dieser Dichtung zu denken oder auch nur dafür, das dichterische Wort und das Wort selbst 
in seinem eigenen Wesensraum zu erfahren” (GA 53: 204f.)
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Die Elegie ‘Heimkunft’ ist nicht ein Gedicht über die Heimkunft, sondern 
die Elegie ist als die Dichtung, die sie ist, das Heimkommen selbst, das sich 
noch ereignet, solange ihr Wort als die Glocke in der Sprache der Deutschen 
läutet. (GA 4: 25)
The elegy “Homecoming” is not a poem about homecoming, but rather 
the elegy is, as the poetry that it is, homecoming itself, that still comes to 
pass as long as its word peals as the bell in the language of the Germans.36
The semantic difference between Heimischwerden and Heimkommen, com-
ing-to-be-at-home and homecoming, may seem small and easily explainable; 
the idea of homecoming corresponds more viscerally to lived experience, to 
the fact that hundreds of thousands of young men had already fallen for the 
sake of the homeland, all the while remaining oriented toward that “home.” 
However, the difference is far from insignificant. While Heimischwerden im 
Unheimischen reveals itself as a possibility that is basically untenable, Heim-
kommen directs itself to a destination that remains secret (ein Geheimnis). 
And secrets can be told, though they must be guarded until the proper 
moment.
 The absence of the foreign is as conspicuous in this text as its presence 
was dominant in the earlier lecture. Whereas in the “Ister” lecture, ethical 
responsibility lay primarily within the notion of hospitality, in the decision 
to preserve difference as such even at the source, here the “care” (Sorge) of 
the poet inheres in the preservation of the secret held by all Germans, the 
secret of proximity to the source (das Geheimnis der Nähe zum Ursprung 
[24]). Sorge, in fact, here comes to replace the love that expressed the poet’s 
courage as a fundamental openness, as hospitality to that which is unset-
tling, unheimlich. All that remains of the foreign is a sense of the bur-
den placed upon those who have proven themselves worthy of the journey 
home.
Wiederkehren kann nur, wer vordem und vielleicht schon eine lange Zeit 
hindurch als der Wanderer die Last der Wanderung auf die Schulter genom-
men hat und hinübergegangen ist zum Ursprung, damit er dort erfahre, 
was das Zu-Suchende sei, um dann als der Suchende erfahrener zurückzu-
kommen. (GA 4: 23f.)
 36. Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, trans. Keith Hoeller (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2000: 
44 (translation modified). Henceforth designated as Hoeller, with page number.
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Only he can turn back who previously, and perhaps for a long time, has 
wandered as a traveler and borne upon himself the burden of the journey 
upon his shoulders, and has crossed over into the origin, so that there he 
might experience what is to be sought, in order then as the seeker, to come 
back more experienced. (Hoeller 42; trans. modified)
Those who are worthy of returning have learned to hear the Sorge that the 
poet speaks: “‘The others’ must first learn to think the secret of sparing 
nearness” (‘Die anderen’ müssen erst lernen, das Geheimnis der sparenden Nähe 
zu bedenken [GA 4: 29]). And it is in this regard that the “others” become 
the poet’s relations (Verwandte). Caring for the secret thus implies insular-
ity—and guarantees the exclusion of the foreign. For those with their eyes 
trained towards the homeland, not even a death on foreign soil can preclude 
the inevitability of return.
. . . sind dann nicht die Söhne der Heimat, die fern dem Boden der Heimat, 
aber mit dem Blick in die Heitere der ihnen entgegen leuchtenden Heimat 
ihr Leben für den noch gesparten Fund verwenden und im Opfergang 
verschwenden—sind dann nicht diese Söhne der Heimat die nächsten Ver-
wandten des Dichters? Ihr Opfer birgt in sich den dichtenden Zuruf an 
die Liebsten in der Heimat, der gesparte Fund möge ein gesparter bleiben.
 Er bleibt es, wenn aus denen, “die im Vaterlande besorgt sind,” die 
Sorgsamen werden. Dann ist die Verwandtschaft mit dem Dichter. Dann 
ist Heimkunft. Diese Heimkunft ist aber die Zukunft des geschichtlichen 
Wesens der Deutschen. (GA 4: 49f.)
.  .  . then are not the sons of the homeland, who though far distant from 
its soil, still gaze into the gaiety of the homeland shining toward them, and 
devote and sacrifice their life for the still reserved find, are not these sons 
of the homeland the poet’s closest kin? Their sacrifice shelters in itself the 
poetic call to the dearest in the homeland, so that the reserved find may 
remain reserved.
 So it will remain, if those who “have cares in the fatherland” become 
the careful ones. Then there will be a kinship with the poet. Then there will 
be homecoming. But this homecoming is the future of the historical being 
of the German people. (Hoeller 48)
Whereas Antigone’s destiny in Heidegger’s view was to take das Unheimliche 
into her very being, the destiny of the Germans only one year later is quite 
opposite: the preservation of the center, the source, will bring the Ger-
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mans back to themselves, bring them back home. Previously, in the logic of 
Ortschaft und Wanderschaft, the center could not hold; now it is held dear.
 The conclusion to this piece, then, is very different from that of the 
“Ister” lecture; whereas in the latter text Heidegger appears in the end to 
back off from the notion that he has modeled any sort of understanding at 
all, calling attention only to the limits of understanding, in “Homecoming” 
he concludes with a call to action:
Darum wendet der Dichter sich zu den anderen, dass ihr Andenken helfe, 
das dichtende Wort zu verstehen, damit im Verstehen für jeden je nach der 
ihm schickliche Weise die Heimkunft sich ereigne. (GA 4: 30f.)
That is why the poet turns toward the others, so that their remembrance 
may help in understanding the poetizing word, so that in understanding 
homecoming might take place in a fitting sense for each one of them. 
(Hoeller 49; trans. modified)
Significantly, it is not only through the saying of poetry but through the 
help of understanding that homecoming is possible, an understanding that 
takes place by means of a form of thought (Andenken). We are very far here 
from the notion of “poetizing knowledge” that Heidegger developed in the 
“Ister” lecture, as a moment in which understanding falls short in the face 
of the “hardly sayable”; we are far from his assertion that “truth” may lie in 
the recognition that thought cannot exhaust its poetic object:
Sind wir aber stark genug zum Denken, dann kann es genügen, daß wir 
die Wahrheit der Dichtung und ihr Gedichtetes nur aus der Ferne, und 
d.h. kaum, bedenken, um von ihr plötzlich betroffen zu sein. (GA 53: 205)
Yet if we are strong enough to think, then it may be sufficient for us to think 
upon the truth of this poetry and what it poetizes, merely from afar, that is, 
scarcely, so that we may suddenly be struck by it. (I 167; trans. modified)
In “Heimkunft,” reading as Zwiesprache has been displaced by reading as 
prelude to thought. This is where the violence of interpretation begins anew. 
Despite the rhetoric of homecoming, it is a shift that signifies no return to 
an origin but a retreat into insularity, a flight from the possibilities of the 
foreign, a silencing of Verstimmung.
 Only a few years later, Bertolt Brecht will himself experience an unset-
tling sort of “homecoming.” Returning to Europe in 1947, he will be con-
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fronted with a “home” that had not only become unrecognizable in the 
aftermath of world war but also bore the fresh scars of unrepresentable 
events. His foray into tragedy at precisely this moment of return is signifi-
cant insofar as he considers, not unlike Heidegger, the potential explosion of 
historical complacency inherent in the confrontation with the unsettlingly 
foreign.
in der tat scheint es die hauptsächliche wirkung einer produktion 
wie der meinen heute zu sein, soviel wie möglich vom theater 
niederzureißen und zu ruinieren (AJ 20 Dec. 1947: 797).
In fact it seems that the primary effect of a production like mine 
today is to tear down and ruin as much of the theater as possible.
Known, don’t know, over known
day after day, moon after moon,
overfull, pain after pain,
horrors of hate abate not
ever.1
bertolt breCHt  returned in late 1947 to a shattered Europe. To a Europe in which memory would be forced to bear the “horrors of hate,” 
in which art would have to confront incessantly the contours of that hatred 
and to place itself at odds with a tainted history. In 1947, to be sure, art 
could do little else. A mere five years after Heidegger had insisted on the con-
current flow, the Zwiesprache of poetry and history evidenced in Hölderlin’s 
Dichtung der Ströme, their dialogue had been irrevocably changed, leaving 
irruption and discord as the artist’s only tenable position. For the drama-
tist returning out of fifteen years of exile, that rupture expressed itself in 
an existential as well as an aesthetic register. Even Brecht’s initial overtures 
towards a post-war, divided Germany required an intermediary, Switzerland, 
 1. Ezra Pound and Rudd Fleming, Elektra (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 35f.
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that maintained (however questionably) its own status as neutral bystander; 
likewise, even his first commissioned production for the Berlin theater, Mut-
ter Courage und ihre Kinder, required the intervention of another theatrical 
vehicle in order to come to fruition.
 That supplemental production, conceived as a second role for Helene 
Weigel during rehearsals for the lead in Mutter Courage, was a new adap-
tation of Sophocles’ Antigone as translated by Hölderlin. It was hardly a 
rousing success in its first incarnation; the production closed a mere four 
weeks after its premiere at the Stadttheater in Chur in January 1948. Yet the 
materials Brecht generated out of that initial production—beyond his ren-
dering of the play itself, a visual and textual record consisting of script, pho-
tography, sketches, and commentary collectively published in 1949 as the 
Antigonemodell—have maintained an intriguing afterlife as an example of 
critical debate over the function and practice of modern theater. In Decem-
ber 1947, Brecht outlined his objectives for this project in typically irrever-
ent fashion: “In fact it seems that the primary effect of a production like 
mine today is to tear down and ruin as much of the theater as possible.”(AJ 
797) But what does it mean to “ruin” theater, precisely in the moment in 
which the rest of the world is occupied with picking up the pieces? What is 
at stake for Brecht—embittered by years of exile and dismayed by post-war 
Germany’s reticence with respect to the recent past—in positing the idea of 
a theater in ruins?
 On a very superficial level, it would be immediately possible to say that 
Brecht’s Antigone “ruins” its source text twice over, insofar as the play is situ-
ated at some distance from the plot and structure of both Sophocles’ drama 
and Hölderlin’s translation. Yet elements of Sophoclean and Hölderlinian 
drama prove effective nevertheless in producing an essentially Brechtian text, 
and not only in the sense of the anti-Aristotelian epic theater. By adapting 
a text steeped in classical tradition (again, twice over—the Greek and the 
German) Brecht weaves a sense of historicity directly into the fabric of the 
text, not merely by bringing the material into the present day but by show-
ing the process by which stories are recorded and performed. In doing so, 
he allows both violence and its resistance to rise to the play’s surface on a 
structural level, making form resonate with the political themes of the piece.
 This exposure of the process of “making history” takes tangible form in 
what Brecht calls the “Modell,” a collection of script, notes, photographs, 
and sketches that create a record of the play’s performative genesis and devel-
opment. Beginning with initial rehearsals and extending potentially into 
infinity is a gathering of materials—in effect, a history—meant to serve as 
both an example and an impetus for future productions. In its multimedial 
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incarnation as the first installment in a planned series of Modelle, the Anti-
gone represents for Brecht the genesis of a new “way of doing theater” (eine 
neue Spielweise) far more than it suggests a return to the dramatic stuff of 
ancient Greece. Brecht’s adaptation develops from a concept of translation as 
a quintessentially modern paradigm: his Antigonemodell blends the remains 
of a distant, even inaccessible aesthetic tradition with the novelty of modern 
methods of artistic production, effectively offering a prototype for transla-
tion in the age of technological reproducibility.
 What this implies for Brecht’s work will prove not to be so distant from 
Benjamin’s discussion of the potential effects of the photographic image 
as mass medium in his essay The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological 
Reproducibility. For Brecht as for Benjamin, concepts such as authorship, 
immortality, and genius had been co-opted and thus corrupted by fascist 
ideology, leaving entirely unsettled—but also entirely open—any remaining 
possibilities for artistic production. By using photography alongside exten-
sive textual commentary to record the ongoing adaptation of a “classic” play 
(not to mention a legendary translation), Brecht attempts to achieve the 
“shattering of tradition” that Benjamin sees in the decline of the primacy of 
the singular art work.2
 Taken as a whole, then, Brecht’s Antigone des Sophokles marks an intrigu-
ing if little-examined moment in the development of a modern concept 
of tragedy, a moment of transition in which the classical text morphs into 
what Brecht describes as a “theater of the scientific age” (Theater des wissen-
schaftlichen Zeitalters). In its “through-rationalization” (Durchrationalisier-
ung) through the lens of scientific inquiry, the concept of authorship will 
be more closely related for Brecht to the piecework of the assembly line 
than to the toils of the individual genius: “The modern division of labor has 
recast the idea of creativity in many significant areas . . . so that the isolated, 
original invention has lost significance” (Die moderne Arbeitsteilung [hat] auf 
vielen wichtigen Gebieten das Schöpferische umgeformt . . . so daß die isolierte 
ursprüngliche Erfindung an Bedeutung verloren hat [BFA 25: 76]). Embed-
ding this challenge in his radical reformulation of tragedy—a genre whose 
founders had been revered literally for millennia—Brecht takes on the task 
 2. Interestingly enough, in a twist that leaves Brecht’s engagement with tragedy even more 
proximate to Benjamin’s essay, the consequence of this destructive moment for Benjamin will be noth-
ing less than a new kind of catharsis. With respect to film as the “most powerful agent” (machtvollster 
Agent) of mass movements, Benjamin writes in the artwork essay: “Seine gesellschaftliche Bedeutung 
ist auch in ihrer positivsten Gestalt .  .  . nicht ohne diese seine destruktive, seine kathartische Seite 
denkbar: die Liquidierung des Traditionswertes am Kulturerbe.” Benjamin, GS I:2, 478 (The social 
significance of film, even—and especially—in its most positive form, is inconceivable without its destruc-
tive, cathartic side: the liquidation of the value of tradition in the cultural heritage [SW 4, 254]) 
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of formulating the stakes of a theater in ruins. It is a project that demands 
a confrontation with the violence of literary and historical transformation, 
with the urgency implicit in the attempt to represent through art a history 
that has become unrepresentable. In a new “time of need” (dürftige Zeit), a 
time in which, as Hannah Arendt notes, Brecht struggled openly with the 
notion “that he felt himself unequal to the formidable task of being a poet 
in a time such as this,” both Antigone and the text she inhabits offer the 
expression par excellence of responsibility to the dead, to the signs of the past 
both written and unwritten, both remembered and forgotten.3
 It was not his idea. Hans Curjel, director of the Stadttheater in Chur, 
had previously collaborated with Brecht in 1927 at the Kroll-Oper in Ber-
lin and now offered him a choice of several pieces, including Macbeth and 
Racine’s Phaedra (BFA 8:489). Brecht opted for Antigone—Antigone in a 
new adaptation, the ancient Greek text reimagined in his own epic theatrical 
vision and recorded as both text and image in the photographs, sketches, 
and remarks that make up the Antigonemodell. Following the suggestion 
of his collaborator Caspar Neher, he chose Hölderlin’s translation as his 
German source.4 In opting for Antigone he joined a trend, most famously 
taken up at the time by the avant-garde dramatist Jean Anouilh, of adapting 
Greek tragedy in the context of anti-Fascist politics. Anouilh’s own Antigone 
(1945), which transformed the heroine essentially into a modern resistance 
fighter and Creon into a puppet of the totalitarian state, was markedly more 
successful than Brecht’s was in 1948, perhaps due to its wholly contempo-
rary, thus more immediately accessible context.5 Brecht’s version is partly 
consistent with this overall inclination, for he also modified the details of 
Sophocles’ plot in ways that render its conflicts more contemporary: most 
notably, in his version the war in Argos has not yet ended, and Polynices 
 3. Arendt, Walter Benjamin, Bertolt Brecht. Zwei Essays (München: R. Piper, 1971), 82. Arendt 
also describes Brecht’s “list of losses” (Verlustliste), constructed in exile in the forties, with Walter Ben-
jamin, Karl Korsch, and others who did not survive. Brecht writes of the self-loathing he experienced 
with the awareness that he had somehow survived those others: “Ich weiß natürlich; einzig durch 
Glück / Habe ich so viele Freunde überlebt. Aber heute nacht im Traum / Hörte ich diese Freunde von 
mir sagen: ‘Die Stärkeren überleben.’ / Und ich haßte mich” (81: Of course I know that I survived so 
many friends by pure luck. But last night in a dream I heard these people say of me: “The stronger survive.” 
And I hated myself ).
 4. Ruth Berlau claims in her memoirs that Brecht went through various translations and even 
consulted a Greek text, “having found someone with a slight knowledge of Greek.” According to Ber-
lau, Brecht viewed Hölderlin’s rendering as “‘the strongest and the most amusing.’” Living for Brecht: 
The Memoirs of Ruth Berlau, ed. Hans Bunge, trans. Geoffrey Skelton (New York: Fromm, 1987), 167.
 5. For a comparison of the two Antigone plays, see Gisela Dibble, “Antigone: From Sophocles 
to Hölderlin and Brecht,” Legacy of Thespis: Drama Past and Present, v. IV, ed. Karelisa V. Hartigan 
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984), 1–12.
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(rather than falling in battle with his brother) is a deserter whom Creon 
himself kills for failing to stand firm against the enemy; moreover, not only 
Polynices’ corpse is left to decompose in the open, but the bodies of all 
Argaean soldiers are mutilated and left on the battlefield as well.6 Brecht also 
adds a prologue in the initial version that plainly aims to link the events of 
the tragedy to the present day: below a hand-lettered sign that reads “Berlin, 
April 1945, daybreak,” a scene plays in which a deserter is killed and strung 
up in front of his home, where his two sisters discover him and argue bitterly 
over whether to endanger their own lives by claiming his body.
 Yet even as Brecht’s adaptation maintains a political stance unmistakably 
tied to the contemporary critique of power and its abuse, he also insists in 
his opening remarks on the ancient text’s essentially insuperable distance 
from any modern events whatsoever, despite superficial resemblances.7 In 
fact, it will be this distance that, in properly epic-theatrical fashion, helps 
to engender the Greek tragedy’s effect on a modern audience:
For the theatrical undertaking before us, the Antigone drama was chosen, 
because from a thematic standpoint it could achieve a certain currency and 
because it presented formally interesting tasks. With respect to its political 
material, to be sure, its analogies to the present emerged as more disadvanta-
geous than originally thought: the great figure of resistance in the ancient 
drama does not represent the German resistance fighters, who must appear 
as most significant to us. Their poem could not be written here. . . . It will 
not be immediately clear to everyone that this play is not about those resis-
tance fighters, and only those to whom it is clear will be able to muster the 
degree of foreignness necessary to see with profit (mit Gewinn) that which 
is worth seeing in this Antigone play: namely, the role played by the asser-
tion of power in the disintegration of the state. (BFA 25:74; my emphasis)8
 6. This is implicitly true of Sophocles’ version as well, where in line 10 Antigone refers to the 
treatment of philoi as enemies, indicating that all have been left unburied (tôn echthrôn kaka, “that 
evils belonging to (proper for) our enemies are coming upon our friends” [Jebb 1.10]). However, that 
implication is not emphasized in Hölderlin’s translation; Antigone speaks merely of the “enemy’s ills” 
(Feindesübel) that have befallen “the dear ones” (die Lieben), without suggesting that the enemies have 
been treated likewise (FA 16: 265).
 7. See Wilfried Barner’s account of the project’s development from a complete transforma-
tion of the Greek source to an engagement with its mythic content; he argues that Brecht’s early 
interest in rendering the story current by showing the effects of political resistance ultimately proves 
untenable, leading Brecht, through a “process of working-through and testing-out” (Prozeß des Erar-
beitens und Erprobens), to call this knee-jerk connection to the present into question [192f.]. Barner, 
“‘Durchrationalisierung’ des Mythos? zu Bertolt Brechts ‘Antigonemodell 1948,’” Zeitgenossenschaft: 
zur deutschsprachigen Literatur im 20. Jahrhundert: Festschrift für Egon Schwarz zum 65. Geburtstag 
(Frankfurt a.M. 1987), 192f.
 8. “Für das vorliegende theatralische Unternehmen wurde das Antigonedrama ausgewählt, weil 
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The “poem” dedicated to German resistance could not be written in the end 
over the abiding marks of Antigone’s own resistance, of her defiant refusal 
to allow a brother to depart from this earth unburied and unmourned. 
Although Brecht’s and Neher’s original goal had been a contemporary recast-
ing of the play’s representation of resistance, that actualization has met with 
its own resistance. As a result, the tragic text remains detached from the new 
and rooted in a particular history that will likewise not go gently in the 
transformation to contemporaneity; for Brecht the text itself in its ancient 
form resists such transformation, and it is precisely this resistance that helps 
to generate an alienating effect on the audience. That critical element which 
for Brecht makes the play “worth seeing”—its enactment of both the abuse 
of power and its resistance in a moment of political crisis—will thus extend 
to the formal process of adaptation itself and its assumption of a certain 
defiance for the sake of the ancient text it references. While the content 
of the tragedy resists its potentially new configuration into a version of 
modern-day events, its formal demands will model a new “way of doing 
theater” that takes into account the ruined landscape in which dramatic 
art will have to situate itself. Insofar as the “profit” to be procured from 
theatrical representation rests in the viewer’s capacity to take note of that 
which is “worth seeing,” moreover, that Spielweise will be integrally linked 
to the economy of seeing that Brecht attempts to distill and reproduce in 
the photographic images of his Modell. Seeing theater—and seeing, in turn, 
precisely how theater is constructed as an event—makes possible not only 
a critical understanding of the aesthetic space but a new ethico-historical 
awareness as well.
 What Brecht describes in his introductory remarks to the Antigonemodell 
as the desire to slake the vague “thirst for the new” (Durst nach Neuem) in 
post-war European culture represents for him nothing more than an over-
determined response to the “fear of the return of the old” (Furcht vor der 
Rückkehr des Alten), which might refer to the dread of memories returning 
as well as of history repeating itself (BFA 25: 73). The task of a “theater of 
the scientific age” will lie in this double confrontation with the past and 
the apprehension that accompanies its remembrance; in short, it must call 
es stofflich eine gewisse Aktualität erlangen konnte und formal interessante Aufgaben stellte. Was das 
stofflich Politische betrifft, stellten sich die Analogien zur Gegenwart . . . freilich als eher nachteilig 
heraus: die große Figur des Widerstands im antiken Drama repräsentiert nicht die Kämpfer des deut-
schen Widerstands, die uns am bedeutendsten erscheinen müssen. Ihr Gedicht konnte hier nicht 
geschrieben werden. . . . Daß von ihnen auch hier nicht die Rede ist, wird nicht jedem ohne weiteres 
klar sein, und nur der, dem es klar ist, wird das Maß von Fremdheit aufbringen, daß nötig ist, soll 
das Sehenswerte dieses Antigonestückes, nämlich die Rolle der Gewaltanwendung bei dem Zerfall der 
Staatspitze, mit Gewinn gesehen werden.”
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into question how history is to be remembered. As he writes in his Kleines 
Organon für das Theater, written in 1948 just after the Chur production 
of the Antigone, “stories can be told very differently” (Geschichten sind sehr 
anders zu erzählen), and it is this telling difference that will make it possible 
not only to relate historical events on the dramatic stage but also, more 
importantly, to lay bare the process by which the past is itself reconstructed 
and transformed as history. The Modell attempts to produce and reproduce 
this process, to make certain that it is seen, acknowledged, confronted. 
By compelling the critical stance so vital to Brecht’s epic theater, then, 
the persistence of a gap in the modern viewing of classical tragedy—and, 
in particular, the reception presented by Brecht’s own Modell—will allow 
the spectator to survey the ruins of theater both ancient and modern and 
consider the passage of time and ideological investment that rendered it as 
such.
 As I will argue here, however, the ethical and critical sway of the Modell 
proves ultimately to be much less self-evident than Brecht’s comments let on. 
For at the same time that the play’s form encourages its audience to reflect 
critically on the brutality of the modern state, Brecht commits a violence of a 
different kind—namely, an overstabilization of his sources—in the (perhaps 
irresistible) gesture of leaving his own signature. In some ways, the result is 
not entirely distant from the motives Brecht aims to criticize.
iF breCHt’s deCision  to stage a Greek tragedy appears surprising at 
first glance, his choice of Hölderlin’s translation over any other in 1947 
ought to seem at least as curious, despite his explicit affinity for its “Swabian 
cadences and schoolish Latin constructions” (schwäbische tonfälle und gym-
nasiale lateinkonstruktionen) (AJ 795 [16. Dec. 1947])9 The National Social-
ist party, drawing rhetorical support from the youth movement inspired by 
Hölderlin at the turn of the century, had all but usurped the poet’s image 
in the service of the Vaterland; already enthroned by Stefan George as the 
voice of German destiny, already linked to the war heroism of Norbert von 
Hellingrath (to whom Heidegger dedicated one of his first published essays 
on Hölderlin, the 1936 “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry”), Hölderlin 
the radical revolutionary had risen under the Nazi regime to a legendary 
status as icon of a luminous cultural past, as heroic beacon of hope for 
Germany’s future resurrection as a Kulturnation.10 Perpetuated not least by 
 9. Berlau confirms Brecht’s affection for Hölderlin’s “folklorish Swabian idiom, which he was 
constantly pointing out as he read it to me…” (Bunge 167)
 10. See Claudia Albert, “‘Dient Kulturarbeit dem Sieg?’ Hölderlin-Rezeption von 1933–1945,” 
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Heidegger, the cultic image of Hölderlin as messenger, as seer—even as mes-
siah—had overshadowed his more dubious history: his enthusiasm for the 
French revolution, his madness, even the daunting nature of the poetry itself. 
Meanwhile, his complex relationship to classical Greece had been reduced 
to the conviction that a more profound study of the ancients served the sole 
purpose of solidifying national identity.
 To be sure, Brecht was hardly unaware of this heritage of ideological 
appropriation; in conversations with Hanns Eisler (who set Hölderlin’s 
poetry to music) he clearly expressed his general distaste for Hölderlin’s 
poetry, particularly in light of what had been done to it in the twenti-
eth century.11 Why, then, when presented with the opportunity to stage an 
adaptation of Sophocles’ text, did he follow Neher’s suggestion and turn to 
Hölderlin’s translation? The decision may have proven even more personally 
motivated than Brecht’s comment about the familiar appeal of “swabian 
tones” lets on, for Hölderlin’s Antigonä—an eccentric text at the very least, 
at most a translation that undermines the very possibility of establishing 
identity of any sort, national or otherwise—mobilizes an experience of the 
foreign that mimics the acute dislocation of the recent exile.12 While still 
in America, Brecht had already considered problems of translation when 
he recorded in textual and photographic form the painstaking process of 
developing a theatrical performance, that of Charles Laughton in a Los 
Angeles (Beverly Hills) production of Galileo Galilei (1947). Entitled Aufbau 
einer Rolle: Laughtons Galilei (Constructing a Role: Laughton’s Galilei) the 
published text shows how the challenges of bringing his own work to the 
American stage shed light upon the parallel problems of negotiating between 
two languages and bridging the gap between text and performance.13 The 
in Hölderlin und die Moderne, ed. Gerhard Kurz et al. (Tübingen: Attempto, 1995), 157–59. Albert 
focuses her highly informative discussion on the year 1943, in which the hundredth anniversary of 
Hölderlin’s death served as a crucial marker of the resilience of German culture. In an historical mo-
ment in which resources were scarce, the event was given the highest priority, and its commemorations 
remain influential even today; it was the year that Goebbels founded the Hölderlin-Gesellschaft and 
Beissner published the first volume of the Stuttgarter Ausgabe.
 11. See “Fragen Sie mehr über Brecht! Hanns Eisler im Gespräch,” ed. Hans Bunge (Munich: 
Rogner & Bernhard, 1970).
 12. See Albert’s discussion of how German exiles likewise adopted Hölderlin as their own: “Wie 
die Exilanten schien er auch ein ‘Fremdling im eigenen Haus’” (155: Like the exiles he seemed to be a 
“stranger in his own house”). Within exile culture, Albert claims, the fragmentation and “Zerrissenheit” 
(torn-up, disrupted quality) of Hölderlin’s character represented a contrast to the totalizing aims of 
National Socialism.  See also Bruce Cook, Brecht in Exile (New York: Holt, Rinehard and Winston, 
1982).
 13. See Patrick Primavesi’s discussion of the Aufbau in relation to Benjamin’s conception of trans-
lation in Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers. “The Performance of Translation: Benjamin and Brecht on the 
Loss of Small Details,” The Drama Review 43:4 (1999): 53–59.
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collaboration between Laughton and Brecht, as Brecht stresses, demanded 
an almost constant recourse to these interconnected modes of translation:
Wir trafen uns zur Arbeit gewöhnlich in L.s großem Haus über dem Pazifi-
schen Ozean, da die Kataloge der Synonyme zu schwer zum Herumschlep-
pen waren. Er gebrauchte diese Folianten viel und mit unermüdlicher 
Geduld und fischte dazu noch Texte der verschiedensten Literatur heraus, 
um diesen oder jenen Gestus oder eine besondere Sprachform zu studieren, 
den Äsop, die Bibel, Molière, den Shakespeare. . . . Dies waren Übungen, 
und er verfolgte sie mitunter in mannigfache Richtungen, sie seinem übri-
gen Werk einverleibend. . . . Wir benötigten solche ausgebreiteten Studien, 
da er kein Wort Deutsch sprach und wir uns über den Gestus von Repliken 
in der Weise einigen mußten, daß ich alles in schlechtem Englisch oder 
sogar in Deutsch vorspielte, und er es sodann auf immer verschiedene Art 
in richtigem Englisch nachspielte, bis ich sagen konnte: Das ist es. Das 
Resultat schrieb er Satz für Satz handschriftlich nieder. Einige Sätze, viele, 
trug er tagelang mit sich herum, sie immerfort ändernd.
We usually met to work at L’s big house overlooking the Pacific Ocean, 
since the catalogs of synonyms were too heavy to lug around. He used these 
folios often and with tireless patience and even fished other texts out of the 
most various literature—Aesop, the Bible, Molière, Shakespeare—in order 
to study this or that gesture or a particular linguistic form. . . . These were 
exercises, and he pursued them at times in numerous directions, incor-
porating them into the rest of his work.  .  .  . We needed such extended 
studies, since he did not speak a word of German and we had to agree on 
the gesture of each bit of dialogue by my acting it all out in bad English or 
even in German and his acting it back in proper English in different ways 
until I could say: That’s it. He wrote down the result by hand, sentence by 
sentence. For days he would carry some sentences, many, about with him, 
changing them constantly. (BFA 25: 11)14
Resulting from this negotiation were what Brecht called “theatrical thoughts” 
(theatralische Gedanken), new insights into the possibilities posed by the text 
 14. As Ruth Berlau notes in her memoirs, however, Laughton had far less confidence than Brecht 
indicates here in the process of developing an epic-theatrical performance, to the point that the click-
ing of Berlau’s camera shutter during rehearsals drove him to distraction. This apprehension led him 
to attempt numerous changes in the New York production of Galilei, staged after Brecht’s departure 
from the United States. Brecht dispatched Berlau to photograph and record the performance in detail, 
including phonograph recordings of Laughton explaining the changes he had made. Berlau claims to 
have sent over three thousand photographs to Brecht in Switzerland (Bunge 1987, 155–57).
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in performance. As an attempt to harness in text and image the manifesta-
tions of these “theatrical thoughts,” the Aufbau amounts to a translation 
from text to performance (and ultimately to published record) that not only 
allows the process of adaptation to advance in new directions but tracks, 
both visually and textually, the steps that led to that creative result (cf. 
Primavesi 57).
 By showing the dialectical process of crafting a performance, moreover, 
Brecht’s Aufbau means to proffer a new, critical way of taking pleasure 
in the experience of theater: “the spectator, particularly the sophisticated 
type, enjoys in art the making of art, the active element of creating” (Der 
Zuschauer, besonders der bewanderte, genießt in der Kunst das Kunstmachen, 
das aktive Element des Schaffens [BFA 25: 9]). Thus it brings to light the 
framework of theatrical performance as a negotiation of existing, written 
material with a more ephemeral Aktualität, the result of which is constantly 
in flux (immerfort ändernd), and it posits that negotiation as a creative act 
vital to the piece’s effectiveness on stage. This does not at all imply that a 
performance referencing the past must merely place that past into a contem-
porary context; rather, the dimension of creativity lies in illuminating the 
delicate links between past and present. That these tears and sutures must 
remain visible in particular is clear in Brecht’s recourse to a photographic 
record of Laughton’s performance;15 the still images of various scenes, which 
were viewed in Los Angeles and in a brief run on Broadway by barely ten 
thousand spectators, became, along with Brecht’s commentary, an integral 
part of the play’s textual fabric. Though the production failed as a piece of 
popular theater, then, its physical remains express Brecht’s hope for its future 
potency: “Thus such productions must be viewed as examples of a theater 
that could be possible under other political and economic circumstances” 
(BFA 25: 69).16
 15. By this time Brecht relied on photography as a means to record the progress of his work, 
for purposes of collaboration and creative development as well as the establishment of an archive. 
His 1948 versification of the Communist Manifesto, also photographed by Berlau in various stages of 
completion, represents another interesting example of his attempt to record the dynamics of writing 
and rewriting, this time not demonstrated by the actors’ performances but inscribed within the text 
itself. Berlau further describes Brecht’s striking method of textual correction, which he called Klebolo-
gie (“stickology”): “In order to avoid the task of recopying corrected pages in full, he would write the 
new text on a fresh page, cut it out neatly, and stick it to the old manuscript” (183). These attempts to 
mark textual modifications as such reflect a more intriguing dynamic than Berlau indicates in describ-
ing Brecht’s “weakness for clean, uncorrected manuscripts” (183); I would argue that they record for 
Brecht in physical form the sedimentary, fragmented nature of writing that underlies the illusion of 
teleological linearity.
 16. “So müssen solche Aufführungen als Exempel eines Theaters betrachtet werden, das unter 
anderen politischen und ökonomischen Verhältnissen möglich sein könnte.”
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 And indeed, Brecht’s theatrical production in Switzerland and later with 
the Berlin Ensemble would adopt this framework as an example for the 
Modellbücher, though with an important difference: what appears here, often 
at close range, as the singular performance of a renowned, if fading, actor 
(in this sense the vestige of an “auratic” event) soon develops into a more 
distanced perspective with respect to Antigone, where for the most part the 
individual actors are so far away from the camera that they are barely recog-
nizable. Despite the photographer Ruth Berlau’s retrospective laments about 
the poor quality of her photographs, this distancing constitutes a refine-
ment of the Modellbuch as it reflects Brecht’s project; the actors, after all, 
should recede behind their gestures, that “grouping of characters against one 
another,” as Hölderlin put it (FA 16: 419), which is all the more visible from 
a distance. Even Weigel’s Antigone, clearly the focal point of the production, 
only rarely assumes center stage in the photographs; on the other hand, 
Berlau stood so close to Laughton that the clicking of the shutter unnerved 
him, forcing her to snap the images behind a glass partition (Bunge 1987, 
155).
 Brecht returned to Europe from America, as he states in his work journal, 
intending to “ruin” what was left of its theater; yet given this recently dem-
onstrated commitment to making visible the constructedness of theatrical 
performance, it is impossible not to think that his new way of doing theater 
means to be an engagement with those ruins and not a blueprint for their 
total erasure. Even a ruined past speaks volumes (as Brecht’s friend Benja-
min knew), if only about its own corrupt premises. Hence Brecht’s turn 
to Hölderlin with the Antigonemodell might represent an engagement with 
ruins in its own right: while his adaptation of the tragedy and the record 
of its performance lay bare the process by which the politics of historical 
transformation shape the receptive act, the choice of Hölderlin’s translation 
represents his encounter with the remains of a poetic corpus long enslaved by 
political motive. And insofar as the Modell attempts to narrate that encoun-
ter at the same time that it presents the result, the transformative process it 
undertakes will this time not negate its own past. Consequently, as Brecht 
writes in his notes to the 1951 production in Greiz, even the most difficult 
passages of Hölderlin’s translation must be preserved for their dialectical 
possibilities:
The choral passages, into which new thoughts have likewise developed, have 
also been adapted. These choruses, like some other passages in the poem, 
can hardly be fully understood in a single hearing. Parts of the choruses 
sound like riddles that demand solutions. Yet their outstanding feature is 
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that, when studied a bit, they give back more and more beauty. The adap-
tation was not merely supposed to eliminate this difficulty, the overcom-
ing of which brings so much pleasure—particularly since the Antigone has 
the good fortune of having been translated by one of the greatest formers 
(Gestalter) of the German language, Hölderlin (AB 114).17
Like the “theatrical thoughts” that resulted from his collaboration with 
Laughton, the new thoughts (“neue Gedanken”) emerging out of this ongo-
ing process of adapting the Antigone constitute an exchange between text and 
something intangible, something that happens in the course of developing 
a particular adaptation; thus creative responsibility never rests solely in the 
authorship of an “original” text or even, in this specific case, in Hölderlin’s 
act of producing a uniquely challenging translation. We will have to return 
to the question of how Brecht marks or effaces the specificity of language 
that Hölderlin has “formed” (gestaltet) in the translation, for it is here, in the 
text of Brecht’s Antigone, that his theoretical remarks may be most in tension 
with their product. In structural terms, however, his Antigonemodell presents 
its public with a clear, critical purpose: it illustrates the ongoing practice of 
translating a translation in original terms, both bridging and problematizing 
the gaps between text and adaptation and between past events and present 
perceptions. “Copying,” insofar as it becomes the basis for a new concept 
of creativity as a collective and collaborative act, must be a fluid art rather 
than a static exercise.18 It must not only destabilize the place of an “original” 
per se, but it also subvert any possibility of claiming finality; every adapta-
tion is at once part of the “original” and a product of translation, subject 
to the “continuum of a dialectical sort” (BFA 25: 76) that enabled it in the 
first place.
 By disavowing the tyranny of origin in the creative process, moreover, 
the theatrical material produced out of this position aims to achieve not only 
 17. “Bearbeitet sind auch die Chöre, in welche ebenfalls neue Gedanken kommen. Diese Chöre, 
wie auch manch andere Stellen des Gedichts, können bei einmaligem Anhören kaum voll verstan-
den werden. Teile von den Chören klingen wie Rätsel, die Lösungen verlangen. Es ist jedoch das 
Vortreffliche bei ihnen, daß sie, ein wenig durchstudiert, immer mehr Schönheiten herausgeben. 
Die Bearbeitung wollte diese Schwierigkeit, deren Überwindung soviel Freude macht, nicht einfach 
beseitigen—um so mehr, als das Werk “Antigone” das Glück hat, einen der größten Gestalter der 
deutschen Sprache, Hölderlin, zum Übersetzer zu haben.” 
 18. Werner Hecht, Brecht im Gespräch: Diskussionen, Dialoge, Interviews (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1975), 86: “Man muß sich frei machen von der landläufigen Verachtung des Kopierens. Es ist nicht 
das ‘Leichtere.’ Es ist nicht eine Schande, sondern eine Kunst. Das heißt, es muß zur Kunst entwickelt 
werden, und zwar dazu, daß keine Schablonisierung und Erstarrung eintritt” (One must free oneself 
from the common disdain for copying. It is not “easier.” It is not a scandal, but rather an art. That is to say, 
it must be developed into an art, to the extent that it avoids [mere] templates and congealment).
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the ruination of an entire theatrical tradition but also something like the 
destruction of totalitarianism as an aesthetic system. It attempts to initiate, 
in other words, what Benjamin named as the antidote to National Socialism: 
in response to the aestheticization of politics, it presents, particularly on a 
structural level, the politicization of art.
ePiC tHeater  is the antithesis of the poetry of streams. The flow of the 
river as Heidegger described it in Hölderlin’s poetry, the fluid interchange 
it models between dynamism and stillness, Wanderschaft and Ortschaft, sug-
gests a synergy—if not necessarily a union—between the foreign and of 
that which is one’s own; the subject submits to an uncertain movement of 
history and memory that moves in two directions (zwiefach gerichtet), to a 
transport that leaves no place for a foot to take hold. Epic theater, on the 
other hand, consists precisely in the process of taking hold, of stopping, of 
refusing to submit to the flow of events staged before the audience: “Since 
the audiences is not being invited to fling itself into the plot as into a river, to 
let itself be borne here and there indeterminately, the individual events must 
be connected so that the knots become evident” (BFA 23: 92).19 The pat-
tern Brecht describes here is familiar in the context of his dramatic theory; 
far from being swept away, the spectator takes firm hold of the knots that 
disrupt the flow of performance, allowing the productive stoppage Brecht 
finds exemplified in the iconography of technological progress—or, more 
precisely, in the force of technology in the service of discontinuation.
The attitude is a critical one. With respect to a river it consists in the regu-
lation of the river; with respect to a fruit tree, in the grafting of the fruit 
tree; with respect to forward movement, in the construction of driving 
and flying machines; with respect to society, in the overturning of society. 
(BFA 23: 73)20
If a river’s current can be regulated, made productive through redirection 
by technological means, Brecht goes on to suggest, the dynamics of theatri-
 19. The passage is from the “Kleines Organon für das Theater”: “Da das Publikum nicht einge-
laden werde, sich in die Fabel wie in einen Fluß zu werfen, um sich hierhin und dorthin unbestimmt 
treiben zu lassen, müssen die einzelnen Geschehnisse so verknüpft sein, daß die Knoten auffällig 
werden.”
 20. “Die Haltung ist eine kritische. Gegenüber einem Fluss besteht sie in der Regulierung des 
Flusses; gegenüber einem Obstbaum in der Okulierung des Obstbaums; gegenüber der Fortbewegung 
in der Konstruktion der Fahr- und Flugzeuge, gegenüber der Gesellschaft in der Umwälzung der 
Gesellschaft.”
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cal performance can likewise be made more “productive” through its own 
disruption. Dramatic effect in a “scientific age” finds its stimulus not in 
the spectator’s propensity to let herself be swept away but precisely in the 
caesurae that render that affective participation impotent.
 In this attitude of interruption, Brecht’s project finds itself in unexpected 
congruence with its two Vorbilder, both Sophocles’ “original” and Hölder-
lin’s translation. In his introduction to the Antigonemodell, Brecht notes the 
“formally interesting tasks” particular to producing Sophocles’ tragedy in 
modern form, claiming that the “historical remove” (historische Entrücktheit) 
of the piece precludes the possibility that a modern audience might iden-
tify with its heroine, and asserting that “formal elements of an epic sort,” 
including the structural and visual insertions of the Chorus, guarantee that 
viewers will remain at distance from the action as well (BFA 25: 75). Neher’s 
stage itself replicates that distance, as the model shows: it is divided into 
two realms, one small area in which the action of the play takes place and 
the remainder of the stage surrounding it, where actors who are not part of 
the current scene are seated facing the action, presenting to the spectator a 
model of her own activity (see BFA 25: 93).21 Meanwhile, center stage is sur-
rounded by tall pillars topped by the skulls of horses, what Brecht describes 
as “barbarische Kriegskultpfähle” (barbarian war cult stakes). As cultic death 
tokens, these delineate the space in which the mythic action of the play 
diverges from any possible modern-historical context.22
 Two disruptions, then, two examples of displacement (Entrückung)—
one temporal, one structural—are characteristic of the tragic drama as it 
plays itself out before a modern audience. And for Brecht, those disruptive 
elements potentiate the “freedom of calculation” (BFA 25:75) necessary to 
make theatrical performance productive. If tragic representation once gener-
ated its effect, in Aristotelian terms, by evoking the powerful emotions of 
fear and pity—or even, for that matter, by exhausting itself in Nietzsche’s 
Dionysian intoxication—Brecht’s reformulation of tragedy aims to mobilize 
its audience toward a moment of reflection by making use of the very same 
elements, now skewed to such an extent that it becomes impossible not to 
 21. For a detailed account of Neher’s stage layout, see Jochen Schmitt-Sasse, “Zwischen bar-
barischen Kriegskultpfählen: Antigonemodell 1948—Bild und Text—Brecht und Neher,” Theater 
ZeitSchrift 26:4 (Winter 1988–89): 128. Schmitt-Sasse presents a very helpful discussion of the re-
lationship between text and image in the Antigonemodell, in particular how its photographic images 
form a layer of meaning independent of the play itself, ultimately offering an interpretation of the 
dramatic text.
 22. As Barner asserts, this structural preservation of the drama’s “sinnlich-physische Dimension” 
(sensual-physical dimension) serves as a visible and omnipresent contrast to the “Entideologisierung des 
alten Mythos” (de-ideologization of the old myth) undertaken in a thematic sense (Barner 196).
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notice their acute foreignness. Like Ezra Pound’s translation of Elektra, in 
which entire choral passages left in the original Greek intensify the disori-
enting experience of taking in ancient tragedy with modern senses, Brecht’s 
and Neher’s visual and aural dramatization of the gap between actors and 
spectators reveals the temporal disjunction that other modern interpreters 
aim to bridge.23
 At the same time, Brecht’s desire to exploit the productive effects of 
discontinuity reveals on a textual level a certain affinity with Hölderlin’s 
translation in particular. Passages in which Brecht remains particularly close 
to Hölderlin reflect the eccentricity that voices that translation’s instability, 
its “madness.”24 And while Hölderlin’s translation emphasized this instabil-
ity conceptually in the words of the Chorus (“Jetzt aber komm ich, eben, 
selber aus dem / Geseze”), Brecht—as if he recognized the crucial synthesis 
of content and form in Hölderlin’s model—transfers the stakes to a linguistic 
dimension of pure rhythm: “Jetzt aber komm ich eben selber / Aus dem 
Takte . . . ” (But now even I myself step out of meter [BFA 8: 224]). Instead 
of articulating the disruption of the “outlaw” subject inspired by the sight 
of a wandering, changing Antigone, language now speaks of its own rhyth-
mic rupture. This is at once both a metaphor for the destabilizing force 
of tragic experience and the radical refusal of metaphor in the service of 
translation; for even in Hölderlin’s version, it is always already the “Takte,” 
the meter disrupted by the caesura, that affects the modern audience in the 
most immediate sense.
 Such small but extremely weighted modifications to Hölderlin’s text—
the measured transformation of a different sort of “original”—present the 
reader with a challenge, insofar as they further undermine the conventions of 
authorship already shaken to the core by a transforming translation. In effect, 
Hölderlin’s text proves to be the first text of the Antigonemodell—subject, 
like all others that will follow it, to the dialectical process of adaptation—
while Brecht’s, from its inception, is already a modification. Moreover, in 
 23. See Richard Reid’s introduction to Pound’s translation of Elektra, in which he discusses 
Pound’s concept of “logopoiea” as the abrupt intrusion of the unexpected in language, through which 
his translation depicts not only a house divided but “language at war with itself ” (Pound xvii).
 24. Thus it is unfounded to claim, as Ulrich Weisstein has, that Brecht’s adaptation of Hölderlin’s 
language constitutes a return to a “more Sophoclean spirit, without indulging in the use of eccentric-
ity” (“Imitation, Stylization, and Adaptation: The Language of Brecht’s Antigone and Its Relation to 
Hölderlin’s Version of Sophocles,” German Quarterly 46:4 [November 1973]: 585). Indeed, in the 
materials that make up Brecht’s Antigone project there is little evidence that he is at all interested in the 
stylistic recovery of a “Sophoclean spirit” that would efface the “indulgence” of Hölderlin’s translation; 
on the contrary, he leaves much of Hölderlin’s most “eccentric” language intact (the most obvious 
example being, as even Weisstein notes, Ismene’s opening observation that Antigone “schein[t] ein 
rotes Wort zu färben”).
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proposing the continuation of this process (potentially into infinity), Brecht 
places himself, as one adaptation’s “author,” in an equally precarious posi-
tion. The Modell is “to be regarded from the start as unfinished (unfertig),” 
its development as much at the mercy of accident as dramaturgic intention. 
The remarks that frequently interrupt the script of Brecht’s Antigone, often 
in the form of questions posed and answers given by unknown interlocutors, 
stylize this state of incompletion:
Frage: Die Darstellerin der Ismene hat diese Szene ohne jeden Stellungs-
wechsel oder besondere Geste gespielt. Aber sollte nicht wenigstens zwi-
schen der Haltung vor dem Spielfeld und der auf ihm ein Unterschied 
sein, da sonst das Warten auf den Auftritt und das Warten auf Antigones 
Anliegen nicht verschiedenartig ist?
Antwort: Ja, Ismene könnte, ausgehend von Vers 21, beim Betreten des 
Spielfeldes das Gesicht verhüllen.
Frage: So war, was ihr machtet, unrichtig?
Antwort. Ja. (BFA 25: 90)
Question: The actress portraying Ismene played this scene without any 
change of position or particular gesture. But shouldn’t there at least be 
a difference between the posture/attitude before the field of action and 
the one in it, since otherwise her waiting for her appearance and waiting 
for Antigone’s request would not be different?
Answer: Yes, Ismene could, according to line 21, conceal her face upon 
entering the field of action.
Question: So what you did was incorrect?
Answer: Yes.
 Even errors discovered in hindsight are now meant to serve a dialectical 
purpose; plainly interwoven into the text’s recorded history, they signal both 
its evolution and its potentiality. Moreover, the reproduction of a performa-
tive moment in visual form permits contemplation from an angle that can 
catch hold, in the very same instant, of what Brecht calls “the before and the 
after,” das Vorher und das Nachher: the evidence of a text’s fractured history 
and the questions it continues to pose. This in-between status reflects not 
only the content of the piece but its very structure. Its dynamics of pure 
mutability—indeed, of the impossibility of standing still—again brings the 
Modell into surprisingly close proximity to its own “Vorher” by recalling the 
“tragic transport” of Hölderlin’s translation, which was likewise unlimited 
(ungebunden); Hölderlin’s Antigone, too, was perpetually in the process of 
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“wandeln.” And yet at the same time the text anticipates its own “Nachher;” 
the visual component of the Antigonemodell, made possible by technological 
means, ensures that the text will also be continually marked as a product of 
its own time. This intervention by the future into the past opens new pos-
sibilities, just as it does for Benjamin in the artwork essay, where “process 
reproduction can bring out those aspects of the original that are unattainable 
to the naked eye yet accessible to the lens. . . . ”25
 Brecht’s series of Modelle, from Laughton’s Galilei to Antigone to Mutter 
Courage, demonstrates that photography offers an ideal means to represent 
this momentary status, this position between “the before and the after.” As 
stop-action mode it reveals to the naked eye those ephemeral moments in 
performance that would not otherwise have come to such evident light. 
Compared with Neher’s preliminary sketches for the stage, which have the 
static two-dimensionality of primitive line drawings, there is even a kind of 
indeterminacy to the photographs, as if they were taken at random and in 
unguarded moments; they convey a mobility and an imperfection that hint 
more generally at the provisional status of the Modell (see BFA 25: 139).26 
(This random quality begins to disappear in the Couragemodell, where the 
photography is of uniformly higher quality than in the previous Modelle; 
what this may mean, however, is that the model places greater emphasis on 
facial expressions rather than gestures, the actions of individuals rather than 
their attitudes towards one another.)
 Perhaps as a direct result of his increasingly sophisticated work with 
photographs from the Aufbau to the Modelle, Brecht eventually conceived 
of this provisionality in an explicit sense (even if, ironically, the images 
begin to look more posed). In the Couragemodell 1949 he notes the extent 
to which art after 1945 cannot help but reflect a new environment, a new 
life characterized by its own destruction:
If life continues after the great war in our ruined cities, then it is a life of 
another kind, the life of others or at least that of groups that are otherwise 
put together, and it is both hampered and governed by our new surround-
ings, the new part of which is its destroyed state. Where the great piles of 
rubble lie, we also find valuable underground structures, the sewer system 
and the gas and electricity grids. Even the large, untouched building is 
drawn into sympathy with the half-destroyed ones and the debris it stands 
 25. Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” first version, in Il-
luminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 220.
 26. Berlau: “If the takes are posed, the pictures that emerge may be very sharply focused, but they 
are unrealistic, counterfeit” (Bunge 1987, 232).
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between, and under some circumstances can be a hindrance to planning. 
Structures must be built provisionally, and yet the danger is that they will 
remain. Art reflects all of this; ways of thinking are part of our ways of 
living. As it pertains to the theater, we fling the Models into the breakage. 
(BFA 25: 171)27
 This rich passage, with its allusions to the parallel destruction of cities, 
their subjects, and the art they produce—and the concomitant potency that 
lies beneath the rubble—establishes not only a rationale for the Modelle but 
a set of working hypotheses. Even if the past, the Vorher, has been ruined, 
art must work with what remains to ensure a Nachher. Must build provision-
ally, and yet never stop building for so long that the provisional becomes 
permanent. Must allow the “sympathetic” engagement between the ruins 
and that which, right next door, remains intact. Where fragmentation rep-
resents future possibility, the “untouched building” may even become the 
“hindrance to planning;” the implication is that it, too, must be destroyed 
before it can be of use. This emphasis on the primacy of destruction even 
finds its way into Brecht’s conception of how Greek tragedy might be pro-
ductively compared with the present; unsatisfied with the contemporary 
prologue he and Neher presented in the initial production of the Antigone in 
Chur, Brecht suggests that it be replaced with “a panel with the representa-
tion of a modern city in ruins” (eine Tafel mit der Darstellung einer modernen 
Trümmerstadt).28
 Brecht posits his Modelle as likewise broken, fragmented bodies that 
must be put back together again. Between creation ex nihilo (which would 
secure the sacred status of the “original,” the “author”) and overly rever-
ent imitation, they represent a way of working with extant materials that 
produces something both new and alert to its relation to the past. Brecht 
as “creator” of the Modell insists over and over that the copy need not be 
an inherently restrictive medium: “There are slavish and sovereign ways of 
imitating.”29 The collective dread of the past returning should not hinder 
 27. “Wenn in unsern Ruinenstädten nach dem großen Krieg das Leben weitergeht, so ist es ein 
anderes Leben, das Leben anderer oder wenigstens anders zusammengesetzter Gruppen und gehemmt 
und geleitet von der neuen Umgebung, an der neu die Zerstörtheit ist. Wo die großen Schutthaufen 
liegen, liegen auch die wertvollen Unterbauten, die Kanalisation und das Gas- und Elektrizitätsnetz. 
Selbst das unversehrte große Gebäude ist durch das Halbzerstörte und das Geröll, zwischen denen es 
steht, in Mitleidenschaften gezogen und unter Umständen ein Hindernis der Planung. Provisorisches 
muß gebaut werden, und die Gefahr besteht, es bleibt. Die Kunst spiegelt all dies wider; Denkweisen 
sind Teil der Lebensweisen. Was das Theater betrifft, werfen wir in den Bruch hinein die Modelle.”
 28. Cited in Barner 192.
 29. “Es gibt eine sklavische und eine souveräne Nachahmung” (Hecht 87).
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the confrontation with the intact remnants of history, however scattered 
and irreconcilable they may be; out of the “Trümmerstadt” emerges the 
possibility of the new. To rebuild without this open link to history would 
be to deny its raw impact. To erase the remains of totalitarianism, then, 
would be to replicate its own founding gesture. For Brecht, art is effective 
as a political instrument only insofar as it depicts that which it rejects along 
with everything else.
 Thus Brecht remained unperturbed by the howls of protest provoked 
by the Modelle among theater companies who were accustomed to adapting 
and modifying dramatic texts as their players saw fit. The notion that all 
subsequent productions of a particular play would have to refer to a single 
specimen project was profoundly unappealing to many, and there was little 
enthusiasm for participating in a rigidly conceived dialectics of imitation 
and variation where total creative freedom ought to be the norm. As Brecht 
states in his own defense, however, every theatrical production of an existing 
text has an element of imitation to it; in fact, every theatrical text is always 
already an imitation of human behavior (menschliches Verhalten), constrained 
by its own set of imperatives. There is essentially no difference between 
reproducing the small details of the script and those of the Modell:
What difference does it make if you find in the script that Courage gave the 
peasants money for burying the mute Kattrin before departing, or if you 
find in studying the model that she counted it out in her hand and put a 
coin back into her leather pouch? In truth you’ll find only the former in 
the script, the latter in Weigel’s figure in the model. Should you keep the 
former and forget the latter? (Hecht 86).30
However, in arguing for the creative potential of copying, Brecht neglects to 
distinguish between the decision to copy (his, for example) and the exter-
nally imposed command to follow a rigidly conceived example. The former 
is a creative device employed not only by Brecht but by countless theatrical 
predecessors, from Gottsched and Lessing to Goethe and Kleist to Karl 
Kraus; by contrast, not even Brecht can claim to have followed the latter 
concept in his adaptation—except insofar as he follows his own Modelle in 
subsequent productions.31
 30. “Was macht es für einen Unterschied, ob Sie im Stücketext finden, die Courage habe den 
Bauern Geld für die Beerdigung der stummen Kattrin gegeben, bevor sie wegzog, oder beim Studium 
des Modells auch noch, sie habe es in der Hand abgezählt und eine Münze wieder zurück in die 
Ledertasche gesteckt? In der Tat finden Sie im Stücktext nur das erstere, das zweite bei der Weigel im 
Modell. Sollen Sie das erstere behalten, das zweite vergessen?
 31. Cf. Brecht’s Anmerkungen zur Bearbeitung, which accompany the second production of his 
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 Nonetheless, for Brecht the desire to create something new in theatrical 
production is not a sufficient reason to break with a text’s performative his-
tory. Rather, with the concept of the Modell he insists that history must be 
permitted to find its own way into that which is new. The point is thus to 
reconsider in a radical sense the place of creativity, to claim that place not for 
the “original” text, nor for any single director’s vision of the mise-en-scène but 
for the observing eye itself, the sophistication of which had been neglected: 
“Our theater [i.e., German theater] is not realistic precisely because it under-
estimates observation” (Unser Theater ist schon deshalb nicht realistisch, weil 
es die Beobachtung unterschätzt) (Hecht 86).32 The witnessing eye must take 
note of the fragments before it and make something of them. As a result, the 
Modell ultimately introduces another dimension of historical transformation 
by assuring at its very foundation its own infinite variability, thus the impos-
sibility of ever being “finished” with the past. The dramatic confrontation 
with a textual and performative history—the self-conscious presentation of 
its ruins—becomes an affirmation of the relationship to the past not as 
something to be overcome but rather as a means of comprehending one’s 
own responsibility for the survival of that history. Seeing is authorship—is 
participation. It is up to the one who examines the Modell—the witness to 
its history—to view the process by which a story comes to be told and find 
his or her own position with respect to that story. The Modell is, as Brecht 
puts it, “not meant to spare us from thinking, but rather to stimulate think-
ing; not meant to replace artistic creation, but rather to compel it” (BFA 
25:172).
 Not all of Brecht’s modifications evince such a delicate intervention 
into Sophocles’ and Hölderlin’s texts, however. Indeed, many of his changes 
reflect not an engagement with the “difficulties” of the texts, as he professes 
in his remarks on the adaptation, but a neutralization of their unsettling 
power. To begin, the drastic plot alterations clearly flatten the complexity 
Antigone in Greiz, 1951: “Adaptations of this kind are nothing unusual in literature. Goethe adapted 
Euripides’ Iphigenie, Kleist Molière’s Amphitryon. These adaptations do not impede enjoyment of the 
original works” (“Bearbeitungen dieser Art sind in der Literatur nichts Ungewöhnliches. Goethe bear-
beitete die ‘Iphigenie’ des Euripides, Kleist den ‘Amphitryon’ des Molière. Diese Bearbeitungen ver-
hindern nicht den Genuß an den Originalwerken” [BFA 25: 216]).
 32. “Our actors look within themselves rather than at their environment. They take interactions be-
tween people, on which everything depends, purely as a vehicle for the display of temperament and so on. The 
directors use the theater pieces as motivation for their “visions.” . . . We should stop this, today rather than 
tomorrow” (Unsere Schauspieler schauen in sich hinein, anstatt auf ihre Umwelt. Sie nehmen die Vorgänge 
zwischen Menschen, auf die alles ankommt, lediglich als Vehikel für die Zurschaustellung von Temperament 
und so weiter. Die Regisseure benutzen die Stücke als Anregung für ihre ‘Visionen.’ . . . Damit sollten wir 
lieber heute als morgen aufhören). “Hemmt die Benutzung des Modells die künstlerische Bewegungs-
freiheit?” interview with Erich-Alexander Winds, Hecht 86).
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of the Greek conflict. Brecht’s crude and despotic Creon, rather than rep-
resenting a theoretically legitimate instance pushed beyond its own limits, 
now occupies a clearly indefensible position, making Antigone’s the only 
tenable stance in the play. Creon’s command to leave Polynices unburied is 
no longer transgression enough, since Brecht emphasizes that he orders his 
army to leave all enemy soldiers unburied;33 thus Creon must kill Polynices 
as well. Precisely because Brecht’s Creon is so wicked, Antigone’s once sin-
gular act takes on the milder character of a more general protest against the 
injustice of state violence.34
 What does this tendency to generalize the tragic conflict do with Hölder-
lin’s translation, which, as we have seen, bears the full weight of Antigone’s 
solitude in its very foreignness, in the monstrosity of its language? The shift 
is nearly a full reversal: while for Hölderlin Antigone’s ethical stance was 
grounded in the imperative to preserve the dignity of difference, Brecht’s 
heroine acts in the name of unity, for the sake of a larger community of 
which she is unquestionably part. The Chorus even chides Antigone for not 
recognizing this community before it is too late, for haughtily maintain-
ing her separate status within the ruling class until its doom had become 
imminent:
Aber auch die hat einst
Gegessen vom Brot, das im dunklen Fels
Gebacken war. In der Unglück bergenden
Türme Schatten: saß sie gemach, bis
Was von den Labdakus Häusern tödlich ausging
Tödlich zurückkam. (BFA 8: 228)
But she too once ate from the bread that had been baked in the dark 
cliffs. In the shadow of the towers that sheltered sorrow, she sat comfort-
 33. By expanding a single reference by Sophocles’ Antigone (tôn echthrôn kaka, “evils from our 
enemies as they coming upon our friends” [Jebb 5, l.10]) to an explicit proclamation, Brecht stresses 
that Creon acts with brutality against his enemies as well as against Polynices, which undermines any 
potential legitimacy of his position: “Auf rauhem Ruhplatz / Legtest, Thebe, du das Argosvolk. Stadt-
los, grablos / Liegt jetzt im Freien, das deiner spottete. / Und du siehst hin / Wo einst ihre Stadt war / 
Und du siehst Hunde / Denen glänzet das Angesicht. / Die edelsten Geier fliegen zu ihr; sie schreiten 
/ Von Leichnam zu Leichnam / Und von dem reichlich bereiteten Mahle / Nicht in die Höhe können 
sie steigen” [BFA 8: 76f.: 128–38] (On a raw place of rest you, Thebes, laid the people of Argos. Those who 
mocked you and yours now lie cityless, graveless in the open. And you look to the place where your city once 
was, and you see dogs with gleaming faces, the noblest vultures fly there; they stride from corpse to corpse and 
cannot fly back up into the air after that richly prepared feast).
 34. See Margaret Setje-Eilers, “Antigone in Pre-Wall and Post-Wall German Theatre: Bertolt 
Brecht’s and George Tabori’s Power Plays,” Text & Publication (2007), 173.
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ably, until that which left the house of Labdakus in deadliness, returned 
in deadliness.35
 In Brecht’s view of the tragic landscape, then, an individual’s fate is tied 
to the social relations that structure a community rather than to the will of 
the gods. This development is already evident in his earliest notes on the 
adaptation in his work journal, where he writes of his plans to reduce the 
role of the gods to that of “the local divinity of the people, the god of joy” 
(der lokale volksheilige, der freudengott) (AJ 795, 16. Dec. 1947). The empha-
sis on provinciality and the Volk replaces the distant hegemony of the gods 
and their influence on the destiny of mortals; Antigone’s recognition of her 
place within the community thus emerges with the discovery that she can 
no longer isolate herself, that her actions and those of her family bear both 
personal and public consequences. Indeed, Brecht already saw this social 
aspect incorporated in Sophocles’ Antigone, which made it a particularly apt 
choice for his project of “Durchrationalisierung.” A Berliner Zeitung review 
of the Greiz production in 1951 summarizes:
Brecht says that he chose Sophocles’ drama for his adaptation because it is 
the only tragedy of antiquity that is not completely stifled by the inconceiv-
able doom of a mystical fate. For him it was a matter of showing how social 
forces—that is, those that can be recognized and mastered by humans—
hold sway in the course of the tragedy.36
 Brecht’s displacement of the interplay between gods and mortals in favor 
of a network of social forces unbound from divine intervention represents 
less his quibble with Sophocles’ (or Hölderlin’s) source text than his whole-
sale rejection of Aristotelian conventions in the framing and staging of trag-
edy. The move out of the “ideological fog” is simultaneously a break with 
the force of tragedy as a closed universe in which the audience sympathizes 
with the hero’s inescapable plight and fears for itself as a result.37 To be more 
 35. In producing a translation of Brecht’s adaptation I have consulted Judith Malina’s translation 
from 1984; however, because that translation is fairly transformative, I often resort to my own more 
literal renderings. See Judith Malina, Sophocles’s Antigone in a version by Bertolt Brecht (New York: Ap-
plause, 1984), 49.
 36. Berliner Zeitung no. 270, 20 November 1951: “Brecht sagt, dass er das Drama des Sophokles 
deshalb für seine Bearbeitung gewählt habe, weil es das einzige in der Antike sei, das nicht durch das 
unbegreifliche Verhängnis eines mystischen Schicksals vollständig erdrückt wird. Ihm aber kam es 
darauf an, im Gang der Tragödie das Walten gesellschaftlicher, also durch den Menschen erkennbarer 
und zu beherrschender Kräfte deutlich zu machen.”
 37. With these modifications to the structure of classical tragedy, Brecht means to mobilize the 
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precise, then, Brecht’s polarizing stance with respect to Aristotle is in fact 
more directly informed by Lessing’s reading of Aristotle than by the Poetics 
themselves, which barely address at all the issue of fate in relation to the 
gods. Aristotle’s discussion of tragic plot is more closely linked to the notion 
of philia, which refers both to family relations and to the social matrix more 
generally.38 Understanding tragedy as the collapse of the social order thus 
ironically places Brecht closer to Aristotle than he would ever have cared to 
imagine. Nor is it entirely clear, as we will see, that Brecht’s erasure of the 
divine instance (and finally that of kinship) from Hölderlin’s text and his 
consequent shift to a wholly social register is at all successful in disrupting 
the attraction of empathy (Einfühlung).
 Fate therefore becomes for Brecht a matter of social rather than divine 
intervention, culminating in the recognition of the subject’s inscription in 
the community rather than the unsettling exposure to the limits of the self. 
As a result, the choral passage affirming the monstrosity of every human 
being in Hölderlin’s text—the ineluctable relation to a “nothing” we can 
only represent as death—is transformed in Brecht’s version into a disavowal 
of excess (Maßlosigkeit) as the internal enemy of the self. There is no longer 
any explicit mention of death at all.
Überall weiß er Rat
Ratlos trifft ihn nichts.
Dies alles ist grenzlos ihm, ist
Aber ein Maß gesetzt.
Der nämlich keinen findet, zum eigenen
Feind wirft er sich auf. (BFA 8: 209)
In every case he knows what to do; nothing leaves him at wit’s end. All of 
this is limitless to him, but a limit has been set. For he who does not find 
one becomes his own enemy.
Brecht’s Chorus thus comes to a conclusion nearly opposite from that of 
Hölderlin’s: it is the duty of the subject to join the community, thus to reject 
the solitude that for Hölderlin was essential to tragic experience.
transition from an Aristotelian tradition to a “theater of the scientific age.” For an interesting account 
of the development of this “Galilean” theater out of the ruins of the Aristotelian one, see David Rob-
erts, “Brecht and the Idea of a Scientific Theater,” in Brecht aufführung—Brecht performance: Brecht-
Jahrbuch 13 (1984), ed. John Fuegi et al.: 41–60.
 38. For a fascinating discussion of the role of the philos in Greek tragedy, see Elizabeth Belfiore, 
Murder among Friends: Violation of Philia in Greek Tragedy (New York: Oxford, 2000).
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  Nicht den Magen
Kann er sich füllen allein, aber die Mauer
Setzt er ums Eigene, und die Mauer
Niedergerissen muß sie sein! Das Dach
Geöffnet dem Regen! Menschliches
Achtet er für gar nichts. So, ungeheuer
Wird er sich selbst. (BFA 8: 209)
He cannot fill his stomach alone, but he builds a wall around that which 
is his own, and the wall must be torn down! The roof opened to the rain! 
He does not value what is human. So he becomes monstrous to himself.
 Insofar as monstrosity is linked to the isolation of those who do not 
value “Menschliches”—do not recognize the relationship of mutual depen-
dency that defines the community—it can no longer be said to characterize 
each and every subject, as it did so clearly for Hölderlin. This distinction is 
not at all innocent in its implications for the critical stance Brecht means 
to inspire in his audience. According to the definition set forth by Brecht’s 
Chorus, only Creon is “ungeheuer”—and we knew that from the start.39 
Rather than bringing it to acknowledge the pervasiveness of monstrosity 
among all subjects, Brecht permits his audience to distance itself from that 
monstrosity, to call it by name: Creon. Or, as the messenger in Brecht’s text 
calls him, mein Führer.
 Thus it is far too limited to understand Brecht’s Antigone text merely 
as an historical document that condemns Nazi ideology by drawing crude 
parallels between Creon’s Thebes and the Third Reich. A charitable read-
ing would perhaps maintain that the disavowal of monstrosity implicit in 
Brecht’s alterations to the source texts mirrors the epic-theatrical divide 
between spectator and stage, allowing the audience to reflect critically on 
Creon’s actions and recognize the brutality behind them. However, there 
may also be more troubling consequences—consequences that, despite 
the intricacy of the Modell, remain out of the dramatist’s control. Though 
Brecht’s Spielweise explicitly and actively seeks to deny the possibility of 
identification with any of the figures onstage, there is within the text an 
 39. Creon’s barbarism and violence are evident not only in his speech but in the stage directions 
as well, where he often threatens or disparages his subjects; for example, after hearing the message that 
Polynices’s body has been buried, he “stands up, approaches the watchman threateningly  .  .  . and, 
standing behind his bodyguard, tests the sword blade with his thumb” (steht auf, geht drohend auf den 
Wächter zu, . . . und prüft, hinter dem Leibwächter stehend, die Schwertschneide beziehungsvoll mit dem 
Daumen [AB 87]).
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implicit temptation to identify with Antigone, duly noted by the interlocu-
tor in the Modell and not fully acknowledged in the director’s response. 
Insofar as this temptation accompanies the unmistakable message not to 
identify with Creon, it clearly places audiences on the side of social justice, 
effectively protecting them from the exposure of any potential culpability 
of their own.40 In the scene in which Antigone is brought to Creon as a 
prisoner, she wears a high, wide board on her back (making her into, in 
Brecht’s words, a “center of unrest” [Unruhezentrum] on the stage), and 
at this point a question arises in the remarks with respect to an audience’s 
possible sympathy.
Question: Surely this is finally the place where the whole audience can 
just sympathize with Antigone, for it will feel what she feels and share 
her arguments?
Answer: It is more important that Antigone feels what the whole audi-
ence feels and shares its arguments. It is a considerable temptation for 
the actress playing Antigone to seek the audience’s sympathy in her 
exchange with Creon. In succumbing to this temptation, however, she 
would cloud the audience’s view into the beginnings of discord in the 
ruling class, to which Antigone belongs, and endanger the speculations 
and emotions that this view can provide. (BFA 25: 106)41
The “Antwort” does not answer the question at all. The question concerns 
staging—how Brecht and Neher present Antigone in a crucial scene—and 
not, as the response seems to indicate, how an actress chooses to portray her. 
In fact, the stage directions in the Modell do make her suffering explicit and 
visible to the audience: “During the guard’s report Antigone staggers under 
the weight of the board” (BFA 25:102). As the photographs likewise make 
evident, sympathy is almost inescapable. And where there is sympathy with 
one in this encounter, there is easy condemnation of the other.
 40. Brecht’s Creon only alters his judgment of Polynices and Antigone when it is clear that the 
elders are turning against him; he agrees to release Antigone only to secure the support he needs to 
defend Thebes against attack by Argos. Thus he remains unworthy of sympathy even when he receives 
the message that Hämon is dead: “Frage: Soll Kreon im Unglück die Sympathie des Publikums haben? 
Antwort: Nein” (Question: Should Creon in his misfortune have the sympathy of the public? Answer: No).
 41. “Frage: Hier ist doch endlich der Ort, wo das breite Publikum einfach mit Antigone sym-
pathisieren kann, denn es wird fühlen wie sie und wird ihre Argumente teilen?
Antwort: Wichtiger ist, daß Antigone fühlt wie das breite Publikum und seine Argumente teilt. Es ist 
eine beträchtliche Versuchung für die Darstellerin der Antigone, im Wortwechsel mit Kreon lediglich 
auf die Sympathie des Publikums auszugehen. Dieser Versuchung erliegend, würde sie jedoch den 
Blick des Publikums in die beginnenden Zerwürfnisse der Herrschenden, zu denen Antigone zählt, 
trüben und Spekulationen und Emotionen, welche dieser Blick gewähren kann, gefährden.”
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 This transformation of the play’s antagonists and the stabilization of 
their conflict continue in many of Brecht’s modifications to Hölderlin’s 
text. In casting Antigone’s resistance as more political than personal, more 
in the name of the community at large than for the sake of the brother 
she cannot replace, he renders impotent the painfully unique relationship 
between brother and sister on which Hölderlin’s translation relied, leaving 
it simply as one part of a general family dynamic. Not only does he omit 
Antigone’s claim that she would not have defied the state for anyone except 
her brother—not for a husband, not for a child—but he also mitigates 
the potentially incestuous desire that forged their bond; while Hölderlin 
presents Antigone’s desire for death clearly as a desire to lie beside Polynices 
(“Lieb werd’ ich bei dem Lieben liegen,” dearly I shall lie by the dear one), 
Brecht modifies the phrase to include her entire family, even suggesting a 
return to the mother’s breast: “Stilled, I will lie with the still ones” (Gestillt 
werd ich liegen mit den Stillen [BFA 8: 202]).
 This subtle dilution of the personal in favor of the communal emerges 
directly from Brecht’s rejection of the Greek gods, for Hölderlin’s Antigone 
relies on a sense of the gods that has more to do with personal conviction 
(as she says of her act, her Zeus did not tell her to do it) than with religious 
convention, and her understanding of the role of fate is formed entirely 
within the framework of kinship relations. It is this layer of the text that 
Brecht, in expunging all divine names from the text, ultimately removes as 
well; Brecht’s Antigone might as well have no family any longer, for she acts 
not in its name but in spite of the wall of privilege it has built around her.
 As a consequence, Brecht’s Antigone is notable not only for her custom-
ary resolve but also for a sheer banality, coded in the play as an essential 
humanity. Her behavior retains no trace of the defiant solitude that had 
characterized her for Sophocles and Hölderlin. Whereas Hölderlin’s transla-
tion often presents an intensification of the Greek lines, Brecht’s transfor-
mation reverses that tendency on numerous counts. Ismene, for one, no 
longer deems her sister’s determination to be incomprehensible or excessive; 
Hölderlin’s twofold declaration of excess, “It is senseless to do what is exces-
sive” (Überflüssiges zu thun, ist sinnlos [FA 16: 271]), becomes the tamer “It 
is unwise to do what is futile” (Vergebliches zu tun, ist unweis [BFA 8: 202]). 
Meanwhile, Antigone’s desire to suffer the powerful and violent (“Laß mich 
aber und meinen irren Rat / das Gewaltige [to deinon] leiden” [FA 16: 273]) 
is transformed into a retributive gesture, trained toward the restoration of 
honor where it has been disturbed:
Laß aber mich das Mind’ste tun und
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Meines ehren
Wo’s mir geschändet. (BFA 8: 203)
But let me at the very least honor my own where I have been disgraced.
There is no mistaking the validity of Antigone’s position here, for she no 
longer stands only for herself. In defending her actions, she now invokes not 
the enigmatic gods of the underworld but rather a sensus communis related 
to conventional notions of Menschlichkeit.
Kreon Immer nur die Nase neben dir siehst du, aber des Staats
 Ordnung, die göttliche, siehst du nicht.
Ant. Göttlich mag sie wohl sein, aber ich wollte doch
 Lieber sie menschlich, Kreon, Sohn des Menökeus. (BFA 8: 215)
Creon. You only ever see the nose in front of your face, but the order of 
the state, the divine one, you do not see.
Ant. That order may be divine, but I would rather have it human, Creon, 
son of Menoeceus.
 Antigone’s disavowal of the divine instance here follows Brecht’s stated 
objectives in the Arbeitsjournal at the very start of his engagement with 
the text: “of all the gods [only] the local divinity, the god of joy remains” 
(AJ 795: von den göttern bleibt der lokale volksheilige, der freudengott). With 
this almost total removal of the gods from his adaptation—not only from 
the action of the play but from its very language—Brecht aims to isolate 
the “highly realistic folk tale” concealed within the “ideological fog” of the 
Greek. There is no place for the gods any longer now that the Volk has 
reached a point of clarity, a point at which it knows it can rely only on itself.
 This self-reliance extends to the understanding of history in the text; 
whereas the gods were once the record-keepers of the tragic universe, meting 
out reward and punishment for a family’s actions for generations to come, 
here it is the Chorus who chides Antigone as well as Creon for past missteps 
against the Volk. Yet the substance of their reproach in each case differs on 
a basic level. While Creon is implicated for his self-isolation in the elders’ 
remark that he becomes “monstrous to himself,” Antigone must bear their 
criticism for her complacency, from which she only awakened when it was 
in her immediate interest:
Nicht ehe die letzte
Geduld verbraucht war und ausgemessen der letzte
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Frevel, nahm des unsehenden Ödipus
Kind vom Aug die altersbrüchige Binde
Um in den Abgrund zu schauen. (BFA 8: 228)
Not until the last bit of patience was exhausted and the last outrage mea-
sured did the child of unseeing Oedipus take the blindfold, brittle with age, 
from her eyes in order to look into the abyss.
Forced by the Chorus to remove her well-worn blindfold, Oedipus’ daughter 
Antigone recognizes the abyss that has defined her family for generations. 
And in her incapacity to ascertain the importance of standing firm in resis-
tance before it is too late, the Chorus sees the polis itself:
So unsehend auch hebt
Thebe die Sohle jetzt, und taumelnd
Schmeckt sie den Trank des Siegs, den viel-
Kräutrigen, der im Finstern gemischt ist
Und schluckt ihn und jauchzt. (BFA 8: 228)
Just as unseeing, Thebes lifts its feet now and giddily it tastes the victory 
drink, the well-spiced, mixed in the dark, and swallows it and rejoices.
 Just as for Sophocles, Hölderlin, and especially Heidegger, Brecht’s Cho-
rus remains that part of the Volk that can isolate the errors of individuals, 
in particular of both Creon and Antigone. However, while Creon stands for 
an inhuman isolation, Antigone takes a step that the elders finally describe 
in a collective sense; hers is an error shared by the community as such, and 
therefore it does not isolate her. On the contrary, it permits the polis to 
participate vicariously in her error and subsequent awakening—permits, if 
not identification in a strict sense, then a positive point of comparison: like 
Antigone, the community is challenged by the Chorus to peer into the abyss 
and recognize its own complacency. And as the title of a 1951 GDR review 
of the Greiz production indicates, the modern audience is sure to follow: 
“Theben—Chur—Greiz.”
 Within the logic of Brecht’s epic theater, Antigone’s act thus represents 
what Brigid Doherty has described as an imitable gesture, captured in 
Brecht’s hybrid concept of “mitahmen,” which he used in conversation with 
Benjamin in 1931.42 Neither synonymous with identification (mitleiden), 
 42. Brigid Doherty, “Test und Gestus in Brecht and Benjamin,” MLN 115:3 (2000): 452. 
Doherty develops the idea of “mitahmen” as a relation in which the spectator’s response to a character 
“will always be mimetic before it can be empathetic”; emphasizing not “one man’s innermost likeness 
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nor entirely comparable to imitation (nachahmen), “mitahmen” still invites 
the spectator’s participation in the spectacle in another sense, one more on 
the level of self-conscious recognition than the emotional investment of 
classical Mitleid. Antigone acts not for the sake of her brother but rather in 
the name of her community, and the spectator who recognizes this gesture 
can find a point of resonance in that action.
Frage: Vertritt Hämon das Volk?
Antwort: Nein.
Frage: Vertritt der Chor der Alten das Volk?
Antwort: Nein.
Frage: Welche Stellung einzunehmen soll dann das Publikum veranlaßt 
werden?
Antwort: Die des Volks, das dem Zerwürfnis der Herrschenden zusieht. 
(BFA 25: 118)
Question: Does Haemon represent the people?
Answer: No.
Question: Does the Chorus of elders represent the people?
Answer: No.
Question: What position should the audience then be induced to take?
Answer: That of the people observing the dissension of the ruling class.
The rejection of a totalizing violence that encompasses the primary substance 
of Brecht’s adaptation thus bears within itself another totalizing form, the 
establishment of a new community—with the audience—around the exclu-
sive valuation of precisely that rejection. The past incarnations of resistance 
that Antigone invokes in the gods, in the singular bond between siblings, 
have lost their relevance, and in their place the tragic heroine appears not 
as a figure of difference but purely as representative of the Volk—thus of an 
audience that can observe from a distance the dissension and violence that 
will undermine the ruling class from within. An audience that can safely 
claim political resistance, therefore, as its own true path.
 Where Modell stops and text begins, then, the resonance of Brecht’s Anti-
gone as critical instrument begins to dampen. Perhaps Brecht would argue 
that it does not matter, that the evolution of performance contains within it 
the gradual, inevitable ruination of the text per se. However, it does matter, 
to another, but their interchangeability, a kind of identity the audience will be encouraged to observe 
critically rather than imitate sympathetically” (453).
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for the Modell already shows how the dialectics of past and present can nar-
rate a history that includes those ruins rather than dispenses with them. On 
this point, Brecht’s Antigonemodell truly remains a work in progress, not 
only by virtue of its expressed claim to a provisional status but also in those 
moments in which its best intentions might be called into question.
even iF his epic theater is without question a didactic method, Brecht 
bristled at the notion, newly popularized during the 1940s by proponents 
of the Stanislawski method, that theater should have a moral basis.43 That 
tragedy, and the Antigone in particular, had long been understood to con-
front ethical quandaries relevant to a modern context did not alter his view; 
as he writes in his work journal, the imposition of a moral message onto art 
does not constitute an ethical position with respect to art. The only ethical 
maxim that truly counts is not to lie to the audience.
What disgusts me most of all about the German Stanislawski book is the 
pedestrian moral tone (der hausbacken moralische Ton) . . . whereas the actor 
is really only bound to one moral precept: that in presenting human nature 
he not lie, for instance for the sake of a form of morality. . . . In S. he owes 
everything imaginable to the “word,” or to the “work”; but in reality he 
owes everything to the audience and, insofar as he ought to have the same 
concerns, to himself. (AJ 810 [4 Jan. 1948)44
The interpreter of a text is in no way obligated to the text an sich, then; 
the ethical dimension of art inheres in its reception. Because, as Brecht 
writes in the foreword to the Antigonemodell 1948, it is impossible to try 
and summon the “spirit of antiquity” (Geist der Antike) in a modern age, 
adaptation must have a different task: “Even if one should feel obligated to 
do something for a work such as the Antigone, we could only do so insofar 
as we let it do something for us” (BFA 25: 75).45 Any obligation to the 
ancient text only makes sense when expressed through the text’s evolution; 
preservation merely for its own sake is not preservation at all. On this point 
 43. See Dieter Baldo, Bertolt Brechts “Antigonemodell 1948”: Theaterarbeit nach dem Faschismus 
(Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1987).
 44. An interesting counterpoint to Brecht’s imperative here is Arendt’s view that Brecht himself, 
who had always spoken the unvarnished truth about the social order, began to “lie” after the second 
World War, composing and performing work “as if one were standing in the midst of the old, familiar 
class conflict and as if ethnic persecution were an optical illusion” (Arendt 100).
 45. “Selbst wenn man sich verpflichtet fühlte, für ein Werk wie die Antigone etwas zu tun, könnt-
en wir das nur so tun, indem wir es etwas für uns tun lassen.”
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Brecht echoes Benjamin’s view of translation as an integral part of a text’s 
history or “afterlife”: translation (by an “author”), like performance by an 
actor, is a means of making a piece of language resonate—in a specific time 
and place—as truth.
 For Brecht, it is in historical moments of crisis that this resonance might 
most productively occur: “the primary effects seem to be concentrated where 
primary transitions, decisions, collapses, catastrophes have taken place” (AJ 
821 [3 March 1948]). The theater in ruins is the space from which the 
dramatic stuff of the past can rise, phoenix-like, to new levels of mean-
ing. Its conveyance into the present day depends upon that relationship to 
catastrophe, insofar as it constantly evokes both the hard lessons of sifting 
through the rubble and the exhilarating potentiality of transformation: das 
Vorher und das Nachher. The Antigonemodell does not only make reference 
to itself as theatrical device but also “models” a relationship to history that 
takes shape as its particular form of tragic effect: “main thesis: that a certain 
kind of learning is the most important pleasure of our age, so that it must 
assume a significant place in our theater” (AJ 835 [18.8.48]).46
 What, then, is the audience supposed to glean from Antigone? If not the 
intrinsic value of the “spirit of antiquity” on the one hand, if not the cor-
relations between the themes of Greek tragedy and contemporary politics on 
the other: what can Antigone give her modern audience? Is there a middle 
ground between rigid preservation and total transformation? And if there is, 
how can we conceive of it?
 On this point Brecht seems to have benefited from his own hindsight. 
In his remarks on the Greiz production in 1951, he withdraws from his 
categorical denial that the play offers any moral standpoint whatsoever. 
However, the ethical framework he sees in Antigone’s act does not permit a 
modern audience to find solace in her heroism; indeed, the humanity that 
her act represents now appears as astonishingly callous.
Die grosse sittliche Tat der Antigone, die sich gegen den Tyrann Kreon 
auflehnt, besteht darin, dass sie, bewegt durch tiefe Menschlichkeit, nicht 
zögert, durch offenen Widerstand das eigene Volk in die Gefahr des Besiegt-
werdens in einem Raubkrieg zu bringen. (AB 113)
The great ethical act of Antigone, who rebels against the tyrant Creon, con-
sists in the fact that she, moved by profound humanity, does not hesitate 
 46. “hauptthese: daß ein bestimmtes lernen das wichtigste vergnügen unseres zeitalters ist, so daß 
es in unserm theater eine große stellung einnehmen muß.”
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to place her own people, through her open resistance, in danger of being 
defeated in a predatory war.
Antigone’s great ethical gesture, then, is this: she acts as she must, with no 
regard for her security or for anyone else’s. She does not hesitate to take a 
risk that could destroy her entire community. And for what? No longer only 
in the name of her brother; that has already become clear. Brecht instead 
emphasizes that she is “moved by profound humanity” in her decision to act, 
suggesting that her ethical action is based in a more fundamental sense of 
Menschlichkeit than the substance of society can offer on its own. It is for this 
reason that Brecht can claim that his adaptation of the play is not “moral” in 
a conventional sense; the “profound humanity” that inspires Antigone here 
is not synonymous with the recognition of “human rights” as responsibility 
to a community of others. It may even run counter to that, insofar as her 
ethical stance of open resistance leads her to place that community in dan-
ger. Conventional morality is suspended, the ethical sacrificed for the sake 
of a cause that will shake the community to its core. Hers is an essentially 
irresponsible ethics, then, and yet Brecht insists on its value nonetheless.47
 The interplay between texts presented in Brecht’s Modell follows a similar 
pattern: his practice of adaptation is both responsible and irresponsible, both 
reverent and impudent with respect to its sources. Its only ethical claim may 
lie in the willingness, even determination, to sacrifice the status quo—the 
integrity of the text—for the sake of its audience. As for Antigone herself, 
responsibility to the past only carries weight when paired with the resolution 
to change, no matter what the consequences.
 Even if Brecht’s often fierce defense of the imitative dimension of his 
Modell might undermine this interplay of Vorher and Nachher in some ways, 
there is no question that his insistence on accountability to the past in and 
through change emerges out of a profound dismay—a disillusionment with 
a post-war German culture in which “‘going on’ is the parole, we defer and 
repress” (es wird verschoben und es wird verdrängt) (AJ 814 [6. Jan.1948]). 
 47. Kierkegaard’s account of Abraham in Fear and Trembling offers a similar viewpoint, though 
obviously tied unlike Brecht’s Antigone to to the problem of faith. Hent DeVries points out, for ex-
ample, that Abraham’s ordeal shows that in every genuine decision, the ethical has to be sacrificed in 
the name of an ab-solute duty or obligation. For Kierkegaard, the name of that ab-solute would be 
“God.” “Thus, to say “à Dieu” is to say adieu to the ethical order of universal laws and human rights 
by responding to a singular responsibility towards an ab-solute other” [33]. Thus I sacrifice the totality 
of all others; but this does not lessen my responsibility to all the others. Hence I become more guilty 
as I become more responsible; I remain a hostage in my obligation to those others (de Vries 34). This 
results in a double bind: “in being responsive and responsible, one must, at the same time, also be 
irresponsive and irresponsible.”
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What Hannah Arendt describes as Brecht’s deep-seated capacity to sympa-
thize (mitzuleiden) and consequent commitment to transforming sympathy 
(Mitleid ) into anger (Zorn) finds a direct parallel in Antigone’s resolution to 
take action at all costs:
“The classics,” Brecht says, “were the most sympathetic of all men” (and as 
everyone knows, in Brecht’s encoded language the classics are Marx, Engels 
and Lenin); they distinguish themselves from “unknowing natures” insofar 
as they “transformed sympathy into anger,” because they knew that sympa-
thy is “what one does not deny those to whom one denies help.” One can get 
rid of sympathy if one “does not put oneself in the place of a suffering per-
son in order to suffer, but rather to end his suffering.” Thus Brecht arrived 
at the same conclusion as Machiavelli, whom he scarcely could have known: 
Whoever wants to take political action must “learn how not to be good.”48
Brecht’s engagement with tragedy thus offers a touchstone for political 
action not in the name of sympathy (or even of fear for the self, as Less-
ing might have it) but outrage. Antigone is not a pitiable figure in Brecht’s 
vision—despite the claims to the contrary noted above, for him she is not 
even a sympathetic figure—and her action strikes the audience not because 
it evokes the bonds of kinship or the unwritten dike of the gods but because 
it restores authority to the collective where tyranny had reigned. It is surely 
no coincidence that the Chorus, emboldened by Antigone’s apparently reck-
less deed, turns on Creon when he concedes that the war with Argos has 
not ended after all.
Kreon, Sohn des Menökeus
Immer folgten wir dir. Und Ordnung
War in der Stadt; und hieltst uns vom Halse
Unsere Feinde allhier . . . ;
Und die von Zwietracht leben, die Schreier mit
Langen Mägen und großen Lungen am Marktplatz
Redende, weil sie bezahlt sind, oder weil nicht bezahlt,
 48. “Die Klassiker,” sagt Brecht, “waren die mitleidigsten aller Menschen” (und in Brechts ver-
schlüsselnder Sprache sind die Klassiker bekanntlich Marx, Engels und Lenin); sie unterscheiden 
sich von “unwissenden Naturen” dadurch, daß sie Mitleid sogleich in “Zorn verwandelten,” weil sie 
wußten, daß Mitleid das ist, “was man denen nicht versagt, denen man Hilfe versagt.” Man kann also 
das Mitleid loswerden, wenn man sich “in die Leidenden nicht, um zu leiden, versetzt, sondern um 
ihre Leiden zu beenden.” So kam Brecht zu dem gleichen Schluß wie Machiavelli, den er schwerlich 
kannte: Wer politisch handeln will, muß “lernen, nicht gut zu sein” (Arendt 93).
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Jetzt schreien sie wieder und haben
Mißlichen Stoff auch: hast du denn
Etwa allzu Gewaltiges anbegonnen, Sohn des Menökeus? (BFA 8: 233f.)
Creon, son of Menökeus, we have always followed you. And there was order 
in the city; and you kept our enemies from our throats. [ . . . ] And those 
who live from discord, the rabble-rousers with empty stomachs and strong 
lungs, speaking at the marketplace because they have been paid, or because 
they have not been paid, now they cry again and also speak of dangerous 
things: did you perhaps take on something all too violent, son of Menökeus? 
(cf. Malina 55f.)
The stage directions for this passage mirror that exchange of authority: “The 
elders surround Creon. Their tone changes completely, now they speak to 
him as masters” (BFA 8: 149). By the time a messenger arrives with grave 
news from the battlefield (the young Theban soldiers, including Creon’s 
older son Megareus, have all been slaughtered in a bloody confrontation, 
and the Argives are now on their way to Thebes, which can no longer defend 
itself ), Creon is forced to submit to their counsel: “Zum Felsgrund / Eile 
und löse die Grabschütterin schnell / Antigone löse!”(BFA 8: 156: To the cliff 
base / Hurry and quickly release the pourer of grave dust / Release Antigone!).
 While Antigone may model in word and deed a challenge to tyranny 
in the name of a more basic justice, however, her defiance is no longer the 
issue by the end of Brecht’s play. Indeed, within the framework of the plot 
it proves not to have had any effect at all; as Brecht’s versification of the play 
(the Antigone-Legende) indicates, the elders simply follow their leader into 
oblivion.
   Und elend und furchtsam
unbelehrbar, stolperte er, der viele geführet,
jetzt der stürzenden Stadt zu. Aber die Alten
folgten dem Führer auch jetzt, und jetzt in Verfall und Vernichtung.
And wretched and frightfully unteachable, he who led many now staggered 
toward the falling city. But the elders still followed the leader, even now 
into decay and destruction.
Not only Creon is “unteachable,” as it turns out. But by depicting the 
unteachable in its demise, Brecht attempts to open up a space from which 
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to teach. This is what Antigone “can do for us,” in his words: the quaking 
of the rule of law, though stilled by the end of the play, becomes conceiv-
able, while its weary reinscription is exposed as ethically bankrupt. Brecht’s 
reproach that the immediate past “is deferred and repressed” (wird verschoben 
und . . . verdrängt) thus takes on concrete form as the Theban elders follow 
Creon, one by one, off the stage.
 By contrast, Antigone’s earlier exit becomes all the more powerful in light 
of this pathetic exit by Creon and the Chorus:
Nicht, ich bitt euch, sprecht vom Geschick.
Das weiß ich. Von dem sprecht
Der mich hinmacht, schuldlos; dem
Knüpft ein Geschick! Denkt nämlich nicht
Ihr seid verschont, ihr Unglückseligen.
[ . . . ] Euch beweine ich, Lebende
Was ihr sehen werdet
Wenn mein Auge schon voll des Staubs ist! Liebliche Thebe
Vaterstadt! Und ihr, Dirzäische Quellen
Um Thebe rings, wo die Wagen
Hochziehn, o ihr Haine! Wie schnürt’s mir den Hals zu
Was dir geschehen soll! Aus dir sind kommen
Die Unmenschlichen, da
Mußt du zu Staub werden. Sagt
Wer nach Antigone fragt, sie
Sahen ins Grab wir fliehn. (BFA 8: 127)
I beg you, do not speak of fate. I know that. Speak of him who condemns 
me in innocence; he has a fate attached to him! Don’t think that you’ve 
been spared, you unfortunate ones. [ . . . ] I weep for you, living ones, for 
what you will see after my eyes are already filled with dust! Lovely Thebes, 
father city! And you, springs of Dirce encircling Thebes, where the wagons 
gather, oh you groves! How it chokes me to think of what shall happen to 
you! The inhuman ones have emerged from your midst, so you must turn to 
dust. Tell those who ask about Antigone that you saw her flee into the grave.
 As Antigone already knows here, the demise of a human being does not 
result from the gods’ imposition of fate but from the actions of other men. 
And the demise of an entire city will follow. Authority undermines itself 
when its grasp of power becomes too desperate; Antigone is the only one 
to recognize that in the end, though the audience is meant to observe it as 
ruined tHeater 227
well. Likewise, where the original held sway over the translation, the Modell 
undermines that authority; the remnants of the past combine with glimpses 
of the present, and all of it stands as a record only long enough to be changed 
in the act of imitation as infinite variation. Aestheticized politics tumble into 
ruins; meanwhile, art gains a political voice in that very same rupture.
Das ist die Lage.
Geschichte, blutige Koloratur.
Mehr Atem braucht sie als ein Bote hat.
Unfertig ist sie in jedem Augenblick.
Schon scheint vieles besser zu sein. Plötzlich
brichst du ein auf der Stelle, auf der du stehst.
Du fängst an zu graben in der Geschichte,
die nichts entschuldigt, nur erklärt, warum
es schwer ist, einen Grund zu finden für Schlaf
und Appetit, ein kurzes Leben lang.1
That is the situation. History, bloody coloratura. It needs more 
breath than a messenger has. In every moment it is incomplete. 
Much already seems better. Suddenly you appear, in the place 
where you stand. You begin to burrow into that history that 
excuses nothing, only explains why it is so difficult, for an entire 
brief life, to find reasons for sleep and appetite.
t He story has been told now, more than once. Does that mean we have come any closer to it? In his eloquent discussion of the Lutheran 
Bible’s historical significance, Franz Rosenzweig describes the “miraculous” 
moment in the history of translation in which the foreign work becomes, 
for better or for worse, a native text, when “the receiving people comes forth 
of its own desire and in its own utterance to meet the wingbeat of the for-
eign work.”2 Sophocles’ tragedies might be said to have had their miracle in 
 1. Martin Walser, “Prolog,” in Sophokles. Antigone. Übersetzt von Friedrich Hölderlin. Bearbeitet 
von Martin Walser und Edgar Selge (Frankfurt: Insel, 1989), 1.






Hölderlin’s translation, in the “sensation” (as Rosenzweig described Luther’s 
translation) of its clash with the German language and the perceived mad-
ness of its form. Tragedy had already begun to have its German moment 
before Hölderlin’s texts made their disquieting debut, but his particular 
approach to the Greeks stands out for its longevity as well as its resistance 
to systematic resolution. Ultimately Hölderlin’s translation has changed the 
modern tragic landscape not because of its sheer legibility, as was the case 
with Luther’s Bible, but because of its challenges to reading; it compels, 
continuously and without end, its own revisitation. Indeed, it might be 
argued that Rosenzweig and his co-translator, Martin Buber—who claimed 
to have been dismayed precisely at the expressive beauty of Luther’s transla-
tion, its “smoothed-over conceptual language”3—eventually followed a path 
of translation already laid out by Hölderlin.
 As we have already seen in Brecht’s adaptation, the ongoing confron-
tation in the twentieth century with the gaps and incoherencies of these 
Sophocles translations mimics for some readers the challenge of engaging 
with an even more incomprehensible history. The struggle with the text fig-
ures as a struggle with the past and thus is aligned with a certain approach 
to history that leaves wounds open. As a result, not just the tale but also its 
telling amount to “bloody coloratura.” “In every moment it is incomplete”: 
we tell that tale to no end, rummaging in its darkest corners for something 
that would show us how to finish. Yet its meaning—and its conclusion, its 
burial, as it were—eludes us, for with every shift of light or circumstance 
we must look upon it differently.
 Since Brecht’s 1948 production, Hölderlin’s Sophocles has remained at 
the forefront of German classical reproductions: Carl Orff set Hölderlin’s 
Antigone to an operatic score for the Salzburger Festspiele in 1949 (Hei-
degger saw the 1951 production in Munich);4 a version of Ödipus Tyrannus, 
with adaptation by Heiner Müller, was produced by the Deutsches Theater 
in East Berlin in 1967; and no less than seven theater companies staged high-
profile productions of Antigone in the 1960s and 70s.5 Brecht’s Antigone, 
and Translation, trans. Lawrence Rosenwald and Everett Fox (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1994, 53.
 3. Martin Buber, “On Word Choice in Translating the Bible: In Memoriam Franz Rosenzweig,” 
in Buber and Rosenzweig, 73.
 4. See Otto Pöggeler, Schicksal und Geschichte (Munich: Fink, 2004), 175–76. Pöggeler tells an 
amusing anecdote about a conversation between Heidegger and Orff: “During the storm of applause 
after the performance, a little man walked up to Orff on the semi-darkened stage, a man whom he first 
took to be a stage worker: ‘Thank you for reawakening classical tragedy! My name is Heidegger’” (11).
 5. Pöggeler discusses the popularity of Sophocles on the German stage from the 1960s to the 
1980s, citing 58 productions of Sophocles plays in the 1980s alone, but he does not specify how many 
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meanwhile, has also been produced and reproduced extensively, both in 
Germany and in various translations; Judith Malina’s Living Theatre alone 
produced the play over twenty times in sixteen different countries (Malina 
vii). The incompleteness (Unfertigkeit) of these plays, as Walser’s prologue 
indicates, evokes not only the text’s chequered past but the inexhaustibility 
of history itself, the more or less constant encounter of the past with its 
potential topicality in the present. Such is the status of Holderlin’s Antigone 
(and to a lesser extent, Oedipus) in the second half of the twentieth century; 
Antigone is invoked not merely to call attention to the relationship between 
past and present but in order to “make history,” to render it part of the pres-
ent while (more or less) maintaining its fundamental estrangement.
 In countless more general contexts, Sophocles’ Antigone has persisted in 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries as an exemplary figure of resistance 
against the modern abuse of political power. As Malina writes in the intro-
duction to her translation of Brecht’s Antigone, “ . . . wherever we played it, 
it seemed to become the symbol of the struggle of that time and place—in 
bleeding Ireland, in Franco’s Spain, in Poland a month before martial law 
was declared, clandestinely in Prague—the play is uncannily appropriate to 
every struggle for freedom, for the personal liberty that Antigone demands 
for herself ” (vii). Irish theater companies, for example, have embraced the 
Greeks as spiritual compatriots since the early twentieth century and have 
produced dozens of Greek plays in translation since the 1960s (including, 
most intriguingly from the standpoint of translation studies, versions in 
the Irish language).6 Indeed—in a gesture highly reminiscent of Hölderlin’s 
efforts to let translation amplify dramatic effect—in nations such as Ireland 
and South Africa, the very act of translation into native tongues (Irish and 
Afrikaans) lets Greek tragedy resonate with contemporary conflicts and resist 
dominant hegemonies.7 Using the classics as specimen piece also often lends 
enough subtlety to allow political protest to evade censorship; Athol Fugard’s 
1973 play The Island, for example, in which two prisoners on Robben Island 
attempt to stage Antigone as a protest against their imprisonment, managed 
to earn considerable legitimacy within South Africa while clearly denounc-
ing state oppression (Fugard called Antigone “the most powerful political 
play ever written”).8
of those productions were based on Hölderlin’s translations (16).
 6. See the anthology Amid Our Troubles: Irish Versions of Greek Tragedy, ed. Marianne McDonald 
and J. Michael Walton (Methuen 2002).
 7. See Betine van Zyl Smit, “Multicultural Reception: Greek Drama in South Africa in the Late 
Twentieth and Early Twenty-first Centuries,” in Hardwick and Stray, A Companion to Classical Recep-
tions (Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 373f.
 8. Athol Fugard, Statements (New York: Theatre Communications Group, 1986). See also Ron 
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 To be sure, some manifestations of this theatrical trend make the leap 
to classical text (and Antigone in particular) too effortlessly, a tendency that 
Seamus Heaney criticized in a commentary to his own translation of Anti-
gone, which he rechristened The Burial at Thebes: “Antigone is poetic drama, 
but commentary and analysis had turned it into political allegory. . . . I didn’t 
want the production to end up as just another opportunistic commentary 
on the Iraq adventure, and that is why I changed the title.”9 Insofar as 
Hölderlin’s translations plainly resist this type of transformation, the persis-
tent use and reuse of his Oedipus and Antigone brings an additional layer of 
complexity (and an echo of Antigone’s stubborn resistance) to this process 
of “re-writing” the classics. Moreover, the back story of Hölderlin’s brilliant 
yet ill-fated attempts at translation vibrates, at least as subtext, within any 
new inscription in the German context —indeed, along with the legacies of 
Benjamin, Brecht, and Heidegger, which likewise belong to the rich Fortle-
ben of these texts. Within this context, three appropriations of Hölderlin’s 
translations stand out in particular, both for their engagements with this 
difficult legacy and their provocative treatments of the texts in contem-
porary contexts: Heiner Müller’s Ödipus, Tyrann, which was staged by the 
director Benno Besson in the above-mentioned Deutsches Theater produc-
tion (1967);10 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s Antigone de Sophocle, produced by 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Michel Deutsch in Strasbourg in 1977;11 and Walser’s 
1989 Antigone.12 Despite the prominence of their respective authors, these 
adaptations call attention to themselves, like those of Heidegger and Brecht, 
in their deference to Hölderlin as well as their energetic self-justification. 
Composing not only in different settings but with different audiences in 
mind as well, each author argues for the particular timeliness of tragedy in 
the present day. And not just any tragedy—Hölderlin’s tragedy. Meanwhile, 
the sad conclusion to the poet’s own life often functions as an additional 
layer of both history and drama; though the authors remain fairly reticent on 
this point in the published texts, there is no question that Hölderlin haunts 
the stage, underscoring in a different way the contrast between a past that 
can be recorded and verified and one that constantly threatens to disappear. 
The task of rewriting the past as mourning play (Trauer-spiel ) thus echoes 
Jenkins, “Antigone as a Protest Tactic,” The New York Times, 30 March 2003: 6.
 9. Seamus Heaney, “Search for the Soul of Antigone,” The Guardian, 2 November 2005.
 10. Printed as Heiner Müller, Sophokles. Ödipus Tyrann. Nach Hölderlin (Berlin and Weimar: 
Aufbau, 1969).
 11. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Hölderlin. L’Antigone de Sophocle. Suivi de la Césure du speculatif 
(Paris: Christian Bourgois Éditeur, 1978).
 12. Sophokles. Antigone. Übersetzt von Friedrich Hölderlin. Bearbeitet von Martin Walser und E. 
Selge (Frankfurt: Insel, 1989).
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the special responsibility in the writing of history: a responsibility to preserve 
the singularity of the past in the face of ideological pressures that threaten 
with transformation.
 In his 1997 article “German Antigone,” Hans-Joachim Ruckhäberle 
gives a fascinating account of Antigone productions (most of them using 
Hölderlin’s translation) in the last decades of the twentieth century.13 In 
1977–78 alone, the play was featured in five different theater companies, 
along with Volker Schlöndorff’s nod to Antigone in Deutschland im Herbst 
(Pöggeler 14). In a moment in which West Germany finds itself seized by 
leftist violence, reeling from the kidnapping and murder of Hanns Martin 
Schleyer and the subsequent suicides of Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, 
and Jan Raspe, Antigone becomes “simply too current” (einfach zu aktuell ), 
as one of the executives in Schlöndorff’s scene describes the film clip he has 
just seen; in the film, the presentation of “denied burial, rebellious dames” 
(verweigerte Beerdigung, aufsässige Weiber)—in short, a “terrorist play” (Ter-
rorstück)—proves uncomfortably destabilizing to the status quo, such that 
not even various modes of “distancing” can prevent the executives from 
recommending that the film be shelved.14
 In general, theater productions of Antigone at the time presented the 
play as an expression of political and social dissent, with Hölderlin playing 
nearly as prominent a role as Antigone herself. While Lacoue-Labarthe’s and 
Deutsch’s version in Strasbourg featured an epilogue in which Hölderlin 
appears and composes verse, Nel’s 1978 Frankfurt production offered the 
argument that the poet himself experienced the conflicts of the play, the 
struggle of the individual with the state and the proximity of that struggle to 
madness. As Ruckhäberle points out, Günter Rambow’s posters created for 
the Frankfurt production illustrate tendencies typical of the recent history 
of German Antigones: “the longing for the immediate, the primal . .  . the 
attitude of the individual toward the state, state terrorism . . . the critique of 
the Germans” (Ruckhäberle 489). Paired with several citations from Hölder-
lin, the image of a burning chair summarizes this stance with its reference to 
a shattered domesticity: “The piece of furniture that might provide a certain 
state of sedentariness stands in the wilderness; a piece of civilization burns” 
(489).
 13. Ruckhäberle, “German Antigone,” in Documenta X: The Book, ed. Catherine David and Jean 
François Chevrier (Ostfildern-Ruit: Cantz, 1997).
 14. Rainer Werner Fassbinder, Heinrich Böll, Volker Schlöndorff, Edgar Reitz, Alexander Kluge, 
Deutschland im Herbst (Munich: Filmverlag der Autoren, 1978). See the recent article by Eric Kliger-
man, “The Antigone-Effect: Reinterring the Dead of Night and Fog in the German Autumn,” New 
German Critique 38:9 (2011), especially 16–24.
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 The developments that Ruckhäberle describes thus have a common con-
sequence: Antigone becomes Hölderlin, and both present the terrible price 
of political and social opposition. The past as mourning play is rewritten 
to include the author, as tragic heroine and translator meet in their forced 
subjection to the “terror of normality” (489). The Antigone put on display 
in a yellow cocktail dress and pushed out onto the dance floor in Nel’s 
Frankfurt production is also the poet packaged for mass consumption. To 
reduce both to a few key representative gestures guarantees popular interest 
by establishing the potential of both figures to bear contemporary relevance, 
and yet it also calls attention to a problem, namely, that the process of 
rewriting inevitably creates new fictions on its path to new “truths.” In this 
respect, post-war productions that align Hölderlin’s text with contemporary 
history do more than, as Ruckhäberle puts it, “transcend borders between 
presentation and action” (488). Whereas the need to respond provocatively 
to the problem of state violence prompts a return to Sophocles’ and Hölder-
lin’s texts in the 1960s and 70s, for the most part those responses are not 
concerned with the extent to which that return performs its own violence 
on the body of text. The possibility of making theater political—of linking 
presentation with action—is thus undermined from within, as the call to 
give voice to dissent also amounts to a silencing of the text’s inherent resis-
tance to its own actualization.
 The next step in this process of bringing the tragedy in line with con-
temporary history is logical, even predictable, and in some ways even more 
violent: the Germans become Antigone. Not every adaptation’s author 
takes that step; in fact, some actively avoid it. Brecht, of course, had explic-
itly rejected this comparison, claiming that “the great figure of resistance 
in the ancient drama does not represent the German resistance fighters” 
(BFA 25:74), while Heidegger had alluded to it in his conflation of ancient 
Greek glory with modern German potentiality. The post-war adaptations of 
Hölderlin’s tragedy, however, face the issue of appropriation from a different 
perspective, inviting a manner of free association that permits recognition 
on any number of levels. As Walser asserts in the remarks accompanying his 
1989 adaptation, for example, the parallels between Antigone’s conscience 
and the German experience of conscience among the post-war, post-1968 
generation guarantee the possibility of such free-form recognition: “Every-
one is free to adapt the Antigone example in his own way. One can hear one’s 
own voice in all of those voices that appear here” (15).15 That recognition of 
 15. “Es ist jedem freigestellt, sich das Antigone-Beispiel auf seine Weise anzueignen. Es kann 
einer in allen hier vorkommenen Stimmen seine eigene hören.“
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“voices” implies an identification between the viewer and the play’s historical 
points of reference, whatever they may be. Lacoue-Labarthe’s and Deutsch’s 
production, for example, which opened with Antigone and Ismene hiding 
in an attic, evoked for Sarah Kofman the memory of Anne Frank and thus 
confirmed the continuing relevance of tragedy for modernity: “And you 
think that a Greek tragedy translated in this way can concern us once again 
today” (Et vous pensez qu’une tragédie grecque ainsi traduite cela peut encore 
aujourd’hui nous concerner).16
 In depicting the process of translation and re-writing as a tenuous bal-
ance between maintaining a link to the text’s foreignness and inviting par-
allels to the present, Müller, Lacoue-Labarthe, and Walser contend more 
or less directly with the legacy of Brecht as well as Hölderlin. This is per-
haps as it should be, since the engagement with a text such as Hölderlin’s 
must also take into account its considerable afterlife. But these more recent 
attempts move forward from Brecht’s project insofar as they are punctuated 
by their need to account for tragedy’s significance in the present day, whether 
through identificatory strategies (as in Walser’s or Kofman’s remarks above) 
or a kind of post-Brechtian detachment, as Benno Besson aims to orchestrate 
with Müller’s Ödipus. Either way, this is also their major shortcoming.
Authorship unbound: müller’s Ödipus, Tyrann
In the German Democratic Republic, Antigone was persona non grata. As 
Horst Domdey notes, the urgency of her task and the determination with 
which she acts irritate the “Socialist credo of reform” (reformsozialistisches 
Credo) in which the resolution of conflicts depends on the passage of time; 
there is no possible “futurization” of her conflict, for waiting any longer 
will result not in profit but in loss.17 In this respect Antigone represents 
the “opposite of reform: dissidence. She provokes a decision, the break with 
despotism (Gegenposition zur Reform—die Dissidenz. Sie provoziert die Ents-
cheidung, den Bruch mit der Despotie [Domdey 288]). Small wonder, then, 
that the GDR saw no new adaptations of Antigone after Brecht’s in 1948 
and no new productions of Brecht’s Antigone after 1963 (Domdey 319n.). 
Nevertheless, in a fascinating analysis, Domdey locates echoes of Antigone 
throughout Müller’s dramatic oeuvre.18 While Domdey focuses on figures 
 16. Kofman, “L’espace de la césure,” in Critique 379 (December 1978): 1146.
 17. Domdey, Produktivkraft Tod: Das Drama Heiner Müllers (Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau, 
1998), 288.
 18. According to Domdey, Müller engages particularly with Antigone with respect to questions 
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of personal and political responsibility to the dead and forgotten in original 
pieces such as Mauser and Zement, however, as well in the 1983 Medea play 
Verkommenes Ufer Medeamaterial Landschaft mit Argonauten, Müller’s Ödi-
pus engages differently with Antigone, particularly Brecht’s Antigone, insofar 
as it appropriates and adapts not only classical subject matter but also the 
structural rubric of the Modell.
 Müller is well known for his adaptations of Greek tragedies, of course, 
from Philoktet (1966) to Medea (1983). Within this progression, his Ödipus, 
Tyrann might appear to play a fairly insignificant role. The published version 
appeared in 1969, two years after the stage production and three years after 
the text was composed. It lies chronologically between two other adapta-
tions, Philoktet (1966) and Der Horatier (1968–69), and was published just 
before Müller’s return to more concrete socialist themes in Mauser. Given its 
obvious affinities with these “Greek” plays, Hans-Thies Lehmann concludes 
that the subject matter of this Ödipus reflects similarly on the problem of 
Stalinism, which Müller locates in a fundamental dissonance between theory 
and practice.19 And there is no question that this dissonance permeates the 
play, indeed endows it with its critical thrust by emphasizing, in the figures 
of Oedipus and Creon, the thirst for power that masks the incommensu-
rability of theoretical “truth” with the experience of reality. In representing 
the birth of this duality of theory and practice, the play both brings forth 
the extent to which any claim to communion between the two is shaken at 
its very ground and points toward the radicalization of that split in a more 
contemporary context, as Müller asserts in an article accompanying the pro-
gram notes for the Berlin premiere: “The piece describes its (bloody) birth, 
its most radical formulation is the atomic mushroom over Hiroshima.”20 
In this respect, Müller’s rendering casts Oedipus’s self-blinding in a new 
light: it is no longer merely an abdication from the past but also, insofar 
as it represents a retreat into the realm of pure abstraction, symbolic of the 
self-satisfied reliance on a theoretical knowledge unconcerned with political 
responsibility (Schulz 89).21
of personal and political responsibility towards the dead and forgotten, both post-WWII and in the 
context of the socialist state.
 19. See Lehmann’s account of Ödipus, Tyrann in Genia Schulz, Heiner Müller (Stuttgart: Metzler, 
1980), 87.
 20. Müller cited in Schulz 87: “Seine (blutige) Geburt beschreibt das Stück, seine radikalste 
Formulierung ist der Atompilz über Hiroshima).”
 21. Müller, cited in Schulz 89: “Die Haltung des Ödipus bei der Selbstblendung  .  .  .  ist ein 
tragischer Entwurf zu der zynischen Replik des Physikers Oppenheimer auf die Frage, ob er an einer 
Bombe mitarbeiten würde, wirksamer als die H-Bombe, wenn dazu die Möglichkeit gegeben sei: Es 
wäre technisch süß (technical sweet), sie zu machen. Die Verwerfung dieser Haltung bleibt folgenlos, 
wenn ihr nicht den Boden entzogen wird.”
ConClusion236
 This is a logically consistent reading, both with respect to this text in 
particular and within the larger framework of Müller’s engagement with 
classical models. The Oedipus of Müller’s Kommentar is a figure of brutal 
self-enclosure in the realm of reflection:
. . . er hat die Zeit überrundet
In den Zirkel genommen, ich und kein Ende, sich selber.
In den Augenhöhlen begräbt er die Welt.22
. . . he overtook time
Caught in the circle, I and no end, himself.
In his eyesockets he buries the world.23
The vocabulary of the Ödipus play itself, though it remains notably close 
to Hölderlin’s text, evinces a subtle shift in emphasis from the question of 
human finitude to a more contemporary critique of the abuse of power; 
whereas in Hölderlin’s translation, the Chorus reports Oedipus’s denuncia-
tion of Tiresias indirectly to Creon (“People are saying it. In what sort of 
temper, I don’t know” [Man sagts. Ich weiß es nicht, in welcher Stimmung]), 
Müller’s Chorus attributes the slur directly to their ruler: “Spoken by the 
King. No one knows the reason” (Müller 42: Aus Herrscherwort. Man weiß 
nicht seinen Grund ). Similarly, the Chorus’s concluding remarks present 
Oedipus not simply as a mortal man exposed to the isolation that describes 
human beings’ distance from the gods and from each other, as in Hölderlin’s 
version, but as a man “who was powerful above all” (Müller 89: der vor allen 
mächtig war).
 Müller’s recourse to the rubrics of absolute reason and power recall his 
modifications in Philoktet, where the Greek model is altered much more 
radically to emphasize the tactical Realpolitik and moral relativism of Odys-
seus. However, the provenance and ultimate influence of Ödipus, Tyrann are 
also somewhat more complex. Initially, the adaptation received notably more 
attention than its immediate predecessor; while Ödipus had its première at 
the Deutsches Theater in Berlin in 1968, Philoktet, published in 1965 in 
Sinn und Form, only opened in the GDR for the first time in the mid-1970s 
and received little attention there (Schulz 71).24 In a more general vein, 
 22. Heiner Müller, Kommentar, in Sophokles. Ödipus Tyrann. Nach Hölderlin (Berlin: Aufbau, 
1969), 91.
 23. “Oedipus Commentary,” in A Heiner Müller Reader, ed. and trans. Carl Weber (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 92.
 24. Philoktet did have a very successful premiere in Munich in 1968. As Schivelbusch notes, 
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Wolfgang Schivelbusch describes Müller’s adaptations of Greek tragedy as 
a universal “parable form” lacking in “historical and social concretion.”25 
These doubts about the relevance of classical material, which are also clearly 
voiced in the published reactions to Ödipus, Tyrann, may reflect more gen-
eral debates at the time about the importance of cultivating the nation’s 
cultural heritage.26 On the other hand, Mauser, the play that directly follows 
the publication of Ödipus, Tyrann, represents for Schivelbusch the fortunate 
synthesis of a classically tragic “collision” grounded in socialist history, a wor-
thy successor to Brecht’s Maßnahme (Schivelbusch 108). Yet to frame Mauser 
in this way also reveals a debt to the practice of adaptation as “reutilization”27 
in the Greek plays, particularly Ödipus: only that now Brecht himself is the 
“Klassiker,” with Müller’s play presenting, as Schivelbusch puts it, “a more 
advanced level of historical consciousness on the basis of more advanced 
historical development and historical knowledge” (Schivelbusch 111).
 In this context of debate between a conventional devotion to the literary 
tradition and more controversial attempts in the 1960s GDR to establish 
new “Klassiker” such as Brecht, Ödipus, Tyrann assumes a far more intrigu-
ing status in what has been viewed as Müller’s creative development. Insofar 
as it essentially represents a threefold claim to “classicism” (Sophocles—
Hölderlin—Brecht) and at the same time insists upon its recontextualiza-
tion, Ödipus, Tyrann relates to the past as both referent and foil, just as 
Müller’s Mauser will later relate to its predecessor, Brecht’s Maßnahme.28 
What Helen Fehervary describes as the “new historical actuality” of Brecht’s 
drama in Mauser thus mirrors the far more complex process of actualization 
underlying Müller’s Ödipus, in which not only language and thematics but 
Müller’s “Greek” plays were particularly well received in the West, where their presentation of more 
universal themes had a wider appeal and Müller was compared to Beckett. Wolfgang Schivelbusch, 
“Optimistic Tragedies: The Plays of Heiner Müller,” trans. Helen Fehervary, New German Critique 1:2 
(Spring 1974): 106.
 25. For Schivelbusch, this emphasis on universal problems accounts for Müller’s popularity with 
western critics.
 26. See Jost Hermand, “The ‘Good New’ and the ‘Bad New’: Metamorphoses of the Modernism 
Debate in the GDR since 1956,” New German Critique 1:3 (Fall 1974), esp. 87–92.
 27. Helen Fehervary introduces this term in her foreword to Schivelbusch’s article, which she 
translated for New German Review (Schivelbusch 105).
 28. Brecht’s Antigone was certainly a point of comparisonon critics’ and audience members’ 
minds with respect to MÜller’s text and particularly Besson’s 1968 production, as the “Gesprach Über 
‘Ödipus, Tyrann’” makes clear in the published edition (133–134). Brecht’s stature in the GDR at this 
point was unassailable, as David Bathrick has discussed; by the time he was honored in 1968 with a 
symposium celebrating his seventieth birthday, he had achieved an ironically “classical” status. Within 
five years, however, that status had been seriously undercut. See Bathrick, “The Dialectics of Legitima-
tion: Brecht in the GDR,” New German Critique 1:2 (Spring 1974): 90.
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also dramatic technique itself (Sophocles’ and Brecht’s) are appropriated and 
“reutilized.”
 While the concept of his adaptation can be situated squarely within the 
context of Müller’s creative development, however—at once consistent with 
and at odds with the state’s view of the relevance of pre-revolutionary mate-
rial—its execution raised more mundane concerns based within the political 
present. These concerns make their way into the text’s apparatus, which like 
Brecht’s concept of the Modell engages the performance and reception of a 
theater piece with its textual base. Yet the text produced by this mode of 
appropriation is Brecht’s Modell turned on its ear: while Brecht maintained 
a nearly uncanny degree of creative control over the publication and dis-
semination of the Antigonemodell, Müller seems to have ceded his authorial 
claim entirely, offering no commentary on the text or its production in this 
published version. Nevertheless, this Ödipus is not fatherless, far from it; 
opinions about how to interpret his fate abound in the published text, which 
is framed by introductory remarks by Karl-Heinz Müller and a concluding 
“discussion” (Gespräch) between the production’s director, Benno Besson, 
and a group of audience members.
 With its multiple authors, the published Ödipus, Tyrann appears in 
theory to present a process of reception and adaptation that takes Brecht’s 
concept of the Modell a step further by integrating into the textual apparatus 
the thoughts of the “common man.” The remarks that follow Heiner Mül-
ler’s rendition of the text are the transcript of a discussion involving “art-
ists, teachers, workers, authors, housewives, state functionaries, engineers, 
and colleagues” (bildende Künstler, Lehrer, Arbeiter, Schriftsteller, Hausfrauen, 
Staatsfunktionäre, Ingenieure und Mitarbeiter). This run through the gamut 
of GDR professions—the butcher, the baker, the candlestick maker—and 
the use only of single initials to identify each speaker promote anonymity, 
as if to suggest that anyone may have a hand in the process of re-writing.
 At the same time, however, it is clear that the man behind the only 
identifiable initial, B, ultimately calls the shots. For despite its overtures to 
communal theatrical practice, the published text does have two “authors” 
who do not easily relinquish control over text and production: the author 
of the foreword, Karl-Heinz Müller, and more prominently, Besson (B). In 
fact, there is no indication within the transcript of the discussion or after it 
that Besson took any of the group’s criticisms to heart. On the contrary, he 
spends much of the discussion defending his production from what he obvi-
ously perceives to be misinterpretation, at times seeming almost incredulous 
that spectators could have understood the play in this way. For example, 
when participants in the discussion attempt to describe the play as a tragedy 
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of fate (“Schicksals-Tragödie”) with “no spiritual relevance whatsoever to the 
present” (100), Besson responds in apparent frustration: “Have you seen the 
production? . . . And you think that in this production the tragedy of fate 
simply remained intact, that fate is presented in it as inescapable?” (100).29
 The result of this theatrical tug-of-war—for the discussion after the play 
is obviously no less staged than the play itself—is more revealing than pro-
ductive, given its context. Despite the air of indeterminacy and mutabil-
ity that opens the discussion (like Brecht, Besson describes the production 
repeatedly as “only an attempt,” “a great experiment” (nur ein Versuch, ein 
großes Experiment [Müller 95]), the book in which that discussion appears 
opens with an interpretation that insists upon itself quite emphatically. Iron-
ically, a central tenet of this interpretation—which is, in effect, a radicalized 
version of Hölderlin’s discussion—is that Oedipus’ fate need not be under-
stood as predetermined, that he sets events into motion himself through his 
excessive will to knowledge. A reading that insists on the indeterminacy of 
fate thus relies heavily on its own determinacy as a reading. While Oedipus’ 
fate now lies in his own hands, the fate of the spectator—whose autonomy 
receives lip service but little else—cannot be separated from the dominant 
interpretation presented in the program, as K, one of the discussants, recog-
nizes: “Everyone who believes he has seen your conception was prejudiced 
(vorbestimmt, literally predetermined) through your comments on Oedipus” 
(Müller 110). Even the word K uses to describe the influence of Besson’s 
interpretation on the spectator, “predetermined” (vorbestimmt), suggests a 
link to Oedipus’s helplessness with respect to his own fate.
 Nor is that prescribed spectatorial experience meant to be inaccessible 
to the reader of this volume. Early in the introduction, Karl-Heinz Müller 
describes the parallels between the goals of staging the play and those of 
presenting it as text:
The reader should not only concretize his point of view on Sophocles’ trag-
edy, as with the mere reading of text, but rather should also be confronted 
with foreign points of view. Thus the book aims to communicate something 
of the process that otherwise takes place in the reception of art in the the-
ater, where author, director, actor, theater technician, spectator—with their 
various opinions, standpoints, feelings, desires, abilities, means of expres-
sion—enter into communication in a production. (Müller 7)30
 29. Haben Sie die Aufführung gesehen?  .  .  . Und Sie finden, dass in dieser Aufführung die 
Schicksalstragödie weiterhin einfach bestehen blieb, dass in ihr das Schicksal als unausweichlich hin-
gestellt wird?
 30. “Der Leser soll nicht nur, wie bei bloßer Textlektüre, seinen Gesichtspunkt zur Tragödie des 
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Not only the nominal author is responsible for the text’s point of view, then; 
everyone, in effect, is not merely invited but obliged to assume that respon-
sibility. And in being confronted with the contributions of others to the 
text’s development, one also comes to recognize its polyvalent complexity. 
The engagement with the foreign, always integral to Hölderlin’s conception 
of Greek tragedy within modernity, thus expands as the notion of individual 
authorship (or individual translation, for that matter) dissolves into multi-
plicity. That multiplicity—foreign points of view, in the plural—is what the 
producers of Ödipus, Tyrann aim to concretize on the stage.
 However, the discussion soon indicates that this mode of presentation 
only results in the audience’s confusion and alienation from the events on 
stage. Despite the creators’ lip service to the notion of collaborative author-
ship, the participants in the discussion after the play are unified only in their 
skepticism about the very particular valence of Besson’s production. The 
process of re-writing, stylized in the supposedly productive communication 
between director and audience, has been preceded and dominated from 
the start by a contextualized re-reading, through which Sophocles’ tragedy 
has attained a more contemporary “function”; the authors’ concern is no 
longer cathartic release, nor the experience of the dialectics of the nation-
state developing out of the polis, but rather the unveiling of contradictions 
inherent in the individual’s confrontation with the new classless society:
With the story of Oedipus, we can gain insight into the process through 
which the individual constructs himself in and outside of, with and against 
the new society—which took shape out of the classless and community-
conscious tribal society—and about the contradictions in this process. 
(Müller 10f.)31
The introduction goes on to describe the process of re-writing explicitly as 
a journey of discovery with a recognizable destination, the “discovery of 
the piece with the actors” (Entdeckung des Stücks mit den Schauspielern) and 
ultimately “the finding of the fable” (das Finden der Fabel ). Simply put, the 
Sophokles konkretisieren, sondern sich auch mit fremden Gesichtspunkten konfrontieren. Das Buch 
will also etwas von dem Vorgang vermitteln, der sonst bei der Kunstrezeption im Theater stattfindet, 
wenn Autor, Regisseur, Schauspieler, Theatertechniker, Zuschauer mit ihren verschiedenen Ansich-
ten, Standpunkten, Gefühlen, Wünschen, Fähigkeiten, Ausdrucksmitteln bei einer Aufführung eine 
Kommunikation eingehen.”
 31. “Mit der Geschichte des Ödipus ist Aufschluß über den Prozeß zu gewinnen, in dem sich 
der Einzelmensch in und aus der, mit der und gegen die neue Gesellschaft herausbildet, die aus der 
klassenlosen und gemeinschaftsbewussten Stammesgesellschaft entstand, über die Widersprüche in 
diesem Prozeß” [10f.].
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play now stages the downfall of the individual who abandons the commu-
nity and thus seals his own fate:
The great individual, who had once brought good fortune to the commu-
nity, released himself from the community. Oedipus remains alone with the 
power of his thought, with a body destroyed of his own accord, at a loss, 
superfluous (unnütz), no one follows him anymore (Müller 16).32
Not only at a loss for action but “unnütz,” useless, Oedipus exchanges the 
infrastructure of community for the wilderness of abstraction. For Besson, 
this is what makes Oedipus a revolutionary figure in his time, an example 
of the “development of individual consciousness out of the community’s 
consciousness” (Herausbildung des individuellen Bewußtseins aus dem Stam-
mesbewußtsein [Müller 124]), whereas GDR society is involved in the reverse 
movement, in which individuals attempt to conceive of themselves as a social 
body (Gesellschaftswesen). Oedipus insists upon the possibility of crafting his 
own fate, which renders his position radical; but only an alienated audience 
can recognize that although he can indeed determine his fate from an indi-
vidual perspective, he must also take account of the social determination of 
that fate, how the community affects individual identity.
 Besson makes an eloquent argument here, one that is consistent with 
Karl-Heinz Müller’s introductory remarks; however, his discussants still seem 
skeptical. The tone of the exchange thus remains tense, as both sides reproach 
one another for drawing anachronistic conclusions (“You are drawing con-
clusions based on today’s way of thinking” (132: Sie schliessen im heutigen 
Denkschema). Yet Besson’s final remarks constitute a determined affirmation 
nevertheless: “Our discussion proves to me, precisely through the protesta-
tions that are being made, how correct it is to stage Ödipus, Tyrann, and 
indeed in the way we have produced it: as foreign (154).33 By emphasizing 
its distance from the familiar, the play’s producers are able to transform the 
play’s alienating effect on its perplexed audience into something productive. 
In a moment of somewhat elitist condescension, they even suggest that those 
who approached the discussion “naively” were able to glean the most from it: 
“those who approached without pre-established views, who let the play work 
 32. “Der große Einzelne, der einst der Gemeinschaft Glück gebracht hatte, löste sich von der 
Gemeinschaft. Ödipus bleibt mit seiner Denkkraft allein, mit eigenmächtig zerstörtem Körper, ratlos, 
unnütz, ihm folgt keiner mehr.”
 33. “Unser Gespräch beweist mir gerade auch durch die Einwände, die gemacht werden, wie 
richtig es ist, Ödipus, Tyrann aufzuführen, und zwar so, wie wir ihn aufgeführt haben: fremd.”
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its effect on them and listened (176).34 The organizer “D” thus draws out 
of the discussion a positive outcome that is meant to apply to the theatrical 
production itself: the reproduction, after the audience has viewed the play, 
of a flexibility that combines knowledge (here, the familiarity with classical 
myth, Kenntnis der Mythologie) with openness and the ability to listen.
 This obvious dissonance between the prevailing interpretation of the 
text and its reception reveals a fundamental point of contention in GDR 
culture, the suspicion of intellectual elitism that hindered the success of most 
“modernist” art in the 1950s and 60s (Hermand 85–86). The apparatus 
of this Oedipus production falls into a similar category. If the state’s goal 
was to diminish the gulf between “bourgeois” art and the common people, 
then Besson’s attempt to engage in dialogue with workers and peasants of 
every stripe, though politically intriguing, proves utterly counterproductive. 
A concluding gesture of “agreeing to disagree” hardly resolves that contradic-
tion, given that the means of production in this case remain in the hands of 
the play’s producers, thus on one side of the argument. While Heiner Mül-
ler himself, conspicuously silent at the moment of its publication, appears 
to have relinquished the play, Besson and company cannot help but claim 
authority (and perform that claim, both rhetorically and structurally, in their 
published text). The voices may be many, but the vision remains unmistak-
ably singular.
walser’s Antigone
More explicitly than any of the authors we have examined so far, Martin 
Walser reflects in his 1989 Antigone on the problems of writing and re-
writing history; in this sense his reading resonates with the central argu-
ments of this book, although it does not correspond to those arguments. The 
relationship to the past expressed through the perils of translation, which 
has informed the entire progression from Hölderlin to Heidegger, Brecht, 
Müller, and others becomes, for Walser, a more specific point of identifica-
tion between Antigone and the Germans. Simply put, Walser seeks to make 
 34. “ . . . der also, der nicht mit bereits festgefahrenen Ansichten an die Sache heranging, der die 
Sache auf sich wirken liess und zugehört hat.” Besson himself exhibits, apparently naively, an elitism 
disconcertingly tinged with racism when he describes how the actors in the Chorus were unable to 
make their movements complement their vocalizations until the producers brought in African dancers 
to demonstrate “wie man tanzen kann” (160). Asserting the difficulty of achieving this dimension of 
physical “intelligence” in modern “civilization” (160), Besson succeeds in insulting both the East Ger-
man performers (who were evidently too “civilized” to dance properly) and the “uncivilized” Africans 
who coached them.
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Antigone stand for the post-war struggle in Germany to work through the 
past, commonly known as “Vergangenheitsbewältigung.” The focus of the 
play as well as her character is, after all, a “burial problem” (Beerdingungspro-
blem [Walser 9]), “because the past has not been cleared up yet” (12); thus 
Antigone is no historical drama but rather “an example of how to deal with 
one’s own recent history” (12).
 Walser’s swift transition from Antigone to the collective “we ourselves” 
serves the argument that, far from requiring “topicalization” (Aktualisierung), 
the conflict of the play in its original context can easily apply to “us”: “We 
do not have to graft our own motives onto Sophocles in order to make 
him useful to us. Nor must we saddle Hölderlin with topicality in order to 
make him our contemporary” (11).35 Distinguishing his adaptation from 
Brecht’s, therefore (and by extension from Müller’s as well), Walser instead 
claims Antigone for modernity based on the universality of the play’s themes; 
despite having been written 2400 years ago, he writes, it can still be “our 
piece” (unser Stück).
 At the cusp of a stunning historical turning point in 1989, then, Walser 
places primary emphasis on the “usefulness” of the piece to highlight the 
correspondence between the problem of burial and a particular set of criteria 
for historiography, ostensibly inspired by Antigone: “The past must be swept 
underground, but how? As something incomparably, thus incomprehensibly 
evil? Or historically determined and explicable, despite all of its unique 
monstrosity. . . . And already, one would be amidst the buzz of voices and 
counter-voices (13).36
 Walser’s entire discussion in these remarks focuses on the thematics of 
Sophocles’ play, breaking off only to offer praise for Hölderlin’s translation 
and justification for his adaptation of it. If, however, Walser is concerned 
with representing our encounter with the past, with our search for a way 
to be “done” with it, to what extent does this concern extend to his appro-
priation of Hölderlin’s text? He refers often enough, here and elsewhere, to 
his lifelong devotion to Hölderlin’s lyric;37 yet in this piece he also strives 
to explain why certain alterations were necessary. Evoking in positively 
Hölderlinian phrasing the translator’s “relentlessly lyrical breadth of expres-
sion” (rücksichtslos lyrischen Ausdrucksweite), his “‘sleepwalkingly’ free use 
 35. “Wir müssen Sophokles nicht mit unseren Motiven impfen, um ihn für uns brauchbar zu 
machen. Wir müssen auch Hölderlin nicht aktuell aufladen, um ihn zum Zeitgenossen zu machen.”
 36. “Die Vergangenheit muß unter den Boden, aber wie? Als unvergleichlich, also unverständlich 
böse? Oder trotz aller einmaligen Ungeheuerlichkeit historisch bedingt und erklärbar. . . . Und schon 
wäre man mitten drin im Geschwirr der Stimmen und Gegenstimmen.”
 37. Cf. Walser, Umgang mit Hölderlin.
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of language” (traumwandlerisch freien Sprachgebrauch), Walser describes his 
attempt to dramatize the translation’s lyrical dimension: “No general restric-
tion of the elevated tone’s frequency, more of an effort to make Hölderlin’s 
elevated tones useful for the purpose of Antigone [für den Antigonezweck]” 
(12).38
 The reference to the “usefulness” of tone in the service of the “Antigone 
purpose” (Antigonezweck) is, interestingly enough, both consistent with and 
contradictory to Hölderlin’s project; for Hölderlin, as we have seen, tone 
bears an effect that intensifies and complicates the effects of tragic plot. 
Walser, however, aims to generate a particular effect through the clarifica-
tion (and modernization) of Hölderlin’s language and syntax. But does this 
shift to the idea of making tone “useful” as a conveyance of plot not simul-
taneously constitute a “burial” of the text’s strangeness, which had essen-
tially defined it? A few glances into Walser’s text certainly indicate that this 
has happened. One of the most striking lines of Hölderlin’s translation, for 
example, Ismene’s remark “Was ists, du scheinst ein rothes Wort zu färben?” 
(What is it? You seem to color a red word ) becomes “Was ist es? Was bewegt 
dich so?” (24: What is it? What agitates you so?). The Chorus’s disconcerting 
self-assessment “Jetzt aber komme ich eben selber aus dem Geseze” (Now 
even I myself am brought outside of the law) becomes “Jetzt verlier ich auch 
noch den Kopf” (58: Now even I am losing my head ), and the striking double 
valence of seeing Antigone “wandeln” in the same passage (both to wander 
and to change) becomes flatter and more concrete: “wenn ich Antigone / seh 
auf dem Weg / ins alleschweigende Bett” (58: when I see Antigone on the way 
into the all-silent bed ).
 This reluctance on Walser’s part to present the sheer foreignness of the 
text he is so eager to reference is significant in light of his interest in the 
problem of historiography, which he describes as the possibility of “clearing 
up” (klären) the past. The formal peculiarities of Hölderlin’s text constitute 
an active rejection of that plea for clarification, a rejection that operates 
alongside Antigone’s own refusal to be “done” with the past. Both Sophocles’ 
text and Hölderlin’s translation offer a more complex relation to the ruins 
of history, letting the past remain open like a wound rather than burying 
it underground; Antigone’s defiance in the name of her brother Polynices 
is, after all, not simply a burial but a ceremonial gesture meant to preserve 
his memory. The unending responsibility to the past, despite its irritation, 
is central to Antigone’s resistance of Creon’s mandate and to Hölderlin’s 
 38. “Keine generelle Frequenzbeschneidung des hohen Tons, eher eine Bemühung, Hölderlins 
hohe Töne für den Antigonezweck brauchbar zu machen.”
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method of translating, which always upholds the status of an untranslatable 
remainder. Re-writing the past for Hölderlin demands the preservation, even 
the orchestration of the distance which defines our relationship to it. Walser, 
in claiming simply that Antigone has never been “plainer” (eindeutiger) than 
it is today, misappropriates Hölderlin’s project in this fundamental sense.
 What exactly does Walser find “eindeutig” about the play? The corner-
stone of his reading is the question of conscience and its relationship to per-
sonal and civic responsibilities. From where does conscience emerge? How is 
it implemented in public and private contexts? What is its relation to reason 
(Vernunft)—that is, can one follow one’s conscience in a direction that is 
also “unreasonable” (unvernünftig), and what would be the implications of 
that decision? Antigone’s act is fundamentally an act of conscience, but it 
necessitates her becoming guilty; it represents a Gegenstimme, an irrational 
counterpoint to the rationality of the state. She refuses to allow conscience 
to be proscribed by an outside instance, and in this sense exemplifies the 
universal struggle against state injustice: “In our intellectual history, Anti-
gone is the first great insurgent against the captivity of conscience (die erste 
große Empörerin gegen die Gefangennahme des Gewissens) (10).
 To be sure, this concern for the voice of the individual in counterpoint 
to the dominance of the state has been central to readings of the Antigone 
for centuries, and is particularly prevalent in recent interpretations, such as 
Judith Butler’s and Martha Nussbaum’s, which have focused impressively 
on the ethical complications posed in both Greek and modern societies by 
an outlier such as Antigone. The primary problem with Walser’s reading, 
however, is that his emphasis on questions of conscience throughout the 
remarks invariably ends with the nearly imperceptible shift to “ourselves” 
(uns selber), thus to the more pressing concern with the contemporary articu-
lation of guilt. And that guilt no longer has much to do with Antigone at 
all. “Is it possible to regulate, to dictate our association with our guilt? Can 
one association be better than another?” (13).39 Antigone’s striking courage 
in Sophocles’ tragedy emerges not from the recognition of her own guilt; 
although she does voice that guilt, it is secondary to her resolve to act in spite 
of the assurance that she will become guilty, at least from the standpoint 
of the state. How, then, does this relate to the guilt that Germans bear in 
1989? The comparison, when we think it through, is problematic. Antigone 
acknowledges in advance a guilt imposed by a human instance of law while 
invoking on her own side an unwritten, eternal law associated with the 
 39. “Ist der Umgang mit unserer Schuld reglementierbar, vorschreibbar? Kann ein Umgang 
besser sein als der andere?”
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divine. What does Walser invoke in his discussion of individual conscience 
and ethical responsibility? In effect, he cannot invoke anything more than a 
guilt that is undeniable and for which he, and many others, still struggle to 
find words.
The public acknowledgment of our guilt has in the meantime led to a 
competition which is less concerned with guilt itself than with the fact that 
one is always criticizing another for not expressing our guilt properly. . . . 
In this way one is already something positive compared with the other. The 
terrible negative, however, guilt, remains incomprehensible. (14)40
 As long as words fail, guilt remains at a distance. It is impossible not to 
find in this statement a frustrated expression of Walser’s own experience in 
taking controversial positions with respect to Germany’s troubled history. 
By equating the difficulty of publicly acknowledging guilt with Antigone’s 
dilemma, Walser places the Germans (and specifically himself ) on her side 
once more. In Walser’s defense, however, I read that equation more as a chal-
lenge than a self-congratulatory comfort. One should not take Antigone’s 
side because she is “right,” or even because she is “innocent,” but because 
she is courageous. Because she risks something. Reminiscent of Brecht’s 
claim that Antigone acts without regard for anyone else, Walser’s attempt 
to provoke his readership places the heroine in the exemplary position of 
heeding her conscience, which is always “the ownmost thing. Anti-public as 
such” (allereigenste Sache. Antiöffentlich schlechthin [13]).
 That this affirmation of risk is conspicuously absent from Walser’s 
approach to Hölderlin’s text may not be entirely unavoidable, given that he 
is constructing the adaptation with a specific audience in mind. Neverthe-
less, with his version he does describe the approach to the tragic that shaped 
Hölderlin’s interpretation and translation. As Hölderlin did, Walser presents 
the argument that a tragedy such as Antigone does not give us answers but 
rather raises questions and highlights contradictions. The main difference 
is that Hölderlin sought to present this sense of contradiction through his 
translation; Walser, by striving to clarify that problematic thematically and 
highlight the “usefulness” of the text, manages to dampen the structural 
impact that constituted Hölderlin’s primary contribution.
 40. “Das öffentliche Bekennen unserer Schuld hat inzwischen zu einem Wettbewerb geführt, in 
dem weniger von der Schuld die Rede ist als davon, daß immer einer einen anderen kritisiert, weil 
der unsere Schuld nicht richtig zum Ausdruck gebracht hat. . . . Dadurch ist man selbst schon etwas 
Positives, verglichen mit dem anderen. Das furchtbar Negative, die Schuld aber, bleibt weiterhin 
unfaßbar.”
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 A comparison of the final lines of the translation and Walser’s adaptation 
provides a case in point of this simultaneous emphasis and effacement; while 
Hölderlin’s line reads “Um vieles ist das Denken mehr, denn Glükseelig-
keit” (Thinking is about much more than happiness), Walser’s rendering, “Die 
einzige Glückseligkeit ist doch das Denken” (76, Thinking is the only happi-
ness) constitutes a near complete reversal. For Hölderlin, reflection reaches 
beyond happiness and toward the nothingness of death; for Walser, thought 
is redeemed as the only legitimate form of happiness. Where Walser’s read-
ing and adaptation “settle” in happiness, then, Hölderlin’s remains unsettled 
and unsettling (unheimlich), pointing to the subject’s status beyond the 
representable, the translatable, the conceivable.
lacoue-labarthe: L’Antigone de Sophocle
Of the contemporary adaptations of Hölderlin’s Sophocles discussed here, 
Lacoue-Labarthe’s 1978 translation into French, rendered by a scholar of 
Romanticism and literary theory, is the most philosophically rigorous—and 
the most successful. Concerned less with literality than with the conveyance 
of a certain experience of dislocation, Lacoue-Labarthe’s project includes, 
in its published form, both an interlinear translation and a set of remarks. 
The former may be a nod to Benjamin, who stated in “The Task of the 
Translator” that the best translation is interlinear, since no translation can 
be truly literal; the latter is a justly influential essay, La césure du speculatif, 
that converses with both Hölderlin’s own remarks and the literary-philo-
sophical thinking of the tragic, a line extending from Aristotle to Schelling 
to Szondi. Perhaps because it is an attempt to translate rather than to adapt 
Hölderlin’s text—thus addressing questions about how closely it hews to the 
“original”—Lacoue-Labarthe’s Antigone takes on Hölderlin’s Antigonä in a 
manner different from the other appropriations we have seen in the twen-
tieth century; because it is a translation, the author cannot simply change 
the text to fit a specific purpose but rather must engage in interpretation 
(not only of Sophocles’ plot, but of Hölderlin’s mode of translation as well). 
Lacoue-Labarthe’s rendering follows closely from Hölderlin’s project, pre-
cisely because he arguably thinks more about translation than about the play 
itself—as Hölderlin did, of course, in confronting Sophocles.41
 41. In the introduction to his essay “La césure du speculatif,” Lacoue-Labarthe describes his 
project in this light: “On n’y trouvera donc pas une ‘présentation’ d’Antigone: ces pages n’ont autre but 
que d’éclairer brièvement, dans la mésure du possible, le sens du travail théorique mené par Hölderlin 
sur la tragédie depuis le projet d’Empédocle jusqu’à la rédaction des Remarques sur la traduction de 
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 Although Lacoue-Labarthe was one of the most prominent interpreters 
of Hölderlin in France during his lifetime, Hölderlin’s poetry in particu-
lar has attracted a wide readership and has been translated repeatedly into 
French.42 Lacoue-Labarthe’s curious decision to translate one of the most 
difficult translations in the German oeuvre—only Buber and Rosenzweig’s 
Bible translation seems comparable—thus does not emerge from out of the 
blue. Nevertheless, in his foreword Lacoue-Labarthe points explicitly at the 
timing of this production: “But what was important was also (because it is 
a matter of some urgency) to listen to Hölderlin in France, today, on the 
stage” (Mais l’important était aussi (parce qu’il y a bel et bien urgence) de faire 
entendre Hölderlin, en France, aujourd’hui, sur une scène [Lacoue-Labarthe 
1978, 2]). The historical reference here may, as noted above, be an attempt 
to evoke the debates surrounding the issue of left-wing radicalism in Ger-
many, debates in which Antigone frequently served as a cultural touchstone.
 Although his detailed notes to the translation clearly demonstrate his 
constant attention to small details of Hölderlin’s discourse, there is one 
point at which Lacoue-Labarthe’s impressive sensitivity to Hölderlin’s text 
and project becomes especially apparent. Where no one else noticed any-
thing out of the ordinary, Lacoue-Labarthe finds a strange alteration in 
Hölderlin’s text, the condensation of three minor figures in Sophocles’ play 
(the guard who discovers the dust on Polynices’ body, the messenger who 
reports Antigone’s act, and the servant who describes the scene in the tomb) 
into a single “messenger” character. In entrusting to one voice the charge 
of reporting “that which cannot be represented” (157), Lacoue-Labarthe 
explains, Hölderlin also compels the representation to expose “the separa-
tion . . . between the properly dramatic and the narrative (the scene and its 
‘outside’)” (157: le partage . . . entre le dramatique proprement dit et le narratif 
[la scène et son ‘dehors’]). The very appearance of this separation guarantees 
its permanence: “the tragedy never breaks away from narration and does 
not cease to strive, mournfully, for a ‘theatricality’ it can never accomplish” 
(157: la tragédie ne s’affranchit jamais du récit et ne cesse de s’efforcer, doulou-
reusement, vers uns ‘théâtralité’ qu’elle ne peut accomplir). In this sense the 
messenger is for Lacoue-Labarthe “the pivot of the tragic structure” (157); 
his appearance and reappearance in Hölderlin’s version give him a history 
and a substance that mark his presence on stage as a caesura and place him 
in league with the seer Tiresias, whose pronouncements are likewise defined 
by their narrative quality.
Sophocle” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1978, 185).
 42. See Bernhard Böschenstein, “Hölderlin in Frankreich: Seine Gegenwart in Dichtung und 
Übersetzung,” in Hölderlin-Jahrbuch 1988/89: 304–320.
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 That Hölderlin placed this structural and rhetorical disturbance into 
the heart of a text that constantly tests the disruptive forces of language and 
syntax is highly significant. Reporting in narrative form “that which can-
not be represented” is the dramatization of the experience of falling short, 
of the impossibility of translation itself. Words separate their speaker from 
the theatrical, set him apart from the mise en scène, making evident that 
the entire play, at least in Hölderlin’s hands, dramatizes the collapse of rep-
resentation’s solid ground—the persistence of remains, unrepresentable and 
untranslatable, to which the play relates mournfully.
 Surely it is in part this separation to which Lacoue-Labarthe refers when 
he writes in “The Caesura of the Speculative” that Antigone is “the most 
Greek of tragedies,” thus not “reconstitutable” in the way that Oedipus is 
(220); however, this very “Greekness,” this insistence upon its own differ-
ence in our context, is also what makes the tragedy “modern.” Sarah Kofman 
notes the dislocating effects in Lacoue-Labarthe and Deutsch’s production, 
which began to take shape when the audience entered, via a decaying stair-
case, what looked like the attic of a bombarded house: “you are in an entirely 
other space than the classical stage, in a place that radically displaces ‘the-
ater’ . . . in the space of the caesura that shatters that of representation—of 
radical disruption and dislocation” (Kofman 78).43 The play that ensued 
was both Greek and modern, evoking in its use of French “three languages, 
three rhythms, three epochs” (80). If Kofman’s account of the staging is reli-
able (and there is no indication that it is not), then translation once again 
becomes a crucial dimension of effect here, introducing a gap sufficient to 
displace the Antigone of Sophocles and let Hölderlin’s Antigone emerge, 
only to emphasize once again her distance from a French audience in 1978. 
Yet in emphasizing that separation, Lacoue-Labarthe evokes at the same time 
a strange alliance between texts, between spectatorial experiences.
That which is played out here is the infinite distance that separates Hölder-
lin from the Greeks and that which distances us from Hölderlin; but in 
both cases, what is played out in extreme distancing is extreme proximity. 
(Kofman 81)44
 43. “ . .  . vous êtes dans un tout autre espace qui celui de la scène classique, dans un lieu qui 
déplace singulièrement le ‘théâtre’ . . . dans l’espace de la césure, qui brise celui de la ‘représentation,’ 
le trouble et le disloque singulièrement.”
 44. “Ce qui se joue là, c’est la distance infinie qui sépare Hölderlin des Grecs et celle qui nous 
éloigne de Hölderlin: mais aussi bien, dans les deux cas, so joue dans l’éloignement extrême, l’extrême 
proximité.”
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Kofman captures it well: for Hölderlin and for Lacoue-Labarthe, Antigone 
is “the tragedy of isolation, of the interval, of the in-between; of failure, 
Hölderlin’s and ours” (la tragédie de l’écart, de l’intervalle, de l’entre-deux; de 
la défaillance, celle de Hölderlin, la nôtre [81]). If “we” can learn anything 
from Hölderlin’s Antigone in particular, it is this, that language and repre-
sentation can only, in the end, show us the blank spaces that gape wherever 
the stability of law meets its resistance, wherever translation runs up against 
that which it cannot master. Lacoue-Labarthe lets this strange experience 
of proximity dominate his rendering of the play, thus deferring more to 
Hölderlin’s method of translating than to the events of the drama. The result 
is a curiously “Hölderlinian” translation and interpretation, one that refuses 
to resolve imperfection for the sake of purposeful adaptation.
in tHe Final analysis, it is evident that Hölderlin’s approach to trag-
edy continues to fascinate and confound readers and spectators with an 
irresistible combination of eloquence and opacity. The unsettling effects of 
Hölderlin’s mode of translation demand further elaboration just as emphati-
cally as the stories they present. By not only preserving the distinctions of the 
source text—including the fierce contradictions inherent in tragedy—but 
intensifying the discontinuities that translation must produce, he offers the 
framework for an argument within modern translation theory and practice 
that would leave such gaps between languages open to interpretation, nego-
tiation, and experimentation. Indeed, this gesture bears a significance that 
extends beyond the realm of literary studies, as Emily Apter has proposed 
in The Translation Zone, into intersubjective relationships across national, 
cultural, and linguistic borders:
Cast as an act of love, and as an act of disruption, translation becomes a 
means of repositioning the subject in the world and in history; a means of 
rendering self-knowledge foreign to itself; a way of denaturalizing citizens, 
taking them out of the comfort zone of national space, daily ritual, and 
pre-given domestic arrangements.45
 Apter’s inclusion of the experience of history here points up the particu-
lar depth and significance of Hölderlin’s project and its numerous adapta-
tions in the present day—the considerable “living-on” of an exchange that 
refuses mere transparency, a somewhat messy history that presupposes its 
 45. Emily Apter, The Translation Zone (Princeton University Press, 2006), 6.
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own eternal state of incompletion.46 Indeed, as we have seen, that quality 
of incompleteness not only motivates adaptation but ultimately becomes 
enfolded within the dramatic presentation. Hölderlin’s legacy, then, is not 
precisely in the tradition of the “querelles des anciens et modernes,” under-
stood as the attempt to situate modernity against a static or idealized notion 
of antiquity; nor does it suggest that modern discourses ought to translate 
classical material into current contexts. Rather, his attention to the theoreti-
cal problems of translation, always in conjunction with the conflicts pre-
sented within the text, allow an ancient text to open up points of contention 
within modernity itself. Perhaps no other tragedies could be as modern, or 
as postmodern, for that matter, as Hölderlin’s; in the best sense of his own 
term, they leave room for the “tearing spirit of time,” that articulation of 
the passage of time that cannot finally be calculated, only brought endlessly 
into contradiction with itself.
 46. By contrast, Apter points out the new “will to system” inherent in technological approaches 
to translation, in which “everything (in theory at least) becomes translatable through the medium of 
digital code” (10). The sheer difficulty of Hölderlin’s texts represent a stubborn (and laudable) coun-
terpoint to this idea of translation’s “systematicity.”
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